



Poverty, Inequality, and Innovation in the Global South

Edited by
Oliver Mtapuri

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Durban, South Africa

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PREFACE

This book questions notions of development and advances ideas, theories on poverty, and inequality from a perspective from the South. It makes a link between poverty, inequality, development, and innovation to unpack new pathways for progress and valorizes the transferability of those lessons to other landscapes or settings with potential for scalability. The book is about the experiences learned through practice including among small-holder farmers to eradicate poverty. In other words, it discusses practical solutions which small scale farmers can use to alleviate poverty and reduce inequality. It provides insights that can be translated into policy with the potential to inform practice. It also has the potential to address the issue of rural urban migration by providing knowledge that is useable by small scale farmers on the ground, policy makers, and entrepreneurs alike. It was written by authors from different countries like Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe indicating the commonality of the problems of poverty and inequality. It contains insights from all these countries assembled together into an amalgam of practices ready to use and implement informed by evidence from the field as most of the Chapters are based on empirical data.

This book will appeal to scholars—academic staff/faculty and students. For students, it is accessible to both undergraduate and postgraduate students. It targets staff/faculty and students in the disciplines of Development studies, African studies, Agrarian Studies, Social studies, Development economics, Political economy, Climate studies, Anthropology,

Development management, Pan-African studies, Geography, and Agriculture as it foregrounds the complex nexus between poverty, inequality, development, and innovation. It will appeal to politicians, activists, development practitioners, researchers, and policy makers who deal with the challenges of poverty, inequality, development, and innovation every day. It will appeal to African scholars on the African continent and those in the Diaspora and those with a keen interest in poverty, inequality, and innovations in a context of resource abundance juxtaposed with glaring poverty as reflected in Africa.

Oliver Mtapuri is a full Professor in Development Studies at the School of Built Environment and Development in the College of Humanities at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Durban South Africa. He has a Ph.D. in Development Studies (UKZN) and an M.B.A. degree from the University of Zimbabwe. He is an Associate of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators. His areas of research interest straddle poverty and inequality, redistribution, research methodologies, community-based tourism, project management, and the political economy of Africa which adumbrates struggles on many fronts and a yearning for total emancipation.

Durban, South Africa

Oliver Mtapuri

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Of Poverty, Inequality, Development, and Innovation: An Introduction

Oliver Mtapuri

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Poverty, inequality, development, and innovation are intertwined and inter-linked concepts. The entanglement of these concepts seems to be obvious and yet obdurate. Unpacking these concepts and understanding their intersectionality is useful in grappling with the challenges they (re)present. The ambition of this book is to disentangle the connections between them using lived experiences and the practices and praxis of scientists in the field and their immersion in studies that reflect on these matters on the African continent. At face value, development and innovation are invoked and grow in circumstances of freedom, while poverty and inequality seem to thrive in circumstances of unfreedoms. It is preposterous (perhaps unacceptable) to experience poverty in circumstances of

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abundance—an abundance of land, minerals, and human resources, juxtaposed with bad governance and poor leadership—this implies that poverty and inequality will reverberate down the generations if no new paradigms of governance and leadership are established on the continent. Africans must develop and nurture what I call Afro-patriotism—the attachment to and love for the continent and not of a single country for the continent to prosper and claim its rightful place in the world. This begins with arrogation and expansion of freedoms to all its people and unshackling them from mental slavery.

Hart (n.d.: 30) notes that ‘Africa is too fragmented and half its countries have economies about a third the size of Vermont’s. The biggest, Nigeria and South Africa, do not seem to be going anywhere’. Its poor performance is an indictment of the continent’s leadership and their technologies of governance in the face of ruthless machinations of transnational corporations who pillage its resources seemingly with impunity in broad daylight. This takes place in a political ecosystem in which rigging of elections has become a shameful pandemic in which Mbembé and Meintjes (2003: 14–15) observed that ‘Politics is, therefore, death that lives a human life’. On reflection, it is politics that leads to death through wars, starvation, and widespread banditry. Since I mentioned death and life, two human rights become pertinent, these are the right to breathe and the right to eat (food). These rights appear basic and fundamental but appear to have become threatened and but find a voice in movements such as the #Black Lives Matter, founded in the United States of America in 2013 after the acquittal of George Zimmerman who shot to death Trayvon Martin in 2012. It intensified to become a worldwide movement following the death of George Floyd in 2020 in Minneapolis at the hands of the police (Ransby, n.d.). These rights have been weaponised and violated in wars over resources, during elections and electioneering, and during crisis times occasioned by natural and man-made disasters such as floods and drought. There are people who preside upon who shall eat and who shall not, including donated food. Transnational corporations also come into the fray.

Hart (n.d.: 33) states that ‘the political and legal structures of nation states remain an obstacle to the formation of a world society where corporations are the only effective citizens’. In recent years, transnational corporations have been working in cahoots with their governments as an extension of their foreign policy to the detriment of African countries—if pillage of natural resources and illicit financial flows are anything to go by.

These processes of pillage and looting are responsible and causative for the persistence of poverty on the continent. About poverty, Steve Biko said: ‘Poverty was a foreign concept. This could only be really brought about to the entire community by an adverse climate during a particular season’ (Arnold 2017: 122). That is the season we are in. The seasonality of poverty means it cannot persist forever. Nelson Mandela said: ‘Like slavery and apartheid, [poverty] is man-made and can be removed by the actions of human beings. Overcoming poverty is not a gesture of charity. It is an act of justice. It is the protection of a fundamental human right, the right to dignity and a decent life’.

1.2 OF POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

In finding solutions for Africa, given the multidimensionality of poverty, which touches on income, education, health, shelter, sanitation, nutrition, freedoms and rights, and happiness, the interventions must reflect a context in which the need for each of the dimensions is acute. This means that the combinations should ideally be varied from person to person; household to household, and community to community. Where there are no houses in a given area, housing assistance should be provided in the form of houses and social amenities, and infrastructure. Some assessments and interventions could be cumbersome to be done at the individual level. The concentrations and scales of the dimensions in a given context should inform the interventions for each dimension required in a given context covering a community, region, or country. In a context of poverty, the existence of inequality impedes social cohesion.

The existence of variegated circumstances and endowments breeds inequality. Differences are causative of inequality with implications that there are differences that are tolerable and differences that are not tolerable especially if they lead to resentment, chaos, and disorder at any scale. These differences should exclude biological differences, racial, religious, and related differences because the biological differences are outside one’s control and the others are man-made. In other words, inequality leads to social classifications on the basis of differences such as biological (gender) and non-biological differences (race). Inequality can invoke innovation from community, entrepreneurs, and leaders as they try to cope with it. In other words, it can give rise to innovations when trying to cope with and do better to disrupt the status quo. From Sen’s capability perspective, in the presence of high inequality, the expressions of capabilities (the beings

and doings such as being safe, being well nourished, well-educated, and participating in local politics) can be stifled and muzzled due to inequalities. In other words, in conditions of widening inequalities, capabilities are encumbered consciously or subconsciously such that, in turn, inequality encumbers development.

1.3 UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENT

In understanding development, it should be understood from the perspective of the individual concerned at the micro level with a consensual understanding at the meso, and macro levels. For one development may mean the absence of poverty, the abundance of happiness, however, defined, or a good standard of living in a self-definition of development. For others, it could mean the aggregate of the assets and endowments a community or country may command for the benefit of its citizens. Development may also mean having access to a sustainable life or standard of living devoid of suffering, and isolation, and being able to work when one wants to work, find shelter when one needs one, to find health, and education when they are needed. It is also about the availability of infrastructure for the use of citizens in enough quantities to enjoy the benefits of that development. The benefits of development must accrue to the citizenry for it to be meaningful and endearing to them. Development is the absence of hunger and poverty; the presence of dignity, happiness, and food security. The technologies, constitutions, and ideologies to achieve these may not be paramount. These matter when they lead to oppression and suppression of dignity, happiness, food security, and the perpetuation of hunger and poverty. Innovation becomes a necessary condition for development.

1.4 INNOVATION: A SINE QUA NON FOR DEVELOPMENT

I write with an aphorism that innovation is good for development—and development nurtures more innovation. Similarly, poverty breeds inequality and inequality is a by-product and manifestation of poverty. Innovation is a consequence of imagination and for as long as people can imagine, the scope for innovation is limitless. Innovation has neither physical nor imaginary boundaries. In reflecting on outcomes of innovation and lessons, it is evident that human endeavours result in outcomes. It is from these outcomes that lessons can be learned. In other words, it

is exertions and efforts for the individual or common good, that lead to outcomes. The outcomes of innovation can be positive or negative and translate into lessons when applied to real circumstances to improve practice or desist from taking specific actions with undesirable results. I come to my question: Why are Africans generally poor? The blame goes around from slavery to colonialism, from apartheid to imperialism, from unfair trade practices to utter plunder, from poor leadership to poor governance, from blaming the leadership to blaming the citizenry, from theft to corruption, from incompetence to misrule, from bad debt to toxic politics, from greed to disunity, from disease to climate change, from endogenous vulnerabilities to exogenous risks. These are the challenges bedevilling the continent and some of the challenges are presented in this book.

1.5 THEMES AND STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK

Oliver Mtapuri (this chapter) looks at poverty, inequality, development, and innovation to establish how they interact. He delves into issues of leadership and governance as one way to explain the persistence of poverty and inequality on the African continent.

In Chapter 2, Oliver Mtapuri and Andrew Okem delve into the issue of inequality using a case of an informal settlement in Durban. The study's findings reveal that participants view inequality as unequal treatment of people and is often a function of race, gender, and the legacy of South Africa's apartheid system. These findings show that inequality can be internalised; it can become oppressive and exclusionary, even if self-imposed in the subconscious to the extent that people question their self-worth and value as it disrupts confidence and self-esteem. Mtapuri and Okem then theorise that inequality comes with psychological costs to society and a sense of unfairness; that inequality is disempowering and leads to loss of control. Its effects are psychological as much as they are corporal and corporeal; that inequality is experiential—you have to feel it to know it; They further theorise that, in circumstances of inequality, human potential is hamstrung and constrained leading to its transmission inter-generationally. As such, inequality can perpetuate inequality; and it may lead to the seclusion of some members of society through segregation and discrimination which is bad for social cohesion. The study further reveals that participants view inequality as a manifestation of government

failures; and as a part of human existence that can never be eradicated, and that, in worse case scenarios, it can lead to crime.

Toendepi Shonhe and Isaac Chinyoka (Chapter 3) observe that while many Africans live in rural areas and rely on agriculture for livelihoods, technology adoption remains weak. They argue that this low uptake of technological innovation derails agrarian-led economic development. They maintain that while state intervention is critical, the choice of technology such as big tractors introduced under the South-South arrangements is not appropriate for smallholder farmers who work on small plots. As such, notwithstanding the welfarist inputs support by the governments, the rural population remains vulnerable in the long term, due to persistent poverty and inequality. Shonhe and Chinyoka also maintain that contract farming undermines smallholder farmers' capacity for accumulation from below, as primary commodities are exported in a semi-processed form, limiting returns for the farmers, and undercutting their ability to accumulate assets such as tractors and the capacity to innovate.

Using an action research design, Saidah Mbooge Najjuma (Chapter 4) explores social change by linking the unequal capabilities of people through immersion of those in authority in poverty settings in order to learn directly from those people living in extreme poverty. The immersion exposed those in authority to unfamiliar aspects of poverty in its multidimensionality. Her findings show the power of immersion in that it provides the opportunity to learn and understand the nature of poverty and inequality by those in authority. Through immersions, the poor actively participated in unpacking the challenges that condition their well-being. Saidah Mbooge Najjuma concludes that it is imperative to immerse both early career development professionals and seasoned professionals, in order for them to appreciate what poverty is about. She recommends advancing social entrepreneurship innovation in rural communities and to adopt immersions as an official policy poverty reduction initiative.

Christina Shitima and Saida Fundi (Chapter 5) are of the view that to implement a new water policy, the government of Tanzania put in place a legal and institutional framework through the enactment of the 2009 Water Management Act (WMA) and the establishment of River Basin Boards. The Act transformed water into an economic good by requiring water resources users to pay fees to acquire water use rights. Water users' groups (WUGs) were also formed to reduce the costs of obtaining water use rights by smallholder users. Christina Shitima and

Saida Fundi argue that through such arrangements, some water use practices resulted in improved livelihoods and the conservation of resources. They also observe that in spite of these successes, the policy does not accommodate indigenous conservation systems and water-based livelihood strategies, thus creating room for inequalities and poverty as well as fierce tensions between cultural values and formal rules in water management. They opine that natural resource problems are multiple in nature and magnitude and require variegated solutions informed by cultural contexts and livelihood options available to the people. Overall, they conclude that policy and institutional arrangements are not blueprints because they cannot fit in all circumstances given the wide spectrum of water resources problems.

Based on a study conducted in the Morogoro region in Tanzania, Venosa Mushi and Aldof Makauki (Chapter 6) explore the activities performed by farmer groups in pursuit of rural development in order to evince lessons for practice. The study adopted a cross-sectional research design in which a structured questionnaire was administered. Venosa Mushi and Aldof Makauki found out that the challenges the farmers faced, encumbered their efforts to reduce poverty and improve their standard of living. They conclude that the main problem that the farmers faced was a lack of working capital. They recommend that it is imperative to economically empower farmer groups using policy instruments that support the development of sustained farming and entrepreneurial skills.

In Chapter 7, Edward Claudia Mamkwe appraises the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) II for poverty reduction and argues that TASAF II investments were critical in improving household assets, facilitating access to clean and safe water, education, and health by the poor and the creation of employment through investing in new projects. She opines that the initiative constitutes an excellent development model and best practice that significantly empowers the poor and meaningfully contributes to their socio-economic wellbeing. The chapter recommends that the government should formulate policies that reflect the lived experiences of the poor by making them participate in their development processes while itself, NGOs, CSOs, and the private actor remain facilitators.

Maria Matshidiso Kanjere (Chapter 8) argues that poverty in South Africa fractured the society into the haves and have-nots thereby undermining all efforts to achieve social cohesion in the country, manifesting largely among black African women in both rural and urban areas. She

maintains that achieving gender parity is one way of eradicating poverty. Central to her thesis is the empowerment of women because of their increased vulnerabilities emanating from divorces and paternal deaths. Kanjere observes that, in the past, women were confronted by multitudes of oppressions based on their race and gender; and that their ill-treatment persists in the form of gender-based violence, gender pay gaps, and constrained access to opportunities and resources. The chapter argues that gender equity is beneficial to the country as part of the initiatives of eradicating poverty and empowering women to become decision-makers, as they are in a better position to understand what builds strong families, and what policies can be developed to bring about change in the society.

In critiquing concepts of development, Bashir Olaitan Ibrahim (Chapter 9) interrogates the applicability of yardsticks used to measure and categorise countries as developed, developing, and underdeveloped and questions their applicability to countries of the global South. Ibrahim further unpacks orthodox western development theories and reforms and critiques the unipolar and bipolar conventional frameworks of development to argue that every society has its own trajectory of development and that the orthodox conception of development and its reforms are not sacrosanct given the peculiarities of the global South. He maintains that alternative conceptions are needed to disrupt the core-periphery arrangements that are used to denote the global North and the global South.

Tapiwa Muzerengi and Shepherd Gudyani (Chapter 10) argue that Africa should seek redemption from its enormous treasures of historical wisdom to address poverty and other contemporary challenges confronting the continent. These efforts must be undergirded by the mythical African Sankofa methodology which addresses the tensions between universalism and particularism. They argue that poverty alleviation in Africa is one of the many issues that should constitute the Sankofa re-memory capturing; and claim that Sankofa itself is a source for spiritual recovery, healing, and reconciliation steeped in African historical wisdom. By leveraging the Sankofa Methodology, they are of the view that it is possible for Africa to return to the lost Africanity—the source of African redemption.

In Chapter 11, Tinashe Gumbo and Admire Mutizwa contend that poverty and inequality have foregrounded Zimbabwe's socio-economic policy since independence in 1980. They observe that the number of extremely poor Zimbabweans has remained high over time. The chapter

interrogates the evolving and dynamic roles of the State, the Private Sector, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Zimbabwe's poverty alleviation strategies. They maintain that the role of the State in fighting poverty floundered towards the end of the 1990s which saw the emergence of the Private Sector as an equally significant player in poverty alleviation strategies following the adoption of market-led economic reforms. Gumbo and Mutizwa claim that the genesis of the economic meltdown in the 2000s relegated the role of the state in fighting poverty and elevated that of NGOs. Because the results were bleak, new approaches were adopted in 2009, by combining the efforts of the three central players in new partnerships. Gumbo and Mutizwa argue that the bleak story of fighting poverty and inequalities is closely linked to the treatment of the poor and their detachment from the centres of decision-making.

Ivan Gunass Govender (Chapter 12) explores alternative methods of conceptualisation and interventions for sustainable development. He argues that this has been necessitated by the rapidly changing social, economic, and environmental factors that entrench poverty and inequalities around the globe. Govender argues that to craft new pathways to achieve the desired outcomes for sustainable development, innovation and creativity are imperative. He suggests that only visionary leadership has the propensity to promote a systems approach and networks when addressing wicked problems such as poverty and inequality. The chapter argues that the ultimate outcomes of alleviating poverty and inequality depend on the effectiveness and efficiencies of the monitoring and evaluation systems in place.

Tsion Kidane and Oliver Mtapuri (Chapter 13) investigate the factors that influence agricultural science students' attitudes towards entrepreneurship. Their study shows that students' residential places during their high school studies and their job preferences have a significant but negative influence on their perception of entrepreneurship. They also show that students whose parents have private or government jobs have a positive attitude towards entrepreneurship. Kidane and Mtapuri suggest the creation of an education system that engages multi-stakeholders and provides practical exposure.

Tobias Mutale and Oliver Mtapuri (Chapter 14) investigate the perceptions of rural women on poverty and inequality in the Mungwi District of Zambia. They argue that poverty and inequality are complex, and context matters to understand them better. They observe that women in this

district experience many deprivations. In their self-definition of poverty, the women defined poverty as a lack of income and wealth; failure to afford basic commodities, being socially excluded, not being respected, often abused, and lacking resources needed to live a decent life as defined by society. They conclude by stating that poor women feel neglected by the government into a state of helplessness.

In Chapter 15, Isaac Chinyoka foregrounds agrarian welfare regimes as a tool for poverty alleviation. He argues that this is imperative in semi-industrial and largely agro-based developments in most parts of Africa, by consolidating agrarian welfare regimes. This is pertinent and apposite for a country such as Zimbabwe that is endowed with abundant human and physical resources and as such, this consolidation presents a viable pathway for poverty alleviation. Chinyoka maintains that this requires the promulgation and implementation of innovative social policies, praxis, and appropriate technologies.

Barry Ibrahima Okem, Andrew Emmanuel, and Julien Reysz (Chapter 16) are of the view that despite the amount of important work done on Africa, particularly on poverty, little work has been completed on the impact of innovations on inequality. The contributors provide an assessment of the relationship between innovation and inequality using the Gini Index from the World Bank and the Innovation Index of the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO) on 14 purposively selected Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. The empirical approach used in this study indicates a negative correlation between innovation and inequality. This finding suggests that advancement in innovations may paradoxically be accompanied by an increase in inequalities. The conclusion is that the existence of countries with low levels of innovation and low inequality leads to the idea that innovation may not be the only factor that can reduce income inequality.

1.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter reflects on poverty, inequality, development, and innovation for their significance in the life of humanity, given their artificiality—the quality of being made by human beings. It further shows their importance and effects at the individual, community, and country levels. It expounds on development as the absence of hunger and poverty; and their nemesis—happiness and food security. It discounts the importance of ideology, technologies, and constitutions for their achievement

because it is the result that matters. Innovation provides the tool that hastens and gives impetus to development if harnessed to the maximum. This chapter concludes by acknowledging the vastness and immensity of human imagination—as a source of innovation.

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Perceptions of Inequality in an Informal Settlement in Durban, South Africa

Oliver Mtapuri and Andrew Emmanuel Okem

2.1 INTRODUCTION

Goal 10 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aims to reduce inequality within and among countries based on income, sex, age, class, ethnicity, race, religion, and opportunity. Despite progress, inequality remains a persistent problem, particularly for many countries in the global south (UN 2020a). Recent evidence reveals that Sub-Saharan Africa, a region with the highest burden of inequality, has made little or no progress in reducing inequality (UN 2020b). The impacts of the Novel Coronavirus are exacerbating the high level of inequality in Africa.

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Emerging evidence reveals that the poor and the vulnerable are experiencing the worst impact of the pandemic (De Groot and Lemanski 2020; Hill and Narayan 2020). This leads to the loss of gains in inequality reduction, thus widening the levels of inequalities around the world.

A strong association has been found between inequality and several social ills, including violence against women (Shoukry et al. 2019; Gibbs et al. 2019) and corruption (Dominik and Heldman 2018; Lannegren and Ito 2017). Shoukry et al. (2019) ‘argue that income inequality increases the risk of experiencing violence by eroding social capital in the living community’. Differentiated level of income between men and women with women often earning less than men contributes to rising cases of gender-based violence. Well-being (Schneider 2012). Income inequality has been found to affect humans (Wienk et al. 2021; Bullock 2019). There is an emerging body of evidence that economic inequality affects human psychology (Bullock 2019; Jetten et al. 2017). A review by Easterbrook (2021: 14) found ‘that higher levels of inequality are associated with lower well-being’ in developed countries. This association was found particularly in groups that are characterized by fewer resources. The link, Easterbrook (2021: 12) argues ‘is likely to be because greater inequality brings about a change in people’s psychology that causes them to lose faith in themselves, others, and society at large’. Psychologists (Jetten et al. 2017) claim that the effects of inequality include anxiety, increased status-seeking behaviour, erosion of social capital, and increased nationalist aspirations particularly among the poor. In contrast, most studies in ‘developing nations tend to find that objective inequality is positively related to well-being for both the rich and the poor’ (Easterbrook 2021). The next section looks at inequality in South Africa.

With its checkered history of colonialism and apartheid, South Africa bears the highest burden of inequality in Africa and ranks among the most unequal countries in the world (Moyo 2014; International Monetary Fund 2022). However, inequality in the country is not homogenous. Different levels of income inequality have been reported across provinces with Gauteng and the Eastern Cape being the least and the most unequal provinces respectively (Statistics South Africa 2019a). Inequality is also highly gendered with female workers earning approximately 30% less than male workers (Statistics South Africa 2019b). Income distribution is racialized with Black Africans earning the lowest wage compared to other population groups (Statistics South Africa 2019). In terms of access to necessities, Lannegren and Ito (2017) reported that most black South

Africans are without access to electricity, adequate housing, water and sanitation. Lannegren and Ito (2017) further note that the country's economy is largely controlled by 'the same whites and small black elite companies and families that have been powerful for decades, still to this day control to a large content, the economy'. Racialized inequality has also been reported in education (both in terms of access and throughput) (Statistics South Africa 2019).

Cognisant of the country's high level of inequality, the South African government has taken various steps (e.g. the National Minimum Wage Bill, the Reconstruction and Development Plan, Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 as amended by Act 46 of 2013, the Expanded Public Works Programme, social grants) to address the entrenched problem of all forms of inequality since the transition to the democratic dispensation in 1994. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is anchored on the principle of equity and justice and, thus, makes provisions for addressing inequality and injustices (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 1996). More recently, the National Development Plan, the country's current development blueprint, identified inequality reduction as one of its core aspirations (Statistics South Africa 2019; National Planning Commission 2011). Despite all these measures, inequality has remained a primary challenge in South Africa. Rising concerns about the high levels of inequality are often expressed in the form of public protests against the lack of or the poor quality of services, particularly to those in less affluent parts of the country. This form of reaction requires understanding how people perceive inequality.

This chapter contributes to the body of knowledge on the perceptions of inequality among vulnerable groups using the case study of an informal settlement. It adds the perspective from the global South using a qualitative approach. The rest of the chapter is structured into five sections. In the next section, it presents an overview of the perceptions of inequality. This is followed by the methodological approach that underpinned the study. The chapter then presents the study's findings and discusses these findings in the context of the broader literature. It concludes by highlighting the significant contribution of the study to the current body of knowledge on perceptions of inequality.

2.2 AN OVERVIEW OF THE PERCEPTIONS OF INEQUALITY

Studies that have examined perceptions of inequality have found large differences between official measurement records and those of the citizens (Hauser and Norton 2017; Iacono et al. 2019). Hauser and Norton (2017) note that ‘the bulk of the current evidence suggests that people around the world hold incorrect perceptions of inequality in their country—but with variation’. According to Hauser and Norton (2017), there are three underlying factors for the ‘(mis)perception’ of inequality: people’s immediate environments, media coverage ‘acceptance of hierarchy and beliefs in the role of personal choice on outcomes’.

Perceptions and experiences of inequality have been linked to social outcomes including ‘civic and political participation’ (Han et al. 2012). Han et al. (2012) argue that ‘how people experience and perceive inequalities is potentially one of the crucial mechanisms linking actual inequality to a range of social outcomes’ (Han et al. 2012). Similarly, Hauser and Norton (2017) note that the strength of reaction to inequality is linked to where a person is positioned on the inequality spectrum. The ‘(mis)perception’ of inequality has implications for public support of redistribution policy (Hauser and Norton 2017: 29). For instance, Hauser and Norton (2017) observe that:

when people hold inaccurate beliefs about their relative income position in the population, correcting these beliefs makes them more supportive of redistribution when they thought themselves richer than they actually are (and might benefit from redistribution), but less accepting of redistribution when they realize they are better off than they initially thought (and might suffer from redistribution).

Despite the growing body of knowledge on inequality, there is limited reporting on how those on the lowest rung of society experience and conceptualize the term. In addition, the bulk of the studies on perceptions of inequality are from the global north and are primarily quantitative (Hauser and Norton 2017; Iacono et al. 2019; Knell and Stix 2020). This chapter takes a qualitative approach to document how inequality is viewed and experienced in an informal settlement in Durban, South Africa. Approximately 14% of South Africans lived in informal dwelling settlements in 2016 (Hopolang and Dennis 2017). Like in most global south

countries informal settlements in Durban are characterized by unplanned housing and limited/no public infrastructure and services (Ndungu et al. 2020; Todes and Turok 2018). Informal settlements in South Africa are also characterized by high levels of violence in general and intimate partner violence in particular (Gibbs et al. 2018; Willan et al. 2019).

In this study, perception of inequality is understood as ‘people’s impressions of the nature and extent of inequality in the opportunities available to particular social groups, in the treatment accorded them by other social groups and institutions, and in the conditions of life that they experience’ (Robinson 1983, 345 quoted in Han et al. 2012). In this context, inequality includes educational, social, income, and gender inequality (Han et al. 2012).

The social justice theory provides a framework for understanding issues related to inequality. According to Jost and Kay (2010), social justice is a state of affairs (either actual or ideal) in which (a) benefits and burdens in society are dispersed in accordance with some allocation principle (or set of principles); (b) procedures, norms, and rules that govern political and other forms of decision making preserve the basic rights, liberties, and entitlements of individuals and groups; and (c) human beings (and perhaps other species) are treated with dignity and respect not only by authorities but also by other relevant social actors, including fellow citizens. They argue that this definition of justice corresponds with the three dimensions of justice (i.e. distributive, procedural, and interactional). Hage et al. (2011) argue that there is a relationship between social justice and overall health and well-being. They note that at the individual level, the lack of justice results in ‘increased physical and emotional suffering as well as greater vulnerability to illness’ (Hage et al. 2011). Similarly, justice in terms of access to resources has implications for collective well-being.

2.3 METHODOLOGY

The study adopts a qualitative approach in which words, as spoken by the participants, constitute the corpus of knowledge in the community (Babbie and Mouton 2012). The study adopted the interpretivism paradigm which supports multiple truths and the subjectivity of experience, particularly lived experience. Snowballing and purposive sampling were used to select 16 study participants (Campbell et al. 2020; Ghaljaie et al. 2017). Only those that have resided in the settlement for more than three years and willing to give their consent to take part in the

study were included as participants. The researchers believe that three years was sufficient time to know the settlement well and understand the inequality dynamics and embedded lived experiences. The participants represent various groups including gender, level of education and age (see Table 2.1).

Of the 16 participants, one did not provide demographic information. The youngest participant in the study was 26 years, while the oldest was 52 years. There were 6 youths (those 35 aged years and younger), while 10 of the study participants were older than 35 years in the study sample. About the same number of males and females (7 and 8, respectively) participated in the study. A slightly higher number of participants (9) reported that they have completed tertiary education.

One-on-one in-depth interviews were conducted with the study participants using a semi-structured interview guide. Moser and Korstjens (2018) define an in-depth interview as ‘A conversation where the researcher poses questions and the participants provide answers face-to-face, by telephone or via mail’. The duration of the interviews varied between 25 and 40 min. In this study, in-depth interviews allowed for

Table 2.1
Demographics of the
study participants

<i>Participants</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Gender</i>	<i>Education</i>
#10	41–45 Years	F	SE
#11	36–40 Years	M	TE
#12	26–30 Years	F	SE
#13	Refused	Refused	Refused
#14	41–45 Years	F	SE
#15	26–30 Years	M	TE
#16	36–40 Years	F	TE
#17	31–35 Years	M	TE
#18	41–45 Years	F	SE
#2	46 Years and Older	F	SE
#3	31–35 Years	M	SE
#4	36–40 Years	M	TE
#5	41–45 Years	F	TE
#6	46 Years and Older	M	TE
#7	46 Years and Older	F	TE
#8	36–40 Years	M	TE
#9	26–30 Years	M	TE

Source Authors (2021)

M = male, F = female, SE = secondary education, TE = tertiary education

depth and data collection with thick descriptions. All interviews were audio-recorded and later transcribed. The transcripts were exported to NVivo version 12 and coded thematically. This entailed reading and re-reading the texts for emerging patterns following which themes are identified (Williams and Moser 2019). Chunks of text with a similar meaning were grouped. This process continued until all data had been read multiple times and texts relevant to the research questions were coded. In presenting the findings of the research, the study used direct excerpts from the study participants to give voices to the study participants. Summary tables are used with illustrative excerpts by themes to indicate how themes are coded according to participants' demographic information to provide further context in understanding participants' perspectives. The study received ethical clearance from the University of KwaZulu Natal (Ethical clearance number HSSREC/00000130/2019).

2.4 FINDINGS

In this section, the findings from the in-depth interviews with the study participants are presented. The first section describes the participants' understanding of inequality. In the second section, the participants' views on inequality are presented.

2.4.1 *Understanding of Inequality*

Table 2.2 presents an overview of participants' understanding of inequality. Inequality, according to 10 participants, is broadly about unequal treatment in terms of access to resources and opportunities (e.g. educational and income-generating opportunities). They also cited a lack of access to decent living conditions as a defining characteristic of inequality. Participant 10 (41–45 years, F with SE), for instance, identifies inequality as an 'Unfair situation when some people have more opportunities than others'. Inequality in this sense is about the opportunity available to people. Participant 16 (36–40 years, F with SE) further unpacks this noting that 'Those who are exposed to opportunities usually are the rich and privileged people'.

The study participants identified three factors that determine inequality: race, gender, and legacies of apartheid. The excerpt from participant 11 (36–40 years, M, with TE) in Table 2.3 captures how race defines inequality (including education and job opportunities). The

Table 2.2 Understanding of inequality

<i>Key themes</i>	<i>Participant No.</i>	<i>Illustrative excerpts from interviews</i>
Unequal treatment	13	‘Inequality leads to unequal distribution of resources among people leaving the “most special” more favoured than the other group. Inequality causes internalized oppression. And inferiority among the unfavoured. The unfavoured come to believe that they are not good enough at anything compared to favoured. It can lead to exclusion. It makes other people go unnoticed (marginalized) because it is thought that they have nothing to offer. The favoured are the privileged people, and usually rich. It destroys a person’s inner self, confidence, and one’s self-esteem’ (no demographic information)
	15	‘Unfair situation when some people have more opportunities than other people. The law favours those with resources, they are well informed about the law and even know how to manipulate it. For example, when a rich person commits a crime, the way she is treated by the ‘law’ differs from an ordinary person’ (26–30-year, M with TE)
Racial differences	11	‘Equal opportunity was suppressed, people of black colour could not get jobs that White folks were getting, equal access, equal education, etc., therefore, inequality when putting it in context. It really means not being granted the liberty to exercise your rights and responsibilities in a manner that you willingly decide how you wish to and prefer because there are certain restrictions that are holding you to do so, e.g. government policy, company policy (maybe one saying Black people are not allowed to work in a particular company only Whites are), or regulatory laws’ (36–40-year, M, TE)

(continued)

Table 2.2 (continued)

<i>Key themes</i>	<i>Participant No.</i>	<i>Illustrative excerpts from interviews</i>
Legacy of the past	11	‘Inequality could depict numerous things dating back to the era of segregation’ (36–40 years, M, TE)
	9	‘And also us as people we are not close to resources due to old laws and our past, that create inequality among people’ (26–30-year, M, TE)
Gender differences	10	‘Inequality to me means we are not equal, for example, regarding gender, a female is not equal to a male, mostly males have power over us, especially us the Zulus’ (41–45-year, F, SE)

Source Authors (2021)

Table 2.3 Understanding of inequality by demographics

	<i>Gender differences</i>	<i>Legacy of the past</i>	<i>Race differences</i>	<i>Unequal treatment</i>
<36 Years	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
>36 Years	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Male	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Female	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Secondary/high school	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Tertiary	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source Authors (2021)

Note The information presented in this table is not a count but a representation of whether a participant in a demographic category was coded for a given theme. Those below and above the ages of 36 and in tertiary institutions believe inequality has its foundations in gender and race differences, it is a legacy of the past and is a result of unequal treatment. This implies that race and gender differences are taught, and they can be taught differently because the current format of teaching about them has failed. This is evident when one gender or race feels more superior than the other. Race in the case of South Africa is linked to the legacy of the past which gave Whites rights and privileges that Blacks were denied, one of which is the fundamental right to vote

participant further noted that some government and company policies could bar certain racial groups from some opportunities. Overall, most participants noted that Blacks are largely unequal to their White counterparts on all measures of inequality.

For some participants, this reality is linked to the country's colonial and apartheid history which was characterized by unfair opportunities for White South Africans compared to other racial groups. To them, the inequality that is witnessed in the country today is a continuation and a result of the country's history of apartheid and colonialism. According to Lannegren and Ito (2017), 'The same whites and small black elite companies and families that have been powerful for decades, still to this day control to a large content, the economy'. For instance, 'black Africans have the highest unemployment rates, in excess of 30,0% in 2016 and 2017, while for whites the unemployment rate peaks in 2014 at 7,4%' (23).

Of the 16 participants in the study, 6 reported that inequality is about unequal treatment because of gender. More precisely, they see inequality as the unfair treatment of women. The excerpt from participant 10 (41–45 years F with SE) in Table 2.2 reveals that the patriarchal system in which women are seen as subordinate to men contributes to this form of inequality.

Table 2.3 presents a summary of participants' understanding of inequality coded against their demographic information. As shown in the table, participants across the three demographic information presented in the study were coded for the 4 themes related to understanding inequality. Only female participants were not coded for the 'legacy of the past' as a contributing factor to inequality in present-day South Africa and are female with SE.

2.4.2 *Views About Inequality*

Table 2.4 presents the participants' views on inequality. The views are grouped into four broad themes that summarize what the study participants think about inequality. The excerpt from participant 8 (46 and older M, with TE) in Table 2.4 shows that for the participant, people should neither be treated differently because of their social status nor because of their race, gender, or religion. This view, however, contrasts with that of 7 other participants who reported that inequality will never end. For this group of participants, inequality is a human condition and has been there from time immemorial. They observe that because of its long association with human beings, inequality can never be eradicated. Participant 13 (no demographic information) sums up this point noting that the society has

‘internalized its [inequality] existence and that nothing can be done about it’.

Some participants attribute the persistence of inequality to the failure of the government to address the challenge. For participant 4 (36–40-year M with TE), for instance, inequality exists not because of a lack of resources to address it but because of a lack of interests and corruption of the political elite. For this participant, politicians are self-serving and are interested in advancing their interests and that of their families at the expense of the public. However, participant 17 (31–35-year M with TE) offered a contrasting view noting that the persistence of inequality results from poor policy decisions by the government. The participant advocated for more research that will lead to evidence-informed policymaking to address the problem of inequality.

Three study participants (all 36 years and older) view inequality as a social construct. Participant 18 (41–45-year, F, TE) observes that

Table 2.4 Participants’ views of inequality

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Participant number</i>	<i>Illustrative excerpts from interviews</i>
Treat everyone equally	8	Regardless of your social status, whether or not you are poor or rich, male or female, privileged or less privileged, regardless of your race or ethnicity everyone should be treated equally because we are all the same, we are all human beings at least GOD views us all as equals. Therefore, we should treat each other as such (36–40-year M, TE)
Government Failure	4	My view on this is that it is not because there is no money to develop our settlements, but those with power, the politicians to be specific, these people do not serve us, but their families and themselves only. They forget to serve us, the people who they represent (31–35-year M, TE)
	17	‘The strategies which are employed by the government of equality seem not to be effective, therefore, more research needs to be conducted in order to come up with effective interventions’ (31–35-year M, TE)
It is a social construct	18	It is socially constructed and condoned by society. Cultural practices and religion are also contributors to the phenomenon. It’s also a form of oppression (41–45-year F, SE)

(continued)

Table 2.4 (continued)

<i>Themes</i>	<i>Participant number</i>	<i>Illustrative excerpts from interviews</i>
	6	‘My views of inequality, firstly, I can say that inequality is not something we were born with, but is something as human beings we made, started, and created in our daily life as there are rich people. It is because they made themselves to be so which tells that they had an ability to pull themselves up and to those who are poor it’s because they lack the ability to pull themselves up’ (46 Years and Older Male, TE)
It will never end	12	‘Inequality is something that you can never change, therefore, people should accept that not everybody is equal or the same. I feel like inequality is unfair. It is severe’ (26–30-year F, SE)
	13	‘I think that inequality is a social issue that has existed from time immemorial and it’s never-ending because already many generations have experienced it and internalized its existence and that nothing can be done about it’ (no demographic information)
Leads to crime	15	‘I think inequality is very bad because it makes some people more powerful than others which will then cause violent crime in the society. It will be very hard to accept that other people get more opportunities than others while they all qualify’ (26–30-year M, TE)

Source Authors (2021)

inequality is not only a social construct; it is also condoned by society. The participant further observes that religion contributes to inequality, and it is a form of oppression. Participant 6 (46-year M, TE) elaborates on this point noting that inequality is something that is made by human beings. For this participant, inequality is a manifestation of people’s ability to pull themselves up from their unequal society.

For participant 15 (26–30-year M, TE), inequality is bad for society as it contributes to violence and crime. For this participant, those that are denied opportunities will, at some point, resist the continued denial of access to opportunities and will resort to violence and crime to access what they think is due to them.

Table 2.5 Participants' view inequality by demographics

<i>Demographics</i>	<i>Treat everyone equally</i>	<i>Government Failure</i>	<i>It is a social construct</i>	<i>It will never end</i>	<i>Leads to crime</i>
<36 Years	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
>36 Years	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Male	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Female	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Secondary/high school	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Tertiary	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source Authors (2021)

Table 2.5 summarizes how participants' views on inequality are coded against their demographic information. The table reveals that no participant younger than 36 years was coded for two themes 'treat everyone equally' and 'it is a social construct'. Similarly, no female participant expressed views on two themes: 'treat everyone equally' and 'government failure'. Regarding the level of education of the study participants, those with SE did not express views that everyone should be treated equally. In addition, they neither see inequality as a manifestation of government failure nor did not express the view that inequality leads to crime.

2.5 DISCUSSIONS

This study explored perceptions of inequality using the case study of an informal settlement in Durban, South Africa. Participants in the study conceptualized inequality not only in terms of income but also in other dimensions including education, housing, gender, and race. Our study reveals that inequality among the study participants is viewed broadly regarding how people are treated unequally concerning access to societal opportunities and resources. This condition is inconsistent with the notion of social justice as framed by Jost and Kay (2010). Our study participant identified three factors that determine inequality: race, gender, and legacies of apartheid. This is consistent with the thrust of the literature on the underlying causes of inequality in South Africa (Statistics South Africa 2022; International Monetary Fund 2020; Leibbrandt et al. 2012).

Participant 13 (no demographic information) observes that inequality causes internalized oppression and inferiority among the unfavoured such that they come to believe that they are not good enough at anything compared to the favoured. According to the participant, this can lead to exclusion and marginalization because of the perception that the poor have nothing to offer while privileging rich people. This, according to the participant, could destroy a person's self-confidence and self-esteem. A low sense of self-esteem could have implications for individual well-being. Inequality has been found to impact people's well-being (Schneider 2012; Bullock 2019; Easterbrook 2021). Viewed from the social justice framework, lack of justice manifested in inequality impacts human well-being (Hage et al. 2011). These findings show that inequality can be internalized; it can become oppressive and exclusionary, even if self-imposed in the subconscious to the extent that people question their self-worth and value as it disrupts confidence and self-esteem. As Easterbrook (2021) argues, inequality could indirectly erode people's sense of well-being and could also result in changes in their behaviour.

The predominance of the narrative of race, gender, and apartheid in the discourse on inequality in South Africa is not surprising because these three social ills continue to be a reality in the country. Despite several efforts by the democratic government, the legacy of the past remains stubbornly high including patterns of human settlements leading to a notion of the persistence of the geography of apartheid. Similarly, access to necessities, opportunities and higher levels of income in South Africa is highly racialized and all have a strong linkage to the country's history of colonialism and apartheid (Lannegrenet and Ito 2017). Similarly, access to education opportunities and outcomes is racialized (Leibbrandt et al. 2012).

Gender inequality has remained a topical issue in South Africa. Despite its progressive policies, unequal treatment of women and men in South Africa remains a challenge. In terms of income inequality, women have been reported to earn 30% less than their male counterparts (Statistics South Africa 2020). Studies have established an association between income inequality and violence including gender-based violence (Shoukry et al. 2019; Kearns et al. 2020). This view is reflected by one of the study participants who noted that inequality could lead to violence and crime. The persistence of violence against women contributes to and strengthens the narrative that women are less equal to men and are considered as properties of men (Maitse 2000; Meyer 2017). Based on what participant

12 (26–30-year F, SE) said, ‘I feel like inequality is unfair. It is severe’, we theorize that inequality comes with psychological costs to society and a sense of unfairness.

According to Transparency International (2021), South Africa ranked 69 out of 180 countries in terms of corruption perception in 2020. Our study reveals that some participants viewed inequality as a manifestation of persistent corruption in government. Continuous experiences and reporting on corruption (both in the public and the private sector) contribute to a sense of disempowerment in the face of inequality. As Raghavan (2013 cited in Lannegren and Ito 2017) argue, corruption and inequality are two critical issues facing South Africa. This feeds into the narrative of inequality in the country with the poor essentially becoming uninterested in the government’s policy statements on its commitments to addressing corruption and inequality.

The foregoing could underscore why some participants reported that inequality is a human condition that can never be addressed even legally. It could also underly why only a few participants identified their living conditions in an informal settlement as a manifestation of inequality. Participant (26–30-year, M with TE) was of the view that the law favours those with resources and they have the capacity to manipulate it, for example, the way a rich person is treated by the law after committing a crime is different from the way an ordinary person is treated by the same law. Based on this excerpt, we hypothesize that people experience differential treatment both legally and through manipulation due to inherent inequalities in society.

2.6 THEORIZATION ON INEQUALITY

A participant mentioned the negative effects of inequality thus,

It all depends on a person’s ability to be assertive, their confidence, and all. For people who are passive with low self-esteem, it creates uncontrollable anger and depression when they have no power to control the situation.
(Participant 15, 26–30-year M, TE)

Given the foregoing, we hypothesize that inequality is disempowering and leads to loss of control. Its effects are psychological as much as they are corporal and corporeal.

A participant had this to say with respect to how inequality is experienced by the rich and poor:

When the situation favours you like it does the rich, you are unable to see fault in it—only unless you experience it on your own. Rich people are most favoured than all other people. (Participant 18, 41–45-year, F, TE)

We hypothesize that inequality is experiential—you have to feel it to know it. You do not feel inequality as an injustice if you are benefiting from it. The participant added:

On one hand, some of the rich people think that poor people are not doing enough to change their situation. On the other hand, poor people are not given a chance to change whatever situation they find themselves in—which hinders them from reaching their full potential?. (Participant 18, 41–45-year, F, TE)

We hypothesize that in circumstances of inequality, human potential is hamstrung and constrained. In other words, inequality constrains human potential. It, therefore, can be transmitted to next generations because of constrained circumstances. As such, inequality can perpetuate inequality while the rich/favoured would prefer the preservation of the status quo.

On exploitation, a participant had this to say:

Inequality leads to the exploitation of those who are disadvantaged in anyway. It leads to the seclusion of some members of the community. It is clearly shown by the segregation of people and discrimination because of the emergence of the have and have-nots.

On the basis of the above excerpt, we hypothesize that inequality may lead to the seclusion of some members of society through segregation and discrimination which is bad for social cohesion.

Inequity and the uneven distribution of resources came to the spotlight as a participant had this to say:

People see themselves as worthless and not deserving anything. They are subjected to poverty due to unequal distribution of resources. (Participant 4, 36–40-year M with TE)

We hypothesize that inequality leads to feelings of worthlessness. It manifests in circumstances of resources—either in their abundance or scarcity. From Sen’s capability perspective, in the absence of resources, capabilities are constrained and the fulfilment of functionings is impaired.

The longevity of inequality was described by participants as follows:

Inequality will always be there for as long as people are able to pinpoint what makes them unequal or different from each other. This makes me feel sad and hopeless that we will never be equal. (Participant 17, 31–35-year M with TE)

We hypothesize that inequality exists where there is a distinguishing factor—a marker, real or imagined, logical or illogical—and it has the potential to engender sadness and hopelessness.

Inequality was reported as causing crime and instability. A participant had this to say:

Inequality causes problems such as crime and economic instability. People who do not have money, steal from those who have money in an attempt to bridge the inequality gap. This results in increasing crime. The poor cannot afford medical aid, unlike the rich, resulting in their life span being shorter. (Participant 8, 46 and older M, with TE)

We hypothesize that inequality can lead to crime out of desperation.

Inequality was examined from the point of view of the disadvantaged members of community, the marginalized and the downtrodden. Participant 18 (41–45 years, F, TE) had this to say:

Yes, within my community there is a huge difference between those who are economically advantaged and those who are economically disadvantaged. Also, there is segregation between the educated and those who have not had a chance to better their education. Participant 18 (41–45-year, F, TE)

In light of the above, we hypothesize that inequality breeds segregation even among the disadvantaged on other differences and therefore inequality is multi-layered. One may be Black but because of having attained a lower level of education, one may feel unequal to another Black person with a higher level of education.

A participant offered a solution to inequality thus,

Bringing back the spirit of *Ubuntu* (an African philosophy that upholds respect, community, communality, respect, oneness, dignity, sharing, humanity, co-responsibility, empathy, fairness, humaneness, social justice, personhood, group solidarity, love, compassion, togetherness) which recognizes everyone as valuable and should be respected and treated as such. This also includes working together to improve our society's well-being. It supports respect and equal treatment based on trust. (Participant 6, 46-year M, TE)

In our hypothesis, we argue that a solution to inequality resides in individual human behaviours—the way we treat each other and the way we would want to be treated. We conclude in the next section.

2.7 CONCLUSION

In this study, we examined perceptions of inequality using the case of an informal settlement in Durban, South Africa. The study's findings reveal that participants view inequality as unequal treatment of people and is often a function of race, gender, and the legacy of the country's colonial and apartheid history. The study also reveals that for some participants, the persistence of inequality reveals government's failure despite public commitments to addressing this challenge. Linked to this is the perception that state corruption undermines efforts to addressing the problem of inequality. We note that the seeming intractability of corruption contributes to some of the study participants viewing corruption as widening inequality. As such, participants view inequality as a manifestation of government failures and compounded by corruption. Interestingly, some respondents reported that inequality is a part of human existence and can never be eradicated, while others noted that inequality leads to crime. The overall perception was that everyone should be treated equally. The findings of this study provide valuable insights into the understanding and perception of inequality from an informal settlement in Durban, South Africa. In doing so, it contributes to the body of knowledge on perceptions of inequality.

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Africa's Policy and Technology Options: Linking Agricultural Mechanisation to Social Protection Targets

Toendepi Shonhe and Isaac Chinyoka

3.1 INTRODUCTION

A socially debilitating pervasive food crisis persists in Africa, underscoring the need for new approaches to the question of food security across the continent. In part, the crisis emanate from the changing political, economic, social, ecological and climatic conditions against slow and often the introduction of inappropriate innovations and technologies. The International Food Policy Research Institute (AFPRI) (2018) observes that 827 million people are facing hunger and starvation. Of 700 million

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people observed to be living in extreme poverty worldwide by 2020, 520 million or 74.3% are from Africa (Tong, 2020). Due to high population growth and inadequate food production, Africa has increasingly depended on food aid from the developed World. This notwithstanding, about 60% of the African population relies on agriculture for jobs and livelihoods (FAO, 2018).

Moreover, as Hazell (2017) posits Agriculture provides the best hope for addressing poverty in Africa. Adesina (2007) observes that “In the two decades between 1981 and 2001, 134 million people dropped below the poverty line, putting the total number of people living in poverty (US\$2.15 a day poverty line) at 516 million or 77 per cent of the population”. The Sachs Report (2005) also observed that sub-Saharan Africa experienced an increase in the number of people living in poverty despite an overall decrease of 8% at the global level. Besides, dealing with poverty and vulnerability, if not because of its impact on citizens, food and food production have grown to be not merely for consumption but are now a political instrument in many parts of Africa. Prah (1988) argues that food aid has become politics, as it holds sway and greater power for the starving African majority.

The growth in smallholder agriculture has the biggest potential for reducing poverty, with Thirtle et al. (2003) arguing that 1% increase in crop production reduces poverty by 0.72%. However, Africa’s agriculture remains barely modernised (Hazell, 2017). Even though improvements in productivity, averaging 7% were experienced since 2005, Africa’s yield remains lower than other countries elsewhere (ibid). Critically, the land and labour productivity gap between Africa and Asia widened over the period from 2000 to 2014 (ibid.). As a result, Africa has increasingly “become more dependent on food imports” (Hazell, 2017: 6). Today, besides lack of government commitment, the diverse agro-ecological regions heterogeneity, variegated farm sizes and typographies render the adoption of homogenous modernisation approaches impossible. Whereas Asia invested immensely in agriculture in the 1970s and 1980s by spending an average of 15% on agriculture, African countries barely invested 5% of their budgets in this sector. The African Development Bank (AfDB) (2016) posits that Africa’s agricultural crop yields are 56% of the international average.

In part, the historical development of the food crisis associated with the World systems and linked to colonialism and imperialism account for Africa’s agricultural development trajectory. In particular the process of

proletarianisation which turned the rural black population into reserves, ought to be viewed from the perspective of international capitalist order (Prah, 1988). A process that takes away labour from agriculture to mines, industries and construction industries. In so doing, the proletarianisation process creates a demand for labour in the agriculture and much more for modernisation and innovation. Moreover, this created a new market for tractor and farming equipment for the developed world. The present calls for agricultural mechanisation and tractorisation are therefore characterised by competing Southern power such as China, India and Brazil for the African market under the South-South cooperation arrangement (Cabral, 2019).

To increase agricultural productivity in order to eliminate hunger and malnutrition in Africa, agricultural mechanisation remains inescapable (FAO, 2018), along with the introduction of a whole range of other green revolutions innovations such as seeds, chemicals and fertilisers. The FAO (2018: vii) report suggests that the twenty-first century ought to be “built along the entire agricultural value chain”, “private sector driven, environmentally compatible and climate smart, and must also be economically viable and affordable, especially for small-scale farmers who constitute the bulk of African farmers”. To be effective, agricultural mechanisation, the report proposed, must target women and the youth (*ibid.*). Agricultural mechanisation must therefore be viewed from a social policy perspective, in which the alleviation of poverty, risk and vulnerability is a priority.

Social policy, particularly non-contributory social assistance programmes, in the form of cash transfers, has and continues to play a central role in poverty reduction in developing countries. Developing countries require “transformative social protection and innovation” to address the risk of poverty (Mkandawire, 2007). Such innovation has meant an accelerated adoption of social policies such as cash transfers to reduce household and child poverty (Garcia & Moore, 2012). Besides supporting broader development objectives social policy instruments such as cash transfers also tackle income poverty (Barrientos et al., 2014). In the wake of weakening families, communities and non-formal welfare in much of Africa, social policy becomes key in the promotion of people’s well-being (Midgley, 2017).

The objectives to reduce poverty and vulnerability in poor households have seen a proliferation of cash transfers in Africa since the 2000s (Barrientos & Hulme, 2008). Non-contributory social policy instruments like social cash transfers do not only break intergenerational poverty but also

help the poor and marginalised claim their rights. The expansion of social cash transfers is attributed to their potential in boosting investment in human capital. Overall, social policy bridges the widening kinship support gap that has resulted in high numbers of vulnerable community members and the subsequent increasing demand for social protection.

This chapter relies on a mixed methods research approach carried out in Mvurwi farming area in Zimbabwe. Similar studies carried out in Mozambique and Ghana under the Agricultural Policy Research in Africa (APRA) programme will be relied upon for comparative purposes. In Zimbabwe, qualitative data has been collected from archival and government reports, in-depth interviews with smallholder tractor cooperative members ($\times 12$) and the remaining large-scale commercial farms (LSCFs) ($\times 2$), two tracking studies made up of A1 (smallholders) ($\times 7$), focus group discussions and triad in-depth interviews for tractor cooperative members ($\times 2$ for each). The quantitative component involved a survey of communal family farmers ($\times 453$), (medium scale) A2 farmers ($\times 50$) and villagised A1 farmers ($\times 353$) in Mvurwi, 6 Joint Venture (JV) farmers and two large-scale estate farmers.

Following this introduction, the rest of this Chapter is organised as follows: the next section conceptualises agricultural mechanisation, linking it with the imperatives of economic development and social development policies. Section three discusses the literature review on the history of tractorisation in Africa. In section four, the Zimbabwe case study on tractorisation is presented. In section five, the tractorisation model is revisited before a conclusion is presented in section six.

3.2 CONCEPTUALISING AGRICULTURAL MECHANISATION AND SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Agricultural mechanisation is defined as the “application of tools, implements and powered machinery and equipment to achieve agricultural production, comprising both crop and livestock production, as well as aquaculture and apiculture” (FAO, 2018: 2). Along the farming and commodity chains, mechanisation covers farming and post-harvest processing, comprising a shift from basic to sophisticated and motorised equipment to reduce drudgery, ease labour shortages and improve productivity, resource use efficiency and market access (ibid.). As the FAO (2018) report elaborates, agricultural mechanisation “covers the manufacture, distribution, repair and maintenance, utilization and management

of agricultural tools, implements, equipment and machines for agricultural production". Houmy et al. (2013) observe that agricultural mechanisation has mainly been in the form of tractorisation. This study will therefore use the terms "agricultural mechanisation" and "tractorisation" interchangeably. Moreover, despite influence group partialities, technical considerations remain material. Land preparation demands more power than most farming operations (Lal, 2004), for which the tractor plays a central role and "have historically been the dominant form of mechanical technology promoted by the state in developing countries" (Cabral, 2019: 9). "Mechanisation has the potential to expand production; improve timeliness of operations; widen the application of power to crop processing, irrigation and infrastructure improvement; compensate for labour shortages; and alleviate drudgery" (Adekunle, 2015: i).

The debate on agricultural mechanisation has broadly focussed on the appropriateness of technologies focussing on access and inclusion (Segal, 1992; Stewart, 1987) in the context of Africa's persistent poverty and inequality, variegated agro-ecological terrain and farm sizes. Often the debate has centred on the consideration about the technical and economic efficiency of the machinery (Binswanger, 1986; Binswanger & Pingali, 1988; Diao et al., 2014). Some scholars (Binswanger & Pingali, 1988) argue that African government has imposed technological advancement on the farms without paying due attention to the surplus and cheap labour available for agriculture due to low industrialisation. A further argument following from the former is that state-driven induced innovation agricultural mechanisation miss targets, as it distort factor ratios and prices, instead market approaches are found most appropriate (Cabral, 2019). This approach proposes that the development and adoption of new technologies is a function of the imperative to substitute cheap resources (labour or land) for more expensive ones, with automated machinery replacing human labour (Binswanger, 1986). In Binswanger and Pingali's (1988: 81) view, the introduction of new technologies has not achieved much success in Sub-Saharan Africa due to "wrong technology ... priorities, faulty pricing policies, inadequate infrastructure, and poor institutional development and differences in climates, soils and labour".

Yet, as Gass and Biggs (1993) argue, applying purely economic criteria in assessing rural mechanisation is somewhat sociologically naïve, as it overlooks the critical issue of power in the distribution of resources, and the benefits thereof to rural communities. For Zimbabwe, the fast track

land reform programme (FTLRP) accelerated the need for increasing productivity and as such, mechanisation. The role of institutions in technological change and rural mechanisation policy formulation is inherently obvious (Binswanger, 1978; De Janvry, 1978; Gass & Biggs, 1993; see also Napasintuwong & Emerson, 2003). Figure 3.1 shows that power shapes the involvement of multiple players and interest groups in developing countries (Shonhe, 2019).

The debate on appropriateness of technology also focusses on small and big machinery. For instance, Binswanger and Pingali (1988: 81) argued that the introduction of new technologies has not achieved much success in Sub-Saharan Africa due to “wrong technology ... priorities, faulty pricing policies, inadequate infrastructure, and poor institutional development” and differences in “climates, soils and labour”. Smallholder farmers owning small pieces of land tend to struggle when they access big tractors that are disproportionate to their needs. Yet adoption of small technologies has not responded to these conditions. In countries such as Bangladesh, the government intervened in the 1980s through lowering tariff rates and therefore making two-wheel tractors affordable (Biggs & Justice, 2015; Biggs et al., 2011). Lately, Tanzania has started adopting the same technologies (Agyei-Holmes, 2014; Cabral, 2019). Africa’s agricultural mechanisation has been dominated by large and higher-powered




Fig. 3.1 Agricultural machinery importation and distribution (*Source* Shonhe [2019] adapted from Gass and Biggs [1993] and FAO [2013])

machinery (Cabral et al., 2016) with governments playing a leading role in the choice of the technology adopted (Östergaard, 1989). Sanders and Ruttan (1978) argue, induced technology innovation tended to undermine employment patterns and, in some cases, mechanisation tended to target large-scale farms to the detriment of small-scale farms. Yet, as Gass and Bibbs (1993) noted, there is a general reluctance to theorise the implications of power at multiple levels (household, local, regional, national, transnational) on the diffusion of technology. As result, the scope for price determination because of institutional dynamics is missed, as much as its impact on the market mechanisms and productivity is eschewed.

Often, geopolitical considerations are part of the social and political interplay that moderate the mechanisation trajectory (Shonhe 2019). While in India, political actors intervention resulted in the purchase of four-wheeled tractors (4WTs) and other machines using marketing regulations and investment in infrastructure (Hazell, 2009; Baudron et al., 2015); in Bangladesh, it resulted in that of two-wheeled tractors.

A key aspect of the debate on mechanisation has been the recently introduced notion of sustainable agricultural mechanisation. This debate highlights issues around the social and environmental dimensions of mechanisation (FAO, 2015, 2017, 2018). There is a general view that large-scale commercial farms (LSCFs) and medium-scale farms (MSFs) are more willing to adopt conservation agriculture. FAO (2018) observed increases in the MSFs in the twenty-first century, in countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania and Zambia, boosting the possibility for sustainable mechanisation in these countries. However, in countries such as Zimbabwe and Kenya where extensive resettlement took place, the small-scale farms (SSFs) predominate, underscoring the need to review the nature of mechanisation taking place in these countries, among others.

There is overwhelming evidence of the impact of cash transfers on poverty in industrialised democracies. In fact, the expansion of cash transfers in the global North is primarily associated with their developmental and transformative impacts. While there is evidence of successful transfer of these policies in the developing world in terms of policy adoption, contemporary issues and debates focus on suitability and effectiveness of such policies in reducing poverty in Africa. Some scholars argue that just giving money to the poor in the developing countries may not be the panacea to poverty especially in Africa where the poor are over-represented (Hanlon et al., 2010). There is no consensus on

this. On the one hand is an understanding that cash transfers have long-term impacts on poverty, including eliminating intergenerational poverty (Davis et al., 2016). Proponents of social protection arguably use such evidence to support arguments for the universalisation of cash transfers through the provision of a citizen basic income grant. Notably, advocates of basic income grants in Africa, Namibia and South Africa in particular, or universal cash grants in Botswana and Namibia (Chinyoka, 2019a, b) have been disappointed as political elites in governments rejected their proposals.

Contrary to this, despite international actors' support for social transfers as a form of redistribution, poverty remains unacceptably high even in countries such as South Africa where more than 18 million beneficiaries do receive cash benefits monthly. Lack of adequate government funding, leading to low coverage, low value of transfers and unsustainability of such programmes explains the limited impact. Thus, transnational actors including the World Bank, ILO and IMF and some United Nations agencies like UNICEF in favour of cash transfers struggle to justify why poor countries like Zimbabwe, Ghana or Mozambique should commit a large proportion of their GDP to such "ineffective" programmes. The limits of cash transfer programmes in livelihood empowerment in West Africa, specifically Ghana, illustrate that cash is necessary but not the ultimate poverty solution (Aikins et al., 2017). Our understanding of cash transfers in the developing countries is that they constitute social policies facing great challenges in addressing poverty in the African context.

The inadequacies of social policy instruments, in this case cash transfers, to reduce social insecurity and poverty in Africa effectively calls for new innovative poverty reduction approaches suitable for Africa. This does not imply that Africa is homogenous hence uniformly require similar policy interventions. Our conception of poverty reduction in developing countries, particularly in Africa, as we show in this chapter, consists a set of social policies that address poverty, unemployment, risk and vulnerability in sustainable ways. Social policy should cushion the effects of structural and technological change on the poor. Poverty alleviation should, therefore, focus on empowering small-holder farmers by providing suitable technology such as tractors. In Africa, the focus should be supporting small-holder farming and land redistribution.

3.3 THE HISTORY OF TRACTORISATION IN AFRICA

The demand for tractors has been rising among a wide range of farmers in Africa. Historically, agricultural mechanisation, particularly, the tractorisation of agriculture in Africa is linked to the colonial policy and therefore favoured large-scale commercial farms owned by the white settler farmers (Anthony, 1988; Mrema et al., 2008). The overwhelming argument presented is that smallholder farming is not suitable for tractorisation due to increasing fragmentation of farms (Cabral, 2019). Besides the colonial policy thrust, African nations policy-making processes was defined by ideological contestation. As Ottaway (1978) observed, in Mozambique, agricultural policy was linked to contestation between Soviet-styled tractor-power, who argued that poor performance after tractorisation was possibly due to poor supporting policy framework and those favouring the Chinese-favoured people-powered option, a position bolstered by the poor performance of the government tractor schemes.

In Zimbabwe, the colonial agricultural policy and capital-state relations favoured white, large-scale commercial farmers (LSCFs), who benefited from state subsidised agricultural mechanisation programmes thanks to their production for global markets (Simalenga, 2013; Selby, 2006; Hodder-Williams, 1983; Rukuni et al., 2006). Therefore, agricultural intensification in Zimbabwe was historically configured to serve the white minority agrarian economy (Selby, 2006; Tshuma, 1997). While immediate post-independence effort to reverse the critical shortages in draught power following cattle loses in the period the liberation war, through intensified tractorisation targeting the smallholder farmers, the introduction of neo-liberalisation by way of structural adjustment programmes reversed government intervention from the early 1990s. In the post-2000 period, the economic crisis that followed the FTLRP (Simalenga, 2013) and the heterodox economic policies adopted thereafter diminished state capacity to finance the importation of tractors (Shonhe, 2019). Efforts by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to support agricultural mechanisation through quasi-fiscal activities went a long way in addressing the tractor shortfall, government resorted the international cooperation to further correct and address the challenge.

Amanor (2019) argues that state intervention in Ghana's agricultural sector did not only support the building of state farms, instead, it also encouraged the growth of commercial agriculture. Tendencies towards agricultural mechanisation in Ghana are therefore not solely linked to

market policies, but historical state agricultural policy interventions (*ibid*). Ghana's agricultural mechanisation development is similar to that of most African countries, where, the first phase promoted commercial farming who were therefore the main beneficiaries of modern technology, from the 1950s to the 1970s. The second phase, from 1990s to the 2000s aimed to reverse the legacies of colonialism and therefore focussed on smallholder farming (Mrema et al., 2008). In the third phase, the agricultural policy seems to favour medium-scale farmers whose per cent representation is on the rise in many African countries. In this phase, international agricultural development policy involve intergovernmental cooperation under the South-South arrangements.

In this phase, some African countries are involved in the import of agricultural machinery through bilateral loans and concessionary credits secured from China, Brazil and India. The Brazilian More Food International (MFI) mechanisation programme, which has been implemented in Mozambique, Ghana, Senegal, Kenya and Zimbabwe, should be viewed from this perspective. Implemented by the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA) in 2010, the programme draws on "Brazil's domestic More Food Program, which offers credit to family farmers, to support modernisation through the acquisition of agricultural machinery and implements aimed at boosting productivity" (Cabral, 2016: 49). Based on concessionary loans, the MFI programme seeks to increase agricultural productivity, introduce new technology to family farmers and to reduce drudgery. In Zimbabwe, the Brazilian MFI tractorisation programme complements Zimbabwe's newly reconfigured agrarian structure in which family farms now dominate.

3.4 THE ZIMBABWEAN MVURWI CASES STUDY

At a national level, a comparative analysis across farming sectors shows that A2 farmers have more 40–80 kw tractors than other sectors, much akin to the rest of Africa, excluding South Africa. This observation is in tandem with the tractor circuits highlighted by Simalenga (2005), wherein A2 medium-scale commercial farmers tended to buy from large-scale commercial farmers. Even though the communal area farmers held more tractors than the rest of the other sectors (A1, LSCF, SSCF and the ORA) in 2009 and 2010, in 2011 the LSCFs were second. The A1 sector assumed the second in 2013 and 2014 (see Fig. 3.2), with contract farming and re-investment of agricultural proceeds being the main source

of income (Shonhe, 2019). Overall, total tractor holdings have declined in the period 2010–2014.

The government also signed a cooperative agreement with Brazil for the supply of tractors during this period. Brazil's (More Food for Africa) MFA was aimed at achieving food self-sufficiency for small-scale farming households. The two programmes brought in mechanisation programmes worth US\$30 million and US\$98 million respectively. In the case of Zimbabwe, the Brazilian programme resulted in the distribution of tractors through cooperatives on farms with irrigation land. Turkey was also involved in the supply of tractors to Zimbabwe over this period. The reliance on government-led schemes for mechanisation has been criticised as being inappropriate; instead, some scholars prefer the reliance of machinery markets. According to Adekunle (2015), machines purchased in such a manner tend to end up as “orphans” with no spare parts or backup services and, as a result, tend to have a very short operating life. Yet, for Zimbabwe, these sources now predominate as the Mvurwi case study illustrate.




Fig. 3.2 Tractor ownership patterns by sector and size (Compiled from Zimstats [2017])

3.4.1 *Tractor Ownership Pattern in the Mvurwi Farming Area*

Rusike (1978) observes that the first private tractor was introduced in Chiweshe communal areas in the 1940s and the pace of tractorisation only rose in the 1980s. In the early independence period, communal farmers bought second-hand tractors from the white commercial farmers who were forced to auction to repay bank loans. As a result, most of the tractors and equipment in the communal areas were only in a moderate state of repair. After the FTLRP, newly resettled farmers also bought second-hand tractors from dispossessed large-scale commercial farmers using off-farm finance, including retail trading and farm produce sales (70%) with agricultural commodity sales income contributing 26% of the tractor purchases. Yet, as records in the Ministry of Agriculture Mechanisation and Irrigation Development (MAMID) show, 95% of the Chiweshe area tilled land was carried out using animal draught power, a source for 28% of the farmers across the farming sectors in the 2016/2017 agricultural season (MAMID, 2017) (see Fig. 3.3).

With 72% of the farmers across farming sectors relying on tractors for tillage, this has become the most common source of farm power in the Mvurwi farming area. In the A1 farming sector, 55% of the land was tilled using tractors, compared to 96% for A2, 100% for LSCF and 36% for the peri-urban sectors (MAMID, 2017). The circuits of tractors are now made up of a combination of private and public-sector initiatives. The APRA survey shows that, of the 453 communal area households interviewed, only one (0.2%) owned a tractor, compared to 4.3% of the 353 interviewed households in the A1 sector as shown in Table 3.1.

Of the 353 A1 farmers interviewed, 13 had a tractor each and two had two tractors each to give a total of 17 tractors. As Mr. Alexio Muvhuri noted during an interview:

Three of the tractors at Hariana farm were bought using proceeds from tobacco sales. Most of these tractors were bought from the former large-scale commercial farmers or from the newly resettled farmers who were upgrading. Most farmers at this farm joined tobacco growing between 2008 and 2010 as farmers could keep their sales proceeds in foreign currencies after the liberalisation of the economy during this period. Some farmers have also bought tractors from horticultural sales proceeds. In contrast, in the A2 sector, the some of the farmers grabbed tractors from the former white commercial farmers, some got allocated by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe while some just like in the A1 farms, bought using proceeds from agricultural sales.



Fig. 3.3 A medium-scale (A2) farmer planting using animal power even though the family owns a functioning tractor in Mvurwi farming area

Table 3.1 Tractor ownership in Mvurwi smallholder farming areas

	<i>Tractor of owned</i>				<i>Total</i>
	<i>0.00</i>	<i>1.00</i>	<i>2.00</i>	<i>3.00</i>	
Count	452	1	0	0	453
% of Total	99.8	0.2	0	0	100.0
Count	338	13	2	0	353
% of Total	95.8	3.7	0.6	0.0	100.0

Source APRA Survey (2017)

The animal tractor hiring service is a growing business in Mvurwi area. Even though cattle ownership is on the increase among resettled farmers in small-scale and medium scale farms, the preference for tractors used

by tobacco farmers who do not have such equipment is high as shown in Fig. 3.4.

As a result, while those who have no cattle holding and those who own lower herds tend to hire animals and more animals than tractors, respectively, those with higher holdings prefer hire tractors more (Shonhe, 2019). Agricultural intensification and increased tobacco contract farming from 2009, and the subsequent re-introduction of government command agriculture in 2016, amplified the need for tractor-hiring services in Zimbabwe.

Regarding tractor holdings, the LSCF sector and the Joint Venture (JV) compared differently with the smallholder sector. For instance, Forrester Estates (an Agro-Estate) have better access to modern farming equipment acquired through bank loans, and through contract farming arrangements involving tobacco and horticultural export crops such as mange-tout peas and oranges (DM, Personal Interview, November 2017). On average, each of the six sections of Forrester Estates has 10 functional tractors, as old machinery is generally sold to the newly settled farmers as part of efforts to contain farm operational expenses. While the indigenous commercial farms have operational tractors, their general state of repair was observed to be poor when compared with that of




Fig. 3.4 Source of tobacco and maize land preparation power 2017/2018 season (Source Shonhe [2019], derived from APRA 2018 survey)

Forrester Estates, where a well-manned and equipped repair and maintenance centre is in operation. There are five tractors at Makumbire farm, run by the Mugweni family. The main section has two tractors compared to three at the section run by Mr Mugweni's son. The purchase of tractors for this farm has been financed primarily with off-farm income, as the family runs the only international bus terminus in Harare. Similarly, the JVs have acquired new technologies through foreign direct investment (FDI) from some Chinese nationals, and domestic investment from former white commercial farmers. The acquisition of tractors after 2000 is therefore not confined to a single financing model. While a few farmers among the A2 and A1 sectors have benefited the government schemes, the majority have had to figure out how to secure tractors and have had to rely on own proceeds and the second-hand market to get access to the same.

3.4.2 *Farm Productivity and Capital Accumulation*

The Mvurwi survey revealed a positive correlation between access to tractor services and agricultural productivity. In-depth interviews with management at Forrester Estate, a remaining, family-run LSCF that exists under a Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between Zimbabwe and Germany underscored this phenomenon. For instance, all six sections are endowed with modern farming equipment. Section D had access to 10 tractors, 3 farrow ploughs, 25 barns and 2 centre pivots. The section has 750 ha of arable land, 82 ha of which are irrigable. It also employs a total of 450 workers, of which 250 are female. In 2017, the combined farm production stood at 1996 t of tobacco from 701 ha (worth US\$7,120,554); 1566 t of maize on 260 ha (worth US\$768,255) and 525 t of peas for the export market on 67 ha. Tobacco was grown under contract with TianZe, a Chinese tobacco contracting company.

In the medium-scale sector (A2), the APRA team interviewed household members of a family, who were allocated a 58-ha farm at Eastworlds of Umvukwe flats farm in 2003, under the government-led land reform programme. Four of his sons are involved in farming in some subsections of the farm. With six households now farming on farm 3 of Eastworlds, this means each subsection now averages 12 ha of arable land. The parents farmed on 7 ha of land, which yielded 30 t of maize under the Command Agriculture initiative. His eldest son farmed 1 ha, producing 1.2 t of

tobacco—up from 0.8 t on 0.5 ha the previous year. In 2017, the oldest son earned a total of US\$1,500 from this crop and used the money to rehabilitate 1 ha of irrigation land.

The farm benefits from free-flowing irrigation water from a dam upstream, which has the effect of drastically reducing the farm's production costs. The family's eldest son earned US\$10,500 from 3200 kg of tobacco produced on 2 ha. In 2017, he bought a tractor for US\$6500, which is now shared by family members and is also available for hire to other farmers. The second son grew 1 ha of tobacco and earned US\$4200, with which he purchased irrigation equipment. He has now diversified into horticulture and, in 2018, he plans to buy a stand in Mvurwi town, which he intends to convert into a townhouse. Regarding labour, the family work as a group and hire casual labour for critical stages, such as planting, weeding, harvesting and grading. Those with irrigation facilities also hire additional labour for cash crops.

In the A1 scheme, a similar pattern is emerging. The family interviewed by the APRA team occupied their farm in 2000 through the FTLRP and has been producing tobacco since 2004. At present, the family is contracted by Chidziva Tobacco Processing Company to produce tobacco. The 6-ha plot is now being shared between the family's father, his son and two married daughters, each using up to 1.5 ha of land. The four families share 5 herds of cattle and collectively use their labour to help one another in the production of tobacco and maize. Due to poor prices and inadequate land availability, agricultural income has been low. However, the family is a member of the tractor cooperative who benefited from the Brazilian Tractor scheme.

The MFA smallholder tractor cooperative scheme members of interviewed confirmed that access to tractors had a positive impact on farm productivity. For instance, committee members at Chidziva farm observed that "tractors had improved soil management and planting efficiency and therefore increased their yields" (FG discussion, November 2017). Even though most arable land had already been cleared and was therefore suitable for tractor use before the FTLRP, access to tractors presented options to deal with difficult soils.

Farmers now plough bigger acreage and harvest better crops. As a result, in the 2016/2017 season, all the members of the Chidziva tractor cooperative were able to deliver maize to the GMB. Farmers are accumulating more assets and are more organised, diversifying into non-farm enterprises. The Triad interview held with committee members of the

Chidziva tractor cooperative revealed that cooperative members were now engaged in the collective production of maize. One of the leaders said that “we now have a maize scheme in which members contributed US\$150 for inputs and grow on land donated by some of our members”. The cooperative has plans to increase the area under cultivation, to buy irrigation equipment and to procure a combine harvester as commercialisation intensifies.

At Mandindindi farm, the utilisation of free-flowing irrigation water and access to tractor power has reduced drudgery and improved crop yields, despite shortages of labour. A triad discussion with cooperative committee members at Mandindindi farm revealed that most of them “now produce horticultural commodities to supply to Harare and other urban centres, besides tobacco and other summer food crops”. As a result, farmers have been able to acquire more household and farming assets, expanding production at household level. However, other cooperatives have not been able to enter into horticultural production because irrigation infrastructure on members’ farms is unable to meet total demand at the farm. On the whole, agricultural mechanisation increases productivity, food security among differentiated types of farmers and scales of production. In so doing, poverty and vulnerability are reduced among the farmers, as across gender and generational differences.

3.4.3 Gender, Generational Dynamics and Mechanisation in the Mvurwi Area

The APRA survey data reveals a bias in agricultural productive assets ownership and hiring towards male farmers. Whereas 60.3% of the men in the communal area owned and relied on their cattle for tillage, only 48.2% of the women relied on their own cattle. As a result, more women (32.6%) hire animal power from other farmers for tillage purposes than men (25.3%). In the A1 farming area, while more women (52.1%) rely on their own cattle for tillage services compared to men (50.7%), 83.6% of the tractors are owned by male smallholder farmers. In the tractor cooperatives, women participation is low, although a small number of women occupied key leadership positions. For instance, at Chidziva, there are only three women and one youth in the cooperative, compared to four women and one youth at Mandindindi farm and Donje farm.

Whereas women have been included in the cooperative leadership, by virtue of party positions held before the introduction of the tractor cooperative, Mercy Muteswa, the secretary of the cooperative complained that men have not respected her contributions. Women and youth are therefore disadvantaged by low asset holdings, as such agricultural commodity production among them remains low leading to limited prospects for accumulation.

3.5 NEW APPROACHES TO MECHANISATION AND SOCIAL POLICY

3.5.1 *New Social Policy Approaches*

Existing social policy approaches in Africa have benefitted much from poverty reduction innovations from the North. Many African countries have adopted poverty alleviation strategies particularly driven by donors and United Nation agencies just to pull out one example. The political support of social protection by multilateral agencies like the International Labour Organisation (ILO) through its Recommendation on Social Protection Floors reenergised the poverty reduction agenda across the globe including Southern Africa. Other recommended poverty reduction approaches, as argued in this chapter, include the adoption of new forms of agricultural mechanisation to support food sovereignty and security in Africa. However, these forms of social protection present both opportunities and challenges in the African context. They are not fully innovation-enhancing hence the call for reforming social protection systems in the developing world.

In this chapter, we argue for social policy approaches promoting social protection for poverty reduction in Africa achieved by innovative, effective and transformative social protection systems. Low-income countries like Zimbabwe, Mozambique or Ghana will benefit from an integration of best practices from other regions with indigenous social protection systems. African scholars recently underscored the centrality of such indigenous forms of social protection (Noyoo & Boon, 2018). In addition, financing such integrated systems, however, need serious consideration perhaps through increased political support, reprioritisation of social expenditure by governments if poverty reduction is to be realised.

3.5.2 *Revisiting the Tractorisation Model*

Under the reconfigured agrarian structure emerging from the FTLRP, an increased number of smallholder farmers now co-exist alongside more medium-scale farmers and fewer large-scale farmers. The ownership of farming equipment is now tilted in favour of middle-class farmers, whose supply routes have shifted to the former white commercial farmers, who previously dominated tractor ownership. Due to the economy-wide crisis experienced after the FTLRP, government and private sector capacity to import new and second-hand tractors declined immensely. A few tractors imported by the RBZ were distributed to medium-scale farmers on a patronage basis. In the private sector, capital flight and reduced access to agricultural credit have led resettled farmers to rely on proceeds from the sale of agricultural commodities.

While contract farming accounts for increased production of cash and export crops, agricultural mechanisation under this arrangement has been confined to the remaining large-scale commercial farmers who till larger plots. Yet, under the new agrarian structure, new agricultural production patterns and shortages of agricultural labour caused by movement into the informal sector induced renewed demand for tractorisation. The reliance on rural agrarian capital in the form of proceeds from agricultural sales by medium-scale and smallholder farmers presents an opportunity for theoretical reflections. Shonhe (2018) examines the persistence of primitive capital accumulation linked to export finance capital from the centre, deployed through contract farming. This has a tendency to undermine smallholder farmers' capacity for accumulation from below, as primary commodities are exported in a semi-processed form, limiting returns for the farmers and undercutting their ability to accumulate assets, including tractors.

Even though medium-scale farmers have accumulated agricultural mechanisation, among smallholder farmers, the supply of tractors remains low. As such, and as the APRA survey revealed, 84.1 and 67 of the communal farmers and AI farmers respectively continue to rely on animal-drawn implements for land preparation. For Rusike (1988: 224), the design of an agricultural mechanisation programme "boils down to issues trade-offs on allocating resources" by the government. While for Brazil the tractorisation programme was framed to advance family farming, political gain was certainly an accompanying motivation for the

ruling Zanu PF party to accept the programme in Zimbabwe. A political economy tradition that recognises the role of power, institutions and policy development ought to place social development at the centre of technological innovation processes in the variegated farming settings.

To achieve the social protection targets, which, in the case of Zimbabwe, provided the motivation for the land reform, a social development approach is critical. A transformative social development policy thrust, seeking production and social reproduction, beyond social grants and transfers ought to be incorporated into the agricultural mechanisation policy development. For Adesina (2007: 42), therefore, “Reconnecting social policy to the wider development objectives and the nation-building project is essential for sustainable social policy outcomes, as it is for sustainable economic development” In this sense, smallholder family farms mechanisation programmes involving small two-wheel tractors and irrigation infrastructure development is seen as most capable of meeting the social protection targets in Africa. To achieve social developmental targets for vulnerable groups such as women and the youth, the cooperative approach implemented by Zimbabwe, if bereft of politics, is worth considering. A developmental state that intervene in critical sectors such agriculture must promote the upliftment of the most vulnerable smallholder women and youth farmers, who own less cattle and barely any tractors.

3.6 CONCLUSION

The role of innovative social protection approaches in poverty reduction in Africa cannot be overemphasised given the increasing poverty challenges. Increasing poverty and vulnerability risks for a larger proportion of Africa’s population requires adoption of sustainable policy options with greater potential to lift people from poverty. This requires refocussing Africa on the vulnerable groups and on production rather than social transfers. Given that the majority of the poor are involved in farming, a bias towards the vulnerable through the introduction of technology such as tractors is common sense.

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Building Bridges to Close the Inequality Gap as a Basis for Social Change: A Social Worker's Pragmatic Experience in Immersion

Saidah Mbooge Najjuma

4.1 INTRODUCTION

Development professionals are of the view that someday poverty and inequality shall be overcome. Globally, the dimensions of poverty keep changing challenging development decision-makers to keep abreast with global trends. Knowledge about poverty which informs policy decisions is traditionally generated through surveys. In addition the decision-making process is highly complex with minimum consideration of grassroots people's knowledge. Policy experts far removed from the reality of the poor, sit in urban offices to discuss poverty, a practice which Chambers (2013a), refers to as "capital city traps". However, in a quest to fight poverty together, ActionAid International (Uganda) through its

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innovative Global Immersion Programme brings together the decision-makers and people experiencing extreme poverty. This interaction enables development decision-makers to learn directly from the poor (hosts) as a reference when responding to human development challenges. It creates an opportunity for development decision-makers to question and understand their role in poverty alleviation which supports the interplay of resources, capacities and knowledge from hosts to counteract the top down flow of development (Chambers 2005, 2007; Biggeri and Ferrenin 2014; Najjuma 2015, 2016). Thus, fighting inequality, injustice and addressing poverty is possible when development decision-makers create space to listen to the voices of the poor through experiential learning. This answers Chambers' question which queries:

How much do outsiders know about how the poorest cope? To enable the poorest to do better, the starting point is to understand how they manage at present. And on this the poorest are experts. They know more than ignorant outsiders who have not bothered to try and find out. Chambers (1983: 202)

According to O'sullivan (2012) and Chambers (2007), activities may involve working with and helping the family, listening and dialogue, learning family life history and keeping a reflective diary, among others, but the essence is to be open minded all the time to the unplanned and unexpected encounters that may occur. On encountering the unplanned and unexpected (Chambers 2007) points out that: "The unplanned incident is often the most striking, moving and significant. But, what that will be is hard to predict". Getting immersed among the poverty-stricken gives greater understanding and appreciation of the daily challenges these people experience. The same experience in the Kyakamese community shows that poverty and inequality is explained in a number of factors including location, makeshift housing, and isolation, human threats, land conflicts, access to social services, distance to basic resources, little stock, out-migration and female headed household.

These situations present a biased reality on the conditions of poverty among those directly in development decision-making to the change processes. ActionAid strategy for empowering the poor and connecting development decision-makers encourages participants to conceptualise poverty which is necessary in exploring issues that are important to immerse daily work. Important decisions, such as review of curricular by

the academia, increasing the budget by the parliamentarian, recruitment of public servants by the district service commission and strengthening security by the police, among others, should take place from grassroots in rural villages like Kyakamese! This chapter underlines immersion as the most appropriate pragmatic experience of those in decision-making positions for checking against complex and diverse realities of poor people as a basis for social change.

4.2 THE CONCEPT, CONTEXT AND PRINCIPLES OF IMMERSION

4.2.1 *Conceptualising Immersion*

ActionAid is the brain behind the immersion concept through its innovative global Immersion programme which targets individuals who influence and make developmental policies both internationally and nationally. It organises development decision-makers from a cross-section of sectors to achieve a development or learning objective with intense experiential learning and to enable cross-learning among themselves. Immerse is a term used to describe people working for Governments, Donor Agencies, Think tanks and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) among others, who take part in the immersion process. Birch et al. (2007) contend that a critical mass of interest in immersion is gathering among key stakeholders in decision-making. These individuals spend time with people living in extreme poverty in immersion to promote personal understanding of poverty, having left behind the baggage of roles, organisation and importance (Chambers 2013a, b). By living with a family that is affected by poverty amidst reasonably abundant resources, participants not only appreciate the challenges that poor people face, but also their endurance and wisdom. They use this learning experience to challenge and test their preconceptions of people who live in extreme poverty, as a mechanism to develop new perspectives and to reawaken their passion for poverty reduction.

Immersion also facilitates reflecting on whether policy processes for problem solving, entailing preliminary statement of the problem and assumptions about the nature of the problem, selection and collection of information, analysis of available information, development, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of actions; are relevant, realistic and beneficial to the poor. ActionAid organises several immersion programmes

globally including in Uganda, where the author was a participant. It plays the bridging role by sensitising immersion participants about the nature of poverty in human lives and the need for immersion. The organisation also works with communities and Immerse in advance of the immersion to ensure that each party appreciates its role. At the conclusion of immersion, hosts and Immerse meet in a feedback session with political and technical administration in the locality to share their experiences, reflections and insights. This facilitates collective understanding, learning and assurance on how these can be taken forward as policy matters. It also discusses issues concerning implementation of learnings in organisational settings of Immerse. Different models exist; some structured around a specific theme, others more experiential and open ended. A common purpose is to bring immersion participants face-to-face with ordinary people to test old assumptions, develop new perspectives and strengthen their commitment to fighting poverty and inequality. The host family's schedule determines Immerse time use which is unstructured. As an immerse gets involved in the daily routine of host families, co-learning with host family members, takes place, while getting to know their poverty better thereby co-generating knowledge directly with community members that would be necessary to create social change.

4.2.2 *Contextualising Immersion*

When immersed, it is important to appreciate that every society has a system of beliefs and values through which life is organised and derives its meaning. For Kyakamese village, certain values observed in immersion included: **Dressing:** It was explained that female Immerse should not wear tight jeans, tight T-shirts, labelled T-shirts and jewellery. They should put on loose-fitting clothes, such as dresses and loose long trousers. For male participants, loose pair of trousers, open necked shirts or t-shirts and long pair of shorts up to the knee were acceptable. Sandals were recommended footwear for men and women and plastic flip-flops were suggested for visiting the toilet and bathing. **Home manners:** Participants were prepared of the sleeping arrangement such as sharing of beddings in the form of a mat and the floor space with other same sex members of the host family. ActionAid provided a light cotton sleeping bag and a blanket, which were shared. Bathing was done in a temporary structure constructed within the homestead and my hosts had a pit latrine outside the main house. **Use of telephone and photography:**

Despite the availability of a good coverage of some telephone networks at Kyakamese, immerses were requested to leave their phones behind to avoid disruption of the learning process. Emergency numbers of persons to be contacted at all times were provided. Excessive use of cameras that would detract learning from the immersion experience was restricted. It was suggested that photo-taking was to be kept to a minimum and confined to the last day spent with the host family. It was also necessary to seek permission from the family before taking photos. ActionAid trained the interpreters, organised the necessary logistics and prepared information packs to guide the participants. **Body contact:** Handshake was acceptable in this community, but immerses were advised to avoid direct eye contact while interacting with hosts to avoid intimidation. The left hand was used as much as the right in washing, eating and performing other tasks. To facilitate easy interaction with children in host families, Immerses were encouraged to carry with them crayons, pencils, paper for interacting with children and family photos to share with their hosts. **Medium of communication:** The local language spoken was Runyoro. Immerses were encouraged to internalise some Runyoro phrases before immersion. For instance in the region, Good Morning (*Oraireho Ota?*), response, (*Ndaireho Kurungi*). Thank you (Webale) response, (Ego). Immerses were also introduced to many other words and their translations. **Local foods:** Common staple foods included cassava, fresh sweet potato, millet mixed with cassava and maize, mostly served with pigeon pea, beans, ground-nut sauce and a variety of green vegetables that were grown in host families. The use of **Professional title:** Professionals are often assigned titles such as general manager, executive director, chief finance officer and permanent secretary. These titles make it more challenging for titleholders to get closer to the reality of poverty (Najjuma 2016). Immersion facilitators suggested that professionals leave behind their titles and roles by writing on a small piece of paper, seal and drop in a box for the period of immersion. The aim was to allow the flow of information that has never been imagined and to have an open mind and live as far as possible as our hosts and hostesses lived and learn from them. This was significantly important to an extent that on the last day when one of the facilitators addressed me as Dr. (Ph.D.), just before we parted, immediately, my hosts began to call me so!, and wondering why I never treated them of any health challenges. However, I had to explain to them that I was not a Doctor of veterinary or human medicine but an academic doctor.

4.2.3 *Immersion Principles*

ActionAid proposed five principles which form the core of immersion experience which according to (AAIU 2016), are the basic frame that shapes the interactions, learning, reason and mutual support throughout the process of immersion. The principles are experiential learning, putting a face to poverty, personal learning, unlearning and relearning and avoidance of biases. The principles are discussed in detail below:

4.2.3.1 *Experiential Learning*

This principle emphasises experiential learning through observation, active participation and listening to voices of families to understand their poverty and coping mechanisms. Individuals as learners are expected to live with the host family for a minimum of 3 days and 3 nights. This process of learning is explained in Kolb's (1984) Experiential Learning Theory as learning through reflection on doing. It is more concerned with concrete issues related to the learner and the learning context based on multilevel perspectives. Various scholars in support of local community participation as a platform for exchanging experiences, argue that development implementation is tailored to local context, including voices and needs of the poor (Najjuma 2016; Chambers 1983, 2005, 2007). ActionAid (Uganda) draws from this argument to build the abilities of Immerse as adaptive learners when connected to the poor. This calls for participation, managing emotions to control learning, seeking, interpreting and using feedback as part of professional coordination. The use of analytical skills supports the participants to gain a better understanding of the new knowledge, retain information and use it for social change.

4.2.3.2 *Putting a Face to Poverty*

Under this principle, immerse are expected to spend a minimum of three days and three nights in the host's home. This is to enable them gain a deeper understanding of poverty through listening to their unique problems, developing relationships and understanding who they are, their diversity and their environment. This is expressed as face-to-face, walking in their shoes or fitting in the shoes of a person from ones' self. Development envisaged in figures such as GNP and GDP is abstract, for it represents even people in a state of deprivation. This is because; numbers are faceless and not sufficient to expose hidden and complex aspects of poverty and inequality that manifest in qualitative ways. It is necessary to

put a face to numbers. Immersion provides spaces for people in decision-making positions to envision development by putting a face to poverty to appreciate unrecognised abilities and experiences of those living in poverty. It necessitates walking in the poor person's shoes, but above all, respecting their knowledge. This is appreciation of agency! According to Sen (1985), agency expands the horizons of concern beyond a person's own well-being to include concerns, such as solidarity with extreme poverty. The strong collective desire for agency suggests that the development processes should foster participation, public debate and democratic practice (Alkire and Deneuline 2009). Spending three days and three nights for instance at the Kyakamese community, living and experiencing poverty directly, resulted into appreciating peoples' culture, lifestyles, their fears, resilience and survival and coping strategies as well as their imaginary world of prosperity through interactions as we discuss later.

4.2.3.3 *Personal Learning*

Personal learning is breaking down preconceived perceptions by immerse about who the poor really are. This involves opening up to new ideas and experiences, listening, learning social values, changing mindset, experiencing contrasting life styles, breaking down stereotypes, gaining understanding of poverty in the host family context. It also entails checking on one's work as immerse, ideology and practice against reality. Host families, local leadership, sectional leaders, and leaders of civil society development organisation raise collective empowerment of both the poor and affluent in regard to the role each play in directing social change. It is suggested that an increased desire to support people living in extreme poverty to access the necessary rights will arise, because respect for local knowledge and experiences is paramount (Chambers 2013a, b). The result is intervention often leading to better supported and longer lasting social change. This way the vision for tracking inequality is envisaged and effectively shared!

4.2.3.4 *Unlearning and Relearning*

This principle calls for critical thinking, as an opening for social change. It is about migrating from or to let go what is already learned or acquired as a blue print. Unleash outdated information from one's memory and replaced it with new learning. Relearning involves retrieving known information and putting it to productive use, by reviewing and refreshing the memories for use (Sinclair 1997). This is continually informed by new

knowledge. Most people tend to stick to what they know or current mental frames and avoid situations that make them learn something new. How to start is to consider changing how we think about the poor as helpless, ignorant, vulnerable, who need external help to get out of their poverty. The changes in funding protocol (Fowler 1997; OECD 2005), globalisation, innovations in technology and mobility of populations, among others, make it hard to predict what local issues and actions are. Immersion provides a frame where inequality and other forms of exclusion are most visible. Therefore the potentiality of Immerse to unlearn and relearn is a difference that will support change in the lives of poor people. The lesson we learn is that the poor have human rights, despite their poverty.

4.2.3.5 *Avoidance of Biases*

A bias is a deviation from rationality in judgement. By connecting the people in decision-making positions to learn from the poor in a dialogical relationship, they are able to reflect on their preconceptions about poverty. Most decisions about poverty such as strategies, funding and deciding on the beneficiaries are made in magnificent offices in urban areas, or refer to emails, meetings, reports and workshop resolutions. Those mandated to make decisions are removed from the reality of poverty and from the poor. Immersions are one pragmatic means to offset biases and trends: to keep influential people up to date, and to escape “self referential trap” (Chambers 2013a, b). This appreciation cultivates change of perspectives and strengthens commitment to fight inequality in the short or long term, by connecting the poor and the marginalised to add their voice on matters concerning community development. Central to this is the effort by ActionAid Uganda to build bridges between people living in extreme poverty and influential people, which could be the genesis of a long-term relationship aiming at closing the inequality gap (Table 4.1).

4.3 THEORY OF CHANGE

Informal learning is a significant aspect of our learning experience since it is often said that experience is the best teacher. The article draws on the theories of connectivism (Siemens 2005), collective agency (Alkire 2006) and experiential learning (Kolb 1984) to analyse connection between unequal capabilities of immerses and the poor to address poverty

Table 4.1 Immersion: comparative analysis with conventional methods

<i>Conventional methods</i>	<i>Immersion</i>
Easy to quantify	Experiential learning, i.e. hands-on; interactive
Researcher need not be around	Putting a face to poverty, i.e. every life is considered
Researcher is an outsider	Personal learning, participating, i.e. unique insights
Pre-determined themes	Unlearning and relearning, i.e. Open learning environ
Respondent may lie	Avoidance of bias, i.e. reality based on context

and inequality. We derive our competence from forming connections. Connectivism is premised on the understanding that decisions are based on rapidly changing foundations. Although Siemens promotes the theory for the digital age, it has been adjusted to explain the connections that enable “experts” to learn from the poor through immersions to update the current state of knowing, and to facilitate continual learning. Siemens explains that connections between disparate ideas and fields can create new innovations but the central premise is that connections created with unusual nodes support and intensify existing large effort activities. Collective agency emphasises that individuals are seen as agents (Solava 2006) in the construction of social change to improve their well-being. The poor make their voices heard using the different spaces in a community setting, to contribute towards the change they want to see happen. Experiential learning suggests that concrete experience provides information that serves as a basis for reflection, for which actors assimilate the information and form abstract concepts. They use these concepts to develop new theories about the desired world, which they actively test in immersion. Through pragmatism, reality is interpreted, and knowledge is negotiated through experience in bridges, created by ActionAid for people in development decision-making positions, to learn directly from the poor. The three concepts of connectivism, collective agency and experiential learning operationalised in an immersion experience, profoundly affect social change to close the inequality gap.

4.4 METHODOLOGY

The data was generated from pragmatic experience, based on immersion in a rural village of Kyakamese, Pakanyi Sub County in Masindi District. This was facilitated and enabled with the support of ActionAid (Uganda), and took place in June 2016. The Kyakamese community comprises of families with diverse backgrounds from the indigenous to those who migrated from Northern Uganda due to the armed conflicts by the Lord's Resistance Army in the 1980s and 90s. It provided the study with a typical representation of the people of Bunyoro sub-region that acted as a reception buffer of communities impacted by the armed conflicts (AAIU 2016), and community where people's values and customs are diverse. The community further, developed panic over the new oil discoveries (Kuteesa 2014) that fuelled tension specifically on land-related conflicts. Therefore, it is a reservoir of information about the resilience of Ugandans in shaping their destiny and a sharp time transaction from the pre-colonial era to the current; providing an environment for envisaging a peaceful and developed Uganda in which each citizen lives a life of dignity. Immersion took three days and three nights with the author referred to as the "social worker" here, staying and living with a family, taking part in community activities and sharing in their lives. Other immerses were representatives of donor community, central government, local governments, leaders of civil society organisations, and the management of Action Aid International in Uganda (AAIU) hosted in 15 families. The role of the intermediary agency (AAIU) was to connect the poor through discussions, movements, and non-verbal communications to dialogue on what they needed to lead a decent life and to design strategies that were disempowering on the part of immerse. Overnight stays were vital for relationships, experiences and relaxed conversations at night (Chambers 2013a, b). The process began with a facilitated discussion with communities in their roles as hosts, stimulating their understanding and reflection on the context, followed by orientation of the Immerse together with their interpreters on host community profile, and immersion management. After the bonding, all moved to host families' destinations for placement, of which experiences are shared. Content analysis is employed to organise the data that is presented in form of narratives, verbatim quotes using pseudo names and the use of pictures to provide a clear description of the worker's pragmatic experiences of immersion.

4.5 RESULTS

4.5.1 *Workers Pragmatic Experiences*

Analysis shows that poverty and inequality were revealed in a context of the periphery. Some of these attributes include location, makeshift housing, isolation, human threats, land conflicts, inaccessibility to social services, long distance to valued resources, little stock, out-migration, gender inequality and insecurity among others. The immersion provided the opportunity to interface with the complex issues of poverty and inequality that are usually not noticed but restrain social change. Noted, was that people living in extreme poverty have resilience, strength and uniquely different forces that they apply to deal with poverty. This suggests that a person's capability to achieve aspirations that he/she has reasons to value provides a general approach to the evaluation of social arrangements and this yields a particular way of viewing the assessment of equality and inequality (Sen 1992) as discussed.

4.5.1.1 *Location*

First and foremost, the location of my host's home (Fig. 4.1) was at the periphery of the village and remote. We indeed walked a very long distance moreover very fast, through bushy areas and it took us two hours to reach home. This distance alone made me realise an inequality gap of absence from the centre of communication. Otherwise, I was prompted to ask my host; "My dear, when are we likely to reach home?" "I am the first to reach and the last to reach" host response. I got somehow scared, but continued to walk: I imagined the response implied "periphery". The process of walking, the environment we passed through and the conversations between us was the beginning of the process of learning, understanding of the living conditions, challenges and likely needs of the Kyakamese community.

4.5.1.2 *Makeshift Housing*

At the time of my immersion experience, my hosts were unable to afford a permanent "iron roofed" house. The house was a hut constructed out of mud and roofed with grass. This was also true for many other households in the Kyakamese community. The roof leaked whenever it rained. One night when it rained, we failed to sleep and instead talked all night. This conversation was far-reaching and a learning experience on my side as it allowed sharing of insights in a relaxed way, but at the

Fig. 4.1 Kyakabuzi
(a) and another threat
(b)



same time compromised productivity. The following day we embarked on the routine activities, but as observed, the work rate was affected by the sleepless night, which was a perfect demonstration of the resilience on the poor household. Moreover, in case nature called, at night, everyone was usually put on “call” to travel to the rest rooms, in darkness, which was about 50 m from the main house and was obviously uncomfortable. However during the period we had a torch that had been provided by ActionAid.

4.5.1.3 Isolation

One afternoon, we went for a burial in the neighbourhood which was 2 kms away. The diseased was old and lived a solitary life in a ramshackle house. Sadly he had no wife but a family that never bothered about his condition at the time he was living. This was a test of African culture and indicative of the failure of the extended family system. His death was discovered by neighbours who had not seen him for days! On arrival

at the burial, I noted that some people were warmly welcomed, accompanied to sit, recognised and invited to talk, which did not happen to my host, despite my host being of age, and a landlord. We had to find where to sit. In reality, I faced and experienced the disadvantages that have been cited by Chambers (1983: 33) which continuously reminds me of the challenge of leaving in a different world—“near but far” but also demonstrates resourcefulness in adapting on the side of my hosts. The experience also offered a lesson that leads to questioning of what can be done to create more just societies. It compares with the saying that poverty cannot be dealt with properly, unless steps are taken to deal simultaneously with the problem of inequality (Oxfam and Arco 2016).

4.5.1.4 *Household Threats*

The household was threatened by harmful insects shown in Fig. 4.1, one of which (a) nearly attacked me. The insect is locally called *Kyakabuzi*, and named after a goat (*Mbuuzi*) because of having a related sound. It grew to a maximum of one foot at maturity. In reference to “*Kyakabuzi*” Chambers (1983) writes that in Nigeria, literate meanings of names for harmful insect provide information about its habits and habitat. Before I saw it, my interpreter had told me of its characteristics. She told me that in case *Kyakabuzi* attacked anyone’s body, the body would be cut or burnt in order to remove it. When I first saw it, I shouted at the top of my voice, since I knew of its unjust acts through a story.

This was a horrible experience that will never be erased off my brain. I was shocked to the extent that I looked around all the time, to see if any was approaching me again! I imagined that peoples’ lives are in danger, both at night and during day. By living in a place, full of harmful insects in a state of housing described in Fig. 4.1, anybody would continuously break the sleep during the night, and that would mean less productivity the following day. I asked my hosts how they cope with such dangerous insects and this was the response:

We leave with them, but they mostly live up in the trees. It is only when the wind disturbs them that they fall down. (Female host)

This probably demonstrated the unconscious capability of being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants and the world of nature (Nussbaum 2000) on the part of my hosts. I keep reminded of this incredibly resilient family that appeared to bear such a challenge

amid others discussed. Until now, I am still struggling to make sense of what would happen if the insect becomes more dangerous to community. However, despite its potential danger to humans, with respect to biodiversity, it could be an opportunity for community tourism, when managed professionally, and thus to the social good of human development.

4.5.1.5 *Land Related Conflicts*

My hosts lived on a small piece of land typical of a poor household. Dialogues revealed that crops were grown for survival, without any surplus for the market. Even in times of plenty, they had limited capacity of yields due to compressed varieties of crops on the same piece of land. The family was likely to experience seasonal hunger, exemplified by the malfunction Silo in Fig. 4.2 that shows no sign of recent harvests.

In addition, many families, including my hosts borrowed (leased) land for cultivation, as my female host told me.

There is some other borrowed land we use together with others in the village to farm. He (husband) does not want to take you there, because it is far and he fears you will get tired. (Female host)

Borrowing of land to make ends meet shows a coping strategy on the part of the poor. However, it has a disadvantage of the borrower not being able to grow perennial crops which would bring in automatic cash flows and certainly related to land conflicts.

Despite shortage of land, even the little that my hosts had, was threatened by land-grabbers. On this, he told me that:

Fig. 4.2 Malfunction Silo



We were friends with Mr Jab's father who encouraged me to settle here. He sold me this land (Kibanja) 25years ago at Ugx 300,000/- for which he and I have an agreement. When Jab became 'the heir' after his father passed on, he does not recognize that agreement because the neighbours who signed on the agreement, a man and his wife both died. He treats me like a stranger and wants to take away my land". I do not know what to do, because when my small piece of land is taken away. I will not have anything left. (Male host)

This questions the notion of freedom and the need for awareness on land laws in Uganda. I also thought of whether Jab comprehends that his actions are widening inequality and an abuse of existing land laws; —a sitting Kibanja holder, having been an occupant for ten years and above, one has the right to stay on a piece of land. In case the landlord wants to sell, the Kibanja holder has the right to be consulted and or given the first priority to buy. This concerns the capability to hold property rights on equal terms with others (Nussbaum 2000), but this would be abused in broad daylight in absence of knowledge of land laws. This is what goes on in the lives of the poor and certainly forces them to think of what next! While I encouraged the host, who were resistant to report the matter, I brought it to the attention of the local leaders, for it was possible to fight this inequality gap.

4.5.1.6 *Limited Access to Basic Social Infrastructure*

My hosts had difficulty accessing the health facility. I also noted absenteeism of health staff at the only government health centre in the community, which was close to 2 km away from my host family, when I visited. However, I could not find the staff at the workstation. I asked the patients who were seated on the bench outside, how I could access the staff, who told me that:

We have been told that she was here in the morning and she is coming back soon. We are waiting for her. (Residents, Kyakamese)

The other patients were seated on ground under a tree, and they told me that:

There was one in the morning who went out, but we are told another one is coming. We have been here for two hours, they have not showed up. (Residents, Kyakamese)

Similar reports came in for Kalangala and Nakasongola (Najjuma 2015). The surprise here is the fact that patients were patiently waiting for health staff with some hope! A sign of endurance on their part. One of them mentioned, the likelihood of the staff spending more time at a private health unit, existing in the nearby town and owned by the said medical personnel. This showed awareness of existing alternative services, although they painfully prioritised access to affordable care. The other alternative would be of self medication. It appeared to me that the agency to hold officers accountable for service and the likelihood that they would value changes resulting out of this initiative was lacking in the people of Kyakamese, which calls for strategies and means to close this inequality gap. In August 2016, the President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, fired nine health personnel at a government Health Centre 111 over absenteeism and late coming, when he visited one district. He replaced staff with medical personnel from Uganda Peoples Defence Forces (New Vision, August 4, 2016). The point to ponder is that if structures and policies (GOU/MOH 2015) exist, did it require a president to discover malfunction in the system! Several authors (Easterly 2006; Fukuda-Parr 2012, 2014; Burchi and Rippin 2015), quoted in OXFAM and Action Research for Development (2016), suggest that the effectiveness of actions and strategies to tackle multidimensional poverty and inequality has been recognised as not simply a matter of resources. Rather, it is shaped by governance processes and mechanisms; the rules, processes and behaviour by which interests are articulated, resources are managed and power is exercised in society (EC 2013).

Important to note, is that accessibility to staff and services in the developing world, not only happen in the health sector but even in other sectors such as education. On this, Jameel (2009), reported that absenteeism of teachers and health workers in developing countries is widespread and unpredictable. On an average day, 27% of teachers in Uganda do not come to class. The situation affects human development as a denial of citizen's timely access to social services and can lead to more deprivations and deaths due to long hours of waiting for unavailable health personnel. Additionally, absenteeism holds the likelihood of the problem to compete directly with productive work. It was important to bring this issue to the attention of local leaders so that the inequality gap can be closed.

4.5.1.7 *Long Distance to Water Points*

The distance to a clean source of water from my hosts' home was about a kilometre and in the valley. That is where we could go to collect water during the immersion period. It was really far away that one would get tired before accessing the water point, since the journey involved climbing the hill with a tin full of water daily, for home use. This kind of **resilience of my hosts, continued to be tested time and again, even though they demonstrated creativity. They were able to innovate** local water collection means as shown in Fig. 4.3 in response to the challenge of long distance, in order to access clean water, an indicator that people can be active and creative with the ability to realise their aspirations.

My hosts told me that the system had the capacity to harvest close to 200 L of rain water per harvest which could be used for some time to escape long distance. But the process of collection required enduring the rains. Although exercising patience as a short-term measure to avoid long distance cannot be relied on. Thus the requirement to address the problem of quality water resource access was much desired policy issue. Although, it shows creativity and ability of the people to act on behalf of themselves, something else needed to be done. On the same path, anyone would ask how to improve community well-being and what next,

Fig. 4.3 Water harvesting system



in an effort to bridge the inequality gap. Overall, this supports O’sullivan’s (2012) argument that immersions give insights and experiences that are not otherwise accessible.

4.5.1.8 *Little Stock*

Most families in the Kyakamese community, including my hosts had little stock with a standard of two goats, a few birds shown in Fig. 4.4 and hardly any cow. My hosts told me that:

We usually sell these birds to solve pressing problems, such as purchase of salt and paraffin. When poverty ‘bites’ you can sell one and buy salt to take you for a few days. (Host family members)

Despite self-denial of the nutritional value found in chicken, salt to my hosts was more important for obvious reasons. This which concurs with the idea that people should be free to refrain from a functioning for good reasons if and when so choose (Deneuline and Shahani 2009).

The little stock in each household was moreover threatened by thieves especially at night which worsened the poverty problem. Discussions with several neighbours of my host family, showed that families formerly with some stock like a cow, goats, chicken, were targeted by thieves and were discouraged from working hard, as one Naka, explained:

That night of the Christmas (December 25th 2015), the thieves came and took the two cows and a calf which I only had. They left nothing. They stole all of them. Why should I work so hard for thieves to take everything for free? (Naka, neighbour to my host family)



Fig. 4.4 All birds gathered to eat maize seeds

In addition, many households reported to sell their little stock and left with none. The challenge however could have been that even the naturally lazy people, were likely to hide among those threatened by theft to keep the whole village in disarray.

4.5.1.9 *Out-Migration*

The village faced emigration of able bodied people and mostly youths to the nearby Masindi Township. Most of them went into the motorcycle riding industry, commonly known as “bodabodas” leaving behind their aged parents to take custody of family land. One Otma whom I met, told me that *he seldom visited Kyakamese on his bodaboda* to check on his family and collect some food for a few days. Those who remained in the village, some without certificates and others relatively educated up to Ordinary or Advanced level, were unemployed and worked on short-term jobs like registration of voters, product promotions, census and also as interpreters on the immersion programme. One Jeni told me that despite being qualified to pursue a diploma, she could not fetch her certificate from a former school, since she never paid fees for the concluding term. Yet, in the process of searching for what to do, men “play” with such girls, many of them were noted pregnant! This was really depressing and had direct impact on human development.

4.5.1.10 *Gender Inequality*

The scope of work done by women in Kyakamese was overwhelming. In a normal household, as in case of my hosts, a woman woke up 3 h before the husband, swept the compound, fetched water, cleaned the house, prepared breakfast and organised kids for school. The husband then would wake up to accompany kids to school which was about 2 kms away. In the meantime, the woman would complete other chores such as washing the dishes and both of them go to the farm when the husband is back. This probably explains why many women were physically older than their age and it seemed routine, but my female host would shoulder it! Besides, several women could bear a combination of chores without spousal support, and headed most families in Kyakamese. I took part in effecting these roles such as sweeping shown in Fig. 4.5 and by the time of sweeping a relatively large compound was done, I was tired to move on to the next activity. Other immersion participants faced comparable experiences.

Fig. 4.5 I and my hostess cleaning the compound



However, through this interaction a lot of information is captured that I would not have shared, had I been a casual visitor. For instance my hostess told me how she did not at all like digging, but because she was married, she endured to keep her husband happy, and besides, she had to feed her children. To address such inequalities, immersion connect those in decision-making positions such as policy makers, activists and NGOs to facilitate “eyes on” experience to pursue and realise the valued goal of sharing domestic work as well as transformation of relations of domination that would consider the “Agency” of women, that women as a vulnerable category have reason to value.

4.5.2 *Closing the Inequality Gap*

Poverty in this community was generally complex and real, but people in extreme cases had their resilience, strength and uniquely different forces that they apply to deal with it. These are important to appreciate by people in decision-making in a collective effort to design measures to improve existing conditions. Immersion gave me some valuable lessons about how the poor and affluent can think together to cause positive change. My connection with the host family and the community of Kyakamese at large was a vital contribution to my understanding of poverty and inequality through the lens of community. I needed this exposure most as it strengthened my belief that I could learn more from this initiative through capitalisation of community knowledge.

4.5.2.1 *Mapping the Economy of Kyakamese*

Participant observations showed that the Kyakamese community was rich in fruits especially in mangoes that were rotten on the roadside and in most people's gardens, but would not be used to promote the economic opportunities. Residents would say that they ate mangoes and got satisfied! On the other hand, they told me that they had no market to sell them. Surprisingly major juice producing industries were at the same time closing their operations in Uganda and in some cases were selling their shares due to lack of supplies. This is supported by (Jaramaji 2015a, b), who noted reasons that farmers could not meet the required fruits needed for juice processing. The decision might have probably been fashioned differently had trusted suppliers, who supposedly were close to markets, connected to Kyakamese through an immersion experience which impacts would cause social change.

Through conversations and taking part in household activities with the poor, it was possible to find a sharp discrepancy between the official definition of poverty, i.e. surviving on less than two dollars a day (Carter and Barrett 2006) taken at the international standards and the reality on the ground. Thinking about our conversations, and at the same time figuring out the opportunity of mangoes as a resource in relation to the functioning of people at Kyakamese, and their predicament to get out of extreme poverty, I sat with my hosts and two other families and together we mapped out the local economy of Kyakamese in Fig. 4.6.

These resources are a reflection of capabilities in this community that would be converted into economic opportunities if the poor were supported through government intervention. Specifically, Simsim's growing entailed shoddy but functioning partnership with Mukwano Industries, that sold seeds to community members and buying the produce on a seasonal basis. This would heighten efforts to raise the incomes of the poor at Kyakamese to acceptable minimum standards. This confirms the belief that poverty cannot be understood without reference to wealth incomes and living standards of society as a whole (Todaro 2000; Chambers 1983).

Alkire and Deneuline (2009) suggest that the human development perspective can be found in the principle of equity; economic and social opportunities as well as distribution and cohesion. This relates to the principle of efficiency, concerning the optimal use of human, material, environmental and institutional resources to expand capabilities for individuals and community. Additionally, the principle of participation and

In Flows (Local government)

- Livelihood funds and supplies
- Employment opportunities
- Development funds
- Mukwano Seed project




Fig. 4.6 The economy of Kyakamese

empowerment of individual and collective capacity to be agents of their own future and the principle of sustainability which is the maximisation of intergenerational utility in terms of environmental, social and economic opportunities in view of ethical rules and moral obligation are also relevant in this context.

4.5.2.2 *Access to Pension*

As noted earlier, the night it rained and we turned the sleep into a conversation, I listened to a great deal of my host's struggles, but what emotionally moved me was the failure of my host to access his pension for over 16 years, after retiring from the army. This could have been due to absence lack of information due to absence of a radio and a television as well as electricity in the household. After the long story it was possible to remedy the situation through building information bridges, by accompanying him to the right office, soon after my stay. Here the story goes:

Veteran host:

My dear, I have visited many offices at the district in an effort to chase my pension. For over 16 years now, I have walked places that I knew would help me, but all in vain. I have presented my documents to trusted offices, they tell me to write letters, my name and my number. I have written, and one time we met the President Representative on the same issue, yet I have not been helped. I have been tossed. I do not know what to do. I know this is not what brought you here, but is there a way you can help me access my money?

Saidah:

Do you have any document relating to what you are telling me?

Veteran host:

My daughter, I have my papers, let me bring them (checking under the bed). These are the papers, but for this one, (*showing a coloured brown paper that was previously white*) I was told never to give it or show it to anyone and to keep it private. I only show you because you are my daughter. However, after I die, my descendants can be able to use it to claim my money. Are you able to help me? I am hopeless; it appears that my money might have been eaten by unknown people.

Saidah:

I will try as we both pray. We will make photocopies and leave me your contacts. I will give you feedback after consultation.

Veteran host:

But I take long to go to the City. In fact I don't have the money. What will I do if they require me to pay?

Saidah:

Let us pray for the best.

What again surprised me was to begin to call myself daughter and indicated the confidence and trust that I could act. Not long after immersion, the necessary arrangements were made and the veteran approached the right office in Mbuya Kampala. Few months later, he called me and indicated that the officers concerned visited him and told him to open up an account where his money would be deposited. Indeed, sharing such experiences in unstaged conversation is what made me realise that immersion impacted on my life and really a memorable experience and a tool for the expansion of peoples entitlements and opportunities to lead a kind of life they have reason to value. This veteran having served the country as an army officer for decades was likely to die a miserable man. Important to note is that this is not an isolated case. It represents many others who will never be able to get justice.

This was an attempt to bridge the inequality gap related to information access which almost vanished the opportunity of a people living in extreme poverty to live their rights and dreams and a contribution towards expansion of freedom. On this, Sen (2002) would say that freedom has two aspects: the opportunity and the process. The opportunity aspect pays attention to the ability of a person to achieve those things that one has reason to value and the process aspect pays attention to the freedom involved in the process itself, which matches well with this immersion arrangement. The contention is that even when one is immersed she/he is not better placed to compel people living in extreme poverty to speak even when they pursue the power to listen. Perhaps this conversation would be a missed opportunity, had the rain not interrupted the sleep, which makes immersion a powerful tool.

4.5.2.3 *Establishment of a New Police Post*

When Immerse are deeply moved, by what they see, hear and perceive using their six senses, they are able to follow up with national policy,

influence and practices. Some are able to use their mandate to contribute to measures that build bridges to lessen poverty and the inequality gap. On the final day in Kyakamese, organisers of immersion held a feedback meeting that saw each immerse bring their baggage of experiences in the presence of all stakeholders. One issue that was shared by all was the problem of theft that kept most host families in poverty as revealed in previous accounts. Nevertheless, one immerse, a senior officer in the Ugandan police forces, when she stood to talk, she “requested” in the end the district police commander to expand police operations to Kyakamese by establishing a police post. This was important for planning at that level which was to be implemented with immediate effect. It also served as an accountability mechanism to citizens realised out of immersion. As indicated earlier, the management of immersion activity were making progress on the poverty and inequality front. The team headed by the director of programmes among other officers were functioning or otherwise the community had to think of alternative ways that would not help.

4.5.2.4 *Advocacy Caravan*

As observed earlier, life of women grows with multiple injustices including, violence, exclusion, discrimination, abuse and the expanding unpaid care work, among others. Under the theme “walk a mile in her shoes” a big advocacy event was held against domestic violence, rape, sexual assault and sexual violence against women and calling a stop to these acts. One immerse at Kyakamese, a commissioner of community policing, in company with ActionAid and other rights organisations, organised an advocacy event six months after. The theme was walk a mile in her shoes, that saw male police officers in women’s heels (Fig. 4.7).

The theme, “Walk a mile in her shoes”—literary, put yourself in the shoes of women—a concept that was coined by feminists, and invented from the backdrop of women as a gender that cannot be measured up to men. This slogan asks men to walk in the same patch as women and feel the burden, agony, difficulty and anxiety it comes with. Daily Nation, Dec. 14, 2016, reported.

Policemen would be heard saying that:

You can imagine how painful it was for me to walk in the women’s shoes. So, now I imagine carrying 9 months pregnancy and then giving birth. It was a difficult situation, the shoes got tone, the legs are breaking, I almost gave up.



Fig. 4.7 Male police officers in women’s heels (source: Daily Nation, Dec, 14 2016)

I had to pick up a bodaboda (motorcycle) in order to reach here. It is not easy to walk in these shoes of women. I have tried today and I have experienced myself. It is hot!

The outcomes of this event were transformational to many participants as shown in these responses. In fact, one of the organisers, the Director of Programs, ActionAid Uganda observed that:

In some instances, like this year, we asked men to walk wearing women’s shoes and they all failed to move even 2 kilometres without complaining and it enabled us start up a dialogue with them on the need to recognise and support women’s rights and gender equality initiatives to reduce the pain women go through.

This was a good innovation that probably would lead to good results as an effort to lessen the gender inequality gap.

Important to recognise is that immersion experiences must facilitate social change and not simply taking part. Chambers (2013a, b) suggests that:

Agreement seems universal that immersions give insights and experiences that are not seen in other ways. Those who participate learn in personal ways about people’s lives, livelihoods and culture, and the conditions they experience. The world can be seen the other way round, from the perspective of those who live in poverty. (Chambers 2013a, b)

According to O'sullivan (2012), people repeatedly say they gained more than just useful insights and knowledge from immersion. They stress and give more importance to experiential learning, personal and emotional impact. Yet it is true that immersions enquire into gaps between reality and rhetoric (Chambers 2007; Najjuma 2016) and the emphasis on pragmatism (AAIU 2016). The specific examples throw more light on this:

Ravi Kabul had an immersion with SEWA in a remote village, Mohadi, in India as part of the preparation for the world development report 2000/2001 for which he was task manager. The immersion experience made him appreciate the gap between macro level strategies and local level realities (O'sullivan 2012).

Chambers is quoted saying that: “*am a great believer in outrage. Feeling outraged at some of the things going on here, and indeed in other countries all over the world, can motivate you to act*” (Action Aid 2013).

Oswald cited the confidence to talk about poverty in rural China with some personal authority, instead of referring to statistics; she could refer to her personal experience (Chambers 2007).

John wrote of immersion as the intense personal moments. It made him restless but hopeful. It disturbed him deeply, but at the same time re-charged and challenged him (Chambers 2013a, b).

Hun observed that spending three days in the community was more moving than reading a 50 page book about how difficult life is in a poor community. The process made the family feel close to immerse and enabled hosts to give certain information that the immerse did not think they would have got from them otherwise (AAIU 2013).

4.6 DISCUSSION

Three days and three nights appear to be a short time to share and learn; however, a lot happens through conversations, reflection, hands-on interaction and interface with non-verbal communication with people living in poverty as shown in the results. When immerse are exposed to poor people's livelihoods, they are more open to learning relevant information to enable facilitate social change from the informed point of view. Through immersion a lot of learning takes place ranging from history, culture, religion and environmental concerns, among others, that are important contributions to social and economic policy development.

Although utilisation of learning may not take place immediately, the experiences in immersion are engraved on immerse's heart and brain (Najjuma 2016), which may inform interventions to end poverty and inequalities in the future. It may entail rethinking existing policies and designing collective strategies for social change. Thus immersion is a means to checking against the complex and diverse realities of the poor people (O'sullivan 2012).

I recall the wisdom exhibited by my hosts that I could never have imagined. At times my host would ask me to recapitulate our discussion that brought me close and alert most of the time to remain "relevant". I was humbled by my hosts involving me in their conversations and activities. In fact I felt honoured with a right to have shared perceived secrets about their poverty status as well as the information that gave me insights about poor people's life experiences, values, struggles and resilience face-to-face. Therefore spending time with people in extreme poverty was a worthwhile time venture. This compared to Vaill (1996), he emphasises that:

learning must be a way of being – an ongoing set of attitudes and actions by individuals and groups that they employ to try to keep abreast of the surprising, novel, messy, obtrusive, recurring events.... (1996: 42)

All in all, engaging people in extreme poverty to articulate their concerns is in itself empowering and provides an opportunity for poor people's voices to be heard by those who believe in supporting poor persons' struggles.

As noted, traditionally, policies and decisions about development innovations are generated out of surveys informed by rapid field visits which Chambers (1983) baptised "development tourism", to direct the flow of resources, which may not prioritise dealing with the realities of poverty and inequality. Thus according to Ul Haq and Ponzio (2008) the real challenge is how to bring the policies of growth and distribution close together and they can be brought together only when the general masses participate.

Indeed:

Local people know what researchers and visitors want when they visit them and they will actually tell them what they want to hear—(personal communication with immersion facilitator)

Immersion experience can reverse and transform the quality of what is done in the name of development (Chambers 2013a, b) but many people create excuses for not finding them. Chambers further identifies three clusters of forces that stand out to constrain immersion. The first is **Personal**: It is easy to make excuses, especially being too busy with “important” work, reluctance to give up what is known, cosy and controllable for the unknown, perhaps uncomfortable and uncontrollable. I fear behaving badly and making a fool of myself, after all I know all about that. I grew up in the village. I don’t have anything to learn about that. The second cluster of forces is **Institutional**: Bureaucratic culture looks inwards and upwards not downwards and outwards. There are so many values and incentives that reward writing good memoranda and reports and speaking well in meetings with important people and other perceived priorities and the low value given to the unimportant poor. Some senior staffs regard immersion as frivolous, useless and feel personally threatened by them. Third force of cluster is **Rhetoric** about development relations; i.e. the convenient political correction of government by the donor agencies and the increased reliance on the insights of partners, supposedly close to poverty by international non-government development organisations. To seek direct personal experience through immersion could then be thought of as untrusting and interfering.

An additional cluster of forces would be that of **Professional**: They claim to have worked with grassroots organisations, traditional and conventional institutions have cumulative works with the poor and marginal communities. I have the experience and comparable competence and the skills. I am an expert in poverty. What more do they need to learn? One might actually work in poverty for a relatively long period of time, when she/he has never seen poverty, because she/he has not found whether it matters. This identifies with the metaphor provided by (Alkire and Deneuline 2009) of owning a bicycle (resource) and by riding it is a functioning. However, if a person is unable to ride perhaps because she has no sense of balance, then having a bicycle will not result into a functioning. Immersion in this case may act as a capability to access good policies. These personal, institutional, rhetorical and professional forces combine to prevent poverty “experts” from getting closer to poverty.

While it seems clear that Immersions connect those in privileged positions to less familiar aspects of poverty (Kanbur 2007; Chambers 2007; Action Aid 2013). Critics further dispute the claim that learning can take place for a few days with statements such as; immersions being interpreted

as an excuse to be out of office for a few days. Others think of immersion as emotionally intense and demanding experience. While others think that simply staying with people living in poverty as a luxury is a sign of pathology (AAIU 2007; Najjuma 2016) giving justifications for creating space for immersion. Even when we acknowledge these assumptions, connecting development decision-makers to immersions cause people in extreme poverty act as agents in creating more just and sustainable social change.

4.7 CONCLUSIONS

The importance of immersion in creating a learning environment with the poor to fight their predicament is often under-rated and lost in contemporary development, yet their knowledge and capacities are required when planning for development. ActionAid Immersion provides the opportunity for enhanced learning, identification and understanding of the less familiar aspects of poverty and inequality. This is because Immerse becomes an insider! It empowers people living in extreme poverty to make their voices heard in a relaxed relationship that makes it difficult to conceal information from those in influential positions. Immersion is a good professional practice, which provides important and worthwhile experiences for all categories of development professionals due to cost effective use of time and results are quickly achieved. Immersion experiences can be useful to any field. It supports the poor to share poverty-related issues, cultivating connections and creating meaningful relationships. Immersion, therefore, seems to unveil the “curtain” between the hosts, outsiders and development, envisioned through conversations, reflection and hands-on interaction with those living in poverty. This is a paradigm shift from projects initiated by outsiders to making the poor directly participate in disentangling the challenges that condition their lives from improved well-being. Immersion connection therefore must not be seen from a narrow perspective of getting off work for a few days, rather a process that can drive development anchored on the lived experiences of the poor.

If well designed, immersion is indeed necessary for making practitioners more responsive and aware of the lives of the people living in extreme poverty. Surely, such interactions are what can motivate people to build better partnerships with the poor connect discussions and keep supporting them find solutions to end their plight. To me as a social

worker and an academician, immersion was personally invaluable in reconstructing my thinking of what I teach shifting the emphasis from theory or classroom teaching to more field emphasis. Enabled rethinking of important questions regarding the curricular, such as what kind of students do we send in the world of work, what difference exists in the graduates we produce? Could there be moments when we suffocate students with less useful theory? Do we encourage students to think of models which have practical application? Do we encourage students to think? So, I had to play an active and influential part in what to put in the curricular, first to change personal mindset, followed by training professional to match contexts and purposes of people living in extreme poverty. It is then crucial to immerse early career development professionals whose skills and competencies directly impact on the poor as their constituency but also seasoned professionals. This concerns preparing students to get exposed to poverty right before they graduate and to respect local knowledge by reinforcing immersion in pertinent courses as a contribution to sustainable change.

Observations and discussions revealed that there were rare opportunities of trade in the Kyakamese community despite the resource endowment. This requires connecting stakeholders to build long-term relationships with people living in poverty and showing long-term commitment to empathise with them through harnessing strategies that reduce poverty. This may entail, advancing social entrepreneurship innovation by creating or linking to markets, hosting of relevant industries so that community assets are put to right use. Immersion suggests that experiences can be useful in social policy reforms to benefit the poor as a way of promoting a responsible economy. It is therefore important to design social policies that protect the poor from exploitation and other vulnerabilities identified already as major components of poverty. The call for promotion of small and medium enterprises may entail boosting informal economic activities through creation of community markets as one way of aiding in poverty reduction. Further, social institutions such as microfinance, banks, which have the potential to solve poverty problems, can be invited to support social businesses, taking an example of sunflower growing at Kyakamese to building the capabilities of communities to improve their well-being.

By going to where the poor live and inviting them to contribute to the ongoing dialogue on the subject of poverty is a measure to reduce inequality and to contribute to social change. Immersion has great influence on immerses as persons, as well as their careers, but the question

is whether immerses have the authority, resources and enough experiences to decide what communities have reason to value, which necessitates keeping in touch and get connected from time to time. Those who usually assume development solutions on behalf of the poor can expand their knowledge and experiences of poverty, with an aim to avert top–bottom service delivery. Therefore, immersion invites a commitment on the part of immerse to support the poor define what is needed to lead a descent life and challenges actors to do what is humanly possible to address poverty and inequality individually and collectively, since the process enables decision-makers to have a direct experience themselves through realism. **Immersion can therefore be adopted as an official policy for anyone individual or institution committed to fighting poverty.**

Finally, immersions were found useful in generating the data that has the potential to cause social change and transform society. It creates an opportunity for the poor to influence policy decisions directly. Immersion is most valuable in appreciating unplanned and unexpected incidences and dimension of poverty and inequality that are hardly accessed by outsiders. Thus, requiring to be implemented side by side with quantitative methods to support national and global level decision-making using real life experiences of the poor. The thinking that outsiders know what needs to be done to solve societal challenges is out of date. It is important to be immersed. Through immersion, one might find complex realities that need simple solutions to overcome. Otherwise, the money will continue to be spent in expensive training programmes, conferences, seminars and exposure trips that are important, but could be harmonised by an immersion experience.

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Tanzania Policies on Water Governance in River Basins: Implications for Livelihoods and Resource Conservation

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5.1 INTRODUCTION

5.1.1 An Overview of Governance and Water Governance

The world has observed an unprecedented deterioration of the fresh-water resource base in terms of both quality and quantity (Akhmouch & Correia, 2016; UN-WATER, 2018). Deteriorated supply of freshwater

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coupled with increased demand resulted from factors such as urbanisation, population growth, economic development and climate change that are reported to trigger scarcity and competition among water users (OECD, 2016; UN-WATER, 2018). The World Water Development Report (WWDR) revealed that because of rapid population growth, the global demand for water might increase by nearly one-third by 2050 (UN-Water, 2018). The WWDR also showed that climate change has affected the global water cycle by making the wetter regions wetter and drier regions even drier. The most recent WWDR revealed that water is scarce and it will continue to become scarcer: two billion people already live in water stress areas and the world will experience water deficit of 40% by 2030 (UN-WATER, 2021).

For quite a long period, the water supply challenges were thought to emanate from physical factors hence most of the responses to redress the challenges focussed on engineering solutions (Herbertson & Tate, 2001). Recently there is a general understanding that most of the water resource problems are largely associated with the failure of water governance rather than physical systems (Alexandra, 2018; Hurlbert & Andrews, 2018; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012; Yu, 2018). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines water governance as: “The set of rules, practices, and processes through which decisions for the management of water resources and services are taken and implemented, and decision-makers are held accountable” (OECD, 2016, p. 1). Governance provides the guidelines under which management activities such as the monitoring, analysis and implementation of water resource programmes operate (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012).

The attention on water governance has grown considerably since the adoption of integrated water resources management (IWRM) as an overall framework for water resources management. The IWRM was defined in the 2002 Earth Summit “as a process, which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related resources in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” (Rahaman & Varis, 2005, p. 15). To facilitate the integration of water resources management, the river basin, through the Basin Water Board (BWB) was chosen as a unit in which different stakeholders including the water users can participate in water decisions below the national levels. At the core of IWRM, there is the subsidiarity principle that advocates decentralisation of water resources management to the lowest possible

level. The water user associations (WUA) have been adopted as the lowest possible structures through which the water users can participate in decision-making processes affecting management and uses of the water resources in their areas. The WUAs are supposed to represent the water users in Catchment Water Committees (CWCs) which in turn represent the water users' interests to the BWBs. Generally, water governance system as framed within the IWRM seeks to enhance good governance of the water resources through regulation of the water users and other actors' behaviours towards the water resources.

The National Water Policy recognises the important role that water resources have on the functioning and development of other sectors in the economy, including the agriculture sector (URT, 2002). To implement water policy in the agriculture sector, the government adopted the national irrigation policy in 2010. The policy was followed by the national comprehensive irrigation guidelines of 2010 and their revised edition of 2019, which require all irrigation activities to be conducted by the use of irrigation schemes in the groups of irrigators called irrigator's organisations (IOs) (URT, 2019, 2010). The registered IOs receive permits on using water from their respective BWB office. While the BWB issues permits that specify the amount of water that an IO can use and charges the associated fees of water use, the district council office educates society on the importance of forming IOs and the procedures for registrations and applications for the permits.

The critical analysis reveals that the IWRM (upon which the National Water Policy (NAWAPO), Water Resources Management (WRM) Act and National Irrigation Guidelines draw their principles) are basically products of the neoclassical economic theories, which give primacy to formal governance rules and systems in the management of natural resources. According to neoclassical economists (see, for example, Coase, 1960; Pigou, 1920), environmental resources are characterised as public goods, therefore they should be regulated through government or private sector mechanisms because the community members have no incentives to manage them sustainably. Through her seminal work on collective action, Ostrom (1990) criticised this outlook and showed that when certain principles are followed, the resource users can establish enduring institutions for resource management.

Like the neoclassical economic theories, the Ostrom's principles came under attack by the critical institutionalists (see, for example, Cleaver, 2001; Hall et al., 2014) for relying on rational choice traditions of the

Western cultures while ignoring the human agency in resources management especially in developing countries influenced by the prevailing social-cultural systems. Critical institutional theorists believe that natural resource users (bricoleurs) mediate resource governance rules through the bricolage process. Through the bricolage process, resource users consciously or unconsciously interpret, modify or combine different formal and informal rules under the influence of widely held social-cultural frameworks. Thus, rather than passive recipients of formal or informal rules, resource users are agents capable of interpreting, altering or aggregating them to suit their interests (Cleaver, 2001).

From the above background, it is clear that the existing theoretical perspectives largely influence the design and implementation of natural resource governance policies, which in turn determine the ability of resource users to conserve, access and utilise the resources for the sustenance of their livelihoods. However, we argue that NR problems are diverse: their nature, magnitude and solutions differ depending on cultural contexts and livelihood options available to the people. Therefore, the study intends to assess the implication of Tanzania policies on water governance in river basins on people's livelihoods and resource conservation. In particular, the chapter links the forms of governance structure that exist in the agriculture livelihood with people's access to irrigated water. The findings from the study are important for the designing of policy initiatives that accommodate the specific local contexts conditions to simultaneously improve livelihood opportunities and conserve natural resources. In the next section, the concepts of livelihoods and resource conservation are reviewed before the analysis of how they can be affected by the existing water governance policies is provided.

5.1.2 Water-Based Livelihoods and Natural Resources Conservation

A livelihood is a combination of the “capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities required for a means of living” (Scoones, 1998, p. 5). The livelihood framework shows the interaction between livelihood resources, livelihood strategies and their implications on livelihood outcomes. Five types of livelihood resources (assets) are identified in the livelihood frameworks, namely human, social, natural, physical and financial capitals (DFID, 1999). Households use assets (livelihood resources) to carry out various activities (livelihood strategies)

to achieve different livelihood outcomes. In rural areas, these strategies include both farming and off-farm employment (Ellis, 1999).

In the governance of natural resources, access and ownership of livelihood resources have long been reported as the economic reasons for adopting conservation behaviours (Aikens et al., 1975). Livelihood resources, both natural and other resources that are owned/controlled by rural people show how wealthy a person is and these resources may be combined to pursue different livelihood strategies. People in rural communities do not have the same access to livelihood resources (Scoones, 1998). Those who possess multiple resources such as land, financial capital and social networks have diverse activities and are less likely to depend on the environment for survival (López-Feldman, 2012). They have a range of options to choose from and they can easily switch between strategies to secure their livelihoods (DFID, 1999). As pointed out by Naughton-Treves and Treves (2005) (as cited in Dickman, 2010) people with multiple income-generating activities are less likely to practice methods that damage the natural environment compared to those who depend solely on natural resource as a single means. People without access to diverse resources tend to depend solely on natural resources for their survival, thus may find that their conservation efforts actually compromise their livelihood needs (Sesabo et al., 2006).

Livelihood framework shows that access to resources and the choices of livelihood strategies are modified by the institutional context. This shapes the extent to which people are able to draw on or develop resources in order to sustain their livelihoods. Ellis (1999) categorised the institutional context into organisations, formal rules and cultural norms. Natural resources are shaped largely by the policies, rules, regulations and organisations in which they are governed. Organisations may affect natural resources through policy formulation and implementation (DFID, 1999), formal rules and regulations constrain people's behaviours when interacting with environments (North, 1990), while cultural norms regulate informal social relations governing resource use. All these institutional systems determine the way resources are accessed and used to produce different livelihood outcomes among different social groups (Ellis, 1999).

Sustainable livelihood outcomes are important concepts in livelihood framework as they show how people can use resources to enhance their livelihoods and maintain their natural environment at the same time. Sustainable livelihood outcomes can range from increased income, increased well-being, reduced vulnerability and improved food security, to

the more sustainable use of natural resources (DFID, 1999). According to Brundtland (1987), livelihood is sustainable when it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (p. 43). Thus, sustainable livelihoods are the ones that develop the assets on which they depend, without destroying the natural resource base. Of importance in the idea of sustainable livelihoods is continuity and adequacy of resources people can draw to enhance their lives in addition to availability and diversity. Livelihood strategies are likely to collapse if resources are short-lived or not adequate enough to support people's lives continuously. Whether livelihood strategies are sustainable or not depends largely on the existing policies governing the resources. In relation to water-based livelihoods, policies governing water resources have a central role.

Conservation efforts require creating solutions that consider the interaction between ecological and socio-economic systems to meet the dual goals of natural resources conservation and livelihood enhancement (Berkes, 2021a, 2021b; Charles & Berkes, 2021). People are an integral part of environmental conservation because of their dependency on natural resources to undertake livelihood strategies. Thus, the quality of natural resources depends among other things on human behaviour patterns (Steg & Vlek, 2009). People can consciously/unconsciously use methods that conserve/degrade natural resources when pursuing livelihood strategies. The "behaviour that consciously seeks to minimise the negative impact of one's actions on the natural and built world" (Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002, p. 40) is referred as pro-environmental behaviour. In most theories of human behaviour in relation to the use of natural resources (neoclassical theories, mainstream and critical institutionalism), pro-environmental behaviour is mediated by policies at various levels and institutions (both formal and informal) (see, for example, Cleaver, 2001; Coase, 1960; Ostrom, 1990; Pigou, 1920). In recent attitudinal studies, environmental awareness is considered an important determinant of pro-environmental behaviour (see, for example, Aregay et al., 2018; Paço & Lavrador, 2017; Pothitou et al., 2016). Environmental awareness is an outcome of possession of environmental knowledge that is gained through formal education and informal one derived from local and traditional knowledge. People with environmental knowledge are assumed to have the ability to recognise environmental problem and create their solutions (Zareie & Navimipour, 2016).

Historically, before the twentieth century, environmental knowledge was an area specific, generated to solve certain local context problems (Charles & Berkes, 2021; Garcia et al., 2014). The knowledge was gained informally through life experience, learning by doing and beliefs and norms on environmental issues (Aregay et al., 2018; Pothitou et al., 2016). In the modern states of twenty-first century, environmental knowledge is largely gained through formal education, especially the one that is informed by conventional scientific theories (Charles & Berkes, 2021). While science and innovation have expanded technologies on conservation of natural resources, the world still experiences the degradation of natural resources such as deforestation, depletion of water resources and fishery collapse (Akhmouch & Correia, 2016; UN-WATER, 2020). One of the reasons for natural resource problems is the neglect of knowledge sources other than conventional scientific ones (Charles & Berkes, 2021, p. 4). The recent literature goes back from the old local conservation methods and emphasises the recognition and incorporation of indigenous knowledge on natural resources conservation programmes (see, for example, Berkes, 2021a, b; Díaz et al., 2018). Indigenous technologies and practices are explained to provide better solutions to environmental and livelihood challenges at the local levels. The achievements of positive local solutions, cumulatively, will bring positive impact at the global level.

5.2 TANZANIA'S EXPERIENCES ON WATER GOVERNANCE POLICIES

5.2.1 *Policies on Governance of River Basins*

Tanzania adopted its first national water policy in 1991. The goal of the policy was to provide clean and safe water to the entire population. The policy focussed on the development of water resources rather than its management and protection. Although the existing act at that time, the Water Utilisation (Control and Regulation Act) No. 42 of 1974, as amended in 1981, delegated management of water resources to river basins, the implementation strategy of the policy mentioned the central government as the “sole investor, implementer and manager” of the water-related projects all over the country (MoWLD, 2002, p. 5).

In 1992, only a year after the launch of the first water policy, Tanzania participated in the Earth Summit and signed the Agenda 21 (MoWLD, 2002). Consequently, it became necessary for the country to reform

some of its sectors, including water resources. In 1997, Tanzania adopted its first national environmental policy with four objectives related to the water resources sector. One of its objectives was the application of the integrated approach in the planning and implementation of water resources, including the protection of water catchment areas and their vegetation cover (VPO, 1997). The policy also emphasised the valuation of ecosystem services including water resources by putting institutions for the user charges. The other two objectives are related to the protection of wetland areas and the improvement of technology for safe water supply.

Currently, governance of water resources is guided by the National Water Policy (NAWAPO) adopted in 2002. This policy explicitly includes the IWRM tenets and considers them a cornerstone for the effective management of the country's water resources (MoWLD, 2002). Within this framework, a river basin is considered a focal unit through which water resources can be governed sustainably. The current policy also has changed the role of government from that of a "service provider" to the "coordinator of the sector", including formulation of policy, guidelines and regulations.

In addition to NAWAPO, the government adopted a Water Sector Development Programme (WSDP) in 2006, which sets the framework for the implementation of water policy. The major goal of the WSDP is to strengthen the institutions of water resources management (WRM) and to improve access to water supply and sanitation.

5.2.2 *The Institutional Framework*

To enhance the implementation of NAWAPO, the institutional framework for WRM had to undergo some restructuring which resulted in the formulation of different boards/committees for the management of water resources, especially after the enactment of the 2009 Water Resources Management Act of 2009. These include the National Water Board (NWB), Basin Water Boards (BWBs), Catchment Water Committees (CWCs) and Water User Groups/Associations (WUAs). The district council is also included as a part of the WRM institutional framework. Its role in WRM is to participate in BWBs and CWCs, develop district WRM plans in accordance with the basin's plan, protect and conserve natural resources in the wards and villages, establish bye-laws on WRM and use bye-laws to resolve conflicts in water uses (MoWLD, 2002, p. 28). By the end of WSDP1, all nine BWBs were operational and Ninety WUAs

were formed. In addition, thirty-eight CWCs were identified and the procedures for their formation had already been initiated (MoW, 2014).

Since the enactment of the Water Resources Management Act, people at the community level have started to participate in WRM through water users' groups (WUGs) such as irrigators, fishers and pastoralist groups. The subject of valuing water as an economic resource (as recommended in the 1997 national environmental policy) is addressed in the NAWAPO and its institutional frameworks. The policy and the 2009 Water Resources Management Act indicate the issuing of water rights and the collection of the various fees and charges as among the roles of BWBs. Fees and charges on water use would transform water into an economic good. Payment for water resource use was expected to raise people's awareness of the importance of conserving water resources through reducing the use of water (Sokile & van Koppen, 2004).

Water rights can be held by either an individual person/organisation or a group of people (collectively). Thus, to reduce the cost of obtaining rights for the smallholder's users, the government promoted the formation of WUGs (van Koppen et al., 2007). Through WUG, a group of resource users can apply for a single right to use water resources and share the associated cost. This lowers the cost of using water compared to when the permit is issued to an individual person. In addition, the government found that the collection of fees from users' groups is more convenient compared to individual users (van Koppen et al., 2007).

Generally, water use permits and tariffs were tools that the government thought would enhance control of water exploitations in different areas of the country and promote its sustainability for the present and future generations. These tools however were adopted without paying attention to how they will affect conservation behaviours and the water-based livelihoods especially in rural areas (Lalika et al., 2015).

5.3 METHODOLOGY

5.3.1 *Study Areas*

This chapter was written based on the findings of two PhD researches on "household development strategies and their linkage to river basin resources degradation in Tanzania" and "Policy Implementation under Multiple Institutions: Assessment of Water Allocation Processes and

Conflicts in Selected Tanzania's Irrigation Schemes" in the Wami-Ruvu Basin.

The study was conducted at Ziginali and Kiroka Irrigation Schemes in the Kilombero and Ruvu River sub-Basins respectively. The Ruvu and Kilombero sub-Basins are among the sub-basins forming the Wami-Ruvu and Rufiji River Basins respectively. The Wami-Ruvu and Rufiji Basins are among the nine River Basins that have been established by the government.

The main river draining the Ruvu sub-Basin is Ruvu. River Ruvu originates from the Uluguru Mountains and has three major tributaries namely the Mgeta river flowing from North West, Ngerengere river from the Northern part and Ruvu side stream. The river flows its water into Indian Ocean through Morogoro and Kibaha District, in Tanzania Mainland. At the confluence of its tributaries, the river slope is gentle and it forms a wetland (JICA, 2013). Kiroka Irrigation Scheme is found at Kiroka Village, one of the catchment areas for the Ruvu Sub-Basin.

The Kilombero Basin is located in the Kilombero valley flood plain in Morogoro Region (eastern part of Tanzania). The basin receives its water from the Udzungwa Mountains, Mahenge Mountains and mountain ranges in the Iringa and Mbeya Regions. At Ifakara town, different streams merge into one mainstream to form the Kilombero River. Other rivers join the Kilombero River downstream. Thereafter, the Kilombero River leaves the flood plain area and flows down into Rufiji River (Ramsar, 2002), the largest river in Tanzania. One of the catchment areas for the Kilombero Basin is Ziginali Village, where the Ziginali scheme is located.

As a result of the government measures to improve irrigated farming for smallholder farmers, the Kilombero and Ruvu Sub-Basins have experienced the extension of irrigation activities. In these areas, there have been some transformations towards commercial agriculture due to the presence of modern irrigation schemes, which allow growing of crops throughout the year. Modernisation of irrigation infrastructures and commercialisation of agriculture has led to superimposition of formal water access and utilisation rules on the traditional systems formally used to guide water resources management and sharing among the people in these areas. It was perceived that superimposition of formal institutions had some implications on people's livelihoods and conservation practices. It is against this background that the study areas were selected. They were perceived to have pertinent characteristics for understanding the policy implications on water resources conservation and people's livelihoods.

5.3.2 *Study Design*

The studies that informed our findings were based on a cross-sectional case study research design and intended to investigate how people's livelihoods managed through smallholder irrigation and informal conservation rules and norms have been affected by the existing Tanzanian policy on water resource governance.

Cross-sectional case study design was preferred because of its flexibility. Flexibility, which allows triangulation of various research methods and techniques (Turnbull et al., 2021), was considered important in this study for capturing evolving nature of water conservation and rural livelihoods. Particularly, it was found that triangulation of in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and documentary reviews was crucial for a deep understanding of the evolving nature of resources management rules and its implications on conservation behaviours and people's livelihoods.

5.3.3 *Sampling Techniques and Sample Size*

Purposive sampling was used to draw the sample of key informants who comprised the DAICOs and scheme leaders as well as the irrigators. The snowball sampling was used to get elders among the water users who knew about the history of water conservation in the study areas. We adapted the theoretical sampling technique, in which the size was determined after saturation point was achieved (Qureshi, 2018). Based on this technique, the sample size of 30 participants was determined. Among these participants, 2 were DAICOs one for Kilombero and another for Morogoro District Councils, 2 were irrigation officers 1 from Morogoro and 1 from Kilombero District Councils, 2 environmental officers 1 from Morogoro and another 1 from Kilombero District Councils, 4 Four were scheme leaders 2 from KIS and 2 from Zignali Irrigation Schemes and 20 were ordinary irrigators 10 from the Kiroka and 10 from Zignali irrigation Schemes, among them 4 were elders 2 from Kiroka and 2 from Zignali Irrigation Schemes, who knew the history of irrigation and water conservation in the areas.

5.3.4 *Data and Data Collection Methods*

Data were collected through documentary reviews, in which the water policy of 2002, Water Resource Management Act No. 11 of 2009, Water Utilisation (Control and Regulation) Act No. 42 as amended in 1981, Water Supply and Sanitation Act No. 5 of 2019, the Water Sector Development Programme II (2014/2015–2018/2019) and the Constitutions for Kiroka and Ziginali Irrigations Schemes were reviewed. Data were also collected through focus group discussions (FGDs) with smallholder irrigators in Kilombero and Ruvu sub-Basins and in-depth interviews with District Agricultural, Irrigation and Cooperative Officers (DAICOs), Irrigation Officers and Environmental Officers from Kilombero and Morogoro District Councils and Scheme Chairpersons and Secretaries.

5.3.5 *Validity and Reliability*

Validity and reliability of the research instruments and findings respectively were enhanced through triangulation technique. According to Hayashi et al. (2019) triangulation is important for enhancing validity and reliability in qualitative research as it increases the understanding of the study in question and quality of the study findings. In this study, triangulation of three data sources namely, in-depth interviews, documentary reviews and focus group discussions was done to enhance understanding about people's perceptions of water resources management and utilisation rules and their implications on livelihoods.

Some limitations were specific to one district. During the period of data collection, there was a land conflict between farmers and livestock keepers. Government also had intentions to reduce the number of cattle in the district to protect environmental degradation. Some of the respondents were not comfortable to give answers to some of the questions. Therefore, the disclosure of exact information regarding assets possessions and water use behaviour to some of the respondents were some of the limitations that could affect the validity of the study. However, the problem was solved through explaining the aim of the research and eventually trust was gained throughout the interview process.

5.3.6 *Ethical Considerations*

Research ethics were maintained by providing the participants with the freedom to decide whether to participate in the study or not (Kang & Hwang, 2021). Participants were fully informed of what the study was all about and how the data will be used. The research participants were also assured of anonymity of their identity and confidentiality of information that they provided during the study.

5.4 RESULTS

5.4.1 *Livelihoods Strategies in Kilombero and Ruvu Sub-Basins*

Kilombero and Ruvu sub-Basins are important sources of livelihood for local people. Consequently, it provides opportunities for people to conduct irrigation activities during the dry seasons (Jogo & Hassan, 2010). The sub-Basins are also important areas for the reproduction of different kinds of species of fish in the downstream areas (PMORALG, 2010). In addition, the basin supplies freshwater to both rural and urban areas for domestic purposes and is an important source of hydroelectric power.

Historically, the livelihoods of inhabitants of Kilombero and Ruvu sub-Basins have depended on subsistence agriculture and fishing. In these sub-Basins, agriculture has been transformed to a more commercial strategy due to the presence of modern irrigation schemes, which allow growing of crops throughout the year. In addition, access to the market facilitated, partly by the growing urban populations in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma and Morogoro, the cities where the two sub-Basins are located, has promoted irrigation and rain-fed agricultural activities. However, we found that all irrigators in Kiroka and Zignali Irrigation Schemes were still practicing subsistence agriculture.

5.4.2 *Water Policy Implementation in Ruvu and Kilombero Sub-Basins*

As mentioned in the previous section, the National Comprehensive Irrigation Guidelines of 2010 and their revised edition of 2019, the NAWAPO and WRM Act require all irrigation activities to be conducted through the IOs which are registered and have water use permits. This requirement also determines access to the benefits of modern irrigation schemes.

The Kilombero and Morogoro Districts, where the Kilombero and Ruvu Sub-Basins respectively belong, have started to implement the National Policies and Acts on water. In 2013, the Wami-Ruvu, the Basin where the Ruvu sub-Basin is located, had 173 irrigation schemes (JICA, 2013). Likewise, during the time of data collection in Kilombero sub-Basin, there were 16 modern irrigation schemes, five of which were in their permanent operations while the remaining 11 schemes were in different stages of construction. The establishment of modern irrigation schemes stimulated the formation of IOs and enabled some farmers to abandon traditional irrigation, however, the majority still irrigate traditionally under the guidance of informal rules (See, for example, Fig. 5.1). These rules help them in sharing, developing and maintaining their water resources.

In Zignali Village of the Kilombero sub-Basin, there are inter-village agreements on the use of water. To avoid conflicts, villagers have agreed on the three-day basis rotation whereby each hamlet in the village gets



Fig. 5.1 Modern and Traditional Irrigation Schemes in Kilombero Sub-Basin. Left hand side—the modern irrigation scheme and Right hand side—the traditional irrigation scheme at Zignali Village in Kilombero

access to water for three days and then leaves access to the other hamlets to access it for the subsequent three days. The same system is used in accessing water in Zignali Irrigation Scheme. The Scheme has its own leaders and rules that should be adhered to by all members in the management and utilisation of water. Members of the groups are responsible for overseeing that the rules are followed. They also impose sanctions upon those who break the rules. These findings are in line with the study by Sokile and van Koppen (2004) who found out that local water rights and rotations are widely used and more influential than formal arrangements especially in the dry seasons.

Similarly, the study found prevalence of informal irrigation and rules and practices in Ruvu sub-Basin, especially, the Kiroka irrigation scheme (KIS) where farmers undertake irrigated farming mostly for rice, vegetables and fruits. Before the improvement of the Kiroka Irrigation Scheme started, the farmers in Kiroka Village had already started to engage in traditional irrigation farming. The villagers abstracted water from the traditional intake facility collectively built and maintained by the farmers. Traditional allocation rules based on participation in the maintenance of the intake determined access to the resource. In 2004 following modernisation of the intake facility and lining of parts of the conveyance canal by the government, the farmers decided to formalise their group to *Umoja wa Umwagiliaji Kiroka* (UWAUKI) or in English Association of Irrigators in Kiroka Village.

Despite the availability of the formal irrigators' groups, focussed group discussions and in-depth interviews with government officers from the District Councils revealed that the majority of the farmers in the study areas opted to cultivate on their farms outside the schemes where there are no resource users' group's rules, for instance, payment of water fees and the application of pesticides and fertilisers. This means that the presence of new infrastructures in small-scale irrigation schemes brings more benefits to people with access to different livelihood resources such as cash and credit than those who do not have it. Consequently, this situation further exacerbates inequalities between differently positioned people in the villages. Generally, our study has confirmed the argument by critical institutionalists that the formal water management and allocation rules undergo some mediation by the actors who in our case seemed to prefer mostly their traditional ways of doing things instead of adapting to new formal rules.

5.4.3 *Policy Implications on Livelihoods Strategies*

As pointed out earlier that the government policy requires people to practice irrigated farming through IOs. However, our studies in Kilombero and Ruvu Sub-basins revealed that farming by the use of modern irrigation scheme under the guidance of formal rules is not a livelihood strategy that is readily available to all groups of people. The majority of the poor smallholder farmers lack access to cash or credits to buy the inputs that are required in irrigated farming thus despite owning land inside the scheme areas, they are normally excluded from modern irrigation. The findings conform to the argument that livelihoods are gained not only through the physical ownership of the resources but also by the ability of people to benefit from those resources (Leach et al., 1999; Ribot & Peluso, 2003) determined by the existing property right rules and structural and relational mechanisms.

While some farmers have been excluded from modern irrigation due to financial constraints, others have been left out due to their disagreements over the new rules of allocating water. In modern irrigation schemes, farming often obliges a switch from multi- to mono-cropping (Kissawike, 2008). In Ruvu and Kilombero basins, modern scheme favours the production of paddy rice mostly for commercial purpose. Shifting to paddy rice production was not a problem in Kilombero basin because its flood plain is conducive for the production of paddy rice. In Ruvu sub-Basin, farmers, in some villages have refused to join UWAUKI, the group mandated to own and control the Kiroka Irrigation Scheme mainly due to disagreements over mono-cropping policy. A good example is found in Mahembe Hamlet of the Kiroka Village where irrigators are historically not rice farmers due to topographic conditions of their land. Despite long-time appeals, the UWAUKI leaders have failed to relax the rules and allow the Mahembe farmers to irrigate tomatoes and other vegetables instead of rice. This decision has fuelled conflicts and affected the capacity of people in this hamlet to manage their livelihoods through the utilisation of water as they used to do before the modern scheme was built.

5.4.4 *Policy Implications on Water Conservation*

The existing literature shows that people in local communities are historically good environmental conservers (Katani, 2010; Komakech et al., 2012). The local people conserve environment through the traditional engineering techniques such as terracing to preserve soil moisture and using traditional rules and norms. In our study, we found that conservation strategies are mainly practiced through traditional rules and norms as well as modern regulations. For example, interviews with elders revealed that the Ndamba (one of the tribe groups in Kilombero sub-basin) had norms that did not allow some of the degradation practices such as cultivating in the valleys and at the water catchment areas or catching small fishes. The water catchment areas and big forests were used for rituals. People could not visit those areas without an escort of traditional leaders.

In Kiroka Village of the Ruvu sub-Basin, there were traditional norms that prohibited cutting of some trees, supervised by traditional Chief known as Kingalu Mwana Banzi. To avoid water contamination, such norms also did not allow women who are in menstruation periods to bath in the rivers during the daytime. In Kilombero, the Ndamba culture prohibited bathing in the rivers during the morning time to allow the availability of safe and clean water for household uses. Most of the cultural norms that helped to conserve the environment and water quality are no longer followed. Because of this situation environmental degradation, including degradation of the water sources has been high in the study areas. For example, in Zignali Village of the Kilombero sub-Basin, during focus group discussions participants mentioned that their river used to have a deep depth that it could not be crossed by walking, even in the dry season. Now the situation is different: people can cross the river without using boats or bridges. This river used to flow throughout the year now it has changed to be a seasonal one. All these show that the environment is degraded as one of the respondents said:

Our village used to have a lot of valleys/ wetlands that we respected. The valleys provided us with vegetables that grow naturally. We never cultivated at those areas. We just go there to collect the vegetables that we believed were good to eat because of their medicinal *and health benefits*. Now, *people have cultivated those areas. We can no longer get the vegetables that used to grow on those areas.*

The study found that commercialisation of water through imposition of water use fees and permits and formalisation of irrigation through IOs in Kilombero sub-basin has stimulated large-scale irrigation, mostly by immigrants from distant areas, who can afford the costs of modern irrigation. While the immigrants are considered to bring opportunities, our study, in line with the argument by Monson (2012) found that their arrival has intensified competition over water and killed the environmental conservation culture found in indigenous irrigation systems. In Kiroka Village of the Ruvu sub-Basin, villagers used to conserve water resources and its environment through collective work groups under the local system called *Msalagambo*. This system allowed people in villages surrounding the KIS to collectively participate in development activities. Among the activities undertaken through *Msalagambo*, is cleaning of the scheme environment to ensure the cleanliness of the canal and smoothly flow of water from the source to the farms. Apart from the scheme cleanliness, *Msalagambo* is also used by the UWAUKI group to search for horse pipes that are illegally connected to the scheme and dismantle them. The people work in *Msalagambo* without any payments and are organised under the supervision of the local leaders.

Msalagambo used to be a very useful initiative in water resources conservation and protection of the environment surrounding water sources. The study found that because of inequality and competitions over water access, few people nowadays support *Msalagambo*. During interviews, the scheme leaders admitted that the villagers, especially those who do not benefit from the scheme due to lack of water use permits, nowadays do not work under *Msalagambo* willingly. Because of this situation, the protection of water resources has been difficult in the area. Generally, despite being mandated to manage and control water exploitations in the scheme and the surrounding areas, the UWAUKI group has not been capable to prevent free and unregulated abstractions by those who steal water. This scenario shows incongruence between what the policy prescribes on water conservation and the conditions in the implementation areas.

5.5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.5.1 *Conclusion*

Over time, the policies on the governance of water resources have been changed to reflect the priorities of the contemporary government systems. In Tanzania, the governance of water resources moved from a focus on a centralised system to a more participatory approach that includes different stakeholders in the planning and management of resources. The institutional framework for the implementation of the policy was also designed to support stakeholders' participation in water resource governance. The new policy and its institutional framework have been successful in helping people to organise water resource users' groups such as IOs. Through these groups, resource users have been able to join collective efforts to acquire water permits. IOs also provide opportunities for resource users to gain access to other services from the government, for example, credits and farming extension services. As a result, some people have started improving their livelihood strategies, which also translates into the improvement of their livelihoods.

Despite the success stories, the chapter has also highlighted that the institutional frameworks have not adequately included the majority of smallholder water resource users in the policy implementation. While the policy is based on the good intention of devolving the task of water resources management towards the lowest governance level of the basin, large-scale farmers tend to accrue more benefits from the implementation of the policy compared to smallholder (poor) resource users. This is simply because involvement in IOs requires a certain amount of financial capital to pay for membership charges and other costs associated with irrigation farming. While the national water policy aims to benefit all stakeholders, including smallholder users, local conditions seem to favour those who can afford the cost. Generally, some people feel that the new policy has taken their important livelihood resources and re-allocated them to people with access to financial capitals.

5.5.2 *Recommendations*

This chapter pays particular attention to the impact of water policy on people's livelihoods and resource conservation. Several policy recommendations are suggested based on the findings from this study. First, there is a need to design strategies that include the majority of smallholder

resource users in the implementation framework of the existing water policy. In this regard, we recommend that the government, through its local authorities and social security agencies, design affirmative action that will enable the majority of poor users to accrue benefits from the water policy. For instance, the locally created groups could be a good starting point for the implementation of the water policy. Most local resource users are represented at these local groups. Instead of creating new associations of water users that tend to attract the outsiders, the policy guidelines could have the targets of strengthening the existing local groups by equipping them with necessary skills and resources to enhance their capacity to access and use water for improving their livelihoods. Moreover, the institutional contexts in the governance of river basins in the country need to be improved to accommodate the traditional conservation norms, rules and practices to enable the local communities to participate effectively in resource conservation. Informal water governance practices can offer good inputs on the crafting of the formal institutions for water resources management in Tanzania and Africa generally.

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Farmer Groups Approach to Rural Development in Morogoro, Tanzania: A Study of the Activities Performed and Challenges Experienced

Venosa Mushi and Adolf Makauki

6.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Three billion people live in rural areas in developing countries and the number will continue to rise for the next 15 years. Conditions for them are worse than for their urban counterparts when measured by almost any development indicator. Thus, in order to attain the new Sustainable

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Development Goals (SDGs), there should be greater progress in rural development (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2016a; Dahlman, 2015). Rural people in the developing world, Tanzania included, depend on agriculture as the main provider of employment and hence as a source of livelihood (OECD, 2016b; United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] and United Republic of Tanzania [URT], 2014; URT, 2014). According to OECD (2018), agriculture accounts on average for 37% of rural youth employment, but the figure goes much higher in low-income countries such as Liberia (63%), Malawi (64%), Uganda (71%) and Madagascar (79%).

As a result of rural people's dependency on small-scale agriculture for their livelihood, the Tanzanian government and different development partners have been exerting efforts on rural development (RD) and specifically more so in agriculture, since independence in 1961. The reason has been that, developing agriculture in rural areas would provide employment and hence contribute not only to RD, but also to the national economy and poverty reduction at large. Agriculture in Tanzania contributed to about 29% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2016, which was the largest contribution, surpassing all other sectors, except the services sector (National Bureau of Statistics [NBS], 2018; Tanzania Economic Outlook, 2016; OECD, 2016b; URT, 2014). The sector is dominated by small-scale farmers and is also the main source of employment and livelihood for more than 75% of the Tanzania's mainland households. It further contributes to over 60% of export earnings, provides 65% of raw materials for industries and enhances food production (NBS, 2014, 2018; URT, 2010).

Since most Tanzanians live in rural areas, engaging mainly in smallholder farming, it is important from the context of development policy to develop both the agricultural sector and the rural areas for successful poverty reduction. As argued by Ryan and De la O Campos (2019), smallholder farmers are the rural poor living in rural areas. Thus, developing the rural areas is expected to increase productivity and consequently improve food security and farm income via direct production and farm surplus. In realising the substantial contribution of agriculture to the economy of Tanzania, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) II has identified it as an important driver of economic growth (NBS, 2014). In the same vein, one of the principal objectives of the Tanzania Development Vision (TDV) 2025 is to build a strong and resilient economy that can effectively withstand global competition. The

vision states that the economy is expected to be transformed from a low productivity agricultural economy to a semi-industrialised one. Thus, it is envisioned that Tanzanians will have graduated from a least developed country to a middle-income country by the year 2025 (URT, 2014).

Since independence in 1961, the government of Tanzania proclaimed the development of the rural areas as the cornerstone of the country's development strategy (Chilwa, 1985). Given the fact that the majority of people reside in rural areas, RD strategy remains to be viable and relevant as it is a strategy designed to benefit both urban and rural population. The strategy is designed to improve the economic and social life of the rural poor. Dahlman (2015) argues that, effective RD strategies are necessary to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It is further insisted under the SDGs that resources will be devoted to, among others, developing rural areas and supporting smallholder farmers in developing countries, particularly least developed countries (United Nations, 2015).

In order to pave a smooth road to RD, Tanzania has adopted different and radical approaches and or strategies over time, although there has been limited improvements in the living standards of rural areas over the past decades. Sequentially, the approaches towards RD move from "Ujamaa" period of socialism and forced villagization, to strong economic liberalisation and poverty reduction (OECD, 2016b). Each phase has some approaches and or strategies to attain RD. The approaches under each phase will be elaborated in the succeeding sections.

Farmer groups (FGs) in Kilombero and Morogoro Districts in Tanzania, have been among the approaches that play a significant role in RD (Laizer, 1999; Swai, 1998; Nombo, 1995). Despite all the merits or the vital contribution of FGs as an approach to RD, literature on the challenges encountered by the groups in the process of RD in Tanzania, is deficient, the fact which makes them not well known to the academic society.

It is the objective of this study therefore to firstly identify the main activities performed by FGs members in the study area, and secondly, identify and analyse the challenges experienced by the members in their struggle to improve their well-being. The corresponding research questions are:

- i. What are the main activities performed by FGs members in the study area?

- ii. What challenges are experienced by the members of FGs in their struggle to improve their well-being?

The findings of this study will be useful to policy makers and RD planners as they will reveal the potential of FGs and actual challenges experienced by group members. The findings will hence provide inputs in designing a mechanism of assisting farmers in reducing rural poverty. The next section presents the theoretical foundation, followed by the concept of farmer groups, approaches to rural development in Tanzania, group approach, the role of FGs in rural development, methodology, results and discussion, and lastly, conclusions and recommendations.

6.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

In recognising the importance of working in groups to promote development, various scholars and institutions have exerted enormous efforts to study and document the history and practice of collective action. According to Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004), collective action is important in various ways in rural development programmes, management of natural resources and agricultural development. In a special way, the authors provide an account of the methods for studying different aspects of collective action in rural development while emphasising the need for more research about the factors that affect the development and performance of the approach.

In tracing the development of collective action as a study area, Gillinson (2004) contends that theories for studying collective action have not experienced a smooth path since its emergence in Aristotle's era. According to the author, the philosopher emerged with the "Tragedy of the Commons" when he observed "What is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed on it". From this point, other scholars including sociologists and economists have dominated the study of collective action. For example, in the beginning of the twentieth Century, some sociologists led by Arthur Bentley proposed Group Theory. The theory asserts that a group will be formed by individuals with a common purpose and perception towards the benefit expected from the cooperation for the common good (Gillinson, 2004).

In 1965, through his seminal paper "*The Logic of Collective Action*", Mancur Olson challenged the idea of common good (or community collective action). Instead, the scholar proposed either the establishment

of small-sized groups, which would encourage voluntary members to contribute for and thus benefit from the success of their groups or the introduction of some kind of coercion to make individuals act in their common interest (Ostrom, 2000). Olson's point of view was that rational and self-interested people would not act to achieve their community's common interest but rather where they could benefit without cost, they would do so (Ostrom, 2000; Gillinson, 2004). This idea grew and spread widely in the body of literature from the type and size of cooperation to the type of activities performed (e.g. farmer groups) under different programmes for rural development. A brief discussion of farmer groups is presented in the next section. Since this article is not about comparing different theories of collective action, an extensive review in the comparison of different theories is not done.

As seen above, the central focus in studying collective action for rural development is the existing or practised cooperation, which is fundamental in human society (Gillinson, 2004; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). In Europe and the United States of America, this cooperation led to formal establishment of cooperative societies, or simply cooperatives whose successes caused the establishment of state-sponsored cooperatives in developing countries from the 1960s (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). After the adoption of Arusha Declaration, Tanzania became one of the countries, which sponsored the establishment and operation of cooperative societies particularly for farmers of major cash crops. As a result, collective action at a community level surfaced the public policy decisions in Tanzania from the 1960s to 1970s through socialism and self-reliance (Oyugi and Makauki, 2010).

6.2.1 *The Concept of Farmer Groups*

Farmers groups work together in various ways and different functions (Oxby, 1983). Farmer groups can be either formal or informal. The formal groups have clearly defined structures and written rules, which govern the behaviour of the members while the informal ones, lack the structures and the written rules (Nombo, 1995). Nombo (1995) has defined farmer groups as a composition of men and/or women who come together to pursue a common interest related to individual or group improvement in the spheres of economic and social development. Generally, farmers groups, among other activities deal with communal

agricultural production, savings and credit, income generation and provision of agricultural services for the purpose of poverty reduction (Catholic Relief Services [CRS] and Modernizing Extension and Advisory Services [MEAS], 2015; Nombo, 1995). In some cases, the groups perform certain tasks related to technology development, particularly on-farm and adaptive research and extension. FGs are generally perceived as units of cooperative societies. With time, FGs usually register as formal production or marketing units under the government's prevailing policies and consequently grow to a cooperative society.

6.2.2 *Approaches to Rural Development in Tanzania*

Recognising the need to reduce poverty among her citizens, the government of Tanzania implemented a number of development strategies and/or approaches to rural development as the focus of its public policy during the first twenty years of development after independency. From 1961 to 1966, two main approaches to rural development were implemented and both focused on agricultural development, particularly cash crops with comparatively high export potential. These approaches, which dominated the rural development policy were christened *Improvement* and *Transformation* Approaches. The former, which was implemented immediately after independence in 1961, focused on the provision of extension services to samples of progressive farmers expecting that the technological benefits would spill over to the rest of the community (Oyugi and Makauki, 2010). According to United Nations (2008) farmers who have adopted new practices in farming systems have become teachers for other community members on techniques for improving productivity.

With time, the Improvement Approach began to lose hope and the latter approach was implemented concurrently. Transformation Approach focused on the transformation of agriculture through resettlement in special schemes. The approach led to the establishment of settlement schemes of pre-selected villagers who would then engage in modern farming under the supervision and direction of government officials (Mapolu, 1990). It was characterised by settler and block farms. Settlement schemes were among the exciting programmes of RD to which government and donor agencies alike attached priority. However, many

settlements in Tanzania and Africa as a whole were found to be expensive, thus, like the former approach, the transformation approach began to fade out (Chambers, 2014).

In 1966, both approaches were abandoned because the expected outcomes (in agriculture) were not realised but social stratification was intensified instead. Both approaches focused on the improvement of agriculture without special policy concentration on other sectors. Mapolu (1990) argues that the initial formulation of these rural development policies in Tanzania was a logical continuation of the colonial rural policies. The approaches were replaced by Arusha Declaration in 1967, which introduced the policy of Socialism (*Ujamaa*¹). Ujamaa villages were also introduced during this period, which intended to be socialist organisations; created by the people and governed by those who live and work in them. The Ujamaa village was thus a new conception, based on the post-Arusha Declaration with the understanding that what need to be developed was people, not things.² It was insisted that living and working together could transform and improve the livelihoods of people as it allows greater production (UNDP and URT, 2014; OECD, 2016b). This brings about social inclusion, hence reduced inequality, as people own all the resources together.

According to UNDP and URT (2014), the pillars of Ujamaa included among others, an emphasis on agriculture as the economy's backbone. However, Ujamaa experienced many obstacles and weaknesses, which lead into failure of many rural development projects. It is argued by URT (2010) that the first-phase government's top-down rural development strategies, especially the villagization programme, disrupted agricultural production patterns and bloated bureaucracies, which further drained resources from the sector. As a result, many people in rural areas reverted to subsistence living, abandoning productive sub-sectors such as cash crop cultivation. Despite the above criticism, villagization is associated with several word-wide appreciated advantages including intensified social capital among Tanzanians as brothers and sisters, which resulted in a unique national unity (Oyugi and Makauki, 2010).

From 1970s to early 1980s the policy approach was changed to focus on programmes. Here, we had Integrated Rural Development

¹ Ujamaa is a Swahili term for socialism. Swahili is the national language of Tanzania.

² <http://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/eastafrica/tanzaniaind.html>.

Programmes, which operated through projects in identified lead development sector, not necessarily agriculture. Chilwa (1985) argues that, besides the provision of social services such as clean water, schools and dispensaries to about half of the rural population by 1982, none of the approaches had led to the anticipated transformation of production structures and productivity of the rural sector.

Due to limited economic success of Ujamaa and the deterioration of the macro-economic situation, Tanzania moved away from socialism and entered a period of economic liberalisation and structural reforms. Two programmes were introduced, the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP), in 1981 and the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in 1982, focusing on macro-economic stability. The government maintained the control of agricultural prices, establishing a regional pricing system that taxed areas with comparative advantage while subsidising remote areas (OECD, 2016b). However, due to the introduction of Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in the mid-1980s, the price and marketing of cash crops were left under private firms. During this period, there was also abolition of a series of subsidies. This was done to allow private traders and institutions to participate in the marketing of the crops and agricultural inputs. One of the outcomes of reforms is seen in rural areas where peasant farmers have been left without the long-existed subsidies in cash crop production due to privatisation of agricultural inputs under trade liberalisation. Subsidies were among the direct supports provided to smallholder farmers, in order to achieve growth and poverty reduction strategies concurrently (OECD, 2016b; Ponte, 2001; Ellis, 2000). However, lack of access to agricultural inputs affects farmers, not only in Tanzania but all over Africa as argued by Magreta et al. (2010).

To remedy the situation and lift people out of poverty, the government of Tanzania formulated and implemented various policy-based initiatives including development programmes and plans from 2000s to date. The government endorsed the MDGs and concurrently Tanzania Development Vision 2025, which was to be achieved through a series of sector-based strategies outlined in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) (2001–2003), National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) I (2005–2010), NSGRP II (2010–2015) which worked parallel with the first Five Year Development Plan (FYDP I) (2011/2012–2015/2016), the second FYDP (2016/2017–2020/2021) and the final plan (FYDP III, 2021/2022–2025/2026)

in the national development policy framework for TDV 2025 implementation. In parallel, the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) was established in three phases, from 2001 to 2014, with the overall aim of reducing extreme poverty. These efforts have been reinforced by an initiative called “Big Results Now”, which was inaugurated in 2013, aiming at enabling Tanzania to reform its institutions for more productive investments in human capital development. Although various initiatives have been launched to sustain growth in Tanzania, they have failed to boost agricultural productivity substantially, for the reduction of poverty and inequality (Makene, 2016; OECD, 2016b; Evans et al., 2014; UNDP and URT, 2014; URT, 2014).

6.2.3 *Group Approach in Tanzania*

Through development projects, various developing countries have been using different approaches in trying to find solutions to problems faced by small-scale farmers, particularly in rural areas. One of the approaches is the use of FGs. Mattee (1998) points out that farmers must organise themselves in groups that are strong enough to negotiate with other partners for better research and other services. FGs approach is also suggested by Bebbington et al. (1989) to help the rural people who have been left without subsidies during the implementation of SAPs in many developing countries. In the absence of subsidies, farmers who are organised in groups can buy in bulk, hence can get discounts from suppliers and share transport costs (CRS and MEAS, 2015).

The formation of FGs is usually encouraged by the presence of some projects that aim at improving the well-being of farmers in rural areas. Hebbar (1991) argues that in order for rural people to develop, viable economic assistance must be offered to them. The author added that when poor people are given adequate economic support, they would at last earn their living, become self-reliant and probably cross the poverty line. The appropriate way of assisting poor farmers is hence through RD projects, which are farmer-based. For instance, in Morogoro, the Uluguru Mountains Agricultural Development Project (UMADEP) that aims at increasing the labour productivity and household incomes of farmers in Mkuyuni and Mgeta Divisions in a sustainable way uses FGs approach (Nombo, 1995). Another project that uses FGs approach in Morogoro is the National Special Programme on Food Production (NSPFP) which

aims at increasing food production and farm productivity rapidly in a sustainable way (Swai 1998; Laizer, 1999).

Moreover, Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in Tanzania, in collaboration with different development projects, which work with farmers groups, has tried to come up with a new approach of giving farmers the opportunity to discuss and decide on their problems. Concerning this matter, SUA has organised various workshops, which resulted in the emergence of a network of FGs in Tanzania known as *Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania* (MVIWATA), a Swahili acronym. MVIWATA emerged in 1993 as a new representative network of farmers' groups, with NGO status, representing around 60,000 farming households. The network aims at facilitating communication among small-scale farmers all over the country. It also makes efforts in organising and empowering farmers in Tanzania so as to be strong enough to influence policy decisions and promote their development on a self-reliance basis (Mattee, 1998). The network membership is derived from the representatives of FGs and local networks. The membership condition indicates the importance of forming local networks by various groups existing in rural areas.

Additionally, local networks in Mgeta and Mkuyuni Divisions, for instance, have been organising meetings on monthly basis in which case members interacted and exchanged ideas with one another about their activities, potentials and difficulties. Sometimes, the network proposes field visits to other areas or to specific groups where an important lesson could be learnt. It has been argued that local network facilitates effective communication of extension messages between farmers and change agents, and among farmers themselves (Mattee, 1998). Thus, local networks are essential for the success of both members and non-members of FGs as they help in technology dissemination. The local networking among groups creates a sense of self-awareness of the members and tends to stimulate a continuous emergence of groups without any other external impulse.

6.2.4 *The Role of FGs in Rural Development*

The role of voluntarily formed organisations or groups in the process of RD should not be underestimated. Farmers' organisations have an important role to play not only in raising rural incomes but also in involving the poor in reforms of the agricultural sector, which has a great contribution

in national development. The organisations can help farmers in facilitating accessibility of some inputs as well as accessing market opportunities for their produce. This improves farmers' livelihoods thus, speeds up the process of RD and poverty reduction at large. The organisations also promote the participation of the poor members of the society (Magreta et al., 2010). According to OECD (2018), joining farmers' organisations or cooperatives will help gain trust and solidarity, as well as making access to quality inputs, services, finance and markets easier. Similarly, Magreta et al. (2010) argue that, when farmers are organised in groups, it becomes easier to buy enough fertiliser and other farm inputs which can be used to increase production levels of crops, hence alleviating poverty.

It has been argued that agricultural development will not occur without engaging smallholder farmers. Farmers working in groups are believed to make careful observations and conduct small-scale trials of new ideas. This is possible where local networks exist as they facilitate communication among members and non-members. It implies that the rate of dissemination of research findings and technologies increases. Following policy reforms in the service sector, FGs can fill the gaps left by retrenched people in the sense that a single extension worker can offer services to a big number of farmers at one time while they are in groups rather than approaching them individually (Bebbington et al., 1989). The system of agricultural extension should be adequate and appropriate to the rural community in order to reduce poverty and lift up the rural poor.

Group approach in extension services, for instance, has proved to be more successful as many people can be serviced at a least cost due to cost-sharing among the group members. Apart from cost saving, other benefits gained in FGs include generation of income, getting better prices for farm products, building capacity through learning of new copying strategies and sharing of knowledge from among the members, obtaining financial services and the like. Furthermore, group approach also contributes to the improved capacity of farmers to experiment and solve their own problems. The improvements result from the participatory processes that lead to social capital increases where people's capacity to work together in solving common problems is strengthened (CRS and MEAS, 2015; United Nations, 2008).

Moreover, when farmers work in groups, it becomes easier for them to build up their knowledge, improve entrepreneurial and analytical skills as well as capacities to innovate and control their farm systems. In some cases, where smallholder farmer groups link farmers to agricultural

markets, produce a range of benefits including income and food security (Magreta et al., 2010; Barham and Chitemi, 2009).

Farmer groups approach is therefore recommended and necessary in developing countries like Tanzania. The approach allows contact between farmers and on-station researchers, farming systems researchers and extension officers. It also provides room for participatory approaches in which case farmers will be involved in planning and implementation of development projects. Experts of RD have insisted participatory approaches in the planning and implementation of RD projects. The experts have noted that technocratic elite cannot by themselves promote socio-economic change without active support and assistance of the target group to implement RD programmes and projects successfully (Kallabaka, 1989). In rural areas, the appropriate target groups for RD are the poor farmers.

In Morogoro Region, various projects have been working hand in hand with farmers. The intention of the projects was to facilitate the adoption of different agricultural innovations as well as to disseminate extension messages to other farmers (Swai, 1998). For some years, the Irish Government assisted farmers in Kilosa District whereby in 1990, the Government began to support Planning Rural Development at Village Level (PRDVL) project. The project, which existed in the district since 1986, was seen as a means of supporting grassroots agriculture and RD. It aimed at promoting self-sustaining participatory RD through animation (i.e. helping people to identify critical challenges that face them, uniting people with a common challenge and finding out how to deal with the challenges). Under the help of animators, people with common interests, needs and problems formed groups voluntarily. The size of the groups varied from five to twenty members with balanced gender participation.

Unlike the village farms, which were predominant in the period from 1976 to about 1985 in which villagers had no control over the produce, most groups under the PRDVL project were successful because of members' participation in project activities and self-management within the groups. In the study area, the support of the PRDVL project ceased in 1995 after which the augmentation of the groups started to decline. Before the termination of the PRDVL project, another Irish-supported project, Gairo Agroforestry and Land Use Project (GALUP) was introduced in the area in 1994 and lasted for two years only. During this period, the District Council was providing extension services to farmers through FG approach.

6.3 METHODOLOGY

The study was conducted in the then Gairo Division³ of Kilosa District, Morogoro Region in Tanzania. The district lies between 5°55' and 7°53' South and 36°30' and 37°30' East. Generally, farmers in the study area practice mixed farming (mixing the planting of crops and trees, rearing of animals, bee keeping, etc.). The crops grown in the area include maize, sorghum, sweet potatoes, pigeon peas, bulrush millet, groundnuts and beans while the livestock reared include cattle, goats, sheep, chicken and pigs. Some development projects and innovations, which dealt with, among other activities, the in-service training of extension officers have historically existed in the area. This then justifies the selection of the study area.

A cross-sectional research design was employed in the current study as it allows a snapshot of many variables at a single point in time. It enables the researcher to observe what naturally goes on in the world without directly interfering with it (Field, 2009). The target population for this study comprised all farmers involved in FGs activities from 26 villages of the then Gairo division. Out of the 26, six villages (Gairo, Msingisi, Luhwaji, Rubeho, Kisitwi and Kwipipa) were randomly selected. Through simple random sampling, 87 FG members were selected from the six selected villages.

The main instrument used for collecting primary data was a structured questionnaire. The questions focused on the activities conducted by members of each group, and the challenges encountered by FGs in the study area. In order to avoid problems that might emerge from ethical issues, respondents were assured of confidentiality of their responses and were informed that the results were to be used for academic purposes only. Additionally, they were not required to register their names on the questionnaire during data collection. The collected data were descriptively analysed by using IBM SPSS Statistics computer software. Specifically, frequency and percent figures for each activity and challenge were computed and presented in tabular form.

Attempts were made to improve the validity of the measurements and reliability which are important quality aspects of quantitative research. Validity is an estimation of what the researcher is intending to measure

³ Gairo was a division of Kilosa District until when the government officially announced it as a District in March 2012.

(Drost, 2011). According to Noble and Smith (2015), validity encompasses the truthfulness of the research results since it represents the accuracy of the findings in reflecting the collected data. The authors consider reliability as the degree of consistency in overcoming personal and methodological biases that may influence the findings. Golafshani (2003) contends that reliability is the degree of replicability or repeatability of results or observations.

In order to improve validity, the designed questionnaire was pre-tested in the study area and hence revised accordingly before the actual data collection exercise began. Thus, the pre-testing of the questionnaire of this study identified areas of the instrument that needed modification for improving the ease of understanding by the respondents and thus improving the quality of the instrument and the collected data. Observation of different group activities and the observable challenges like the effects of natural calamities during data collection in addition to the responses from the respondents contributed in the improvement of validity and reliability through triangulation and data auditing.

6.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

6.4.1 *Main Group Activities Performed by FGs*

The study revealed that FGs existed in the study area before 1995 but they were very few. The groups started growing up after the introduction of some development projects in the area. When this study was being conducted, some of the groups had already declined due to a lack of support as the projects had phased out. According to the respondents, the projects were not FGs based but members of FGs were given priority in terms of support. They opted for FGs as the means for reducing poverty and improving their livelihood.

The findings show that members of FGs in the study area were practising various activities, crop husbandry taking the lead, as it was practised by the majority (66.7%) of the respondents as the major group activity. This demonstrates typical characteristic of the majority of rural people, who depend on agriculture as the main source of their livelihood. According to NBS (2018), the agricultural sector is the main source of employment and livelihood for more than 75% of the Tanzania Mainland households.

Table 6.1 Distribution of respondents by group activities ($n = 87$)

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Crop husbandry	58	66.7
Carpentry	15	17.2
Bee keeping	8	9.2
Tree nursery	5	5.7
Metal welding	3	3.4
Running nursery school and dyeing cloth	3	3.4
Knife making	2	2.3
Animal husbandry	2	2.3
Bricks making	1	1.1

Apart from crop husbandry, group members in the study area were also involved in other activities as shown in Table 6.1. The activities outlined in the table were performed together as group activities. Some groups were performing activities together, without piecework, depending on the nature of the activity. Others had a certain pattern on how to distribute the activities among themselves. The patterns vary from group to group depending on members' preferences, sex and physical body ability. Moreover, some groups were performing more than one activity in their struggle to improve their livelihoods. This is a common practice as argued by Ellis (2000) that many rural households in developing countries are found to depend on a diverse portfolio of activities and income sources. The author added that crop and livestock production features alongside many other contributions to family well-being.

6.4.2 *Challenges Experienced by FGs*

Table 6.2 presents a number of challenges experienced by members of FGs, hence hindering their success. Respondents were asked to mention only the major challenge experienced. The frequency and percent figures of the responses were then ranked beginning with the most frequently mentioned challenge. It is surprising to note that out of all the respondents interviewed under the current study, only 6.9% were found to experience no challenges. The results in the table show that about half (50.6%) of the respondents complained to have no modern tools and/or equipment as well as other inputs because of inadequate running capital. The tools needed included farm implements like tractors and inputs such

as seeds, fertilisers and the like, for groups dealing with farming. It has been argued that the withdrawal of fertiliser subsidies and the collapse of seasonal credit delivery have made production of major staple food crops both difficult and costly (UNDP and URT, 2014). Fertiliser application specifically has been claimed by URT (2010) to be a main factor in increasing crop production and productivity. Although fertiliser and other inputs might be available, lack of credit facilities blocks farmers' access to these inputs. This is the outcome of economic liberalisation and structural reforms, such as SAPs, NESP and ERP, introduced in 1980s. During the introduction of ERP, the government decontrolled the pricing and marketing of cash crops as well as abolishing a series of subsidies (OECD, 2016b; Ponte, 2001).

Carpentry and metal welding groups considered lack of modern tools as a burning issue to them. They considered their financial status to be too low to afford purchase of the tools. This problem, like in other areas, was said to make FGs produce under their capacity, thereby holding them back from making significant advancement in their livelihoods. Generally, this makes poverty reduction efforts both in rural and urban areas a difficult game.

Furthermore, the results in Table 6.2 show that 19.5% and 17.2% of the members mentioned poor participation in group activities and poor farming and marketing skills respectively, as being among the challenges against the success of their groups. The challenge of poor farming and marketing skills, is partly due to high illiteracy level of the respondents. Due to this fact they could not produce to the optimum as they were always working under the economies of scale. As such, the poor remain

Table 6.2 Distribution of respondents by challenges experienced in groups ($n = 87$)

<i>Challenges</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Lack of working tools	44	50.6
Poor participation	17	19.5
Poor farming and marketing skills	15	17.2
Wild animals' invasion	10	11.5
Delays in debt payment	7	8.0
Delays in paying entrance fee	7	8.0
Poor leadership	5	5.7
Robbery of working equipment	4	4.6
Natural disasters/calamities	2	2.3
Nil	6	6.9

trapped in the vicious circle of poverty. It has been reported by the United Nations (2008) that, lack of appropriate agricultural knowledge, skills, technologies, methods or inputs in agricultural farming can affect food security. This intensifies poverty among the poor people. It is further argued by Ryan and De la O Campos (2019) that barriers and difficulties faced by rural smallholder farmers and families in accessing local markets, represent major impediments to their right to feed themselves.

Other challenges were the destruction of crops by wild animals, particularly baboons (11.5%), delay in the payment of entrance fees and debt (8% each), plant and animal diseases, poor leadership (5.7%), theft of working equipment (4.6%) and natural calamities (2.3%). The problem of a delayed payment of debts was intense in carpentry groups whose most of customers were used to pay a portion of the agreed cost (down payment) but found it difficult to pay the remaining portion in time. This implies that the carpenters were being stranded in their normal cash-requiring operations due to a lack of funds.

The challenges emanating from the occurrence of natural disasters, such as unpredictable weather conditions and crop diseases were also observed by Kilima et al. (1999) in Iringa Region. Whereas these problems affected agricultural production for group members in the present study, members of cooperatives in Iringa region failed to repay their loans due to the same challenge. Challenges like illiteracy, poor leadership, plant and animal diseases, poor participation in group activities and marketing could be solved by offering some training to group members.

The identification of various challenges faced by the members of different FGs in this study is a contribution to the literature of collective action theory. While the widely accepted view of collective action theory by Olson is that people act successfully in groups to achieve their common good due to perceived benefits, the results of this study have demonstrated that their efforts may face serious unexpected challenges such as natural and man-made disasters. The findings provide a warning for development planners and policy makers to consider a context-specific situation analysis before deciding to adopt the collective action theory for the introduction of FG approach to certain communities.

Despite the challenges experienced by the FGs in the study area, group approach in RD should be encouraged since it has been advocated to be beneficial to members in various ways as mentioned earlier (CRS and MEAS, 2015; Magreta et al., 2010; Barham and Chitemi, 2009; United Nations, 2008). Success stories have been reported in other areas

like Mang'ula division where farmers' training had been organised by various extension programmes based on the requirements and interests of different groups of smallholder farmers (Laizer, 1999). The training promoted the adoption of modern agricultural technologies in the area.

6.5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This article has put it clear that members of FGs in the study area were engaging in different types of activities for the purpose of reducing poverty and improving their livelihoods. Despite their efforts, members of FGs experienced a number of challenges that hindered their path to RD. Lack of working tools seemed to be the biggest challenge in their struggle to improve their livelihoods and achieve RD at large. People in rural areas, who mostly rely on agriculture for their livelihoods, need enough and adequate agricultural extension services to help them in encountering the challenges.

Agricultural extension services link research with farmers, hence playing a favourable role in increasing agricultural productivity. Based on the findings of this study, a comprehensive and effective RD policy intervention is recommended to assist FGs members on how to deal with the challenges they experience. Since this study focused on only one district, the findings cannot be generalised to the whole country. Thus, the recommended intervention should dwell on identifying the appropriate long-term solutions to different challenges faced by FGs in different areas of the country. The long-term solutions would expectedly promote the development of production and entrepreneurial skills among FGs members, thereby improving economic empowerment. Since the implementation of all the sector policies at the community level in Tanzania is done by the local government, any effort to improve FG approach in the study area should practically involve an element of sustainable capacity building to the responsible officers and community leaders. The recommended capacity building will help to promote sustainable benefits of FGs even after development projects phase out thereby causing positive contribution to the farming industry. Further research is recommended on how different development stakeholders can take part in the promotion of FGs approach to RD in poor communities of Tanzania.

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Tanzania Social Action Fund II Implementation for the Household Socio-Economic Improvement: Evidence from Arusha District, Tanzania

Claudia Edward Mamkwe and Elizabeth Lulu Genda

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Poverty is a global and inequality is growing both within and across nations. Poverty is a condition in which low-income people cannot meet the basic needs of life which threatens their wellbeing (UNDP, 2019). Poverty leads to a manifold of difficulties, such as lack of or poor access to health and education facilities, high illiteracy rates and subsisting on low

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quality diets. Poor people have limited ability to secure gainful employment and bring change into their lives (World Bank, 2014). Many poor people in the world, especially, the rural households do not have access to socio-economic development social infrastructure. The lack of infrastructure in poor communities significantly impacts the lives of the people living in these communities. Inequality in many societies has the potential to negatively influence political stability, economic growth, social cohesion and general wellbeing of the people (Thomas et al., 2018; UN, 2020).

In Tanzania income poverty is widespread both in rural and urban areas. According to World Bank (2015) about 10 million people of the rural population in Tanzania live in poverty while 3.4 million live in extreme poverty, compared to less than 1.9 million who live in poverty and 750,000 who live in extreme poverty in urban areas. Further, it is estimated that 80% of the poor and the extreme poor live in the rural where more than half depend on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods. The rural and urban population is also stricken by non-income poverty characterized with different factors such as lower education level, large family size and low access to public infrastructures like piped water supplies, electricity, health and school facilities.

Poverty renders people to remain passive in most development programs because they lack resources such as capital, knowledge and skills to participate in development activities. The poor face difficulties in accessing credits as a source of finance to invest in income-generating activities to come out of poverty trap. In addressing the bottlenecks caused by lack of finance, it is thought that one of the strategies of reducing poverty is to increase the income of the poor. Cognisant to that, TSAFF II provided an important input support for generating income that contributed to enterprise operations; construction of infrastructure and in that way improve access to social services for socio-economic development of the households using participatory approach (Castells-Quintana, 2017).

In the struggle to fight poverty, Tanzania like other developing countries, has endeavour to reduce poverty and during the World Social Summit held in Copenhagen in 1995, where together with other nations it committed to eradicate poverty. As a result of this commitment, Tanzania has developed and set different plans for poverty reduction such as a national development strategy (2016–2020) and the third phase of poverty reduction strategy for Zanzibar (MKUZA 2016–2020), United

Nations Development Assistance Plan II (UNDAP II) for Tanzania, and the amalgamation of the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance and the Tanzania Development Vision 2025 which aspires to have Tanzania transformed into a middle income and semi industrialized nation by 2025.

In the expedition of achieving its development Vision, Tanzania has made different interventions such as the introduction and implementation of social and economic policies which address the issue of poverty both at national and individual levels. These interventions at different periods included state provision of social services such as health care, education and water supply followed by creating enabling environment for private sector to invest in production activities like agriculture including both crop and animal production. Also, the government encourages business sector investments especially in small and medium enterprises for households to earn incomes outside agricultural production, which is pre-dominantly performed by subsistence farmers.

Likewise, Tanzania has put in place different policies and strategies for poverty reduction. One of the strategies is Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), established in the year 2000 (URT, 2003). The strategy has enabled the Government to make some achievements in reducing poverty especially in non-income poverty problems such as in health, education and water supply services. The strategies involved building capacities to people to manage their lives to meet daily social and economic needs.

Another one is National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) of 2004 which emphasizes the promotion of sustainable growth, coupled with continuous social progress and equity with the intention of improving the material condition and quality of life of people and basic poverty eradication. The National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) of 2005 and NSGRP II of 2010 focused on poverty reduction and put it as a national development agenda of redressing the prevailing dearth situation in both rural and urban communities.

Pursuit to the demonstration of the contribution of TASAF II in households' socio-economic improvement, the study was inspired by the question, "How has TASAF II contributed to wealth creation by household income and transformed it into other assets and access to services?" The answers to this question helped to qualify TASAF II implementation model as one of the innovative poverty reduction efforts in Tanzania. The main objective of this chapter was to analyze the Tanzania Social

Action Fund (TASAF II) implementation for household socio-economic improvement in Arusha District. Specifically, the objectives of this chapter were firstly to assess the intended outcomes of TASAF II achievements by using as the case of Arusha District and secondly to determine the contribution of TASAF II projects to the household socio-economic development.

7.1.1 An Overview of Tanzania Social Action Fund and Poverty Reduction

The Government of Tanzania established the TASAF in 2000 through credit financing from the World Bank and from its own sources (TASAF, 2009). Implementation of TASAF started in 1999 as a pilot project that covered eight poor districts in Tanzania Mainland. These districts through conducting Household Budget Survey which led to the identification of districts consisted high percentage of household with shortage of services, need of safety nets, food security, vulnerable groups; and savers (URT, 2002). The main objective of the fund was to support poverty-stricken communities on the principle of community demand-driven initiatives. The TASAF investment fund was managed by the communities themselves. It was a government of Tanzania's funding facility that provided a mechanism for local governments, to respond to community demands for interventions that would contribute to the attainment of specific Millennium Development Goals. In particular, TASAF contributed in achieving poverty reduction goal as stipulated in National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty. Through TASAF the government has made many achievements including investing in infrastructure increasing coverage of education and health services and supporting agriculture development.

After several years of Phase One TASAF implementation and evidence of success, the government came out with TASAF II which was launched in February 2005 and was to end in March 2010. TASAF II implementation was funded by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT) and the International Development Association (IDA) (URT, 2013). TASAF II was an important intervention at community and household levels within the framework of poverty reduction strategy with the aim of achieving the Millennium Development goals, and currently its successor, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It was not very different from TASAF I, but the main objective of TASAF II had been to empower communities to access opportunities so that they could

request, implement, and monitor subprojects that contribute to improve livelihoods linked to MDG indicator targets in the Tanzania Poverty Reduction Strategy (TASAF, 2010). The target groups to benefit from the designed projects included households with limited access to and use of specified service packages such as education, health and water, vulnerable individuals that needed assistance and food insecure households with limited employment opportunities (TASAF, 2010).

TASAF II approach was guided by the principles of community-demand-driven development and follows a bottom-up planning and decision making process through community participation and empowerment. This was an initiative of Government of Tanzania to reduce poverty and improve livelihoods by stimulating economic activity at the household and community level (URT, 2013). A key and exceptional characteristic of TASAF II was the active participation of the target communities through a process popularly known as the Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach. Community-driven development empowered communities through control of decisions and resources to community groups (Krishna, 2000). These community groups worked in partnership with demand-responsive support organizations and service providers such as elected local governments, NGOs, private sector and central government agencies as in this case the TASAF II.

Community-demand-driven approach for development was a way of providing social and infrastructure services, to organize economic activity and resources management, to empower poor people, improve governance and enhance the security of the poor (Krishna, 2000). It was expected that through this approach the learning and capacity of the communities to identify their needs, prioritizing them, plan, implement and manage the subprojects. This meant that the CDD approach intended to achieve the empowerment objective which are also embedded in the overall TASAF II objective. Indeed, the mechanism employed by TASAF II for income generation provided insights into factors which contributed to the improvement of socio-economic conditions of poor households by engaging them effectively in the poverty alleviation projects.

The TASAF II implementation model contributed to the dialogue on the linkages between household participation in wealth creation and economic empowerment in poverty reductions efforts. The poor people who were socially excluded, voiceless and powerless were empowered. When confronted with unequal power relations, poor people are unable to influence or negotiate better terms for themselves with governments,

traders, financiers and civil society. This severely constrained their capacity to build their asset base and rise out of poverty.

7.1.2 The Importance of Community Participation and Development: Experience in Tanzania

Community participation is an important component of community development and reflects a grass-root or bottom-up approach to problem solving. The approach enables self-help which is a democratic process in local community recovery from poverty. In social work, community participation refers to the active voluntary engagement of individuals and groups to change difficult conditions and to influence policies and programs that affect the quality of their lives or others (Mohammed, 2010). Through participation, the community is encouraged to identify and articulate their own goals, design their own methods of change; and pool resources in the problem solving process (Mwiru, 2015).

In Tanzania participatory development is historical. From independence in 1961, when the first Government led by President Julius K. Nyerere instituted the policy of self-reliance. This initiative fits well with the current notion of community participation in development. The early years after independence was a period when many of self-help development projects were established in which community members worked together to build schools, construct roads and health facilities using their own labour and materials while the Government provided technical and financial supports. The self-reliance policy in Tanzania was advocated by Arusha Declaration in 1967 which chiefly aimed at making the government mobilize all the national resources towards the elimination of poverty, ignorance and diseases which were treated as enemies of development. The idea of participation in development invokes the community to be responsible for their development and at the same time allows the government (state) to retain its legitimate control over its citizen. Likewise, the government of Tanzania has made efforts to promote participatory development in accordance with its decentralization policy emanating from its commitment to enhance community participation in development planning and budgeting consistent with the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania Article 145 and 146. To speed up development in local areas, people were given the freedom to participate in the planning and implementation of development programs (Shivji, 1990).

7.2 THE THEORY OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT

Participation is a rich concept. There is no single definition of the term participation. This is so because every individual, organization and various government policies define it based on their own values, culture and contexts (FAO, 2003; Amon, 2014). Participation in development is a highly contested term with no finite meaning (Zocher, 2010). However, Chambers and Kumar (2003) define participation as a development approach which recognizes the need to involve the disadvantaged segments of the population in designing and implementing policies concerning their wellbeing. This study used the definition adopted by the World Bank's Learning Group on Participatory Development which defined participation as a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affects them (World Bank, 1996).

Participation is an approach that attempts to make the end users actively involved in the design process to help ensuring that the products designed meets their needs and is practical. Participatory approaches are strategic interventions that make communities and citizens take part in development initiatives and policies that affects their lives and that of their communities. Community participation is one of the key ingredients of an empowered community. It is an important principle to make citizen actively involved in all aspects of strategic planning and implementation of development projects that affect their livelihoods. A study conducted by Kajembe and Monela (2010) show the rationale of community participation as the key to the success of projects. Community participation is a process which provides private individuals an opportunity to influence public decision and has long been a component of the democratic decision making process (Cogan and Sharpe, 1986; Mapuva, 2015).

Community participation is acknowledged as an agent of development and central to the provision of essential services like clean water facilities, health care, education services and economic support services to underserved communities in developing countries (FAO, 2003; Gebremedhin, 2004; Marsland, 2006). Development requires participation of the native people, who should be placed first in development projects aiming at improving and changing the livelihoods of local people. Development projects at household and community level affects the life of people both directly and indirectly (Wily, 2002; Fabricius, 2004). Public or citizen

involvement is a concept term related to community participation. Public involvement means to ensure that citizens have a direct voice in public decisions. Involvement is the act of participating in something, while participation is joint consultation in decision-making, goal setting, profit sharing or team work.

Generally, terms, involvement and participation are used to indicate a process through which citizens have a voice in public policy decisions. Particularly, in this work involvement or participation can be used interchangeably to mean the liberty of an individual, household, or the community to realize the existing or imminent factors that deprive them from living decent lives and come up with solutions. With the TASAF II approach to poverty reduction, the poor are given an opportunity to prioritize their needs in consultation meetings, helped to understand their problems and think of possible solutions, and empowered to participate meaningfully in shaping their futures (Alsop and Bertelsen, 2006; Eyben et al., 2008). Social support projects are seen as critical towards community empowerment for poverty reduction (Adamson and Bromiley, 2013), whereas individual capacity development depends on a variety of factors including personal characteristics and social arrangements (Sen, 1993).

Empowerment refers to a means of increasing an individual's ability to act more effectively without endangering or reducing others' power or ability to do so (Kanji, 1995); a process that increases the capacity of the disempowered to act on their own and to analyze and understand their problems, to recognize their ability to act on their own and increase their power and control over the resources necessary for sustainable and decent life; and a conscientization process that challenges structures of the society which dis-empowers the poor and removes barriers to transformation (Bartholomew, 2017). Through empowerment, it is possible to make changes in those structures (political, cultural and economic) which create deprivations to the poor. Empowerment and participation complement each other and can be considered as processes and outcomes in the sense that when the community is supported with resources (both physical and knowledge), it can take part in development projects. Nonetheless, through participating in projects the community is empowered to get out of the depriving factors.

The dynamics of empowerment and participation can be explained by the power relation that exists between the agency and structure. Agency refers to the actions and intentions of people and groups, whereas structures refer to the formal and informal institutions, rules, norms and

beliefs that enable or constrain thinking and action, or social norms and forces that enables or constrain thinking, action and behaviour (Pettit, 2012). However, various approaches to empowerment tend to focus on the agency but not the structures (Hayward, 2000). This happens in many cases for instance by strengthening the abilities of the beneficiaries to act by providing training and awareness raising but not on changing norms and institutions that enable and constrain the behaviour of all actors, including the powerful like the government and private institutions. Hence, meaningful empowerment and participation require significant changes in power relations, both at the level of agency and structure. Empowerment entails change in the terms on which resources are acquired (Kabeer, 2001).

7.3 METHODOLOGY

In the course of preparing this chapter, a cross-sectional research design was conducted in which data was collected ones. The study was conducted in Arusha District Council, Tanzania particularly involving Sokoni II Ward. The study area was selected purposively based on existence of significant number of households living in poverty and the presence of social economic projects supported by TASAF II. Another reason for the selection of the area was that TASAF II supported only unprivileged communities in areas which lack development infrastructures or those served with poor infrastructure such as dilapidated health facilities, deteriorated water supply systems and school infrastructures including classrooms and pit toilets. The Sokoni II Ward has seven villages with the total population of 19,054 (NBS, 2012). Three villages which received funds from TASAF II were selected purposively where data was collected from the heads of households who were TASAF II beneficiaries and from the key informants.

The study population consisted of 60 TASA II beneficiaries households, TASAF II coordinator officials, Community Development Officers (CDOs), Ward Executive Officer (WEO), and Village Executive Officers (VEO). The unit of analysis was the households where heads of the households were the respondents for the study. The study adopted two types of sampling techniques; namely systematic random sampling and purposive sampling. The justification to use systematic sampling technique is that it has the operational convenience that it helps to avoid bias. The study

employed a systematic sampling technique to select TASAF II beneficiaries from the sampling frame which was the village register book where every fifth (5th) household was selected. Systematic sampling starts by selecting an element from the list at random and then after every k th element in the frame, where k is the sampling interval (sometimes known as the skip). The technique involved selecting the households in a systematic random manner with the intent of spreading the selection over the entire population.

Conversely, purposive sampling was used deliberately in selection of the study area as explained in the paragraph above. Also purposive sampling was used to select the key informants. Justification for the use of purposive sampling technique is to ensure the involvement of units/individuals who were knowledgeable about TASAF II projects and their contribution to socio-economic development of the households. The purposive sampling was used in selecting nine key informants including two TASAF II coordinators at district level, three Community Development Officers (CDOs), one Ward Executive Officer (WEO), and three Village Executive Officers (VEO) at ward and village levels respectively.

Also, some Income Generating Activities (IGAs) TASAF beneficiaries' were visited to observe the type and development of IGAs they conducted and the way they were managed. Quantitative data were analyzed using IBM SPSS Statistics computer program, version 22, where descriptive statistics such as frequencies and percentages were generated. Qualitative data were analyzed using content analysis in which data were put into small themes and summarized into short texts. These were used to supplement the information obtained from quantitative data.

7.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

7.4.1 *The Role of TASAF II in Improving Household Socio-Economic Development*

The examined participation of household in TASAF II supported activities and its influence to improve social economic development of the household is illustrated in Table 7.1.

As the results indicate in Table 7.1, 26.7% of the respondents reported that TASAF II distributed improved chicken to be raised by the households while 25% reported that TASAF II distributed water pipes for community investment in socio-economic services, and another

Table 7.1 Distribution of types of TASAF supported activities

<i>Economic activities</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Support local chickens keeping	16	26.7
Distribution of water pipes	15	25.0
Distribution of dairy goats	15	25.0
Construction of classrooms and dispensary building	14	23.3
Total	60	100.0

25% mentioned distribution of dairy goats to the poor households for economic investment. In addition some, 23.3% of the respondents mentioned the construction of classrooms and dispensary as another support given by TASAF II to the community.

As reported in the results in Table 7.1 distribution of water pipes was one of the activities supported by TASAF II in the study area after the construction of the water tank shown in Fig. 7.1. The poor households were provided financial support to pay for the supply costs including laying down of water pipes at least to have standing pipes at home-stead while the issues of monthly water bills remain to be paid by the household. This contribute largely to the reduction of workload burden especially to women and girls who, according to household gender division of labour it is the responsibility of women to fetch water for the household regardless of some associated difficulties such as walking long distance to the water source and enduring in long queues in public water points.

Construction of classroom and dispensaries blocks was one of the support provided TASAF II in the study area which helped to solve problem that was pressing the community. This resulted to increased number of classrooms for primary and secondary schools. Construction of new classrooms came as a relief to teachers and parents whose children were victims of overcrowding. This also contributed to the increased enrolment rate of children going to school with the Government abolition of school fees in government schools in 2016. It can be argued that physical facilities are important in enhancing enrolment and school functioning. A study by HakiElimu (2008) revealed that, as more schools and classrooms were built, enrolment increased, which demonstrates that availability of improved infrastructure contributes to the elimination of



Fig. 7.1 A water tank constructed by TASAF II at Irklei Village in Sokoni II Ward

development obstacle of communities and stimulate economic progress and leads to poverty reduction (Kodongo and Ojah, 2016).

Nonetheless, some people have raised concern on the quality of education provided to children in the newly built schools but Chiuri (2005) argued that both individuals and government should continue investing in promoting quality education with the motive of maximizing benefits in future. Through education, individuals expect to win labour market mobility, opportunities for future training, securing employment and increased lifetime earnings while the society benefits through the increased productivity of workers and the increased rate at which knowledge spread in the society. TASAF II was cognisant of the increased demand for education and that the government alone could not cope with demand. This is where exactly TASAF II actively supported the education sector in attaining quality primary and secondary education through construction of classrooms where there was demand. Infrastructure constraint not only affects access to the service but it also infringes on the rights to these services to the citizen. For example in education the effect of poor infrastructure in schools was reported to be associated

with students drop out rates and low-teachers retention rates in the area. This was reported by one of the key informant stating as follows:

Before construction of good classrooms and toilets done by the assistance from TASAF in our school in Sokoni II Ward many pupils were not attending school properly and some even dropped out before they complete standard seven, most of them were girls. This phenomenon is discouraging many parents because we usually devote all our little resources to ensure they get education so that they will help us in the future.

This finding entails that decent school environment contribute to good school performance is a complex issue that deeply concerns students, parents, teachers and public authorities. Good school performance is one of critical aspects for poverty reduction in two folds, first by achieving the intended goal of completing a particular standard level of education with good pass signifying the intended good quality. Secondly, in accomplishing the main objective of the Tanzania education of producing knowledgeable and skilled manpower for socio-economic development. It is also argued that education is the prime mover of development process of an individual or any nation, making its growth needs to be well coordinated so that it yields the desired benefits to the society (Chiuri, 2005; Kaboma, 2014). For the developing countries, the education systems should be worthwhile areas of investment. Aspiration to achieving good quality education provision goals need to bring the core stakeholders, including parents and teachers in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of education plans and programs to ensure school going children have the opportunity to access quality education for socio-economic development.

On the other hand, provision of improved chicken and dairy goats as the start-up capital for the poor household to generate income from the sale of the products instead of being given cash was an innovative model used by TASAF II to empower the poor households so as rise out of poverty. It was noted that even the beneficiaries acknowledged that receiving cash could be tempting. Also, in-kind capital helps to make the recipient involved in generating money which give the sense of responsibility and learn to be budget conscious. This was important especially when considering that these households were from poor backgrounds with multiple needs. The poor therefore, have to learn to put up with

some difficult situations for some time but with positive outcomes, something which the poor are lacking. The poor usually are after immediate and short-term gains which can only be for subsistence living without any save.

7.4.2 *Influence of Wealth Created by TASAF II Projects*

The economic activities performed by households in generating income under TASAF II are indicated in Table 7.2. The activities included chicken rearing for eggs production, keeping meat and milk goat, keeping dairy cattle, getting access to safe and clean water and construction of classrooms as benefits accrued from TASAF II implementation projects.

The results in Table 7.2 show that 25% of the households that participated in TASAF II projects engaged in chicken rearing for eggs production, 25% engaged in keeping meat and milk goat, 23.3% benefited from classroom construction while 21.7% benefited from water pipe distribution. A small proportion (5%) of the households reported rearing of cattle as a benefit that accrued from TASAF II implementation projects. This implies that most of the household generated their own income through these activities; this is similar to responses obtained through key informant interview, one of the key informants who is women head of household reported that:

I have attained primary education level; getting income to sustain life was difficult. TASAF II activities empowered me economically to start business so that I can generate my own income for development by keeping local chickens.

Table 7.2 Benefits of participating in TASAF II project

<i>Project supported under TASAF II</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Chicken (Poultry for egg production)	15	25.0
Goat	15	25.0
Classrooms construction	14	23.3
Water pipe distribution	13	21.7
Cattle rearing	3	5.0
Total	60	100.0



Fig. 7.2 The researcher interviewing one of the key informants at Sokoni II Ward

Figure 7.2 shows the researcher and one of the key informants who keeps local chicken after obtaining a start-up capital from TASAF II support.

7.4.3 Social and Economic Benefits Created by TASAF II

The study aimed to assess things that TASAF II beneficiaries could not do before, but they were able to do after involving themselves with TASAF II. The results are as shown in Table 7.3.

The results presented in Table 7.3 show that the majority (66.7%) of the households which participated in TASAF II project managed to send their children to school, while 16.7% managed to renovate their houses. A small proportions (8.5%) of the households, acquired income to cater for health expenses whereas 8.3% invested in income-generating activities and buy plots of land for further development. Also, some households were able to buy house, bicycle and motorcycle using money generated from TASAF II supported household projects. Generally, TASAF II

Table 7.3 Types of improvement in social economic activities

<i>Social economic activities</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Supporting children's education	40	66.7
Renovated houses and buy plots	10	16.7
Cater for health expenses	05	8.5
Invest in IGAs and buy plot of land	05	8.3
Total	60	100.0

contributed positively to economic activities and improved household life standard. It has been reported elsewhere that by creating income and creating access to education, good health, clean and safe water will make it possible for the poor to improve their lives (OECD, 2006).

This implies that the income obtained was used as expected by the funder; the TASAF II which has enabled beneficiary households to acquire assets and invest in their new business as a start-up or working capital. TASAF II has influenced household income greatly by managing to improve the wealth status of its beneficiaries. Related findings by IFAD (2018) show that physical assets endowment had a positively significant effect on improving household welfare and food security status. This is in line with Akidda et al. (2014) assertion that ownership and control over assets such as land and housing provide multiple benefits to individuals and households, including secured livelihoods, protection during emergencies and collateral in accessing credit.

7.4.4 *Wealth Creation Activities After TASAF II Interventions*

Wealth creation activities performed by the community after TASAF II interventions are as shown in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4 Distribution of household and IGA after TASAF intervention

<i>Economic activities</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Farming, livestock keeping & business	50	83.3
Farming and livestock keeping	7	11.6
Livestock keeping	2	3.4
Business alone	1	1.7
Total	60	100.0

As portrayed in Table 7.4, most (83.3%) of the TASAF II beneficiary households undertook three main livelihood activities including farming, livestock keeping and petty business while a small proportion (11.6%) of the same engaged in both farming and livestock. Again, 3.4% and 1.7% of the TASAF II beneficiary households were engaged in livestock keeping and small business only, respectively. It was noted that none of the TASAF II beneficiary households relied on farming alone. In Tanzania, agricultural production is the dominant livelihood activity that attracts many people. However, after the TASAF II projects implementation, households were turned to combination of agriculture, livestock and small business.

It was observed that the TASAF II beneficiaries had improved their social economic status significantly as evidenced by the majority of the beneficiary households being able to diversify their livelihoods by involving themselves with farming, livestock keeping and doing small business compared to previous situation, before TASAF II intervention where they were depending on small scale agriculture alone. This finding concur with World Bank (2019) which indicated that the social action fund project is implemented in many parts of the world with the aim of contributing towards poverty reduction including the provision of additional resources for programs targeted at the poor. Other different ways in which social action funds are implemented include the promotion of new approach to rural development by involving communities in project preparation and implementation, support of a district-level program of labour-intensive construction to be targeted at the poorest districts as a safety net operation and strengthening the poverty monitoring and assessment systems (World Bank, 2019).

7.4.5 *Capacity Building for Poor Households*

TASAF II offered various training to capacitate beneficiary households 'ability to run TASAF II projects. TASAF beneficiaries received training on how to run TASAF II projects like proper livestock husbandry including chicken and goat rearing for business purposes. Also, the participants were trained on group formation, organization and management. Table 7.5 presents results for types of training provided to TASAF II beneficiaries.

The results in Table 7.5 indicate that majority (81.7%) of the TASAF II beneficiaries received training on appropriate methods of running TASAF

Table 7.5 Distribution of respondents according to type of training offered by TASAF II

<i>Type of training</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
How to run TASAF II supported projects	49	81.7
Project management, group formation and organization	11	18.4
Total	60	100.0

II supported projects and 18.4% were trained on project management, group formation and organization. TASAF II invested in training beneficiaries, to participate for their development which is a good approach towards poverty reduction and thus, sustainable development. TASAF II assists the poor by providing start-up capital and basic training on how to put the capital into operation to realize the output. Participants were also trained to save and then re-invest in similar or different projects. In this way, the participants are respectively empowered socially and economically through conscious raising meetings where people are made to realize their problems and think of possible solutions and then provided with capital assistance from TASAF II.

Participation is meaningful when local communities are viewed as equal development partners who should participate fully in designing, implementation and benefit sharing in their development project. With this approach people will have the sense of improving their lives and the community at large. This is contrary to when poor people are treated as helpless where they see the government as the provider of everything they need. In contrast, Karnani (2007) reports that most of beneficiaries of different empowerment projects such as microfinance do not have necessary skills, and hence cannot make good use of the support provided; therefore, it was important to train them. This is relevant to what TASAF II is doing by training its beneficiaries with the aim of achieving the intended goal of empowering the community economically and socially through designing and implement projects that they have capacities in terms of skills and capital they receive from TASAF II to manage them.

Regarding the analysis in this chapter and TASAF II intent of reducing poverty, it can be noted that its efforts contributed directly to achievement of mainly two previous Millenium Goals (MDGs) number one and two which were to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger and to achieve universal primary education respectively. Currently it can be noted that

TASAF II supported projects which intended to realize several SDGs as follows: Goal No. 1: which is to end poverty in all its forms everywhere, Goal No. 2 to end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture and Goal No. 3 to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages. Others include Goal No. 4 which is to ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all and Goal No. 5 which is to achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls. However, in the society the success in one goal contributes directly or indirectly to the success of another the same way as poverty is multifaceted concept which can be addressed using multiple approaches as it was in TASAF II supported projects.

7.5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

TASAF II program had managed to improve socio-economic aspects of the beneficiary households in Sokoni II Ward, especially through the provision of local chicken, dairy goat, and supply of safe and clean water and construction of classrooms. The improvements realized by beneficiary households and community at large are an indication of good performance by TASAF II implementation projects for poverty reduction. This approach disproved the myth that the poor should not be assisted with subsidized credits which are mostly difficult still to meet some associated conditional terms. TASAF II program managed to improve livelihood of poor household by direct intervention, appraising to grassroots level and creating sense of ownership of project resulted from people's empowerment and participation. Projects that allow the beneficiaries participate fully in designing, implementation and enjoying the benefit of efforts for their development empower the community with the necessary tools to take care of their own welfare instead of remain passive recipients of different social and economic supports which may not help them get out of poverty.

It is recommended that there is a need for the Government through the Ministry of State, Prime *Minister's* Office (*Labour, Youth, Employment* and Persons with Disability) to design and provide training to needy households on entrepreneurship and business skills that eventually build their capacity and creative mind to initiate viable development projects in order to eradicate poverty. Also the government should formulate policies that reflect the real situation of the poor by making them participate in

their development process while the government and the other partners like the NGOs, CSOs and private actors remain to be the facilitators.

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Gender Parity as a Way to Address Poverty Challenges in South Africa

Maria Matshidiso Kanjere

8.1 INTRODUCTION

Gender parity has been eluding a number of governments and organisations over the years. Gupta, Hieronimus, Krishnan, and Madgavkar (2019) maintain that governments have been failing to address gender inequality, despite their agreement to Sustainable Development Goals which were signed in 2015. Hyde (2016) observed that inequality between men and women hurt global developments and international prosperity. As the result, gender parity remains a critical focus across the globe. Gender disparity affects mostly the black African women in both urban and rural areas. Hence the focus of this study is on gender disparity in South Africa and its connection to moral, social and economic issues.

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Gender disparity, alongside poverty perpetuates divisions in society, with poverty taking the lead in creating a gap between the haves and have-nots. It further undermines the social cohesion initiatives in a country which suffered racial divisions over a number of years. South African Human Rights Commission (2017) states that the past social, political and economic segregation which lasted for many years in South Africa, ensured that black African population remained in poverty, and that poverty has affected women the most. Diop (2015) argues that poverty can only be addressed if gender parity is attended to; the two are not mutually exclusive.

Ravallion (2016) defines poverty as a phenomenon that occurs in a particular society, wherein one or a group of members in that society fails to attain an economic level, which is deemed necessary to be able to live a reasonable minimum standard. Statistics South Africa (2019) confirmed that adult females experience a higher level of poverty as compared to their male counterparts. This is because poverty amongst women is linked to a number of aspects such as divorce and paternal deaths. When such calamities befell women, in most cases they lose monetary support and other economic benefits that makes them to lag behind.

Jahan (2019) consented that women in many countries lag far behind their male counterparts in most important aspects of life such as participation in the economy. Women tend to take the non-paying jobs of caring for their children and families, a gesture which is perceived as a sub-standard role. Nevertheless, there is progress in the number of women who take up formal employment, many of such women remain at lower or middle management levels; very few women move to occupy the upper echelons in companies. Fraser-Moleketi (2015) agrees that in many companies, the number of women in higher positions falls as one looks higher in the corporate hierarchy.

When there are fewer women in top positions of the organisations, this means that per capita income of women will not equal that of their male counterparts. Donnelly (2019) confirms that the gender pay gap persists because women in senior leadership roles and revenue generating positions are very few. Despite earning less, women's income is of utmost importance in many families. The income brings about stability, especially in single parent homes. In extended African families, the money is used to support siblings who might be finding it difficult to find employment due to harsh economic factors in the country. Milli, Huang, Hartmann, and Hayes (2017) observed that persistent earnings that are unequal for

working women translates into lower pay, less family income and more children and families in poverty.

Therefore, for poverty to be eradicated in the country, the government, corporates, and all the other organisations should take it upon themselves to address gender disparity. Gender disparity is an ailment that cripples the society. It denies the society the diversity of wisdom and innovation that is embedded in women.

Bayeh (2016) cautions that unless women are empowered and gender equality is achieved, society will forever find it hard to achieve sustainable development because women constitute more than half of the entire population of South Africa. Developments in South Africa have been benefitting men in a number of ways, leaving women behind. Women have always played a catch up role in a number of areas. They were also left in the periphery of many organisations for some time; some were locked out of economic activities. Hence, many companies persist to pay women less.

This poses as a problem because in South Africa there are more female-headed families as compared to male-headed families. Nwosu and Ndinda (2018) found that female-headed families are on the rise in South Africa, and such families are associated with poverty when compared to male-headed households. The authors further argued that poverty is largely an earnings problem; if earnings can be improved, some families will be in a better position to exit poverty.

Benjamin (2015) observed that many women would take longer to exit poverty in the country because the government indirectly permit organisations to pay women less than men. It is also surprising to observe that women earn 38% less than men, when there are a number of progressive legislation that are aimed at protecting women against any form of discrimination and direct exploitation. Benjamin (2015) argues that certain prejudices and discrimination against women cannot be addressed by legislation. This is because there is certain type of work, which is classified as work for women, for example, work associated with children at the pre-schools. Such type of work is perceived to be less important and thus has a low payment scale. Whilst any form of work associated with men has more payment range and more benefits.

South Africa will have to do more in addressing disparity between genders, other than relying on legislation, which is often ignored by individuals and big corporates. As long as there are no punitive measures on companies or organisations that continue to undermine the skills of

women and pay them less than men, gender pay gap will persist. Women will continue being paid less even if they have the same skills, qualifications and capabilities as men, and are often employed in the same company and in the same positions.

See Fig. 8.1, which depicts gender pay gap in South African companies, which are listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

Figure 8.1 summarises the disparity that is prevalent between men and women in Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) listed companies in South Africa. Therefore, it can be deduced from the figures presented above, that women are more likely to achieve less in terms of participating actively in the creation of wealth for their families.



Fig. 8.1 Gender pay gap in South Africa [2019] (Source Donnelly)

8.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON GENDER AND POVERTY IN SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa is faced with triple social challenges, namely, inequality, poverty and unemployment. The triple social challenges affect women the most. This is because women in South Africa have been discriminated in the past because of their race and gender. The past discrimination had also served as a narrative that shaped the poverty discourse in South Africa.

Thus, one of the remarkable researches on gender and poverty was conducted in rural South Africa by researchers from the Northwest University, namely Cheteni, Khamfula and Mah (2019). The aim of the research was to investigate the influence of gender in determining poverty profiles of both individuals and households.

The research found out that the living standards in the country were not uniform, and such standards were accompanied by the rising inequality amongst the people of different races. The poorest group was said to be blacks and coloureds, this was because of the legacy of racial discrimination. Amongst the black South Africans, women were said to be the most vulnerable group.

The study also found out that women residing in rural areas and farm areas were the poorest as compared to their counterparts residing in the cities and other developed areas. Patriarchy and other cultural factors were said to be playing a role in perpetuating poverty amongst the women. The study highlighted intervention strategies from government to fight poverty, the main strategies being economic growth and social grants. Such interventions were said to be addressing the periphery and not the root cause of poverty. The authors argued that cultural norms and patriarchal tendencies in societies should be addressed if gender poverty has to be addressed. They used quantitative research approach whereby Factor Analysis of Statistics South Africa Community Survey of 2016, from all the nine provinces. The study concluded by stating that any successful interventions in fighting poverty will have to incorporate indigenous knowledge systems, which do not suppress the rights of women.

The other remarkable research on gender parity was conducted by Sadie (2014), and the research was titled ‘Gender Policy and Legislation during the first 20 years of Democracy’. The aim of the research was to review the implementation of gender policies and legal framework pertaining to the rights and liberation of black South African women.

Thus, the desktop research was used to review documents and to study the extend of change in the daily life of women in the country.

The research found that there is tension between some legislation, which are meant to liberate and protect the rights women. For example, the Bill of Rights enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa preserves gender equality whilst at the same time guarantees the protection of chieftainship, which is perceived as patriarchal and custodian of traditional leadership.

The study concluded that gender equality is recognised on the official discourse whereas the opposite prevails in the country. Furthermore, the study showed that South Africa is regressing in as far as advancing women in the political sphere is concerned. For example, in the post-apartheid era, parliament had 44% of female politicians and five female premiers, out of the nine provinces. After 2019 elections, the country has remained with only two female premiers and 46% of female politicians. See Table 8.1 for the variance in women representation in parliament.

Table 8.1 depicts a variety of up and down movement of gender equality, a sustainable model of maintaining a healthy number of women in leadership position is necessary.

8.3 GENDER EQUALITY THEORY

The theoretical framework undergirding the study is gender equality theory; this theory is sometimes referred to as ‘gender parity’, ‘sexual equality’ or ‘equality of sexes’ (Van der Brink, Benschop and Jansen, 2010). The theory advocates for equal and ease of access of both males and females to opportunities, economic activities, decision-making and all the other aspects of society. It advocates that women should not be barred from participating on matters of interest in society (Van der Brink, Benschop and Jansen, 2010). Some structural and procedural barriers prevent women from succeeding in the work place and in the labour market. The theory also advocates that harmful tendencies towards women and girls should be removed. Women and girls should be protected from practices such as femicide, sex trafficking, sexual harassment, gender-based violence and other forms of abuse (Van der Brink, Benschop and Jansen, 2010).

However, it should be noted that gender equality theory stems from different perspectives. Van der Brink, Benschop and Jansen (2010) have

Table 8.1 Women in politics in South Africa, 2004–2019

	2004 (%)	2009 (%)	2014 (%)	2019 (%)	Comment
Women MPs	33	43	40	46	Highest proportion of women in Parliament in 2019
Women in the NCOP	41	30	28	36	Proportion of women in the NCOP, need substantial increases moving forward
Women MPLs	30	41	37	46	Highest proportion of women in 2019
Women in cabinet	42	41	41	50	Highest proportion in 2019, 50% cabinet for the first time
Women deputy ministers	60	39	44	46	Falls short of the 50% mark
Women premiers	44	55	22	22	Dropped from 2004 and 2009, 22% in the last two elections, needs urgent action to achieve the 50% mark
Women voters	55	55	56	55	Consistently at around 55%
Women as news sources	22	24	25	20	Lowest proportion of female sources in the last four elections

Adopted from Gender Links for Equality and Justice (2019)

identified three different perspectives of gender equity. The first perspective argues that men and women are equal and should therefore have equal rights and equal public representation. They should also compete as equals in the work place and in the labour market. This perspective is based on the ‘liberal feminism’ and is often used in gender equity discourse, wherein women are encouraged to brace themselves and join the ranks as equals to men.

Tong (2018) maintains that ‘liberal feminism’ involves the processes of reconceptualising, reconsidering and restructuring of oppressive gender roles that are aimed at subjecting women to inferior roles; such roles

are given to women in line with the traditional feminine personalities. The 'liberal feminism' propagate a clear message that women are individuals that are endowed with reason and should therefore be treated as full human beings that have rights. They should be allowed to choose their own roles in society and in the labour market. However, Koenig (2018) observed that women are not allowed to choose their own path of development in society because of gender stereotypes that are descriptive and prescriptive. They dictate to women how they should behave, and that women should avoid dominance in many respects.

The second perspective is referred to as the 'difference perspective'; it argues that men and women are different and should thus be treated differently. However, this does not mean that women are inferior to men. The 'difference perspective' is purported by the standpoint feminism which says such a difference has to be celebrated. Halpen (2019) argues that feminist standpoint theory states that knowledge is situated and interpreted from a particular perspective, and that those belonging to the marginalised group look at knowledge from their perspective, and they have a better understanding than those who are not marginalised. Thus, the theory emphasises that gender equity should be looked at from the women's perspective.

The third perspective of gender equity stems from post-structuralism feminism and social constructionist feminism. This perspective professes that gender is a social construct and a social practice, which emphasizes class-privileged men. Zevallos (2019) agrees that gender is a social construct because it is determined by the society in which the child grows. Society determines the norms, attitudes and activities that are deemed acceptable for both sexes.

The perspective is referred to as the 'post-equity' or 'transformation' approach to gender equity. It professes that the world is gendered, and that it has to be changed because a gendered world serves as a problem to women emancipation. Even though gender equality theories differ in their approaches, they all contribute to the same goal, which is to emancipate women against male domination and against societal prejudices that are aimed at treating women as inferior to men. Therefore, this study endeavours to analyse gender equity policies in South Africa with the aim of investigating how they aid women in achieving better status in society, whilst at the same time they move out of poverty.

8.4 GENDER EQUALITY POLICIES AND LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

South Africa is not void of gender equality policies and legislation, it actually has enough policies and gender equality commissions, whose mandate and functions sometimes overlap. Policies and legislation designated to the protection and advancement of women's interests include; The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Commission on Gender Equality Act (No. 39 of 1996), Employment Equity Act of 1998, Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 and Labour Relations Act of 1995 just to mention but a few. Thus South Africa's National Policy Framework for Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality was brought in to strengthen the implementation of all the other policies and legislation relating to women's issues.

8.4.1 South Africa's National Policy Framework for Women's Empowerment and Gender Equality

This policy framework has been grafted in acknowledgement of the fact that women have for some time been assigned to minor roles in society. They have not been given enough opportunity to occupy decision-making positions. Therefore, the policy provides guidelines and new terms of reference for women empowerment. The Office on the Status of Women (2019) purported that this policy framework deviates from the notion that women's issues are not important, and can be addressed as 'something at the end-of-the-day business'. The office argued that gender parity is a hard core business in development. The policy summarises the framework of advancing gender equality, as depicted in Table 8.2.

The policy framework as summarised above has good intentions for women in that it calls for the training of women and creation of opportunities for women to access decision-making roles. Thus, the primary indicators that will guide the monitoring and evaluation of this policy framework will include the following;

- Enhanced access to economic stimulating resources and professional opportunities.
- Increased earning power of women.
- Reduced social injustice such as poverty amongst women.
- Increased participation in political decision-making.

Table 8.2 Processes and mechanisms affirming progress towards gender equality

<i>Key institutional process</i>	<i>Key role players</i>	<i>Key partners</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review existing policies and institutionalise women's empowerment and gender equality in the departments 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gender Focal Points (GFP) in National and Provincial departments 	Premiers, Ministers, Members of the Executive Council (MEC), Director General (DG), Provincial and Local governments, Women's organisations, Sector Specific Civil Society and other organisations
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adopt policy documents and action plans Implement the plans Development of National Policy Framework, integrated co-ordination and mainstreaming 	Office on the Status of Women (OSW) in the Presidency	Cabinet, Ministers, Premiers, MECs, DG, GFPs, national, provincial and local governments

Adopted from The Office on the Status of Women (2019)

- A change in the attitude towards women in the society.

The success in the implementation of this policy framework will be tested by time. Many policies, legislations and frameworks on advancement of women's issues have been forgotten through the passing of time without actually achieving their goals. Nevertheless, progress is being slowly achieved in the area of women empowerment. Women should constantly seek opportunities that will enable them to better their lives.

8.4.2 Initiatives Taken by the Government to Address Poverty Amongst Black African Women

The World Bank (2018) in collaboration with the National Planning Commission in South Africa, produced a report that analysed the progress which the government has achieved in reducing poverty and inequality. The report stated that the post-apartheid government has initiated the following;

- Free primary health care for all, especially for poor households.
- No-fee paying schools in the disadvantaged communities.

- Old age and child support grants.
- Housing facilities for the poor.
- Free basic services such as water, electricity and sanitation.

All of the above services and many others have been provided to enhance the livelihood of the poor households and the majority of South Africans. However, poverty, unemployment and inequality remain the triple challenge in the country. The report states that South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world. It was also revealed that the labour markets were the largest contributor to wage gaps. This is perpetuated by the dual economy in the country, the economy that has two divergent unequal clusters. There is one cluster of the economy that is made up of few, highly skilled, productive individuals with well paying jobs. The other cluster of the economy is made up of large low skilled, low productive individuals that have low paying jobs.

8.5 DISCUSSION

South Africa has more than enough policies and legislation to combat gender inequality and in the process eradicate poverty, what should be of concern is how such policies and legislation can be actualised to transform society. This exercise should not be done by the government alone, but with all the major stakeholders.

Combating gender disparity and poverty calls for multi-stakeholder engagement. The government cannot tackle entrenched societal problems alone. Companies and other organisations should be compelled to develop the vision for addressing issues of gender at the strategic level. More often than not, gender issues are popularised through observation of the ‘Women’s Month’ and many other festivities, and it ends there. Nothing is translated into tangible transformation.

Barriers that make women fail should be removed. Women should be allowed to have an input on how they would like to be empowered and in what areas. Many women empowerment programmes are designed without consulting women, who are the primary benefactors of such.

More often than not, men design such programmes. The same applies to poverty alleviation programmes. Poverty alleviation programmes also benefit the women mostly, but men are at the forefront of such programmes whereas most of them have experienced secondary poverty and not abject poverty. Thus, such programmes end up benefitting

most of the men's cronies through tendering system, which is indirectly promoting the interest of women but in reality barring them from access.

South African society perceive women as recipient of all the interventions provided by government and corporates. If abject poverty has to be addressed, government should bring women as equal partners in all the programmes relating to gender issues and poverty alleviation. The reason there is little transformation in that area is because women's capabilities are not being taken seriously in the country. Furthermore, gender stereotypes are being perpetuated at homes and schools wherein children are socialised into different roles according to their gender. UNICEF (2019) maintains that both girls and boys observe inequality in their homes, they see how girls are being treated differently from boys. This curtails the girls' generational change and their ambition to achieve more in life. Unless, gender parity is placed at the centre of sustainable development in South Africa, initiatives to eradicate poverty may not yield the desired results.

Initiatives and programmes for empowering women should move from ticking the boxes to real transformation. Most activities of women empowerment are for reporting purposes and not for bringing about sustainable development and change.

8.6 CONCLUSIONS

Complete reliance on government to transform society will not eradicate poverty nor ensure that the rights of women are protected. This is because gender equality structures created to liberate black African women have not yielded enough fruits. The men who are directly and indirectly benefitting from the current status quo are the ones who are required to bring about change and give some power to women. Therefore, this chapter argues that gender parity can occur through transformation of society. This can be achieved if a concerted effort is harnessed through government to educate society, make resources available for change and ensure equal participation of all the stakeholders.

Gender equity should be infused in the strategic objectives of various organisations. This is because activities of empowering women are regarded as side issues and not the fundamental objectives of the organisations. It is through the actualisation of gender equity objectives that the society can be transformed.

8.7 RECOMMENDATIONS

South African society should be actively engaged in actualising the parity of genders in every form. The parents at home should teach their children that girls are as capable and as important as boys; and they should be taught to co-exist in mutual respect. The schools also should mirror and nurture talents equally. It is in the homes and schools where societal values are being formed.

Society should also be transformed through public education, media and social networks to value and appreciate the value of women, not only in good speeches, but also in action. Most institutions in the country do not transform as far as gender equity is concerned, but the narrative on paper is impressive. Therefore, this study recommends that what is on paper should be backed up by evidence.

Women should be allowed to take the lead in setting the agenda for women empowerment and poverty alleviation. Men have been at the helm of driving change in these two aspects, and progress has been slow. As a result issues such as gender pay gap have refused to disappear.

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Development-Driven Tools or Parasitic Paradigms? A Critical Perspective of Western Theories of Development and Its Reforms

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9.1 INTRODUCTION

Over the centuries there have been attempts to conceptualize the phenomenon of economic development. However, orthodox Western thought has influenced the way that development is understood, conceptualized and measured. Western philosophy supported the nexus and synergy between the concept of economic growth and development with little or no emphasis on the indicators of the well-being of people such as equitability in the distribution of income and wealth as well as the extreme gap between the rich and the poor. Western thought focusing on human rationality, reduced development to that which must be applied. Although Western theories and definitions of development became fixed in stereotyped forms. The majority of definitions of, and, and theories on, development have originated from a Western background. Even the

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whole existence of the term ‘development’ is ‘*eurozentrischen*’ (Eurocentric), since resources of each nation are diverse. Thus, as a result of the confusion caused by the plethora of definitions, there have been suggestions to discard the mostly dominant Western term ‘development’ altogether (Sofela et al., 2013).

The taxonomy or typology of development as a result of Western scholarship led to a categorization of the phenomenon according to levels of progression. Western thought on this led to the creation of a category named ‘developed’ or ‘developing’ or ‘underdeveloped’ economies. The premise for this categorization was the acceptance of certain parameters, and features indices of measurement namely, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), National Income, Gross National Product among other conventional instruments of measurement. The underdeveloped or developing regions or countries were pejoratively given this tag as a result of the statistics posed by them using these conventional instruments of development.

This paper is a clinical attempt at providing answers to these salient issues. It also examines the orthodox Western development theories and reforms by citing a wide range of instances of faulty development reforms imposed on the global south by the West. The paper submits in a multi-polarizing style that every society has its own sense of development and that the orthodox conception of development and its reforms are not sacrosanct given the peculiarities of the global South.

9.2 CONCEPTUALIZATION, THEORIES AND MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF WESTERN PERSPECTIVES

The concept of development has created a sort of cerebral dichotomy to include, commonsensical realm, conventional realm and the unconventional realm. The commonsensical conviction entails the crude, lame or generic perception of the term development, which is often positivistic in nature. The conventional perception of Development on the other hand is Western in origination and synonymous to growth because it basically looks into the increase in the parameters and quantifiers such as GDP, GNP, Per Capital Income, and so on which are set by an international organization, such as UNO, IMF and World Bank to measure the level of development in a given nation. This perception keys into the

Macro binoculars of the economy of various nations in continental Africa, Europe, America, Asia, Latin America and Australia (Sofela et al., 2013).

From the theoretical angle, the Western conceptualization of the phenomenon of development in various economic, social and political change in the countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean and the South Pacific. Based on the Western-driven unipolar approach to development, the increase in the parameters and quantifiers such as GDP, GNP, Per Capital Income, and so on of nations around the world determine the degree of development or under development they have. Thus, some countries have been variously labelled as underdeveloped, less developed, developing in the Third World and the South (Turner and Hulme, 1997). Other writers and scholars see the commonality among these third-world countries only in the reception of foreign or development aid. The leaders of these nations, often known as the third world, have extorted their citizens to strive for development and have formulated policies and implemented programs towards this end. In order to understand the whole rationale behind the desire for development we should explain development even though there is no consensus about the meaning of development.

Western theories of development are numerous but notable ones are reviewed here. Several early economists had written extensively about the nature and dynamics of economic change and prosperity. Adam Smith and Karl Marx are the two most famous thinkers for their two opposite views on the nation's system of economic arrangements: one called capitalism and the other called socialism (Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015). Adam Smith's work (published in 1776) entitled *The Wealth of Nations* focuses on the market as an instrument of economic development. Smith argued that division of labour could create more productive processes in an economy. The mechanism for enhancing the nation's wealth therefore is through specialization and exchange. Adam Smith contended that under competition, private investors while pursuing their own interests guided by the 'invisible hand' would maximize national output and thus promote public interests (Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015). The 'invisible hand' doctrine has become the foundation for the working of the market economy or capitalism (Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015). In the system, government interference is seen as inefficient in looking after economic activities. Meanwhile, free trade, private property and competition are seen as the foundations that would spur economic development, reduce poverty and bring about social and moral improvements in humankind

(Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015). However, freewheeling capitalism is often criticized for bringing wealth only to the rich, whereas the poor get poorer (Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015).

On the other hand, Karl Marx defines economic development based on social or public ownership of property. Karl Marx emphasized that the wealth of the capitalists comes from the exploitation of the surplus value created by the workers. Hence, private property and free market were seen as causes of poverty for the many millions of workers. Marx, therefore, suggested that private property should be completely abolished. A nation's economy should be planned and managed by the state to serve the interests of the masses. Marx believed that a revolution would be inevitable to break down the increasing concentration of the capitalists and to establish socialism. However, like Smith's model of economic development. The historical experience of socialist economies showed little or even no improvement in the living conditions of the poor. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the central planning paradigm appeared to demonstrate that the model would not provide the solution to poverty and inequality seen in human society (Meier, 2000).

The Ricardian theory of international trade suggested that countries have a comparative advantage in a good if the good has a lower relative price in a country than is found in the other country. This theory indicates that we need to look at the cost of a product in each country before the trade, (in autarky) and compare it with the trade situation and compute gains/losses from trade (Mathias, 2007). That way we can better understand the pattern of trade between two countries, and be able to answer questions like why does it make sense for a country to export say cheese and import wine or vice versa. Put differently, a country is said to have a comparative advantage in the production of a good (say, cloth) if it can produce it at a lower opportunity cost than another country. David Ricardo's principle of comparative advantage does not require a higher absolute productivity but only a higher relative productivity (a weaker assumption) in producing a commodity. Pre-trade relative productivities/costs determine the pre-trade relative prices. Pre-trade relative prices in each country determine the range of possible terms of trade for the trading partners. Actual terms of trade within this range, in general, depend on demand patterns, which, in turn, determines the gains from trade for each trading partner (Ricardo, 1821).

The Ricardian model assumes constant productivity, as there is only one factor of production (labour), and therefore constant (opportunity)

costs that lead to complete specialization. However, increasing opportunity costs that often arise in multi-factor situations (law of diminishing returns) due to the limited quantity of some factors specific to an industry can easily be accommodated to allow for incomplete specialization. Thus, in the Ricardian model, technological differences in two countries are the major source of the movement of commodities across national boundaries.

There are also classical theories of Economic development. The first generation of economic model was formulated in the early years after World War II (Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015). These early models focused on the utility of massive injections of capital to achieve rapid GDP growth rates (Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015). Indeed, the linear stages growth model is an economic model which is heavily inspired by the Marshall Plan which was used to revitalize Europe's economy after World War II (Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015). It assumes that economic growth can only be achieved by industrialization. Rostow's stages of economic growth model is one of the major historical models of economic change. Building on the historical pattern of the then developed countries (Rostow, 1960). Rostow claimed that the transition from underdevelopment to development would pass through five stages: the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity and the age of high mass consumption.

According to him, traditional society is one whose structure is developed within limited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world (Daly, 1996). Newton is here used as a symbol for that watershed in history when men came widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few knowable laws, and was systematically capable of productive manipulation (Daly, 1996). Thus, the phrase 'traditional society' according to him involves grouping the whole pre-Newtonian world: the dynasties in China; the civilization of the Middle East and the Mediterranean; the world of medieval Europe (Daly, 1996). 'The precondition for take off' are seen as the second phase of economic development according to Rostow. The decisive stage is the take-off, through which developing countries are expected to transit from an underdeveloped to a developed state. But this transition cannot happen except certain strategies are mapped out. One of the principal strategies of development necessary for any take-off was the mobilization of domestic and foreign savings in order to generate sufficient investment to accelerate economic

growth. Besides, the revolutionary changes in agricultural productivity are an essential condition for successful take-off; for modernization of a society increases radically its bill for agricultural products.

The third stage of economic growth according to Rostow is the take-off. The take-off is the interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome. During the take-off, new industries expand rapidly, yielding profits, a large proportion of which are reinvested in new plants; and these new industries, in turn, stimulate, through their rapidly expanding requirement for factory workers, the services to support them, and for other manufactured goods, a further expansion in urban areas and in other modern industrial plants (Daly, 1996). Besides, new techniques spread in agriculture as well as industry, as agriculture is commercialized, and increasing numbers of farmers are prepared to accept the new methods and the deep changes they bring to ways of life (Daly, 1996). Consequently, the rate of effective investment and savings may rise from, say, 5% of the national income to 10% or more (Daly, 1996).

The fourth stage is the maturity level. Maturity refers to the stage in which an economy demonstrates the capacity to move beyond the original industries which powered its take-off and to absorb and to apply efficiently over a very wide range of its resources—if not the whole range—the most advanced fruits of (then) modern technology. This is the stage in which an economy demonstrates that it has the technological and entrepreneurial skills to produce not everything, but anything that it chooses to produce. This, for example, was the transition through which Germany, Britain, France, and the United States had passed by the end of the nineteenth century or shortly thereafter. The fifth stage of economic change according to Rostow is the age of high mass consumption, where, in time, the leading sectors shift towards durable consumers' goods and services (Rostow, 1960). Historically, the United States is said to have reached this stage first, followed by other western European nations, and then Japan in the 1950s.

Similar to Rostow's stages of growth model is Harrod–Domar model which emphasized that the prime mover of economic development is investments (Ghatak, 2003). Every country, therefore, needs capital to generate investments. The principal strategies of development from the stage approach were commonly used by developing countries in the early post-war years (Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015). With a target growth rate, the required saving rate can then be known. If domestic savings were not sufficient, foreign savings would be mobilized.

The linear stage model by Rostow and Harrod–Domar has received criticisms on several grounds. One, Rostow and Harrod are historical in the sense that the end result is known at the outset and is derived from the historical geography of a developed, bureaucratic society. Two, Rostow is mechanical in the sense that the underlying motor of change is not disclosed and therefore the stages become little more than a classificatory system based on data from developed countries. Three, this model is based on American and European history and defines the American norm of high mass consumption as integral to the economic development process of all industrialized societies (Rostow, 1960). Four, his model assumes the inevitable adoption of Neoliberal trade policies which allow the manufacturing base of a given advanced polity to be relocated to lower-wage regions.

During the 1960s and early 1970s, economists generally described the development process as structural change by which the reallocation of labour from the agricultural sector to the industrial sector is considered the key source for economic growth. The two well-known theories in this category are the model by Lewis, and the one by Chenery—sequin statistical analysis (Chinery). The Lewis model, presented in 1955, dominated the development theory in the 1960s and 1970s. It is also known as the *two-sector model*, and the *surplus labor* model. It focused on the need for countries to transform their structures away from agriculture, with low productivity of labor, towards industrial activity, with high productivity of labor. In the Lewis model, the underdeveloped economy consists of two sectors: a traditional, overpopulated rural subsistence sector with surplus labor and a high productivity modern sector to which this surplus labor is transferred. The focus of the model is on the process of surplus labor transfer from the traditional sector which leads to the growth of output and employment in the modern sector. Lewis calculated that with an increase of 30% or more in the urban wages, workers will migrate from the rural areas to the urban areas—which would lead to growth in output and employment through the modern sector. Both labour transfer and modern-sector employment growth are brought about by output expansion in that sector. The speed with which this expansion occurs is determined by the rate of industrial investment and capital accumulation in the modern sector. Such investment is made possible by the excess of modern-sector profits over wages on the assumption that capitalists reinvest all their profits (Lewis, 2003).

9.3 STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT

Like Lewis model, this theory also emphasizes the sequential process of change. However, in contrast to the Lewis model and the original stage's view of development, increased savings and investment are perceived by patterns-of-development analysts as necessary but not sufficient conditions for economic growth. In *Structural Change and Pattern of Development*, in addition to the accumulation of capital, both physical and human, a set of interrelated changes in the economic structure of the country are required for the transition from a traditional economic system to a modern one. These structural changes involve all economic functions—including the transformation of production and changes in the composition of consumer demand, international trade and resource use as well as changes in socioeconomic factors such as urbanization and the growth and distribution of a country's population (Lewis, 2003). If this is achieved, it can lead to the growth of cities, since people will migrate from the rural to the urban regions. Those that eventually make it in the cities would go back to develop the economy of rural areas.

The international dependence theory is another economic development theory that became very popular in the 1970s up to the 1980s. The dependence theorists argued that underdevelopment exists because of the dominance of developed countries and multinational corporations over developing countries. The theory is considered an extension of Marxist theory. Within this general approach, there are three major streams of thought: the neocolonial dependence model, the false paradigm model, and the dualistic-development thesis. The first major stream, which we call the neocolonial dependence model, is an indirect outgrowth of Marxist thinking. It attributes the existence and continuance of Third World underdevelopment primarily to the historical evolution of a highly unequal international capitalist system of rich country–poor country relationships (Ernest, 1973). Since the rich nations were intentionally exploited during the colonial days and unintentionally neglectful since their attainment of self-rule, the coexistence of rich and poor nations in an international system dominated by unequal power relationships between the centre (the developed countries) and the periphery (the LDCs) renders attempts by poor nations to be self-reliant and independent difficult and sometimes even impossible. Whether because rich nations are intentionally exploitative or unintentionally neglectful, the coexistence

of rich and poor nations in an international system dominated by such unequal power relationships between the centre (the developed countries) and the periphery, (the less developed countries) renders attempt by poor nations to be self-reliant and even to be independent difficult and sometimes even impossible.

The second stream in this category is the false paradigm model which attributes Third World underdevelopment to faulty and inappropriate advice provided by well-meaning but often uninformed, biased, and ethnocentric international 'expert' advice from developed countries' assistance agencies and multinational donor organizations. These experts offer sophisticated concepts, elegant theoretical structures and complex econometric models of development that often lead to inappropriate or incorrect policies in Third World countries.

The third strand is the Dualistic-Development Thesis which is an extension of the dualism concept widely discussed in development economics. In simple words, it says that the relationship between the rich and the poor countries is just a global version of the dualism that we see in every aspect of life. The interrelations between the superior and inferior elements are such, be it in a global sense or in a local sense, that the superior element does little or nothing to pull up the inferior element. Infarct, it may serve to push it down (Kelley, 1972).

Indeed, dependency theorists distinguish various states according to the different economic functions they perform. Highly developed and advanced superpowers like the United States of America fall under the Centre centre (CC) category. Countries like Canada, the Netherlands and Japan fall under the periphery-centre (PC) category. These countries have significant economic development and industrialization. The third category is the Centre-periphery (CP) category, which includes developing countries that are growing fast like Brazil, China, India and South Africa. The last category is the periphery-periphery (PP) category which consists of countries that are economically backward and have a lot of social issues, like Cambodia, Zambia, El Salvador, etc.

A critique of dependency theory has been attempted by some scholars. Perhaps the most glaring weakness of dependency was its lack of empirical grounding. If one accepts Karl Popper's famous dictum that in order for a theory to be scientific it must be testable and falsifiable, dependency theory can be said to be patently unscientific. While many social scientists attempted to operationalize and put dependency assertions to the test, this trend met with a strong dissent from leading dependency figures

(Karl Popper, 1992). They countered that the very basic characteristic of dependency studies was the emphasis on global analysis and that a structural or global interpretation could not be subjected to simple empirical evaluation

In the 1980s, neoclassical counter-revolution economists used three approaches, namely the free market approach, the new political economy approach and the market-friendly approach, to counter the international dependence theory of development (Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015). In contrast with the international dependence model, these approaches mainly argued that underdevelopment is not the result of the predatory activities of the developed countries and the international agencies but was rather caused by the domestic issues arising from heavy state intervention such as poor resource allocation, government-induced price distortions and corruption (Meier, 2000).

The central argument of the neoclassical counter-revolution is that underdevelopment results from poor resource allocation due to incorrect pricing policies and too much state intervention by overly active Third World governments (Meier, 2000). Rather, the leading writers of the counter-revolution school, including Lord Peter Bauer, Deepak Lal, Ian Little, Harry Johnson, Bela Balassa, Julian Simon, Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne Krueger, argue that it is this very state intervention in economic activity that slows the pace of economic growth (Meier, 2000).

What is needed, therefore, is not a reform of the international economic system or a restructuring of dualistic developing economies or an increase in foreign aid or attempts to control population growth or a more effective central planning system. Rather, it is simply a matter of promoting free markets and laissez-faire economics within the context of permissive governments that allow the ‘magic of the marketplace’ and the ‘invisible hand’ of market prices to guide resource allocation and stimulate economic development. Thus, neoclassical economists focused on the market to find a way out for the developing countries. Policies of liberalization, stabilization and privatization therefore become the central elements of the national development agenda. Unfortunately, however, the models have not brought about the expected results. For instance, several African countries focusing on these issues achieved an average growth rate of only 0.5% per year (Dang and Sui Pheng, 2015). With weak and inadequate legal and regulatory framework, not to mention

the different institutional, cultural and historical context of the developing countries, free market in these countries fails to stimulate economic development (World Bank, 2000).

New Growth Theory emerged in the 1990s to explain the phenomenon of development in some countries. The theory emerged to offer explanation on the poor performance of many less developed countries, which have implemented policies as prescribed in neoclassical theories. The proponents of this theory noted that technological change has not been equal nor has it been exogenously transmitted in most developing countries (World Bank, 2000). The new growth theory emphasizes that economic growth results from increasing returns to the use of knowledge rather than labor and capital (World Bank, 2000). The theory argues that the higher rate of returns as expected in the Solow model is greatly eroded by lower levels of complementary investments in human capital (education), infrastructure, or research and development. Meanwhile, knowledge is different from other economic goods because of its possibility to grow boundlessly. Knowledge or innovation can be reused at zero additional cost. Investments in knowledge creation therefore can bring about sustained growth. Moreover, the knowledge could create spillover benefits to other firms once they obtained the knowledge. However, markets failed to produce enough knowledge because individuals cannot capture all of the gains associated with creating new knowledge by their own investments. Policy intervention is thus considered necessary to influence growth in the long term. The new growth models therefore promote the role of government and public policies in complementary investments in human capital formation and the encouragement of foreign private investments in knowledge-intensive industries such as computer software and telecommunications (Meier, 2000). Although the new growth theory helps to explain the divergence in growth rates across economies, it was criticized for overlooking the importance of social and institutional structures and its limited applicability lies in its assumptions. It treats the economy in a monocausal way to the neglecting of many other factors which provide the incentives for economic growth which developing countries lack such as good infrastructure (road, electricity, water and transport system), inadequate institutional structures and imperfect capital and goods markets. Policy-makers will therefore need to pay careful attention to all of the factors that determine the changes and their impacts on the aggregate growth rate.

Be that as it may, development in the context of this paper does not mean the rise or increase in the conventional yardsticks, quantifiers or indicators of growth as expressed in the conventional conceptualization of it. In other words, the term ‘development’ as used in this paper denotes poverty reduction, equitability in the distribution of wealth and resources and purchasing power parity that bring about the general well-being of people. It is possible for an economy to attain a significant growth rate while a good number of people in that economy remain poor in spite of it. This is the unorthodox approach to development concepts and policies this paper adopts.

9.4 ORTHODOX GROWTH THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT: A CRITIQUE

At this juncture, it is pertinent to attempt a critique of the unipolar analysis of economic growth theories which view development as a consequence of an increase in the parameters and quantifiers of economic growth such as Gross Domestic Product, GNP, National Income, Per Capital Income, and so on. This is the position of the conventional Western strand of thought on the meaning and measurement of development. Thus, it is the assumption of the conventional school of thought on development that countries should pursue economic policies that will translate to development. In other words, the idea canvassed by the proponents of the conventional approach to economic development is that once the growth parameters of an economy are on the increase, then the economy is in good condition or at best ‘all is well’ with the economy and so development must manifest. But to what extent can growth guarantee the general well-being of the people or ‘real development’? Is economic growth the right measure of economic improvement in the economic well-being of the people? Or are these indicators the wrong measure of development? These salient issues are examined here.

To start with, there is no fundamental reason to pursue economic growth as a primary policy, or to consider it as the key indicator of economic performance or development if it does not guarantee poverty reduction and well-being of people. Economic growth does not, in itself, make people’s lives any better or necessarily reflect changes in well-being. As Woodward and Simms rightly pointed out, growth takes account only of paid work (with some exceptions, notably subsistence agriculture). The exclusion of unpaid work within the home, in particular, is a major

distortion, though they contribute considerably to well-being, it is not considered as a production. Suppose, for example, that Parent A takes a paid job looking after the children of Parent B and in turn pays Parent B the same amount to look after his/her children (Woodward and Simms, 2006). Both incomes will then add to national income, and to economic growth, even though nothing additional is being produced and no one is any better off financially. (Woodward and Simms, 2006).

In the same vein, growth measurement via the National income calculation does not take into consideration the non-financial aspects of well-being, such as working time. Thus, if production were increased by 15% as a result of everyone working 15% longer, people would not be 15% better off, because of the extra time they were working. The measured growth rate is the same, however, whether the working time is increased or not. Similarly, no account is taken of the effects of changes in uncertainty or financial insecurity. Equally, in the childcare example, neither the immediate social and psychological costs of separating young families nor any longer term effects, e.g., on crime or health, are counted. National accounts also include defensive consumption, without taking into account of the social problems which give rise to it. Thus, the additional spending required to clean up pollution, to maintain security in the face of increasing crime or social unrest or to ensure national defense in response to increasing international tensions all add to national income and growth.

Most importantly in the present context, growth calculations take no account of the distribution of income. Woodward and Simms (2006) shed more light on this by away illustration thus:

National accounts treat \$1 of income identically, whoever receives it. This is clearly unrealistic and counter-intuitive: the effect of an additional \$100 on the well-being of a household with an income of \$100 is clearly far greater than for a household with an income of \$1 million. As a result, the effect of a given change in aggregate income on well-being is critically dependent on *whose* income is increased. This means that from a well-being perspective, the incomes of the rich are systematically overvalued at the expense of the incomes of the poor. If we set economic growth, rather than well-being, as our policy objective, it institutionalizes this serious distortion, so that policies will inevitably result in a lower level of well-being than could otherwise be reached by biasing policies towards the worse off.

The orthodox Pro-growth policies adopted by governments of developing economies have not helped development in such countries as poverty has been on the increase with majority of citizens finding it difficult to meet their basic needs. The economic history of Lithuania between 2002 and 2008 provides important lessons and evidence to substantiate the fact that rather than entrenching development and poverty reduction, pro-growth policies have only widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Indeed, Extrapolating the pro-growth policy trends and figures or statistics in Lithuania from 2002 to 2008, one would say that such policies has been an extremely inefficient and a dangerous way of achieving poverty reduction and development which emphasizes good quality of life for people. Between 2002 and 2008 (Roger and Stern, 2010), the government of Lithuania embarked on economic policies that were aimed at entrenching economic growth and this was rightly entrenched but with no positive bearing on improved quality of life or standard of living of the majority of the citizens in the country.

Lithuania from 2002 to 2008 was the fastest European economically growing country when GDP increased by 7–9% annually. However, the poverty threshold in the country stood at the same at 20%, showing that there was no poverty reduction in Lithuania during the same period (Rogers and Stern, 2010). The failure was no poverty reduction in Lithuania during the same period under review. Lithuanian's economy between 2002 and 2008 demonstrated or manifested an outward shift in the country's Production Possibility Curve (PPC) as there was an increase in a country's Production Possibility Curve (PPC) as there was an increase in country's production. However, the country's economic growth did not translate into an increase in citizens' quality of life. So, how relevant were the pro—growth policies of Lithuanian government vis-vis real development' that raises the standard of living or quality of life of the majority citizens in Lithuania? This is a rhetorical question!

The failure and fallacy of pro-growth policies in engendering economic development and improved quality of life of people were also intended by World Bank and IMF induced Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) Reforms in African countries. The SAP was one of the orthodox pro-growth measures aimed at entrenching development in Africa and Latin America to improve the quality of life of people. But rather than impacting positively on the economic well-being of the people, it worsened the situation. For example, the currencies of African nations were devalued thereby raising the exchange rate which caused inflation. In the

same vein, many industrial establishments could not afford the high cost of importing their raw materials due to stringent exchange rates which made locally manufactured goods be on high side when compared with imported finished goods. The citizen therefore preferred the relatively low imported manufactured goods. This threw many industrial establishments out of business in Nigeria when many of their commodities could not be sold for a long time (Ibrahim, 2009).

Also, in Cote d' Ivoire poverty became endemic and the gap between the rich and the poor became widened, following the government's subscription to SAP reforms between 1988 and 1995, the incidence and intensity of poverty doubled from 17.8 to 37% of the population (Aigbokha, 2008). This was in spite of the fact that statistics show that Cote d'Ivoire's exports increased from \$3 billion to \$5 billion from 1980 to 1995 (Aigbokha, 2008). Thus, given the statistics, Ivory Coast experienced economic growth during the period without commensurable improvement in the quality of life of the majority of Ivorians as they were smashed with poverty.

Nigeria's economic growth statistics, like many developing countries that implemented SAP policies in the 1980s and 1990s recorded significant improvement at the detriment of the majority of Nigerians whose quality of life was reduced. Following the SAP reforms, the real growth rate became positive in 1988, turning from an average of minus 1.7% in 1980/86 to 4.7% in 1986/92 (Aigbokha, 2008). The strong growth performance continued in the 1990s and into the 2000s, rising to 6.6% in 2002/2004 and 6.24% in 2004/2006 (Aigbokha, 2008). However, despite this strong growth performance, poverty incidence has remained high, rising from 42.7% in 1992 to 65.6% in 1996. Although estimated to have declined to 54.4% in 2004, poverty incidence could still be considered high. The decline gives an annual average of 1.6% points since 1997 (Aigbokha, 2008).

9.5 MEASURING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: MOVING BEYOND ORTHODOX GROWTH THEORIES

While we reckon with the economic growth quantifiers as set by international organizations and the proponents of the orthodox models as crucial hints or parameters capable of showing the extent of development in a country at a particular point in time, it is our argument that certain instruments of measurement should be added in order to

determine the actual degree of development. Put differently, the use of Growth Domestic Product (GDP), the National Income (NI), and Gross National Product (GNP) and other orthodox parameters of development can stand to an extent in measuring economic growth but are not sufficient enough. However, equitability in the distribution resources or Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and the gap between the rich and poor must also be considered in the determination of real development in a political economy.

In terms of equitability in the distribution of resources and wealth, development, in the real sense of the word, implies fair distribution of resources in an equitable manner. However, in spite of the growth rates experienced by some countries and at the global level, it has been estimated that some 80% of the world's resources are consumed by 20% of the world's population (United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 1998). Even the efforts at addressing this glaring disparity by democratizing development processes and ensuring the free, active and meaningful participation of the beneficiaries of development have met serious roadblocks. Generally, those efforts have been defeated and captured by the same rule of law formalism and the same hegemonic forces of globalization that created the problem in the first place. Thus, the Western powers who benefit from the core-periphery relations between them and the South would continue to do everything within their capacity to promote the pro-growth theories and instruments of development as such favours' their hegemonic interest of dominating the South.

Indeed, better and fair **distribution of resources** or wealth among people will reduce poverty and inequality within countries and at the global level. This is 'real development'. The rate of inequality in the distribution of wealth in many countries today is an indication of the fact that real development is lacking even though there are significant traces of economic growth. Poverty is the inequality between countries and within them.

The Table 9.1 shows the correlation between inequalities in wealth distribution, poverty and development in Africa (Corrado, 1921).

As indicated in the Gini table above, it is possible for a country to witness high income and wealth inequality in spite of a significant increase in GDP. As seen above, South Africa which boasts of one of the highest growth rates in Africa has a very high percentage of income and wealth inequality with 58.5% inequality rate despite a 5.2% growth rate. This

Table 9.1 Gini coefficient, GDP and per capita income growth rate for some selected countries 2018

<i>Country</i>	<i>Gini coefficient (%)</i>	<i>GDP growth rate (%)</i>	<i>Growth rate per capita income (%)</i>
Egypt	32	5.5	3.56
Ghana	34.1	3.4	0.94
Algeria	35.5	3.8	1.39
Niger	36.2	3.4	0.02
Côte d'Ivoire	36.9	5.5	3.57
Cameroon	40	5.2	2.36
Nigeria	45	2.4	-0.46
South Africa	58.5	5.2	4.12
Kenya	58.3	2.7	0.56

Source Amin (2000)

has continued to widen the gap between the rich and the poor and worsen Purchasing Power Parity which should stand as the real indicator of development considering their impact on the well-being of people.

This income and wealth inequality, however, can substantively affect how economic growth impacts the rate of poverty reduction and thus development in any country. A series of studies have underlined the importance of income inequality as a mediator between growth and poverty reduction (See Deininger and Lyn Squire, 1996; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Martin and Shaohua, 2007). For instance, Fosu (2011) points out that not all countries fit the general trend of poverty reduction over the past two decades; in fact, in some cases, poverty has been reduced only marginally, and in a number of countries—such as Bolivia and Mongolia—its incidence has increased. He also posits further that only part of this differential performance with respect to poverty reduction can be attributed to growth rate differentials: income inequality emerges as a crucial mediating factor between economic growth and the extent to which it results in poverty reduction. While Botswana has for instance grown at a much faster rate than Ghana, Fosu shows that Ghana has been much more successful at translating its relatively moderate growth into substantial poverty reduction. This difference, Fosu's study states, can largely be explained by the difference in the levels of income inequality between the two countries. Thus, a move towards equitable distribution

of income is a measure towards development that does not just emphasize growth but poverty reduction and equitability in the distribution of income and wealth. The widening wealth and income gaps between the rich and the poor means countries with accelerated growth are yet to attain real development. It should be noted that wealth and income inequalities is a challenge that is not unique to the developing world but also to the so-called developed economies.

9.6 CONCLUSION

This paper discussed the concept of development showing the various dimensions of development from the orthodox viewpoint and attempted a critique of the orthodoxy in development. The orthodox growth approaches and reforms aimed at economic development and which were sold to governments of third world countries by parasitic Western forces or their agents such as IMF whose acceptance led to the faulty economy, inequality and other negative experiences of the countries who adopted them. Orthodox economic growth quantifiers are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for making development on a number of important fronts from poverty alleviation to equitable distribution of income and wealth. As presented above, this Chapter questions an idea that has become almost unquestionable that a growing national and global economy is the indispensable foundation for solving all with regard to reducing poverty. Thus, the central argument in this paper is a paradigm shift from the orthodoxy, which states that poverty reduction requires rapid economic growth in developing countries. Economic growth in developing countries in turn requires rapid growth in the global economy; therefore, poverty reduction requires the fastest possible growth in the global economy. Impliedly, equitability in the distribution of income and wealth, improved Purchasing Power Parity and efforts aimed at reducing the wide gap between the rich and the power are important quantifiers that should complement growth parameters in measuring what development is.

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The Sankofa Methodology: A Pan-African Approach to Poverty Alleviation

Tapiwa Muzerengi and Shepherd Gudyani

10.1 INTRODUCTION

Tracing the historicity, emergence and causes of poverty in Africa still remains a subject under scholarly debate. Scholars such as Akinlo (2001) and others believe that, amongst many factors, the root of poverty in Africa is deeply rooted in colonialism. However, authorities such as Champalle and Turner (2014) posit that, poverty in Africa is caused by a poor lack of political hygiene which in turn causes economic shrinkage. Some academics such as Professor Lumumba, argue that, Africa is under-developed because, “People who have ideas have no power and those who have power have no ideas.” Critically, this picks up the void in the polit,

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which does not sustain development and deal with poverty in Africa. This chapter looks into how the tenets of the Sankofa Methodology are used to bring Africa back on the development terrain. The Sankofa Methodology sees an African problem as rooted in its history that African problems stem from the lost Africanity, thus the methodology advocates that, it is not a taboo to go back to the source and fetch what you forgot. Sankofa means that, as Africans move forward into the future, they need to reach back into their past and take with them all that works and is positive. Poverty is a multifaceted, complicated, dynamic and diverse concept. The way it is defined and measured varies from place to place, country to country, region to region and continent to continent. All these variations make it a very difficult phenomenon to grapple with in an African context. This is further substantiated by Ravallion (2010) when he argued that those countries which are poor have lower poverty lines as compared to richer ones. Furthermore, the notion of poverty also changes across time. Ayala et al. (2009) and Alkire (2009) resonate that, aboriginal analytic thinking of poverty was predominantly hinged on the objective-type assessment of the economic or how much income one gets amongst others. As time progressed, it was established that, the poverty measurement tools had gross inaccuracies. This created a debate that, poverty is now perceived to be a subjective concept, social, political and economic which should include both socio-political and economic analysis (Lacny, 2020; Harris, 2007; Moore & Putzel, 2001). This further puts strains on tailored African poverty alleviation strategies, which is another problem for Africa as the Sankofa methodology points out what Africa lacks is probably lost in the African history. The subjectivity on the definition of poverty, its causes and efforts invested in fighting it leaves Africa with a lot to be desired.

10.2 POVERTY: DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT

There are a multiplicity of definitions regarding poverty. This illustrates that the concept of poverty cannot be single-handedly defined because of its complicatedness. However, the multiple contemporary definitions of poverty miss the Sankofa methodology's key factor in viewing poverty. The concept of valuing development in monetary terms misses a lot about how Africa exchanged goods, how Africa survived on barter trade, family ties and the concept of Ubuntu, which would not allow any family member to sleep on an empty stomach. These are not valued in the widely

accepted definitions of poverty. According to De Vos and Garner (1991: 267), each definition of poverty partly depends on the social, political, cultural and historical contexts of a given society.” This presents a difficult and complicated scenario in coming up with a homogeneous and universal criterion of defining poverty, worse still to incorporate the key tenets of Africanacity in defining poverty. Regardless of these complexities, all the definitions of poverty point to limitations and deprivations encountered by communities in different forms such as basic needs, income and human capabilities. Various definitions of poverty will be defined and debated under the absolute definitions, relative definitions and subjective definitions this was substantiated by (De Vos & Garner, 1991: 267). However, it is not enough when the Sankofa methodology’s African views on poverty are not incorporated in the wider debate of definitions, this paper views comprehensive definitions as those that capture what binds Africa together, its rich history and the kind of life that defines Africa.

To see how Africa is short-changed in the many ways that are used to view the world, one may look at the two widely accepted types of poverty. These are relative and absolute or abject poverty. These two types of poverty are measured either by objective or subjective approaches. Ferrer-I-Carbonell and Van Praag (2001: 148), “in the case of the former, a researcher determines the minimum consumption basket for the food/non-food items essential for survival, by fixing a quantifiable value upon which a distinction can be made between those that are poor and those that are not.” This approach is viewed as the bed rock of poverty evaluation. Invariably, in the subjective approach to poverty assessment, individuals make self-assessments to determine whether they feel poor or not. This method is characterized by a coherent qualitative analysis of poverty and the ordinal pattern of poverty is assumed. It is critical to note that the African culture used to bridge most of the gaps that point to poverty in the contemporary poverty scales, for example, a family without would have a portion in the Zunderamambo despite that the cereal being weighed is not in his/her household, that’s Africanacity, and has not been widely accepted in pinpointing poverty.

It is imperative to coin a definition on a few crucial concepts of poverty before dwelling much on different measures of poverty, including measures that reflect on the rich history of Africa. The line of poverty covers a yardstick or threshold at which a clear line is drawn between the rich and the poor. This cut-off can be either in the form of subjective or objective income or non-value that is regarded adequate to maintain a

minimum acceptable standard of living. This is substantiated by the World Bank (2001: 18), “as different regions exhibit different characteristics, a poverty line should be constructed within the context of a given country in order for it to reflect the economic and social circumstances of that country.”

On a defined threshold line, the poor normally falls before the threshold value, the bulk of the population represents the poor. The population falls below the poverty datum line of that particular country. Ravallion (1998), argues that this is a common poverty idea which can be categorized under the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family of poverty measurement tools.

It is pertinent to submit that, the head count ratio, however, is blamed for not showing the degree of poverty for those assumed to be poor. For a vibrant poverty measurement, the headcount ratio is usually submitted together with another common poverty idea from the FGT family of tools of measurement, referring to the poverty gap index. Gardiner and Evans (2011), explain that, this index shows poverty occurrence by interrogating far the poor falls below the poverty datum line. The applicability of above said is of paramount importance to South Africa where the roots of abject poverty are deeply rooted into the historical imbalances in different racial groups.

10.3 MEASURING POVERTY: THE MISSING SANKOFA PERSPECTIVE

The orthodox definitions of poverty have shown huge gaps and appreciation of the African perspectives in the defining and also the measurement of poverty, nevertheless, these were called the ideal definitions of poverty. Poverty has been largely measured and grounded in classical ideologies which highly favoured money metric and non-money metric poverty analysis to be the basis of absolute poverty. Critical to this is that, the Sankofa Methodology’s metrics of poverty have rhymes that go far beyond tangible metrics that are valued in monetary terms, values and society weigh heavier in the context of poverty according to the Sankofa Methodology. These are some of the missing links in defining poverty according to the Pan-African perspectives.

10.3.1 *Money Metric Absolute Poverty*

Saith (2005), submits that, money metric absolute poverty is best described when the measurement is objective basing on how much a person requires so that he/she can survive biologically, this includes water, food, warmth and shelter and clothing. Different ways can be used to measure absolute poverty and this may include amongst other methods; the Individual Dietary Diversity Score (IDDS), Household Dietary Diversity Score (HDDS) and Coping Strategy Index (CSI). Ravallion (1998: 10), “further supports that, absolute poverty can be measured in a number of ways such as, such as the food energy intake method, which measures the consumption expenditure or income level at which a person’s typical food energy intake is just sufficient to meet a predetermined food energy requirement.” This suggests that, if an individual or household is able to consume a variety of food per day and able to meet the prescribed daily requirements, it means the individual is not in absolute poverty. This is further substantiated by the severity in Coping Strategies, such as eating one meal per day instead of three. The basis of measurement of poverty here is the monetary value that is put on every meal or commodities that support meals. This is not sufficient to incorporate African perspectives on defining and measuring poverty, the Sankofa puts cultural heritage systems above everything that defines society, including how food is produced and shared amongst peoples, hence, poverty cannot be defined fully without incorporating how communities value sharing, working together and commodity exchanges amongst themselves. Monetary metrics remain Euro-centric, and relegate the African heritage far away from informing what poverty means in African terms.

The same goes to the cost of basic needs, which is the second method which also values the bundle of foods that are normally consumed by the poor basing on prices (monetary values) locally (Coudouel et al., 2002). According to Coudouel et al. (2002), it also incorporates the component for non-food items, which the poor normally associated with the poor. The poverty datum line differentiates the rich from the poor, however, calculated in monetary value, it misses the values of the Sankofa Methodology. Poverty measured in monetary value dismisses the wisdom that is derived from the African religious belief systems, creeds, codes of behaviour, patterns of working and sharing, rituals, spirituality and tradition that speak to the challenging circumstances of today including

poverty. These are by far enriching in an African perspective than the so-called determinants of “poverty datum-line measurements,” for example; if a household or individual is able to survive above the poverty datum line, it is considered to be rich while that which operates below is regarded to be poor. It should be categorically mentioned that, that the poverty lines employed in one of these methodologies often bear arbitrary elements, and worse still misses many key aspects of the Sankofa wisdom, including positive aspects such as liberty, freedom and justice that are also critical in defining poverty and measuring it.

10.3.2 *Non-money Metric Absolute Poverty*

While the above discourse has focused the analysis of poverty basing on material well-being and income, the values of poverty variables have been placed on monetary descriptions. The argument does not only lack the basis of poverty in African terms because of its confinement to the analysis of revenue and expenditure, poverty has beyond non-income dimensions that include many aspects of the Sankofa Methodology. Poverty-stricken people do not only lack material wealth or income but they require both social-economic and political inclusion. This can be substantiated by active community participation in both politics and economics, but further reflects the unity and togetherness that bind people together, the cultures of production, safety and protection that the Sankofa Methodology speaks into. Despite the position of non-metric definitions of poverty, some renowned scholars who brought the discourse of poverty on the development terrain such as Sen (1999) still misses critical value in African perspectives of poverty. Sen (1999) argues that well-being and poverty should be understood as the deprivation of capabilities rather than living below the poverty datum line, where income and low consumption are regarded as indicators. Sen (1999), defines capabilities as guaranteed freedoms that an individual should enjoy in order to live a dignified life that he or she values and these include education, long life expectancy and good health. Sen was very accurate and precise on the fact that income as a major indicator of poverty. A person can have income but not accessing good healthy food or services because they might not have adequate income to advance their well-being. From this point of view, the poor are only distinguished from the rich by objectively specifying the level of non-metric items or capabilities that are attained. Imperatively, this implies that, those people that fall below the poverty datum

line are obviously categorized as the poor while those that are above are regarded as rich. However, ultimately there are still issues of corruption, unethical leadership, abuse, violence, and greed that represent an existential threat to the people-hood and agency of African people as shown in the Sankofa Methodology, hence also distorting the truths above poverty definitions and measurements.

10.3.3 Relative Poverty and Measurement

Defining relative poverty also substantiates the gaps that have been shown above, the misuses that represent Africa's values and perspective on poverty. One of the gaps include treating relative poverty as a result of gross failure by the absolute poverty to recognize that, inequality can cause poverty. Iceland (2005) argues that, a relative type of analysis of poverty of people in the same locality or what others might afford to purchase. This assertion is premised on the fact that, the person's well-being cannot only be based on absolute deprivation but rather on comparisons with the fellow citizens. The relativity of poverty encompasses the average standard of living of people coupled with the definition of people's expectations and when it is the average standard of living which defines people's expectations. This is further evidenced when people are powerless, excluded from participation, ashamed, marginalized and resentful. Arguably, the fact that, the poverty status of people is determined by others in society renders the issue of poverty to be subjective. Alcock (1998) resonates that, because there is an element of value judgement that is required, relative poverty becomes subjective. In the Sankofa, the comparisons or comparative analysis is the source of distortions in itself, the African perspectives value closure of differences amongst people, hence if one has food, everyone has, if one does not have, that signifies everyone. Comparisons are sources of division and enmity amongst people, this unAfrican.

The discourse around economic status of other members in society as the major indicator of relative poverty is part of the condemned distortions of the African definitions of poverty, it further confirms the distortions that were brought by borrowed civilizations especially through colonization. Despite the glaring misses and gaps, the contributions of

these widely accepted definitions still contribute to the important knowledge of how Africa should tap back to its roots. According to Iceland (2005), relative poverty compares whether communities comparatively lack a particular level of consumption, level of income, clothing, good quality housing and material possessions. The overall distribution of consumption, income and any other possessions in the community best define the relative poverty line. It is imperative to note that, the choice of relative line is impulsive. For example, in developed countries most literature as indicated by, Woolard and Leibbrandt (2006), the poverty line can be set at 50% of the country's average consumption or income. Woolard and Leibbrandt (2006), for instance in South Africa, a number of studies prefer to peg poverty relativity at 40% of the national average income. The relative poverty line is used as a yard stick to distinguish the rich from the poor. However, some studies would like to coin relative poverty line as income less than half of the average income at the provincial level (Dartanto & Otsubo, 2013).

10.3.4 *Subjectivity of Poverty*

Contemporary authorities argue that, there is no neither a single definition of poverty no the single measurement of it. Hence, poverty cannot be hinged solely on the economic variables but rather other variables such as access to good health, quality education, free political thought, association, and expression. Together with the advent of the malpractice coupled with social exclusion, these issues pertinently revealed the necessity to have a multidimensional system to the analysis of poverty, which is not adequately addressed under the relative and absolute poverty. This approach of poverty subjectivity addresses the multidimensional analysis of poverty.

De Vos and Garner (1991: 268), argue that, is based on the idea that the opinions of people concerning their own situations should ultimately be the decisive factor in defining poverty.” It can again be coined as felt poverty. Poverty subjectivity has some characteristics such as variation in income poverty, multidimensional poverty that is subjective in nature and subjectivity on one's well-being. The subjective approach to poverty starts by interrogation people how they perceive their own situation (United Nations, 2010).

10.4 WHY AFRICA STILL IN THE POVERTY TRENCH?

The question why Africa still remains poor despite its abundance in natural remains unanswered. Furthermore, the continent has a huge base of human capital and a diversified socioeconomic background. This is rather disturbing if not confusing since poverty is defined by other scholars as having the face of Africa. Poverty and Africa can be called two identical twins because one cannot talk of poverty and fails to buttress the point using the example from Africa. Different scholars are at cross roads trying to understand why Africa is still lagging behind on the development ladder. Some scholars would want to argue that, Africa is not rich in natural resources as some say it is rich in natural resources coupled with favourable climatic conditions that are suitable for agricultural production. The contemporary scholars, however, differ from the classical scholars as they argue that, Africa is suffering from lack of political hygiene, that it is characterized with rampant corruption, irresponsibility and unaccountability. The reasons why Africa is still underdeveloped therefore depends on the stand point one is viewing this at, that is either from the Euro-centric or Afro-centric view. The Sankofa Methodology views Africa's underdevelopment as has been caused by the lost history. Africa lost its identity and is now surviving on a borrowed foundation which does not sustain its true roots, that is why it is important to reflect back and correct the path Africa has taken. Other scholars are not even confident and are in doubt that Africa has good fertile soils that could not feed its population. This stems from how the Western doctrine has been perceived to be the correct and acceptable way of global life. The major reason why Africa is deeply impoverished is that because of the problem of colonialism, where Africa was heavily exploited by the European countries and in the process lost its Africanacity foundation and way of life. The measurement of the degree of exploitation goes beyond the natural resources such as minerals, instead towards labour of their people. Regardless its potential, some of the reasons why Africa is impoverished are discussed below at lengthy.

10.4.1 *Lack of Political Commitment*

The poor economic performance of Africa is broadly associated with poor choices made by African leaders. Critically, this relates well with the position of the Sankofa methodology that "People who have ideas have no

power and those who have power have no ideas.” This assertion leads to a question, “What choices were made, in what context were they making these choices and when was this done?” All these questions help us to understand whether it is fair or not to blame the choices made by the African forefathers. The discourse of Africa’s development has different perspectives as some authorities say, the African leaders lacked the means to influence the status quo, while others say Europe has been ever ready to give a hand in Africa’s development basing on the reasons from self-interest to altruism and pity (Asselin and Anh, 2008). Most of the leaders in Africa are in the comfort zone and the development of Africa is not a priority, they have no idea on how to develop the continent. They use protectionist policies which do not give room to new robust policies that grapple with poverty in Africa in an aggressive way which are in sync with the current trends and realities of poverty. Ayala et al. (2009) argued that leaders in the African continent have been and are still being served as a weapon of politics for foreign and powerful governments rather than focusing on domestic prosperity in the corresponding countries. There is a great mismatch between development policies and strategies and the general populace cannot be identified. A genuine commitment that manifests itself into action is the one expected from African leaders so that the continent can take-off. The Sankofa methodology highlights how putting Africa at the centre of every decision is lacking, which shows how Africa has diverted from its roots. Leaders have been swallowed by the lights of the city and they favour sweet life at the expense of the masses which totally goes against the Africa that binds everyone together.

10.4.2 *Religion*

Cultural diversity, multiplicity of religious faiths, tradition and norms and values highly characterize Africa. Back before the nineteenth century, religion in Africa was well known as a unifying force than its contemporary purpose which fuels conflict that causes civil unrest. Conflict and civil unrest have forced Africa to prioritize human security at the expense of development. The Western kind of religion destroyed the African traditional religion and this is what the Sankofa methodology pleads Africa retrace. The African traditional religion was founded on living together as one unity and assisting each other as one people. The Western religion diluted Africa, and brought the idea that life on earth is meaningless, and so that Africans would not care protecting their resources. This became one major way of exploiting Africa and leading to underdevelopment.

10.4.3 *Institutions*

Institutional capacity and management are regarded as the bedrock on which a desirable and sustained change takes place in the form of development. Vibrant institutions and well organized and managed institutions are a shining beacon for the development of any country. On the other hand, it can be argued that, regardless of the availability of resources needed for economic resources, if the institutional capacity of that particular country is questionable, achieving economic development becomes Utopian. Africa lacks strong institutions, be it the contemporary development institutions or the African type of institutions. Under the African tradition institutions, resources would have never taken out of the continent because minerals were processed locally. Resources would have been channelled towards improving the lives of African people. In the contemporary development, the institutions of governance in Africa are also found wanting, they are identified by bureaucratic processes coupled with corrupt public officials and professionals. This has attracted a lot more challenges than solutions in the implementation of intervention strategies and policies that benefit the ordinary citizens. These also explain why the Sankofa methodology advocates for looking back and reorganize from the African perspective, adopting the African institutions for pro-Africa progress.

10.4.4 *Geography*

The element of geography plays a pivotal in contributing to African insolvency. Most of the African countries are land locked and do not have access to the sea. When a country is land locked, the cost of delivering goods and services becomes very high as compared to countries on the coastal areas. International Trade is less competitive in land locked countries as compared those countries that have access to the sea. The Euro-centric trade system favours the regions with sea ports as they move goods in quantities and support their businesses. Africa is seen as a repository of obsolete goods, but a source of minerals by the developed countries. This is also a strong reminder of what the Sankofa Methodology is advocating for. The Sankofa methodology advocates for Africa to become its own market and not depend on the developed countries, this means going back to the roots where trade was done amongst African people to allow resources to circulate within the continent. This

would allow Africa to develop its own corners of the continent to become various centres of business and become an influential business continent. A critical example is the idea behind the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) which signifies the deepening agreement on a strategic road map for the creation of a common African market and an industrialized African Economy which should project Africa as a significant player and partner in the fast advancing digital global economy. This has always been the idea of Africanacity, the traditional Africa that the Sankofa methodology speaks into.

10.4.5 *Cross Border Terrorism and Conflict*

The major element needed by almost every human being is peace and security and they are a necessary precondition for development take-off. All human beings aspire and deserve peace regardless of either the political, social or economic status in the community. All human beings aspire for good life which is devoid of abject poverty, devoid of indignity and poverty. It is argued that most of the African countries did not enjoy internal peace and security for the past three decades, which is parallel to the Sankofa Methodology. The Sankofa views Africa as peaceful, with traditions related to each other in an African way to an extent that there is no border crossing but traditional relations that fit into trade, cultural relations, helping each other and protecting each other. The prolonged rule by most of the African leaders and dictatorial tendencies created a dominant culture of fear and silence which caused peace and security questionable, these however, are seen to be a borrowed concept, not an African origin. The outcry over the increased number of cases on the violation of human rights was a cause for concern especially in countries such as Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia. It is however critical to note that according to the Sankofa, this is unAfrican, Africa stands for peace, and wherever there are these kinds of conflicts, there is always a foreign hand. Other governments with an oppressive component elsewhere in Africa are viewed progressive and benign and their countries seen as peaceful, secure and prosperous despite rampant citizen torture and unjustified arrests by state repressive apparatus. The justification of political tolerance, economic oppression and gross violation of human rights was done by the super powers using the Cold War. As indicated above, this is not what Africa stands for in the Sankofa

methodology. It is germane to note that, during the Cold War, misinformation and misrepresentation was the order of the day. The false impression gave impetus to those countries that imported land mines and ammunition which have been used as a destruction tool to millions of people in Africa. The blood shed was witnessed in Rwanda, Somalia and Liberia and in the streets of many cities. African people continue to be used so that the factories may remain open, retain their jobs and earn capital. Some scholars argue that, the Cold War was not cold in Africa. The Cold War created some devastating internal as friends of Africa and adversaries of the superpowers uprooted it both political and economic aggrandizement. This can be debated that, the support of the wars was aided by superpowers and their allies, while aid was contributing much. Unfortunately, when Cold War ended in 1989, many African leaders did not change overnight. It is evident that, in many African countries the colonialists were removed but the system of colonialism which is characterized by oppression and not observing the rule of law. That is why the Sankofa methodology advocates for retracing the old Africa where there were no colonial boundaries, Africa enjoyed relations amongst the traditions of the region. This is further substantiated by the heavy presence of authoritarian rulers who are still holding on to power tenaciously, with some taking their citizens into internal wars, conflicts and terror thereby misusing both human and material resources to wars and internal security at the expense of development. The continent Africa is characterized by diverse culture, beliefs, traditions and abundant natural resources specifically in the horn of Africa. It should be noted that, the other impediments which caused Africa to delay in realizing the fruits of development was the fact of wars and cross border conflicts that have become common for a long time. However, some African countries have been eager to invest their effort and time on resolving conflicts to bring peace and tranquillity in the African region. While some African countries are still wallowing in poverty some are still entangled in issues of terrorism. Ethiopia at one time for example invested intensively in its human resources to achieve peace and stability in South Sudan and Somalia. The question then emerges, why did Ethiopia spearheaded to bring stability in Africa, can it be attributed to its capacity? Is it because it wanted to avoid the risk of being affected by conflict? Can the issue of stability and peace be attributed to Ethiopia solely? The issue of restoring, maintaining and promoting peace and stability in Africa can be regarded as the baby for Ethiopia only as other African countries were busy with their business

while South Sudan and Somalia needed their help most. With this and other factors in mind, it can be concluded that, the widening vision disparities gap between the developed and developing countries is difficult to close. Though there are some positive strides in the right direction in some African countries such as South Africa, Ethiopia and Ghana, it is not the expected level of change anticipated.

10.4.6 *Colonialism*

The predicament of colonialism in Africa is regarded as one of the dark cloud that left Africa sighing on the development terrain. The West remains totally accountable and accused in this scenario of African colonization. It is with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia which did not undergo the burden of colonialism from the West. The Europeans has their own primary mission which had a major thrust on heavy exploitation of not only the abundant natural resources but rather the native people of Africa as their cheap labour. Colonization left a permanent psychological dent on Africa which cannot be easily cured as compared to the physical damage, however, the Sankofa believes that the gap can be closed by investing back into the Africa we had before colonialism. There is no shame in rooting back to the origin. This can be demonstrated by the type of education curriculum which undermines the local culture, values and norms and the indigenous languages are dying a natural death, for example, the Franco phone countries and Portuguese-speaking African countries such as Mozambique, Angola, Benin just to mention but only a few. The Sankofa Methodology advocates for Africa to transact and invest in local education. Africa has lost a lot of energy and resources in trying to invest in foreign languages and systems, relegating its languages and systems to the periphery of its development. The way Africa was administered was only for their own political aggrandizement, natural resources were looted and cheap labour from the native people was used, untapped natural resources such as land and minerals were heavily exploited. Surprisingly there is a correlation between GDP level and ethnicity, at macro level exist primarily because it happened to be lighter ethnic groups of western Europe that were the colonizers at the colonization period, while it happened to be darker ethnic groups of Sub-Saharan Africa that where the enslaved ones (Bhorat and Van der Westhuizen, 2012). The Europeans did not only steal Africa's physical

resources but rather Africa's identity as indicated by historical distortions and cultural bastardization, the Sankofa methodology wants Africa to claim back its African education, African type of training, Africa's borderless relations, peace and unity that were dented by colonialism. The Europeans made sure that, there is power in African culture consolidation and ruthlessly invested in heavily in African culture decadence. During the time of slave trade, the natural resources were syphoned and transported to Europe with no any economic gain on Africa.

10.5 AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT TRAJECTORY 1960–2019

It is against this background of the above-mentioned factors that caused Africa to remain underdeveloped that, Africa engaged in robust strategies with the aim to achieve sustained and sustainable economic development and growth. It has been discovered that, most of these strategies that could help Africa to recuperate from the development dust bin were prescribed from the West and this did not work to alleviate poverty in Africa. The Sankofa Methodology pushes Africa to look back to its heritage, tradition and systems in pursuing poverty alleviation. The Sankofa attributes Africa's to the strategies that were championed by the capitalist economies galvanized in the name of Bretton Woods Institutions as a way of "ameliorating" economic performance "with no or little involvement of affected African countries." Nevertheless, the economic development of the African continent was too far backwards as compared to other continents that genuinely embraced the similar strategies. The Sankofa views Africa as redefining its trajectory based on its tradition and the heritage which is defined resourcefulness of the continent. The Sankofa notes that Africa's Development trajectory needs a redefinition and reconsideration to achieve development and economic growth. The various stages through which Africa went through can be established since the late 1950s. It is the major thrust of this section to critically analyze various phases that are identified.

10.5.1 *Period Just After Independence*

Adepoju (1993) argued that, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategies were at the centre of Africa's growth and development strategies during the immediate post-independence era starting in the late 1950s to the 1970s. The developed countries as a way to diversify their economies,

the engaged in locally manufacturing of goods which previously been imported from developed countries. The major aim of the import substitution was to produce goods locally. The strategy was designed in a three step phase as follows; the first step was aimed at selling final locally produced goods, second step was to slowly moving to the production of intermediate goods and finally the third step was on capital goods. Prohibitive external trade policies and substantial protection of growing industries was the major focus of the strategy. Local production was defended through a myriad of ways which included; exchange control, complex non-tariff and systems tariff and import licencing. Protection of infant industries was necessary at this phase since it was necessary to help the growing industries to easily navigate the business terrain which was previously dominated during the transitional period which was characterized by an increase in domestic price production that exceeded international prices.

It was evident that, industries which concentrated on producing final goods for the new urban middle classes developed. These industries were more into bakery, milling of flour, breweries as well the processing of raw materials businesses such as refineries of sugar, oil milling, vegetable and fruit canning factories and plants of processing coffee. Of importance to note was the rapid development of the textile industry in most African countries. However, some few iron-making factories became operational in a few African countries this was due to small scale electrical steel works development. Hammouda (2004), argued that, other industries that developed include the manufacture of small agricultural equipment and hardware articles, paint and varnish industries, and mechanical and assembly workshops. The strategy of Import Substitution Industrialization was premised on the historical development of countries such as Germany, France, China, USSR and the United States of America where protectionism was used to safeguard and develop both the manufacturing and technology industries. Most African countries copied this strategy with the view to manufacture goods for consumers mostly meant for the new urban working class. The Import Substitution Industrialization intervention ostensibly was geared to enable countries in Africa to start the modernization of structures of production inherited from the colonial masters.

It is germane to note that, most African countries inherited vibrant and viable methods of farming from the colonialists. The favourable trading

conditions between the West and Africa, to some extent made the agriculture sector contribute significantly to the economic growth of Africa. In a number of African countries, agriculture is regarded as the corner stone of African economies and the major employer of labour and main source that generates foreign currency. Thus, Africa recorded significant positive strides in the first phase of growth in real per capita income. Notably, in the early 1970s, the socioeconomic indicators were already pointing to poor economic management. Growth became volatile and positive but it was showing a declining trend.

10.5.2 *The Economic Structural Adjustment Era*

Dijkstra (1996), argue, that dismal failure of the Import Substitution Industrialization to launch Africa into industrialization, the success of the “export-led” South- and East-Asian growth strategy, and the debt crisis of the early 1980s led to a new consensus on the importance of trade policy reform and exports in growth strategies. This new consensus was the main focus of the reforms recommended to African countries and the developing world in general from the early 1980s, within the framework of International Monetary Fund engendered Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) (Dijkstra, 1996). Resultantly, the mid-1980s have seen the crafting and implementation of a large spectrum of trade policies that are related to economic reforms as prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank Group. The Sankofa notes that despite these being important measures in the contemporary world economics, Africa needs its own consensus on the type of business policies that develop Africa. Most of the measures that were put forward after independence in many African countries were benefiting the imperialists. There was no benefit for Africa. Oyejide (2004) argued that trade liberalization implies the transformation of the trade regime from an inward-oriented stance that discriminates in favour of (and thus protects) import-competing activities into a neutral regime whose incentive structure does not distinguish between exports and imports or into an outward-oriented trade policy regime that discriminates in favour of and thus actively promotes exports. The adoption of liberalization of trade measures should hence create either a neutral or trade regime that is outward oriented and allows certain levels that enhance productivity and growth promoting economic liberalization. The results of Structural Adjustment Programmes beginning mid-1980s, and specifically in the

1990s, trade liberation was the order of the day in, most African countries, a significant reduction in barriers of trade was noticed more than others especially on import restriction. These reforms gave impetus to the opening up of Africa to more imports and enriching the imperialists by reducing non-tariff and tariff barriers, establishing a strong foundation for exports that are cheap, by avoiding taxes on exports and providing incentives on exports. In a nutshell, this should be categorically and unequivocally noted that, this was the United States of America- engendered “Washington Consensus” in operation. This was a clever way of opening African markets so that goods and services manufactured from the West could be facilitated and in return the export agricultural raw materials and minerals to Western counties at a very cheap price.

For instance, there was a complete or partial conversion of restrictions to tariffs quantitatively with the exception for health security, environmental and moral restrictions in some scenarios in most countries in Africa. Oyejide et al. (1999) revealed that in line with this new strategy, Mauritius got rid of import permits in 1991, Tanzania by 1993, Ghana in 1989, Kenya by 1993, Zambia by 1992 and South Africa reduced 85% of restrictions by 1990. Furthermore, Mauritius trimmed its tariff structure from sixty to ten tariff categories, Kenya from twenty-five to six, Cote d’Ivoire from ten to six, and Zambia and Tanzania reduced their categories to three.

10.6 THE USEFULNESS OF SANKOFA METHODOLOGY IN POVERTY ALLEVIATION

All efforts to modernize development have also come with a heavy price for Africa. Africa lost its identity and form, which the Sankofa methodology wants the region to retain. This chapter has unequivocally shown the major strategies used to avert poverty in Africa such as the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) and Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) were all Euro-centric and serves the interests of colonizers. Sankofa Methodology traces that Africa as a continent has its problems traced as far back the time of slave trade. In as far as we believe in this, it does not mean that, we need a new Africa but rather new innovative minds that can bring Africa back on its wheels. The major thrust of the Sankofa Methodology is that, African problems need African solutions.

The concept of *Sankofa* is transliterated from the Akan language as *Se wo were fi na wosan kofa a yenki*, whose literal translation in the English language is “*It is not taboo to go back to the source and fetch what you forgot.*” The source is the African culture, heritage and identity that all Africans possess. In its essence, *Sankofa* means that as Africans move forward into the future, they need to reach back into their past and take with them all that works and is positive. Globalization is posing both positive and negative effects on the African Continent. Globalization has caused cultural bastardization, whereby most African countries are losing their identities through western curriculum of Education. It is not too late, as we move forward to go back to the roots and take what has been left out such as teaching the curriculum which recognizes our indigenous languages and education which liberates the mind towards problem solving. *Sankofa* is employed by Pan-Africanists all over the world to promote the notion that African people everywhere must *go back to their roots in order to move forward*. Africa has become the training ground for terrorists but before the advent of Christianity it was a fountain of peace yet regarded as a “dark” continent by the European colonizers. The African Traditional Religion could mould a complete human being with a sense of belonging that I am because we are. The element of Ubuntu characterized all Africans. Africans in making they had a sense of familyhood, sisterhood and brotherhood, all this was possible because of Ubuntu. Rebelling against each other was very rare during the time of African Religion. It is therefore, advisable by the Sankofa methodology that, Africans wherever they are it is not yet too late to revisit our Traditional beliefs or using Christianity without the face of colonialism. The visual and symbolic representation of *Sankofa* is a mythic bird that flies forward while looking backward with an egg, symbolizing the future, in its mouth (Bangura, 2011: 175). Most African economies borrowed the way to do business from their colonial masters and this proved not working as it was too capitalistic and many people could not afford goods and services since they are very expensive. The Sankofa methodology advises that, barter trade should be functional in both rural and urban areas. It goes against the idea of valuing everything in monetary terms, yet African people have most of their monies tied up in their belongings such as properties, cattle, goats just to mention but only a few. Far too many works on Africa concentrate on what Africans lack and the urgency for them to adopt non-African ideas, technology and Western-styled institutions if they are to “develop.” These works are written from a fragmented point of view that focuses

primarily on the diversity of African people while ignoring the commonalities that exist amid this diversity. Thus, one of the major strengths of Sankofa Methodology is that it forces the researcher to probe many questions. This is important in order to yield a holistic understanding of African people. If we say Africa is not developed what do we mean? Who should define the concept of development in Africa? What is the standard measure of poverty in Africa? Who has the template for measurement of poverty in Africa? Who designed the template for measurement of poverty in Africa? All these questions remain unanswered, because African countries are busy competing to fulfil the requirements of former colonizers in as far as development is concerned. The advent of Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes embraced by Zimbabwe in 1992 left it in a pool of poverty. It was advised by the International Monetary Fund to embrace the ESAPs, and this did not work because most companies privatized and this was not in sync with what Zimbabwe needed that particular time. Consequently, four methodological approaches can be said to have emerged in Sankofa studies. These techniques can be defined as follows (Bangura, 2011: 181): *Holistic Approach* involves studying Africans by observing and recording the commonalities that exist amid their diversity. This is in contrast to Western approaches that present a fragmented perspective of Africans by focusing solely on the diversity of African people. It is imperative for African countries to identify commonalities in trade, investment, finances, education, agriculture, governance, legal systems than looking at the diversities of these. The commonalities help African countries to find areas of cooperation and this strengthens regional integration. Looking at diversities, force Africa to depend on the West since the notion does not establish the abundant natural resources each African country has. The type of scholarships given to African students sometimes is not relevant since it does not recognize the local culture and does not liberate the mind of students so that they can solve African problems. The justice system through the International Criminal Court of Justice (ICC) it is more Euro-centric and biased towards the Europeans. It is high time we have the African Court of Justice which deals with matters of Human rights and democracy with an Afro-centric view. The International Court of Justice viewed most African leaders as paragons of democracy yet it viewed all European leaders as champions or authors of democracy. Some scholars argue that, democracy has got a European face while dictatorship has got an African face. This is why Africa is still underdeveloped because it needs to follow the development

from the Europeans yet the race to development was not started same time and on the same terrain.

Non-deficit Approach involves critically assessing the merits of non-African ideas and institutions employed in African societies. This approach is imperative for understanding the context of the culture, history and philosophy of Africans. Before the advent of the Europeans, Africa had its own traditional way of doing things for example in agriculture, farmers could use small grains, using manure instead of fertilizer, traditional ways of controlling pests and diseases, using draught power for farming. Unfortunately, due to modernity, all these historical methods were rendered useless and outdated and in the face of Climate Change, communities are suffering from acute food shortages, low agricultural productivity, increasing number of pests and diseases, disturbance of the soil structure. It is highly commendable to go back to the old tradition including our diets involving organic or traditional foods, education which involves folk tales that are relevant in our African context.

Historical Archaeology involves asking questions about the past that relate to the present to help the researcher towards a considered and intentional future. The approaches that Africa is using to address the current phenomenon of poverty is not linked to the background of poverty and its analysis. Questions such as, “Why the presence of donors in Africa is not transforming the lives of Africans?” This can be attributed to programming which does not allow to look back into how societies and communities were living before? What was the situation like for the past fifty years? What went wrong for the community to be in this situation? What is the current situation on the ground? How best can these communities be helped? A very consultative approach which involves the communities affected is needed. This brings ownership and sustainability in projects which is a necessary ingredient in poverty alleviation in Africa.

Fuzzy Logic Approach involves evaluating phenomena based on “degrees of truth” rather than the usual “true or false.” African leaders and non-state actors should interrogate the historicity of African poverty as a result of social exclusion and a deviation from African-Centred approaches to poverty alleviation resulted and device Pan-African Methodologies as a corrective measure to break the vicious cycle of poverty. Most assessment methods used in African countries do not give room for participants to give a divergent view of the phenomenon of poverty, rather the methodologies are too narrow and limiting. A human being cannot be studied the same way we study atoms whereby their

behaviour is predicted. The Sankofa encourages various interventions to be comprehensive and qualitative in nature rather than quantitative. It advocates on being slow but comprehensive than being quick yet shallow in approach. The qualitative research methodologies clearly spell out all the views of participants on a particular phenomenon affecting them. This in turn helps in coming up with strategies that are context specific.

10.7 CONCLUSION

The dimensions of the Sankofa methodology are very useful in grappling with poverty alleviation in African context. Africa should go back and fetch what has left behind for it to move forward. There is no offence in redesigning the curriculum that equips learners with problem solving skills, agricultural systems that are relevant to Africa and which does not the environment, preserving all heritage sites that caused rainfall, bottom-up approaches to development where human beings are treated as conscious beings, embracing the concept of Ubuntu that brings unity and identity and be aware that African problems need African Solutions. Of paramount importance to note is the fact that, while Africa goes back to the basics it should undermine its past experiences or problems it faced.

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Innovations for Fighting Poverty and Inequality in Zimbabwe: The Evolving Roles of the State, Private Sector and Non-governmental Organisations

Tinashe Gumbo and Admire Mutizwa

11.1 INTRODUCTION

Persistent and deepening poverty and inequalities remain of concern in Zimbabwe. Both poverty and inequalities are widespread, largely rural phenomena while in some urban areas; they are notably increasing (ZimStat, 2015: 1). The Government of Zimbabwe in its Interim

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Poverty Reduction Strategies (2016) continued to acknowledge that years of implementing poverty reduction strategies since independence have yielded success in reducing extreme poverty while general poverty has remained significantly high. Similarly, inequalities are quite prevalent and high, with a Gini-coefficient of 0.42. Those in the highest quintile account for two-thirds of total income while the lowest quintile had only 2% of total income in 2012. Entrenched rural–urban inequalities are clear; about 33.8% of households in rural areas were in extreme poverty in 2012 compared with 4% in urban areas showing deep-seated rural to urban inequalities. Zimbabwe’s poverty profile indicates that by 1992, poverty was concentrated in the rural areas (Riddell and Robinson, 1992) but by 2022, it had spread even into high-density suburbs in urban areas.

Thus, despite these phenomena being economically, socially and politically unjust, they persist and coexist with official developmental attempts and strategies meant to alleviate them. Zimbabwe is well known for having undertaken several steps meant to alleviate both poverty and inequalities. In the first decade after independence, the country implemented an expansive social oriented policy before adopting the Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAP) in the second decade. However, in the remaining period to 2022, a combination of state, private sector and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) efforts in the fight against poverty is clear. While during the first decade after independence, the role of the NGO was that of complementing the state through social welfare and relief services as well as small-scale interventions earmarked at reducing poverty in resettlement areas, the NGOs also emerged as strong advocacy agencies. The roles of the three actors in the fight against poverty have often been in isolation thereby weakening the effectiveness of their interventions. More so, poverty and inequality continue as the poor have never been at the heart of the intervention strategies. Furthermore, interventions often occurred in a manner that weakens the local productive systems, with the poor and their economies considered as the recipients of interventions in ways that disrupted their local economies and contributed to the perpetuation of poverty.

Winning the “war” against poverty and inequality requires being considerate of the concerned players. Such players under study in this Chapter are the State, Private Sector and NGOs. Historically, the roles of these players have evolved, thus, defining the dominant approaches to eliminating the catastrophe. Closely related to these evolving roles of the players are not the approaches alone but outcomes in the dynamics of

poverty and inequalities. Thus, the crux of the Chapter is that as far as poverty matters, the players involved in the fight against poverty is more critical. These include policymakers (government); international financial institutions (who are more interested in profit) as well as the civil society and NGOs who are socially scientific in their thinking.

The aforementioned differences have implications for many policies and interventions that are formulated to alleviate poverty. In most cases, the policies are formulated not because the poor find these as the most strategic ways of liberating themselves out of poverty, but because the key players believe and assume such policies hold substantial poverty reduction potential. Thus, the voices of the interested players, not the poor, are heard most loudly and this has had its own contribution in shaping the outcomes of the interventions. Thus, this Chapter chronicles the evolving roles of the three noted players in alleviating poverty and inequalities in Zimbabwe with the ultimate aim of pointing to some essential innovations, challenges and the test for the future.

Common in defining poverty is Sen's approach of considering poverty as a deficit in entitlements and capabilities for a basic function that includes being well nourished or escaping avoidable disease and taking part in the life of the community. The World Bank's World Development Report (2001) focuses on lack of opportunity; insecurity and vulnerability; and empowerment. If poverty is defined as a lack of opportunity, it implies a deficit in human, natural, physical, financial and social assets that are necessary to accord basic life necessities.

Rank et al. (2003) hold that poverty has traditionally been understood as a failure at the individual level therefore, the poor has been viewed as not deserving any form of support from Government or other stakeholders that can intervene. The government in particular has thus been able to find strong justification for doing nothing to address poverty. Yet, one can argue that, in contrast, poverty is a condition emanating mainly from failure at the structural level. Generally, the following dimensions of poverty seem to be common in all definitions shared by scholars;

- (a) Income—having low income or consumption,
- (b) Assets—having little or poor quality land, housing, livestock, or other productive assets,
- (c) Environmental—living in a polluted or hazardous environment or working on poor quality land,
- (d) Education—having little or no education,

- (e) Health—having illness of various kinds,
- (f) Powerlessness—being excluded from decisions with impact on one's life,
- (g) Discrimination—being subjected to arbitrary discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity or any other reason,
- (h) Vulnerability—being susceptible to wide range of shocks such as harvest failure, illness, price changes, violence, etc.

While inequality can be viewed from political and economic perspectives, this Chapter mainly focuses on it as a social phenomenon where there will be social disparities in the distribution of available resources and opportunities. This can manifest between rural versus urban dwellers and is also very clear between the rich and the poor in a society. In the context of this Chapter, the disparities can be noted in the access to education, health and land. This Chapter also considers NGOs in their diversity, thus organisations operating outside the market and apart from the State, formal or informal, and include community-based organisations, research institutions, faith-based organisations, trusts, human rights defenders and not-for profit media. More so, the Chapter considers NGOs in its broader entirety covering the international as well as the national and regional NGOs as they operate through their networks and in solidarity. Further, in this Chapter, private sector refers to the section of the economy that is focused on the maximisation of profits and satisfaction of the customers. The ESAPs which were fronted by international financial institutions are considered within the private sector initiatives for this Chapter. While the government was playing a more enabling role for the international financial institutions, the interventions remained profit-oriented with less focus on the plight of the poor.

11.2 POVERTY ALLEVIATION IN ZIMBABWE

11.2.1 *The State-Led Interventions*

Zimbabwe gained its independence from British colonial rule in April 1980. At that moment, the majority did not have the opportunities and facilities for equal access to formal education and other critical social services (Shizha and Kariwo, 2011). The colonial system was so restrictive that black people rarely finished seven years of education. It was separatist and dualistic premised on fiscal allocations that were grossly skewed in favour of the whites (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). The new government inherited a system of education and health that was racially biased and unequal in both governance and quality. Zhou and Zvoushe further hold that the consistent racist policies were primarily meant to advance more whites than blacks in order to minimise black competition in the job market in all sectors of the economy. Shizha and Kariwo add that the colonial Rhodesian Government made European education compulsory and universal and spent as much as more than 10 times more per European child than the African child. In the years 1976–1977, for instance, the State spent Z\$43.2 per African pupil, and Z\$475.2 per European pupil; in 1972–1973 it was Z\$28.8 per African pupil against Z\$377.8 per European pupil (Riddell, 1978 in Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012: 214).

Access to land for the blacks was also limited. In fact, the nationalists took up arms in the 1970s in order to regain access to their ancestral land from where they had been relocated into reserves which were not productive. Yet, ownership of and access to land by the Africans was a sign of wealth. Thus, the majority were characterised as poor as they did not have access to this critical resource.

Against that backdrop, the new majority government adopted a policy based on what was enunciated in the 1980 elections manifesto of the ruling party, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). The social demand planning approach to social services was considered to be the most appropriate planning model (Mubika and Bukaliya, 2011) as it assumed that all those in need of say education or health care would get access to it regardless of affordability, race, sex or social status. Access to critical resources like land was also a major target for the government.

This became the foundational pillar of the socio-economic policies of equality along the Marxist–Leninist socialist ideas which would be used to destroy the capitalistic colonial system that had led to huge income

discrepancies in the lives of the whites and their counterparts. Thus, the social services policies had to be aligned with the objectives of scientific socialism which were meant to achieve equality in access to education and health as well as to better the lives of the blacks (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). The sections below are detailed discussions of the policies with particular reference to education, health and land. The special role of the State in addressing poverty through education, health and land reforms is traced.

11.2.2 Policy Intervention

The Growth with Equity policy adopted by the government became the planning framework for all three sectors. While the government was not directly addressing poverty issues, the assumption was that access to key services and resources and equality among citizens was the building pillars of dealing with poverty itself.

11.2.2.1 Education

Access to education was promoted through free and compulsory primary and secondary education for all children that was introduced in September 1980. The government established the Zimbabwe Foundation for Education with Production (ZIMFEP) in order to combine theory and practice (ANSA, LEDRIZ and ZCTU, 2012). The education system was decentralised to the district councils under the School Development Committees. However, as noted in ANSA, LEDRIZ and ZCTU, the best educational opportunities remained the preserve of the elites since elements like Group A, B and C ('Upper Tops' in rural areas) systems still remained. There were unprecedented rises in enrolments in all sectors of education ranging from pre-school, primary, secondary, tertiary and adult education (Mubika and Bukaliya, 2011). The number of teachers also increased for both primary and secondary schools. According to Zvobgo (2005) cited in Mubika and Bukaliya (2011: 315), in 1980, there were 1,235,994 students enrolled in Zimbabwean schools and by 1982 the number had risen to 1,934,614. The number of schools and teacher training institutions also followed suit. The objective was to ensure that a school had been established within a radius of five kilometres for primary schools and for every three primary schools, a secondary school was supposed to be created (Mubika and Bukaliya, 2011).

The Growth with Equity policy direction ensured that investment was directed towards school and clinics expansion, teacher and nurse training and resource improvement. The policy was aimed at redressing the inherited inequities and imbalances in access to basic needs such as education, health facilities and social services (Shizha and Kariwo, 2011). The government focused on expanding education and health access by building schools and clinics in marginalised areas and disadvantaged urban centres, accelerating the training of teachers, and nurses (Isaacs, 2007).

11.2.2.2 *Health*

The Growth with Equity framework had a great impact on the health sector. The government adopted an expansionist approach as it did with education. Public expenditure on health remained very high throughout the 1980s. Real government allocations to the Ministry of Health and Child Care in the 1980s remained around 6% of the total government expenditures. This would be reduced to about 4% in the second decade as shown in the sections ahead. According to Vivian and Maseko (1994), a programme to improve community health services trained over 8000 village health workers from 1981–1987 while there were plans too to train 12,500 by 1993, so that there would be a village health worker for every 500 people in the rural areas. Kidia (2018) however argues that although a village health worker programme was installed through the Health Transition Fund, the effort was weakened by a lack of true community participation and a bureaucratic top-down approach where decisions were still made by the Ministry of Health.

Significant disparities in the availability of health care between urban and rural areas could still be noted by 1994 despite deliberate efforts to increase access to health, especially by the rural population. During the 1980s, the infant mortality rate fell from 86 to 61 per 1000 births, immunisation increased from 25 to 80%, the crude death rate dropped from 10.1 in 1982 to 6.1 in 1987 (Dhliwayo, 2001: 7). Further positive development was noted in the construction of health facilities for greater access to health. Dhliwayo also notes that more qualified nurses were engaged and emphasis was on preventive and simple curative care such as immunisation campaigns and health information on family planning, mother–child health care and environmental health and treatment. Yet, overall, access to health increased for the ordinary Zimbabwean.

11.2.2.3 *Access to Land*

Prior to independence, inequalities were also visible in the ownership and control of productive land. This became one of the major causes of the second war of liberation in Zimbabwe in the 1960s and 1970s. At independence, the *willing buyer, willing seller* approach to land ownership retained much of the colonial tendencies as it meant that only those with financial muscles would access the land. This was part of the conditions agreed upon between the nationalists and the Rhodesian Government at the Lancaster House Conference in 1979. The land which was made available for such an arrangement was not productive.

Communal land ownership in Zimbabwe has meant that absolute landlessness is relatively rare (Vivian and Maseko, 1994). However, by the end of the first decade of independence, almost half the land of the country was still alienated from the majority of the population. Vivian and Maseko (p.: 2) observe that about 40% of the land was classified as large-scale farming areas, and was owned by fewer than 5000, mostly white, farmers. This meant that the majority lived on 42% of the land area which was classified as communal land (Vivian and Maseko, 1994). Thus, if access to productive land by the ordinary people would lead to poverty reduction, in this case, the State failed in this regard as the majority remained settlers in unproductive areas which they did not privately own.

11.2.2.4 *Effects of the State Intervention*

There was massive production of human capital due to increased access to health and education yet, the Private Sector had no capacity to absorb the products. Clearly, there were weak coordination mechanisms between the Private Sector and the State and this led to weak linkages between education and industry. The government resorted to using “temporary” (untrained) teachers to deal with huge student numbers that were ever-increasing. The Zimbabwe Integrated Teachers’ Education Course (ZINTEC) was introduced to cater to staff shortages (Mubika and Bukaliya, 2011). The programme entailed that student teachers stayed longer on teaching practice, in the field than in residential courses. Resultantly, the skills gained did not enable entrepreneurship and was not absorbed by the industry.

The main objective of the post-independence state led policy was to achieve equality of opportunities among all citizens. This democratisation process was meant to dismantle the pre-independence capitalism that had promoted poverty and inequality among school children along racial

lines. However, visible gaps between the rural and urban areas remained. During the base period (first decade), the State interventions were neither innovative. The policies were expansionist in nature as they were meant to address inequalities of the past. Ultimately, there was increased pressure on the economy which was still trying to find feet. The needs of the social sector obviously competed with those of the productive sectors and the young government would soon be under severe pressure to review its policies. By 1981, the shortages of critical resources had already begun to be felt. There were not enough infrastructures, teachers, nurses, ministry officials and certainly not enough experienced administrators. To address the infrastructural needs in the education sector, for instance, classes were conducted under trees and in open spaces in the rural areas. This was not the case in the urban areas where at least hot seating was the solution even up to this day hence the issues of inequality remained along the rural–urban divide. Secondary classes were conducted in primary schools’ classrooms under the “upper top” arrangement as a stop-gap emergency measure as more schools were being constructed.

New schools and clinics needed to be constructed, yet the government could not manage hence it had to be assisted by the donor community and the community members who would provide labour force. NGO activities were restricted prior to independence, and were largely welfare-oriented sectors focusing on disadvantaged groups such as orphans, the disabled, and the elderly (Vivian and Maseko, 1994). Since independence, NGOs expanded their activities to incorporate explicitly developmental goals, and have moved into services and provision and repair of physical and socio-economic infrastructure (Kerkhoven, 1992 in Vivian and Maseko, 1994).

The schools and health centres were now no longer run by the government but by the rural councils whose skills were also not adequate. Rural schools and clinics were shunned by the qualified personnel as they later looked for positions in urban areas where they would enjoy better facilities in terms of electricity, accommodation and working conditions. This continued to deprive the rural areas of quality education and health services.

The role of the State during this period was visible and dominant. “It was policy making under state largesse”, argue Zhou and Zvoushe (2012: 220). When the government began to feel the fiscal pressure, the donor community intervened but still, the role of the latter remained subdued and of complementary nature. One major weakness of the

Growth with Equity policies is that there was minimal citizen involvement and participation in the designing and planning of the whole policy process. Everything was left in the hands of the bureaucracy (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). However, without much involvement and strong participation of the people themselves, the policies adopted though with emphasis on “equity”, “growth” and “transformation” lacked sustainability mechanisms beyond being ambitious.

In contrast to the “top-down” approach of the State, the NGOs to a certain extent adopted a participatory one. This was aided by their proximity to the poor as they operated closer to the vulnerable groups, ascertained local needs and preferences, and could involve their target population in the planning of their activities (Vivian and Maseko, 1994). However, this could remain a theoretical and ideal approach but in practice, donor influence on the NGOs would not allow for an effective participatory method of project implementation.

The interventions of the State, as complemented by NGOs, disappointed during the 1980s. Although social indicators improved especially in the education and health areas, per capita income stagnated. Huge government spending crowded out private sector investment and fuelled inflation, shortages of imported goods while constraining growth (Dhliwayo, 2001). There was rapid population growth against widening income disparities by the end of the first decade. The role of the NGOs was minimal to have an impact on poverty and inequalities. As described, it was constrained to welfare, focused on poor household workers in the commercial sector and neglecting low paid formal workers in the urban areas. Moreover, there was both limited development work in the poor urban communities and NGO work in service provision or promotion of self-employment. Thus, despite the rigorous work of the State in fighting poverty, and complementing the roles of NGOs, during the first decade of independence, poverty and inequalities disappointingly persisted.

11.2.2.5 Private Sector-Led Strategies

The period 1990–1996, was marked by a shift towards Private Sector led interventions in addressing poverty and inequality issues. However, there were no direct private sector poverty reduction initiatives. The strategies were more about addressing macroeconomic imbalances, thus poverty and inequality issues became add-ons. The role of the State in critical areas like education and health provision was officially replaced with that of the Private Sector following the adoption of the ESAP in the early

1990s. The ESAP, as a neo-liberal approach to economic growth was mainly motivated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The Cold War had just collapsed and capitalism became a dominant ideology carried by international financial institutions.

The focus was on economic growth, increased income and employment creation (not necessarily productive employment) and less on poverty and inequality reduction. This meant the implementation of cost recovery measures in the social sectors. The rural poor families were heavily affected as the policy compromised their access to education and health. Most families failed to pay the now-required user fees in schools and health institutions. Retrenchments from official employment through the “down-sizing” programme further relegated the former workers into serious poverty as they could no longer be able to meet the new education and health fees. The State was forced to re-intervene to alleviate the poverty that was directly as a result of ESAP.

11.2.2.6 Impact of ESAP

In 1991, to complement the Economic Reform Programme (ERP), the government adopted the Social Dimensions of Adjustment Programme (SDA). This was a programme of action to mitigate the social cost of adjustment, following which the Social Development Fund (SDF) was established to coordinate the formulation and implementation of Poverty Alleviation Action Programmes (PAAP) of 1994 (GoZ, 1998). Social Welfare Programme was also introduced targeting mainly subsidies on food, health and education through the Ministry of Labour, Public Services and Social Welfare and the government continued with drought relief programmes in the rural areas. The programmes were meant to cushion the suffering and vulnerable social segments of society, yet, they were overwhelmed by the rampant structural poverty in both urban and rural areas (Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). Furthermore, the SDA and SDF mechanism was highly centralised in Harare and had its structural weaknesses that allowed abuse of the facilities hence the intended beneficiaries did not access it (ANSA, LEDRIZ and ZCTU, 2012). Moreover, the PAAP sought to broaden the scope of the SDA so as to address wider issues of poverty following drastic cuts in social expenditure (GoZ, 1998). The aim was to reduce poverty induced by the ESAP and unemployment was also on target as retrenchment had negatively affected the capacity of households to deal with new education and health needs.

Overall, the minimalist reform programmes of ESAP impacted negatively on social welfare in Zimbabwe (Mlambo, 1992 in Zhou and Zvoushe, 2012). The ESAP sought to reduce the budget deficit hence cuts in education spending was targeted at 8.7% by 1995 from 9.2% in 1990 (ANSA, LEDRIZ and ZCTU, 2012: 130). Allocation to education as a percentage of total recurrent expenditure fell from 39% in 1999 to 21% in 2000 (Dhliwayo, 2001). Cost recovery and cost sharing was introduced to diversify the funding sources for social services.

The most important policy change was the reduced role of the State in education and health. Much of the education and health expansionist drive of the first decade was reversed. This saw the reintroduction of the previously abolished primary school fees in urban areas and for all secondary schools in 1992. However, the children from families earning less than Z\$400 per month were exempted, yet the Poverty Datum Line (PDL) was pegged at Z\$593 for a six-member family. Expenditure in education and health rose throughout the 1980s while they fell throughout the 1990s. Under ESAP, access, availability and quality of education and health deteriorated. Shortages of drugs as well as health and learning equipment dominated this period. There were some further shortages of qualified personnel in the public health and education sectors as competition from the Private Sector could not be withstood. While rural health and education facilities were generally affordable, their quality was badly compromised by reduced public expenditures in the social sectors. Thus, the government was now failing to provide the most basic health and education facilities.

Makoni (2000) argues that ESAP had a particularly negative effect on the participation of girls at the secondary school level. The government acknowledged this in the 2004 Millennium Development Goals (MDG) progress report when it indicated that “on gender disparities, there is a relatively higher non-participation rate of the girl child, estimated at 10%, compared with 4.9% for boys in 2000” (GoZ, 2004: 24). During the period under review, the primary school completion rate was 82.6%, declining to 76.1% by 1995, and further to 75.1% by 2000 (GoZ, 2004) clearly manifesting the negative effects of ESAP. Thus, Zimbabwe’s progress towards achieving universal education appeared to be under threat, especially with the migration of the people into newly resettled areas, the high staff attrition levels, brain drain and the impact of HIV and AIDS (GoZ, 2004).

The economic meltdown led to poor staff morale in the health and education sectors hence the civil strife of the late 1990s led by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) and the brain drain that would later hit the climax around 2007 and 2008. Nurses, doctors and teachers left the country for the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, Botswana and other countries in the region and beyond. While the social sector continued to receive the highest share of the national budget in nominal terms, the resources remained far below the actual requirements of the sector. The challenges were noted through low per capita and equalisation grants; shortages in basic teaching and medical materials; a high pupil to book ratio of 8 to 1 in 1997; high teacher-to-pupil ratio averaging 1:37, but as high as 1:50 in some cases in 2000, compared with a recommended ratio of 1:28; poor learning environment; and inadequate infrastructure, (classrooms space, teacher accommodation and libraries, and ablution facilities) (GoZ, 2004: 24).

11.2.2.7 Interventions to address Food Insecurity

The period 1991–1992 was very bad for Zimbabwe as drought had heavily hit the nation and most of the districts required urgent food assistance. The government provided food aid to the vulnerable sections of the society mainly in the rural areas. Food for work schemes were initiated where the people had to offer their labour in return for food from the government. The role of the NGOs was clearly embedded in that of the government departments. While the NGOs would source the food, the actual distribution was mainly done by the State. The drought negatively affected the whole country, including the usually productive agricultural zones (Vivian and Maseko, 1994). The grain stockpiles had been reduced the previous season, in line with the requirements of the ESAP, thus, food shortages and increasing food prices began in early 1992. High livestock deaths were recorded and this created tillage problems for communal farmers in the following planting season.

The cost recovery measures were thus introduced in the context of deadly drought which had reduced disposable incomes. In November of that year, the government increased the health user fee exemptions to Z\$400 and this was further abolished at rural health centres and most rural hospitals in order to alleviate the impact of the drought. However, Dhliwayo (2001) notes that most council and mission hospitals continued to charge user fees. In a move that clearly shows the role of the Private

Sector, the government reintroduced the user fees in June 1993 at rural government facilities.

11.2.2.8 *The Intersection of Social and Economic Policies Interventions*

Therefore, when governments experience economic hardships, the social sectors are the most affected due to cost-cutting measures directed at alleviating the budget deficit (Makoni, 2000). However, in the same vein, the consumer will bear a greater proportion of the costs for education and health as part of cost-sharing initiatives. It can be questioned whether a heavy investment in social sectors necessarily pays off in the form of faster economic growth (Pritchett 1996 in GoZ, 1998). The World Bank held that, the payoff to education, for instance, is conditional on the economic and incentive environment. This means that where the environment is inappropriate or unattractive, investment in education will always be too low. Cited in the 1998 Human Development Report, the bank argues that “Education at all levels increases growth, but education alone will not generate growth” (World Bank, 1994 in GoZ, 1998: 74). Thus, a more holistic approach is essential in addressing poverty.

It is thus, clear that macroeconomic policies are a major factor in the performance of social sectors. The social sectors performed well during the 1980s when the government strongly supported the macroeconomic policies but the introduction of ESAP in the 1990s resulted in severe stress of the sectors. The successor policy to ESAP, ZMPREST (1996–2000) continued the same thrust of macroeconomic policies. However, emphasis was now more on the social dimensions, empowerment, indigenisation of the economy and land reform (Dhliwayo, 2001). A holistic approach is key in dealing with poverty and inequalities.

11.3 NGO ROLE IN POVERTY AND INEQUALITY REDUCTION

Poverty alleviation and reduction of inequality, and their eventual elimination, is a central objective of development. In pursuit of solutions to developmental challenges faced by society, the donor community is increasingly regarding NGOs as an important empowering agency that promotes sustainability of local development services compared to government.

The NGOs existed in Zimbabwe since independence, complementing the State in poverty alleviation, rehabilitation and social welfare. During the first decade of independence, the NGOs, both local and international, worked closely with the state focusing on health, education and income generating activities in rural areas (Murisa, 2010). The work of NGOs was notable in rural and communal areas where they assisted with primary education and health care for the poor, the vulnerable and the marginalised groups. More so, they engaged in development work and drought relief given the increased frequency of drought in post-colonial Zimbabwe. During the first decade, the expansive social policy of the government implied that the State assumed a significant role in the fight against poverty, though complemented by the active NGOs whose orientation was to ensure availability of services in rural areas. Despite the improved social outcomes of the decade, sustainability outcomes were compromised and the social outcomes were at risk. Many then wonders what was primarily wrong with the poverty alleviation and inequality reduction approaches. The poor were recipients of the expansive social policies. The interventions were minimally informed or identified by the poor themselves. Moreover, the interventions lacked the active involvement of the poor and a focus on the local economy, thus development of the local economies.

The adoption of the ESAP in the early 1990s changed the typology of the development actors. The new policy thrust meant the Private Sector had a nuanced role in promoting economic progress. Private led economic growth was therefore expected to trickle down and result in improved welfare. A social and livelihood crisis emerged as a result of company closures, retrenchments, reduction in government social expenditure and the introduction of user fees that restricted access to education and health services. Relations between the State and NGOs were strained and characterised by mistrust, resulting in the emergence of the governance discourse (Murisa, 2010). As mistrust emerged, the government became more state centred on development policies and policies were less accessible by NGOs and the citizenry. The policy outcomes of ESAP and the response by the government shaped the shift of the work of many NGOs towards governance issues. Many organisations engaged in policy advocacy, and political and civil rights, then socio-economic rights. Initially, the work of the NGOs intensified in the advocacy for policy and political rights with the assumption that this would result in

socio-economic development and automatically lead to equality among citizens.

Murisa (2010) argues that NGOs and other organisations became socially thin as they concentrated on drought relief and disengaged from the community development programme. Literature (Murisa, 2010) further suggests that the approaches by the NGOs were self-defeating in that solutions were mere approximations of the needs of the people, the solutions were organised according to the dictates of global and donor capital, the NGOs were thinking for intended beneficiaries, and approaches created dependence syndrome as they lack self-reliance. Besides these inherent weaknesses of approaches to poverty alleviation, failure to actively involve the poor and those affected by inequalities was self-defeating and the approaches were disruptive of the local economy. As an example, the disruptive nature of food assistance measures can be exemplified by the focus on consumption without attention to the productive side of food insecurity. During times of sporadic and spatial droughts, the emergence and relief services relied on mobilising foreign supply of maize instead of mobilising excess supplies in local economies. The results of such interventions were disruption of the local economy and creation of dependence syndrome as an incentive for poverty while dis-incentivising local producers.

Thus, NGOs became more visible and dominant in fighting poverty and inequality in Zimbabwe during the decade of macroeconomic crisis and continued to date. Their interventions were not only limited to contributing to local economic development but to advocacy and policy change. During this phase, NGOs became more complete in their interventions by promoting local economic climate, new livelihoods programmes and enterprises for poverty reduction, delivery of social services that were unavoidable given the socio-economic crisis as well as the relief and rehabilitation services. Considering the repressive nature of the State during this period, NGOs engaged in policy and advocacy for accountability and transparency in the use of national resources and effective public service delivery. Advocacy for the curtailing of corruption implied the release of resources towards service delivery and poverty reduction. The promulgation of some repressive regulations such as the Private Voluntary Organisations Amendment Bill of 2021, further shrinks the civic space thereby allowing corruption and other vices that promote poverty and inequalities to persist.

The United Nations linked organisations like United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) also became so active in responding to the immediate educational, health and medical needs of Zimbabweans. In 2008, following the outbreak of cholera in the major cities which claimed more than 4000 lives, UNICEF, joined other State and non-state actors in providing clean drinking water, drugs and other necessities. The same intervention was noted during the outbreak of COVID-19 in 2020. The COVID-19 effects further exposed the poor to dangers that were not felt by their counterparts. While the rich could afford private hospital fees, this was not the case with the poor particularly those in the rural areas. Mobilisation, consciousness-raising and coordinating role of NGOs were also visible during crisis period. The NGOs would raise awareness on the causes of poverty and possible redress mechanism. Thus, their roles were more on the advocacy side where they will push other change agencies like the government and private sectors to act.

11.4 CONCLUSION

The Chapter has noted the evolving roles of the State, Private Sector (informed by the ESAPs) and NGOs in addressing poverty and inequality in Zimbabwe since independence. The expansionist policy of the first decade dealt directly with issues of accessibility to education, health and other necessities. However, the discussion has shown that this strategy was not sustainable on the part of the State which was the main player that time targeting redressing the colonial racist and restrictive policies that were hinged on capitalism. The inevitable pressure on the young economy forced the State to invite other players like the Private Sector whose main focus was on economic growth.

The ESAP measures adopted in the early 1990s were not to directly deal with poverty and inequality issues. Yet, the assumption was that, once the economy performed well, poverty and inequality would be reduced. The net effect of the ESAP was increased poverty and inequality in Zimbabwe. Public expenditure on education, health and other key services was reduced while retrenchments further affected the ability of the ordinary households to afford health and education fees.

From 1980 to the mid-1990s, the role of NGOs in poverty and inequality alleviation was subdued by the State and the Private Sector, respectively. Aid that was meant to address food security, infrastructural development and other livelihoods projects was channeled through

government departments. Nevertheless, from the late 1990s to 2022, the role of NGOs is particularly visible in raising awareness of matters that have the potential to cause or enhance poverty and inequality. Enjoyment of human rights and good governance became the yardsticks for poverty alleviation and equality in society. However, the shrinking of civic space in both the first and second regimes remained a major setback to the efforts of the NGOs. The period however, also saw the three players being visible in addressing critical social and economic issues that have a bearing on poverty. Yet, coordination of the roles remained very poor. Suspicion among the State, Private Sector and the NGOs did not help the situation either.

The major conclusion made in this Chapter is that all the strategies employed by the three players did not put the people at the centre. The decisions were made from the top downwards. This meant that the interventions were not sustainable and, in most cases, they addressed the immediate needs of the people without putting in place mechanisms for sustainability of interventions.

11.5 RECOMMENDATIONS

Mobilisation of the local productive assets of the poor and those affected by inequalities must be central to effective poverty and inequality reduction strategies. This entails involving the affected in the process of drafting and mapping local based intervention strategies. Thus, the government, NGOs and private players should involve the poor as the key agents in any poverty alleviation and inequality reduction intervention strategy. Local economic processes should not be overlooked in favor of imported strategies often adopted by the NGOs, the State and the Private sector. The poor know their priorities. Thus, focus should be on local ideas, concerns, and opportunities on which any intervention should be built. The NGOs and the private actors who may be coming from other countries should hire Zimbabweans, build their capacity, and listen carefully to their priorities. In re-envisioning poverty alleviation strategies, more radical approaches, which truly provide agency to local actors, are needed. This type of innovation is hinged on low-intensity, community-based processes and in the end, it should be the pillar of policy alleviation reform in Zimbabwe. There is need for better and more formal coordination and complementarities of the involved parties in poverty alleviation which

promotes a more holistic intervention to poverty and inequality situations. NGOs should dismantle a project cycle approach which limits input from the beneficiaries through practical participatory approaches. Broader consultation helps build a sense of ownership of poverty and inequality reduction strategies. Government in particular should treat poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon which requires a holistic intervention approach. It conceives of deprivation not only as lack of material goods, but also as a deficiency in other important areas such as social capital, human capital, power and voice (Khawaja, 2005).

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Systemic Monitoring and Evaluation to Enhance Collective Creativity and Innovation for the Alleviation of Poverty and Inequality

Ivan Gunass Govender

12.1 INTRODUCTION

Survival of humanity is seen as a collective goal where the masses are led to prolong their existence by socially responsive leaders confronted with advancing technologies; increased competition while at the same time the quantity and quality of resources are diminishing. Consequently, the distribution of resources is skewed towards the more affluent while the poor endure the most deprived services and high unemployment. To effectively balance these competing issues, a systemic and collective approach is required by public and private leaders to manage the

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complex and rapidly changing environment. This can be done through understanding the contexts within which the social, economic and environmental changes occur. Evidence and aggravation of the inequalities have been seen in managing the current COVID-19 pandemic in the various African countries where the poor are the most adversely affected. In understanding the contexts, the stakeholders need to be engaged, and the nature of the problems and the recommended processes to deal with the issues need to be collectively agreed upon. In the absence of such engagements, the poor become more aggrieved with inequalities and more entrenched which could lead to compromising the democratic system. To prevent and reduce such social injustices networks and collaborations working with effective monitoring and evaluation systems that enhance sustainable development through innovation and creativity are necessary.

This chapter provides an overview of alternate ways to manage poverty and inequality within both the public and private sectors. It is important to understand a problem before attempting to propose possible solutions and tools to successfully manage and measure key performance indicators. Hence, the author views poverty and inequality as being located within sustainable development and classified as a wicked problem. Within this context, a systems approach, transformative leadership, networks and an effective monitoring and evaluation system is required.

12.2 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Sustainable Development (SD) provides for long-term economic and environmental stability which can only be achieved by integrating and acknowledging economic, environmental, and social concerns throughout the decision-making process (Emas 2015: 2). Economic inequality is rising in democracies across the world and poses a clear threat to both the stability and legitimacy of liberal constitutional models including young democracies in Africa (Dixon and Suk 2019). Historically many African countries had to free themselves from the colonised powers but they were unable to benefit from the new dispensations due to persistent corruption, poor governance by the elite and poorly managed development programmes (Kłosowicz 2019: 12; Coetzee 2017: 164). Within these contexts, the limited enforcement of constitutional rights has had limited success in reducing the economic inequalities. In addition, the diversion of resources required to significantly reduce the historic

economic inequalities has widened the gap between the rich and the poor consequently inhibiting class mobility. Du Toit (2004), Department for International Development (2005), Plagerson and Mthembu (2019), Mphambukeli (2019), Matamanda (2020) stated that African countries are challenged by the systemic inequalities and exclusions of marginalised communities from basic services such as water, sanitation, housing and primary healthcare. Sustainable development would be a strategy for overcoming these constraints and aid in empowering the masses. From this perspective, Huang et al. (2015: 1176) observed sustainability as a dynamic process rather than a fixed state in which resource exploitation, investment direction, technological development orientation, and institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.

Variations in the concept of sustainability and sustainable development requirements are multiple and interconnected, allowing many stakeholders to engage with different interventions and greater choices. The wide conceptual framework for sustainable development highlights the interdependence of the subsystems, namely, economic growth, social equity and environmental integrity that led to its complex and multidimensional character. This systemic approach and thinking allows different stakeholders to engage with the interrelated and interdependent subsystems to deliver a synergistic outcome. Francis (2020: 4) argued that the continued control of major economies by capitalists and communist leaders coupled with skewed local ownership has slowed the accessibility of key resources to uplift the livelihoods of the majority of the poor.

As Kemp et al. (2005: 12) and Huang et al. (2015: 1176) view sustainability as a socially instituted process of adaptive changes where innovation is a necessary element. The general concept of sustainability asserts that there should be a balance amongst the three domains of economics, society and the protection of the environment. However, Kuhlman and Farrington (2010: 3436) argue that the original concept of sustainability (as presented in the Brundtland Commission of the United Nations 1987) highlighting the tensions between living a better life and constraints imposed by nature should be re-considered. Clearly, this conceptualisation focuses on the well-being of future generations and irreplaceable natural resources rather than the satisfaction of mankind's current needs. Bartlett (2012: 1) argues that the Brundtland definition of sustainability is flawed since it focuses on the present and posits that "sustainable development is development that does not compromise the

ability of future generations to meet their own needs". In an effort to develop a sustainability index in relation to the current definition, Cantor (2011: 3) argued that Bruntland's definition was too broad, vague and ambiguous. Therefore, sustainable development should be viewed as a system consisting of the economy, society and environment that seeks to achieve a balance where both current and future generations enjoy quality livelihoods. The balance includes a concerted effort to reduce income inequalities, poverty and unemployment, foster social justice, peace and emancipation through the effective and efficient utilisation of natural resources to minimise adverse outcomes for the survival of both present and future generations. Sustainability science attempts to adequately deal with sustainable development issues through the elements of inter- and intra-disciplinary research, coproduction of knowledge, learning by doing, systems perspective and attention to systems innovation and transitions conducted mainly by the state and businesses. Innovative methods in monitoring and evaluation are required to ensure that the desired outcomes are achieved.

Monitoring and evaluation are two complementing processes that occur in problem-solving. Monitoring, according to Kariuki (2014) is a continuous assessment of the function of project activities in the context of implementation schedules and the use of project inputs. Kabonga (2019) concludes that monitoring is a continuous function that uses the systematic collection of data on specified indicators to provide management and primary stakeholders with indications of the extent of progress and achievement of objectives, as well as progress in the use of allocated funds. While evaluation according to Rossi et al. (1999) is the systematic interrogation of the effectiveness of social intervention programmes that are tailored to their political and organisational contexts. A participatory monitoring and evaluation approach could develop partnerships between the state and businesses. By participatory monitoring and evaluation Nzewi (2019: 39) explains that it is a process by which stakeholders at various levels jointly monitor or evaluate a specific project, programme or policy, share control over the content, process and results of the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activity, and take or identify corrective actions.

12.3 ROLE OF THE STATE AND BUSINESSES

A fundamental difference between institutions (both public and private) and living organisms is that living species are sustained by evolving to accommodate the ecosystem within which they survive, rather than by dominating their physical and social environments (Ikert 2007: 4). Since managing sustainability in a globalised market is more problematic, critical citizenship is required to ensure that sustainability is always on the leadership agenda to ensure the required adaptability to the changing environment. Here again, the privileged, powerful and economically endowed make decisions to protect their interests at the expense of reducing poverty and inequality. This could be overcome by engaging with the affected minorities to make informed decisions and evidence-based policies by utilising the information obtained from the monitoring and evaluation system. Sustainability science and transition management which is enveloped by systems theory and thinking could jointly be used to manage the complexity, ambiguity and uncertainty portrayed by sustainable development. Therefore, the state and businesses need to be more proactive when engaging with the economy, society, and environment to empower the current disadvantaged generations towards overcoming their poverty and inequalities.

Cloete (2005: 1) comments that development is an outcome of state interventions in society to empower the citizens to enjoy a quality life and to make informed choices for the future. While there are three hierarchical levels of development, namely: satisfaction of basic needs; consolidating community values, lifestyles interactions and services, and enabling personal preferences, the outcomes are decided by the minorities with authoritative and political power. In order to achieve the highest level, a systemic integration of development initiatives needs to be undertaken where all stakeholders work together to consolidate and sustain the new way of life. Evidence from the South African local government integrated development plans indicates that the developmental needs of the communities and the basic services provided, do not satisfy the basic rights of the majority of the communities. This could be attributed to poor levels of engagement between the three spheres of government and communities and poor monitoring and evaluation systems.

This trend could be stopped if the state and its institutions implement sustainable governance systems where policy development is evidence-based, every citizen abides by the rule of law and every person is to be

held accountable for their decisions affecting sustainable development. To ensure progress towards performance monitoring and evaluation of the sustainable development goals for poverty alleviation, the state has to develop systems that are accessible, effective and efficient. New endeavours need to be instituted to engage businesses to create private–public partnerships to share and create new knowledge. This also provides an opportunity for New Public Management approaches to be introduced with a greater focus on developmental goals where the input consumption is reduced while outputs are maximised through greater inclusivity of poor communities.

It is important to note that businesses operate within a management theory framework that prioritises return on investment, revenue collection, increasing profitability and shareholder value, and efficiencies over developmental goals like social justice, human rights, empowerment, and redistribution. According to Blowfield (2012: 415) while the business engages as a development agent, the actual impact of the business interventions has not been measured systematically due to the complexity of the interactions. A further distinction is made between the business being a development tool or an agent. For example, as a development tool, businesses may create jobs but as a development agent, it needs to take responsibility for the number of jobs created, the level of jobs, and the quality. It is argued that businesses operating as a development agent need to manufacture and deliver products and services that incorporate the needs and accessibility of its customers and the stakeholder concerns, pressures and demands (see design thinking below). Interestingly, business is also seen as the creator of poverty due to supporting or being ambivalent to institutions that disenfranchise the masses. An example would be businesses operating in South Africa during the apartheid era that supported the regime or was apathetic to the sufferings of the masses. There is a general view that businesses continue to operate to maximise profits at the expense of enhancing the basic rights and livelihoods of the communities they serve.

Conklin (2005: 2) posits that there is a pervasive kind of pain in business organisations caused by the misunderstanding of the nature of the problems at hand. In particular, when trying to resolve wicked problems with tools and methods suitable for tame problems. In a complex and rapidly changing environment, the business has to have systems that allow it to respond to challenges, adopt the outcomes and adapt to the new way of thinking and serving the customers. One of the options

is to develop a culture that respects others and their contributions to become more innovative thus acknowledging that the traditional methods of doing business would not resolve the sustainability challenges it faces. A possible solution is for businesses to also act as a development agent and engage in social entrepreneurship where the focus is on social development rather than profitability only. For example, African businesses have a critical role in upgrading the skills of their new graduate employees when the higher education institutions have failed to produce graduates with the required innovation and creativity skills. However, Ikert (2007: 3) argues that most corporate managers still cling to the industrial philosophy of management and continue to manage unsustainable organisations by viewing environmental and social responsibility as a constraint to business profitability.

In view of the above, organisations should be encouraged to engage more in cooperate social responsibility. Hopkins (2006) explained cooperate social responsibility as a voluntary approach in which businesses incorporate social and environmental concerns into their business operations and interactions with their stakeholders. In this regards businesses, organisations and governments are encouraged to give back to the community. Siegel and Wright (2006) clarified that Corporate Social Responsibility goes beyond making money and involves actions that result in social good that go beyond the corporation's legal obligations. Big corporations such as Coca-Cola, Johnson and Johnson actively get involved in CSR programmes. Coca-Cola, as a brand, places a strong emphasis on sustainability through climate change risk minimisation, packaging and water stewardship. Their message is “a world without waste”, and they intend to collect and recycle every bottle, make their packaging 100 per cent recyclable, and return all water used in the production of their drinks to the environment to ensure water security. They hope to have reduced their carbon footprint by 25 per cent by 2030.

12.4 CONCEPTUALISING POVERTY AND INEQUALITY AS A WICKED PROBLEM

Gweshengwe (2020: 7) viewed poverty as a state of acute deprivation characterised by severe food insecurity, premature death, illness, illiteracy, homelessness and a lack of clothing. While inequality is viewed as a set of economic indicators that include income and wealth Schindler

(2016). In South Africa, the state needs to deal with inequality, political pressure, unemployment, global competition, weak economy, poor quality education, low productivity and numerous legislations. Hence, the resolution of triple problems of poverty, inequality and unemployment cannot be solved by a linear approach. Harris (2003: 3) citing Norgaard (1994) states that “it is impossible to define poverty and inequality in an operational manner in the detail and with the level presumed with the logic of modernity”. This could be attributed to poverty and inequality emanating from sustainable development outcomes being presented from the different perspectives of the economy, society and environment. Pierantoni (2004) in Ceigis et al. (2009: 29) also adds that sustainable development may have different meanings depending on the context it is used.

Wicked problems have been present in the planning environment for a long time but have been identified by Churchman (1967) and Rittel and Webber (1973) in the light of the concerns of specialists in areas including planning and policy development. Rittel and Webber (1973: 155) introduced the term “wicked problems” as designation for those distinct societal problems that form the basis of governmental planning, in contrast to those commonly dealt with by scientists. Some examples of wicked problems in the service delivery domain include socio-economic development, HIV/AIDS management and public policy development. Wicked problems could be caused by a number of factors which are difficult to describe and they are not completely solved by the proposed solutions, that is, there is no right answer to completely solve them. Wicked problems are not a reflection of the difficulty involved in solving them but, rather suggest that traditional problem-solving approaches are inadequate. In an effort to define a wicked problem, Rittel and Webber (1973: 161) and Camillus (2008: 100) identified the following key characteristics:

- The problem is unique and involves many stakeholders with different perspectives, values and priorities.
- The root issues are complex and the problem is difficult to define.
- The problem is difficult to come to grips with since it changes with every attempt to manage it.
- The challenge has no precedent.
- There is no indication of what the right answer to the problem could be.

These characteristics of wicked problems highlight the need for an effective monitoring and evaluation system that would assist in identifying problems and symptoms, perspectives used to describe problems that would lead to specific solutions being recommended, and outputs of these specific interventions.

Head and Alford (2015: 50) add that wicked problems are linked to social pluralism, institutional complexity and scientific uncertainty that requires an innovative and creative approach. While Horn and Weber (2007: 1) equate wicked problems with “social messes”, and notes that they are intractable problems composed of interrelated dilemmas, issues and problems at multiple levels, namely, society, economy and governance. In South Africa, the problem-solving process to minimise poverty and inequalities is complicated by resource constraints and constant changes in political leadership, stagnant economy, high youth unemployment rate and a divided society in terms of race and income inequalities. This situation has been aggravated by the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and Ukraine–Russia war.

In a similar vein, unemployment in the different African countries within sustainable development could be regarded as a wicked problem as it has unique contexts for each country, there are many different stakeholders involved. It is difficult to formulate, it could be approached from different perspectives and any one perspective could not completely solve the issue. The complexity is increased due to the number of stakeholders, the different levels of social and economic power, lack of clarity of the role of the stakeholders, mistrust and quantifying the effect of stakeholders (historic) towards causing unemployment. Within these complex and dynamic constructs, the needs of the poor are often neglected due to their negligible economic power. Thompson and Whyte (2012: 485) propose that by accepting poverty alleviation, income inequality, water conservation, housing, and biodiversity as wicked problems encourages interdisciplinary research and collaborative learning processes on environmental issues where innovation and creativity could be enhanced. This approach would also require the engagement of the communities mostly affected by poor quality or inadequate basic services.

12.5 LEADERSHIP

Blowfield (2013: 8) asserts that human behaviour is a major element of sustainability and could include poverty, inequality, social justice and avarice. Martens and Kemp (2007) citing Newman and Kenworthy (2000) add the following principles of sustainability, namely, elimination of poverty, reduction of consumption of resources and production of waste, global co-operation, community-based approaches. Since leaders mould the behaviours of their followers, leadership should be value driven to include not only shareholder's interests but also sustainability principles, namely, community of life, ecological integrity, social and economic justice, eradication of poverty and economic equality Kate et al. (2005: 17). Increasingly, our current generation of politicians do not really have ideas big enough to deal with the problems of widespread insecurity, poverty and marked inequality.

Blowfield (2013: 88) maintains that businesses should have sustainable leaders who discover and then embed sustainable values into their organisation's operations, or show evidence of the organisation's operations complying with relevant sustainable development protocols and legislation. Sustainable development leadership needs to develop flexibility, that is, allow the adaptation, open monitoring and evaluation, and encourage continued learning and empowerment of the poor. This could be achieved through evaluation of technology, transdisciplinary research, participatory monitoring and evaluation, good corporate and cooperative governance. In essence, the leader has to develop a learning organisation where all staff and the communities they serve are given opportunities to learn and share knowledge in an enabling and transformative work environment.

Alban-Metcalf and Alimo-Metcalf (2010: 3) posit that integrative leadership is crucial for management to deal with wicked problems. The leadership skills required for managing wicked problems include good governance, personal skills and knowledge, people skills, transactional, transformational skills, policy and programme knowledge (Beinecke 2009: 1). This means that leaders need to take cognisance of the contexts within which they operate, as well as the constraints, structure and governance, the nature of problems, outcomes and accountabilities to bring about innovation and collective learning (Alban-Metcalf and Alimo-Metcalf 2010: 3) citing Crosby and Bryson (2010) and Real World Group (2010). More importantly, leadership is required to remove the

obstacles to participation, namely, dominance of one group; lack of interest in sustainable development by participants; inadequate time and resources; and restrictive structures and institutional systems that excludes the minorities rights (Hesse and Wissink 2004: 54).

Ethical action and behaviour should drive all transactions and leaders should be socially responsive rather than being socially responsible. Fox (2004: 64) links an organisation's social responsiveness to its capacity to be sensitive to the needs of and adapt to the changes in society rather than merely complying with legislation. Moreover, the type of leader or the sector in which the organisation operates, leaders should be held accountable for their actions where the principles of social and income inequality are neglected in order to enhance shareholder value.

12.6 TOOLS TO MANAGE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY THROUGH INNOVATION AND CREATIVITY

12.6.1 *Systems Theory*

Smit et al. (2007: 57) define a system as a set of interrelated elements functioning as a whole. A system can also be defined as a set of interacting, interdependent parts that are connected through a series of relationships where the interdependent parts work together for the overall objective of the whole (Haines 1998). Schurink and Schurink (2010: 19) also comment that a system is an organised collection of subsystems that are highly integrated to accomplish an overall goal. In this regard, Bevir (2009: 19) emphasises that a system is the pattern of order emanating from regular interactions of a series of interdependent elements. Open systems continuously interact with their environments and are dependent on the environment for the provision of services and products while closed systems having limited interaction with their environment deteriorate and die.

In a community operating as an open system, there are interrelated set of subsystems that function as a whole. Such a system consists of four elements, namely, resources, transformational activities, outputs and feedback (Smit 2016: 39). Every system has the basic characteristics of having a boundary, relationships and perspectives (Hargreaves 2010: 3) that creates systems dynamics which could be unorganised, organised or self-organising. According to Charlton (2003: 4), the function of systems

is to process environmental information in order to predict, respond and manipulate the environment.

In order to reduce poverty and inequality, both the private and public enterprises needs jointly accept the communities it serves as a critical component of their operations rather than an object of their corporate social responsibility programme. Without balancing the social impacts of its operations with the economic rewards, organisations further perpetuate poverty and inequality. In this regard, Van der Waldt and Du Toit (1997: 97) note that for a system to survive it needs to achieve a steady state or dynamic homeostasis, where there is a balance between the systems inputs, activities and outputs. This state is achieved through the feedback process which supplies information to the system to assess the level of the steady state or destruction of its subsystems.

12.6.2 *Systems Thinking*

Systems thinking is the process of understanding the influences of the subsystems, the system and environment on each other. Systems thinking is a generic term for the application of approaches based on systems theories to provide insights into the way in which people; programmes and organisations interact with each other; their histories; and their environments (Rogers and Williams 2006: 80; Williams 2010: 36). For example, the state of poverty and inequality cannot be separated from the apartheid history and the disenfranchisement of the Black majority regarding their rights of movement, trade and poor to non-existent services and infrastructure.

Cabrera et al. (2008: 307) notes that systems thinking can be achieved by applying four basic interrelated and interconnected rules, namely, distinction, systems, relationships and perspectives. Distinction determines what is and is not the scope of the initiative. The system requires the parts and whole to be organised into other systems. Relationships between the components and the whole and the activities and outcomes determine the causal effects. Perspective involves one's viewpoint of real-world experiences. Poverty and inequality could be more effectively addressed through a relational discourse where the conversations commence through trust and openness emanating from sound relations amongst the haves and have nots.

Systems thinking in evaluation is a particular approach that transforms the traditional manner used to evaluate programmes, policies or initiatives since it balances the emphasis between the whole and its parts, taking multiple views into account (Cabrera et al. 2008: 301). Bennet and Bennet (2004: 11) comments that systems thinking enables the micro-environment stakeholders to step out of their particular organisations and view it from a more objective and insightful perspective. According to Bennet and Bennet (2004: 355), systems thinking highlights the need for community involvement, teamwork, open communications and the alignment of actions. Schurink and Schurink (2010: 17) states that the systems thinking approach aids the stakeholders to understand the complex structures by examining the linkages and interactions between the elements that form part of the system as a whole. Significant efficiency savings are achieved by the public service organisations that utilise the systems approach; improved customer satisfaction with the services; and better service design leading to greater community participation than in a command–control environment (Sneddon 2008: 198). In systems thinking, the purpose is derived from the citizens' perspective from which performance measurement and methods are established while the command and control thinking imposes a de-facto purpose with set targets and methods (Sneddon 2008: 82).

Van der Waldt and Du Toit (1997: 96) add that the systems approach allows one to gain insights into three interdependent areas, namely, interaction between the system and the environment, the processes within the system, and the processes through which parts of the environment interact with each other. The recurring service delivery protests around South Africa indicate that the service delivery to the poor is ineffective and inefficient. As greater insights of the interdependencies are achieved of the system and the environment, between the subsystems itself and between the systems processes and the external environment is not evident (Van der Wald and Du Toit 1997: 96).

Systematic evaluation can be utilised in poverty and inequality alleviation for a number of purposes, including policy making; public accountability; programme and organisational improvement; knowledge development; advancement of social justice; enhancement of practice judgements; and assessing creativity and innovation (Mark et al. 2006:

2). According to Rogers and Williams (2006: 88), systematic evaluation developed its framework from the core principles of Critical Systems Thinking and addresses the learning; development; cultural; conflict; and bargaining aspects of an organisation. It operates as an open system where interactions between the internal and external systems occur. Stacey (2003: 94) identifies the lessons from system thinking as the structure of the system influences behaviour; structures in human behaviour is subtle since they could generate unintended outcomes; and thinking of the whole system would assist the organisation to cope effectively to changes in the environment.

Thompson and Whyte (2012: 485), citing (Lach et al.; Norton 2005; Batie 2008; Lazarus 2009; Turnpenny et al. 2009) posit environmental issues contain ill-structured constructs that cannot be successfully managed by the top-down approach nor by a single discipline thus requiring a systems approach which engages other disciplines. Davids et al. (2005: 35) concurs that development management, which includes environmental issues, is transdisciplinary since it cuts across economics, psychology, public management, political science, anthropology and the natural sciences. This means that systems approach and thinking is critical for managing poverty and inequality.

12.7 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

In many African countries, measures to increase investments in education and training, raise the minimum wage, guarantee a universal basic income, and invest in new industries have begun and continue to be considered by their respective governments. However, very little evaluative reporting is undertaken to establish their impacts on alleviating inequality and poverty. Economists propose that to mitigate the threat of economic inequality, three broad policy responses are needed: measures that can foster more inclusive forms of growth, policies that can prevent the overconcentration of wealth and income, and forms of economic redistribution that can mitigate the downsides of ongoing poverty (Dixon and Suk 2019). The administration of the provision of basic services such as water, sanitation, housing and primary healthcare could nurture social inequalities through bureaucratic exclusion, privatisation, fragmentation and political interference. Hence, there is a need for an effective monitoring and evaluation to ensure fair and equitable distribution and provision of services (Rahman 2018).

Monitoring and evaluation systems are critical for improving operations, learning, acquiring new knowledge, tracking activities and costs, and ultimately enhancing the sustainability of the policy, programme and project (Govender 2011). Sustainable implementation reflects on the management and allocation of resources, and performance management that creates a balance amongst the economy, social equity and preservation of the environment for the well-being of humanity through the projects scope, and its final impact.

According to Kuhlman and Farrington (2010: 3442), when the potential impact of the proposed policy, programme or project is assessed, it should lead to higher well-being and to a positive effect on the overall state of resources for the future. The system should be able to accommodate the shocks and stresses within a certain threshold and the outcomes of an intervention should be within these thresholds. Martens and Kemp (2007: 5) highlight the need for monitoring sustainable development as it is an inherently subjective concept and requires “deliberative forms of governance and assessments”. They propose that the ambiguity and uncertainty could be dealt with partly by sustainability science and through reflexive modes of governance and stakeholder participation. Kate et al. (2005: 15) suggest that attention should also be given as to what is to be sustained, what is to be developed and the period considered. This assessment could aid in the development of SMART indicators and obtain a better compromise amongst the environmental, economic and social stakeholders. One of the approaches is to constructively engage the main stakeholders throughout the process as identified in the Logical Framework Approach. For this purpose, participative monitoring and evaluation coupled with the systemic performance analysis model and the theory of change could enable collective creativity and knowledge transfer to entrench a sustainable business practice.

12.8 PARTICIPATORY MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Social and localised contexts determine what is unsustainable or what is considered as progress. Holtzhausen (2004: 112) therefore suggests that sustainable participatory community development requires “tough minds and soft hearts” to evaluate the alternatives and make compromises to protect the livelihoods of future generations. However, best practices develop from a deep understanding of the challenges experienced by the participants to resolve a problem through shared understanding and

commitment. According to Conklin (2005: 1), collective intelligence as a natural enabler for collaboration is required for innovation and creativity, which could be diminished where each stakeholder is convinced that each of their understandings, perspectives and intentions are correct. Social complexity relates to the number and diversity of the stakeholders and the larger the number and the greater the diversity, communication becomes less effective and the opportunity to be creative and innovate is reduced.

According to Wexler (2009: 535), it is necessary to implement a participative and dialogue-based approach when dealing with wicked problems. Cranfield (2007: 1) citing Blackham (2007) argues that agility, flexible innovation, rapid response and the adoption of the correct culture are critical in dealing with wicked problems. In a similar vein, Humphreys et al. (2009: 33) propose that collaborative synthesis in which complexity, ambiguity and context are acknowledged, would assist in dealing with wicked problems. The difficulty of resolving issues is also attributed to fragmentation forces, namely, social complexity, technical complexity and the wickedness of the problem itself, and is evidenced in stakeholders blaming each other for their inability to solve the problem (Conklin 2001: 21). However, the recognition of indigenous knowledge systems is critical for promoting innovation and creativity since it promotes the integration of both the community and project interests; stimulates a greater acceptance of performance standards; provides greater sensitivity towards the communities' feelings, needs and views; and increases the quantity and accuracy of information to deal with sustainable development issues (Hesse and Wissink 2004: 51).

This community-based perspective to deal with sustainable development requires an alternate approach that could accommodate ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty Kemp and Martens (2007) citing Brand and Karvonen (2007). A special type of learning is also recommended by transition management, which is defined as working towards sociotechnical changes as alternative systems of production and consumption to minimise environmental impacts and provide benefits to the users (Kemp and Martens 2007: 11). Key elements include monitoring and evaluation of the transition process, creating a cycle of learning, development of vision and mission and development of transition arenas for innovation. An effective and efficient participatory monitoring and evaluation system could enhance collective learning and innovation through reflexive leadership and a participative process. In terms of sustainability, effectiveness is seen as the preservation of wealth for future generations while

efficiency is categorised as aspiring to achieve productivity by utilising minimum inputs to achieve maximum outputs within the acceptable systemic threshold. This can only be achieved through stakeholders' constructive engagement to accept outputs, outcomes and impacts that creates an acceptable balance between the need for present and future survival.

12.9 NETWORKS

Networks are broadly defined as the sustained knowledge-sharing relations between public and private organisations, groups and individuals. Networks and inter-organisational relationships emphasise the interdependencies of various stakeholders in policy formulation (Klijn 2005: 258) and are considered as an alternative to the limitations of hierarchical and fragmented administrative systems in public policy development and delivery (Webber and Khademian 2008: 334). Spratt (2011: 7) also advocates for a coherent approach to dealing with wicked problems by developing a shared understanding of the problem and consensus to implement the agreed-upon intervention. In order to manage poverty and inequality independent state bodies should be created and be responsible for addressing issues of poverty and inequality through a network of data management systems.

The advantages of networks are their greater capacity to solve problems, manage shared resources, create learning culture and develop shared goals in a complex environment. Such networks are formed by means of existing knowledge networks which include the use of technology to effectively manage and share information (Webber and Khademian 2008: 337). The outcomes from a network are collaborative capacity, problem-solving capacity, improved performance and accountability (Webber and Khademian 2008: 341).

For the full organisational transition from hierarchies to networks, Ferlie et al. (2011: 307) assert that cross-organisational information and communication technology databases to share information, strong inter-organisational learning through joint problem-solving and a shift from vertical management to lateral leadership are required. For these networks to be effective in dealing with wicked problems, they would require simultaneous changes to their structure, organisational capability and interactive processes.

Due to exclusivity, key stakeholders could be excluded from the policies formulation and implementation processes, resulting in group-think due to the closeness of the selected actors in the network (Klijn 2005: 273). To avoid a lack of learning through exclusivity and group-think, a systemic intervention has to be implemented by including as many stakeholders as possible when developing and implementing policies. Therefore, networking is crucial for linking national, provincial and local government monitoring and evaluation systems, e-governance and e-service across the public sector. Communities' immediate well-being, long-term economic opportunity, and social inclusion depend in large part on their ability to access basic services and discriminatory access to these public goods perpetuates poverty and inequality to the already disadvantaged.

The successful implementation of these strategies requires the public sector to have the necessary resources and skills. In this regard, the Australian Public Service Commission (2007: 35) identifies the following critical skills for the use of the collaborative approach to wicked problems, namely: holistic and systems thinking and strategies; innovation, flexibility and adaptation; building a shared learning culture; working across organisational and departmental boundaries; tolerance of uncertainty and a long-term focus; engaging a wide range of stakeholders and communities in a meaningful way; reconfiguration of accountability frameworks and measures, and expanding the new skills sets for employees, including an improved understanding of behaviour change. These need to be measured and monitored in programmes and projects implemented to alleviate poverty and inequality.

The above skills set could also aid in resolving the complex issues in businesses where the outcomes do not correlate with the institutional efforts, to better understand the contexts in which services are delivered. The monitoring and evaluation process firstly requires clarifying and "living" the democratic constitutional value statements. Secondly, leaders need to acknowledge that a wicked problem exists. Thirdly, networks and partnerships have to be developed to collaborate and agree on the definition of and possible solutions to alleviate poverty and inequality by using unique scenario planning. Fourthly, the relevant baseline data, indicators and targets should be developed. Finally, the outputs, outcomes and impacts have to be evaluated against the agreed objectives after considering systemic and stakeholder conditionality changes.

12.10 CONCLUSION

In a complex and rapidly changing environment, there is bound to be anxieties, conflict and disruption associated with democratic sustainability. More often, the poor with minimal economic power are disadvantaged through the entrenchment of inequalities. Innovation, creativity and sustained business practices could be encouraged by a systems approach, constructive engagement and knowledge sharing. An understanding of the nature of the problem would also allow particular tools to be used, namely, systems approach and participative monitoring and evaluation. Leaders should be responsive to sustainable development and be evaluated in terms of the innovation and creativity to deal with the challenges of poverty and inequality rather than only focus on preserving the rights of the privileged.

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Factors Affecting Agricultural Students' Attitude Towards Entrepreneurship at a University in South Africa

Tsion Tesfaye Kidane and Oliver Mtapuri

13.1 INTRODUCTION

The perception of a student towards entrepreneurship has an effect on the student's future success in job and business creation. The entrepreneurial tendency is a created perception that channels an individual's attitude and action to take risks and create jobs in the system. However, different internal and external factors influence personal entrepreneurial tendencies. An entrepreneurial student is key to innovative implementation and expansion of agricultural technologies and businesses (Saat et al. 2019;

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Wadhwa et al. 2010). Entrepreneurial personality is the willingness to open a business in the face of uncertainty to achieve success and determine progress through organizing opportunities such as human and material (Wadhwa et al. 2010; Scarborough 2012).

In developing countries, students have a weak entrepreneurial tendency (Fatoki 2010; Fatoki and Chindoga 2011; Farrington et al. 2012). Internal and external factors such as individual perceptions, individual personality, subjective norms, and economic background influence the student's perceptions and the decision towards entrepreneurship and innovation (Linan 2008; Liñán et al. 2011; Malebana 2014; Hsu et al. 2019). The limited opportunities and high rate of youth unemployment demand a new approach to divert youths' personal commitment towards entrepreneurship (Fatoki 2010). The entrepreneurial intention of youthful students from developing countries is confronted by a myriad of shortcomings. For instance, the obstacles to the entrepreneurial intention of South African graduates are capital, skill, support, risk, economy, and crime (Fatoki 2010; Fatoki and Chindoga 2011).

Developing countries have heterogeneous social, political, and economic conditions coupled with a rising population and youth unemployment, thus demand research findings that can pave the way for entrepreneurship and innovation. Entrepreneurship tendencies and perceptions need suitable entrepreneurial knowledge, economy, and right opportunities (Nabi et al. 2011a, b). Graduate exposure to entrepreneurship concepts, education, and experience creates a favourable environment in order to influence the graduates' entrepreneurial intention and desired responsive behaviour (Gird and Bagraim 2008; Turker and Sonmez Selçuk 2009; Keat et al. 2011; Bin Mahajar 2012). Identifying influencing factors on students' perceptions towards entrepreneurship and innovation will support the existing education system to create and facilitate a suitable environment to enhance students' personal capacity on risk-taking and job creation for poverty and inequality reduction.

The primary purpose of the study was to determine factors affecting the attitude of students at the School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences at the University of KwaZulu-Natal towards entrepreneurship. The question used to guide the study was; 'what are the factors influencing students' perceptions on entrepreneurship and innovation?'

13.2 METHODOLOGY

The study was conducted on the first-year Agricultural Science students at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in the School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences in South Africa. In this study, a Nested Concurrent Mixed Sampling Design (NCMSD) was implemented (Creswell 2013). A multi-stage random sampling procedure was implemented. Quantitative data were collected through a questionnaire. The population of the study was 131 agricultural sciences students, who were randomly selected from the School of Agricultural, Earth and Environmental Sciences. Pre-testing of the questionnaire was performed as a preliminary step before actual data collection in order to check its validity and consistency and to make refinements (Johnson and Christensen 2012; Bryman 2015). The questionnaire contained structured questions in line with the objective of the study. The quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics, percentages, and the Censored Tobit Model and Statistical Programme for Social Sciences v21 statistical software package.

13.3 ATTITUDE

Attitude is the dependent variable. It is the inner learning of a person expressed by personal evaluative response towards a specific idea or thing (Rameela 2004; Neuman 2006; Eagly and Chaiken 2007), and as a result of the direct exposure to the attitude's objects or ideas (Hossain et al. 2010). Attitude is the trend to believe or experience various feelings in a different condition, and also it is a unique concept that integrates multiple properties and has different domains (Miranda 2008; Kususanto et al. 2012). In this study, the attitude was measured by adding the total scores obtained for the attitude statements in the case of positive items as follows: attributing a score of 5 to strongly agree; 4 to agree; 3 to undecided; 2 to disagree; and 1 to strongly disagree responses. In the case of negative attitude statements, the scoring pattern was reversed.

The scale was used with multi-item scales and summated rating scores (Gliem and Gliem 2003). The scale-covered various statements, which were developed after the review of the literature and rated by a panel of experts. The statements were) pre-tested for relevance before the actual data collection. Pre-testing was done using Cronbach's alpha. The standardized Cronbach's alpha can be calculated from the following

Table 13.1 The attitude of first-year Agricultural Science students towards AET ($n = 131$)

<i>Statement</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted</i>
There is a potential opportunity for self-employment in agriculture	4.3	0.577
I have the necessary skills for job creation and entrepreneurship	4.31	0.583
Self-employment in agriculture is easier than in other sectors	3.48	0.602
It is the duty of government to create jobs for agriculture graduates	3.79	0.649
Self-employment is important for agricultural graduates	3.98	0.606
Self-employment is effective in reducing unemployment	4.07	0.531
Starting a new business is very risky	3.4	0.626
My professional goal is to become an entrepreneur	3.82	0.596
I prefer to be self-employed	3.69	0.551
Cronbach's Alpha = 0.7		

Eq. (13.1)

$$\alpha_{\text{standardized}} = \frac{K\bar{r}}{(1 + (K - 1)\bar{r})} \quad (13.1)$$

where:

K = is the number of components (K -items or test lets),
 \bar{r} = the mean of the $K = (K - 1)/2$ OR $(K(K - 1))/2$.

The reliability coefficient result was found to be 0.7. The attitude statements with a Corrected item-total Correlation less than 0.40 were excluded from the survey (Gliem and Gliem 2003) (Table 13.1).

13.3.1 Independent Variable

The independent variables were selected based on evidence from past research in published literature and from discussion with experts. Based on these assessments, nine different independent variables such as; age,

gender, racial background, types of school student attended, students major area, the type of job students would prefer to have, student parents' work, family monthly income and where the students were living during their high school were identified and listed for relevancy ratings. Relevancy coefficients of the independent variables were selected based on relevancy rating which was done by a panel of experts. The lists of identified eight independent variables were subjected to a rating in a four-point continuum. The relevancy coefficients were calculated using Eq. (13.2) below:

$$RC = \frac{OS}{PS} 100\%$$

where:

RC = Relevancy coefficient.

OS = Obtained score.

PS = Potential score.

Those variables with relevancy coefficients (RC) below 50% were excluded from the list. The independent variables selected based on this process were: Racial background, Types of school student attended, Students' major area, Student parents' work, Family monthly income, and Where the Students were living during their High School. These were defined as follows:

Racial background (RBG) referred to the racial backgrounds of the students. The groupings were: African (RBG 1), Coloured (RBG 2), Indian (RBG 3) and White (RBG 4). All racial backgrounds were expected to influence the dependent variable positively and were measured as a discrete variable.

What students like to pursue at university (SPTPU) referred to the type of study subject students wish or wanted to study during their stay at the university. The groupings were: (1) Agricultural Pathology (AP), (2) Crop Science (CS), (3) Agricultural Extension and Rural Resource Management (AERRM), (4) Animal Science (AS) and (5) Agricultural Engineering (AE).

Student's major area (SMA) referred to the current major area of study of the students at the university. The groupings were: (1) Animal Science (AS), (2) Plant Science (PS), (3) Environmental Science (ES), (4) Plant Pathology (PP), (5) Agricultural Extension and Rural Resource

Management (AERRM), (6) Soil Science (SS), (7) Agricultural Engineering (AE). This variable is discrete and expected to have a positive influence on the dependent variable.

Types of school student attended (TSS) referred to the type of school student studied at before they join the university. The groupings were: government (TSS 1), private (TSS 2) and home-schooling (TSS 3). This variable is discrete and expected to have a positive influence on the dependent variable.

Students Job preference (SJP) referred to the type of job students would prefer after their graduation. The groupings were: private job (SJP 1), government job (SJP 2). The variable is discrete and was expected to have a positive influence on the dependent variables.

Student parents' work (SPW) referred to the type of job the student's family does for a living. The groupings were: private job (SPW 1), government job (SPW 2). The variable is discrete and was expected to have a positive influence on the dependent variables.

Family monthly income (FMI) referred to the monthly income earnings of the student's family. The sample was measured as less than R500 (FMI 0), R501–2000 (FMI 1), R2001–5000 (FMI 2), R5001–15,000 (FMI 3), and Above R15,001 (FMI 4). Family monthly income is a discrete variable and was expected to positively influence the dependent variables.

Where the Students were living during their High School (SLP) referred to the place where the student lived during their high school study. The sample was measured as large urban (SLP 1), middle urban (SLP 2), small urban (SLP 3), and rural–urban (SLP 4), on-farm (SLP 5), and rural area (6).

The contingency and multicollinearity coefficients were calculated and the analysed results indicated that there was no multicollinearity problem among the explanatory variables and hence all the hypothesized variables were acceptable and included in the analysis in the Tobit Regression Model.

13.4 FACTORS AFFECTING THE ATTITUDE OF STUDENTS TOWARDS ENTREPRENEURSHIP

The Censored Tobit Regression model (CTRM) analysis resulted in a likelihood ratio of -358.077 , chi-square of 55.95 (17) with a significant level of p -value of 0.001 which indicated that the model as a whole fits significantly better than an empty model (i.e. a model with no predictors) with a 95% confidence interval (Table 13.2). The model coefficients of seven identified independent variables are shown in Table 13.2.

The analysis in Table 13.2 shows that the type of job students would prefer to have (JP1), student parents' work (SPW) and students' residential place during their High School study (SLP) had a significant ($p < 0.01$) and ($p < 0.05$) influence on the students' perception towards entrepreneurship.

Table 13.2 Summary of descriptive statistics for explanatory variables ($n = 131$)

	<i>Coef</i>	<i>Std. Err</i>	<i>T</i>	<i>p > t</i>
RBG1	-1.23353	3.152563	-0.39	0.696
TSS1	-1.9402	1.84628	-1.05	0.296
SJP1	-1.76129	0.837295	-2.1	0.038
SPTPU 1	-1.12779	1.005388	-1.12	0.264
SPTPU 2	3.702598	2.288167	1.62	0.108
SPTPU 3	-0.30153	1.532932	-0.2	0.844
SPTPU 4	3.087857	1.948959	1.58	0.116
SPW 1	5.568828	3.183461	1.75	0.083
SPW 2	7.413566	3.306657	2.24	0.027
SPW 3	5.072302	3.418256	1.48	0.141
FMI 1	1.517995	1.365952	1.11	0.269
FMI 2	-2.23566	1.572112	-1.42	0.158
FMI 3	0.032855	1.903592	0.02	0.986
SLP 1	-5.97018	1.788731	-3.34	0.001
SLP 2	-2.1965	1.08033	-2.03	0.044
SLP 3	-5.64072	1.18183	-4.77	0.000
SLP 4	-0.81551	1.032086	-0.79	0.431
Cons	36.56787	4.549038	8.04	0.000
Sigma	3.722793	0.22998		3.267204

13.4.1 *Students' Job Preference (JPI)*

The result shows that students' job preference (JPI) has a significant and negative influence on agricultural science students' attitude towards entrepreneurship (Table 13.2). The students' knowledge and experience directed the students' job preference, and their job preference influenced their tendency and perception towards entrepreneurship. Their decision and inclination towards career selection and job preference depended on their background and experience (Keat et al. 2011). The majority of sampled students were from disadvantaged groups, low income, and unemployed families (Table 13.3). The students' decisions and perceptions depended on the exposure and experience they gained from their exposed reality (Keat et al. 2011).

Their family income mainly depends on salary earning from a private job, government job and government subsidies. Therefore, students' interest was mainly inclined to gaining a salary by serving private and government organizations rather than taking a risk and having their own business. Therefore, the students' family economic and cultural background has an effect on the students' career choice and attitude towards entrepreneurship (Leung et al. 2011; Durrheim et al. 2011).

Rural and urban unemployment is increasing alarmingly (Klasen and Woolard 2009). Consequently, students are willing to be employed and work in the private sector rather than to innovate, open a new business and create jobs.

13.4.2 *Parents' Occupation (SFW)*

The students' parents occupation had a significant and positive influence on agricultural science students' attitude towards entrepreneurship. A student whose parents have a private or government job had an increasingly positive and significant ($p \leq 0.05$ and $p \leq 0.01$) attitude towards entrepreneurship. Students' family experience and exposure have an influence on students' action and perception towards their future entrepreneurial tendencies. This is in line with others that students' family work experience had a positive effect on the students' ability to engage in an entrepreneurial career (see Zellweger et al. 2011). Their prior exposure and experiences would have an effect on their interest in entrepreneurship (Fatoki 2014). Youth career choice intentions are impacted by individual exposure (Schröder et al. 2011). The student's

Table 13.3 Definition of variables and their descriptive statistics ($n = 131$)

<i>Abbreviated variable</i>	<i>Variable</i>	<i>%</i>
RBG1	Racial background (African)	98.47
RBG2	Indian	01.53
SJP 1	Private job	39.7
SJP 2	Government Job	60.3
TSS1	Government	94.66
TSS2	Private	05.34
SPTPU1	Plant Pathology	61.83
SPTPU2	Crop Science	03.05
SPTPU3	AERRM	09.15
SPTPU4	Animal Science	06.87
SPTPU5	Agricultural Engineering	19.10
SMA1	Animal Science	15.27
SMA2	plant science	12.98
SMA3	Environmental science	14.50
SMA4	Plant pathology	03.82
SMA5	AERRM	30.53
SMA6	Soil science	03.05
SMA7	Agricultural Engineering	19.08
SMA8	Agricultural Economics	00.77
SPW1	Private job	39.70
SPW2	Government job	29.77
SPW3	Unemployed	29.00
SPW4	Pension	01.53
FMI0	Unemployed	29.01
FMI1	R500–2000	32.06
FMI2	R2000–5000	13.74
FMI3	R5001–15,000	05.34
FMI4	Above R15000	19.85
SLP1	Large urban	05.35
SLP2	Small urban	16.03
SLP3	Rural town	14.50
SLP4	On farm	21.37
SLP6	Rural area	42.75

exposure and personal experience to different student's family career and income means can create positive intentions towards job creation and entrepreneurship. Individual and national determinants have an effect on student's entrepreneurial intention. Also, student exposure to nearby

admirable role models in job creation helps students to build hope and high expectations about the sector (Dohse and Walter 2012). Therefore, a student's family career and job (private or government) have an effect on a student's positive perceptions of entrepreneurship.

13.4.3 *Students' Residential Place (SLP)*

Students' residential places have a significant ($p \leq 0.05$) negative influence on students' attitude towards entrepreneurship. The student's residential place correlated with the student's increasing negative attitude towards entrepreneurship. The majority of students came from rural areas (Table 13.3). The implementation of agriculture at the household level is limited in South Africa (Thornton 2008). Their high school practical education exposure is limited (Kidane and Worth 2014). Therefore, students living area can create exposure and experience to create an interest in agriculture and entrepreneurship.

Students' residential place, their family and school background determine the type of information and exposure they have in order to develop knowledge, experience, and attitude towards entrepreneurship. Students' perception is influenced by students' family experience, access to role model, practical and theoretical knowledge towards entrepreneurship (Walstad and Kourilsky 1998; Wang and Wong 2004). Students' background such as parents job, high school education, and the available work option have an effect on students' perceptions towards students' planned behaviour (Shim et al. 2010; Crumpton 2012), which in this study is students' attitude towards entrepreneurship.

For Bull and Urban (2008), job creation and self-employment tendencies are shaped by transferred and learned knowledge and exposure. Students' perceptions and understanding of job creation and self-employment depend on their exposure and background towards entrepreneurship (Urban 2006). In this study, a majority of the students came from rural, low income and unemployed families (Table 13.3). Poverty and inequality have had a long history in South Africa (May and Govender 1998; Woolard 2002). Having an entrepreneurial attitude could facilitate innovation and creativity in order to generate new opportunities, jobs, and the country's economic development (Crumpton 2012; Drucker 2014).

13.5 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The results indicated that students' job preferences such as private jobs and students' living place during their high school studies negatively correlated with the student's attitude towards entrepreneurship. A student whose parent has a private or government job has an increasingly positive attitude towards entrepreneurship. This indicates that students desire to be employed in the private sector but not having their enterprise or business. Residential place and job preference negatively influenced students' ability to take risks to create their own business and create new jobs. Students' experience, practical knowledge, and exposure to different income and job creation opportunities could influence students' entrepreneurship, career choice, and career direction. Implementing entrepreneurship education is more important everywhere in the higher education curriculum focused on the subfield of entrepreneurship education by identifying student needs and efficient teaching techniques. Although, engaging students in different entrepreneurial contexts and practical implementation through different curriculum delivery methodologies could positively influence the students existing perceptions towards entrepreneurship and innovation. Emphasizing entrepreneurial theoretical and practical concepts by engaging students in practical private or government job sectors, short entrepreneurship projects, and departmental entrepreneurial business plan competition could expose students to new information on available entrepreneurship opportunities. This could influence Agricultural Science students' innovativeness and career achievement.

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Ending Poverty on the African Continent: Consolidating the Agrarian Welfare Regime in Zimbabwe

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14.1 INTRODUCTION

Much of Africa is concerned with high poverty and inequality levels. In response, African governments have adopted poverty alleviating social policies, particularly cash transfers, mainly motivated by external actors. This chapter makes a case to take the centrality of consolidating agrarian welfare regimes in poverty alleviation. In comparison with the other countries that massively expanded cash transfers, the Zimbabwe case shows that the fundamentals of alleviating poverty in agrarian and semi-industrialised societies such as Zimbabwe do not stem from international actors proposed poverty reduction strategies. Instead, innovative harnessing of

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new but Africa sensitive social policies and technology essential in agro-based economies like Zimbabwe to reduce poverty substantially without conceding to international influence is recommended.

In view of funding and sustainability challenges associated with donor-driven poverty reduction programmes especially cash transfers, promotion of Agro-based social protection provides a promising effective poverty alleviation policy in Africa. Hazell (2017) posits that Agriculture provides the best hope for addressing poverty in Africa. Hazell further argues that Africa's recent growth pattern based on 'urbanization without industrialisation' has increased rather than reduced the need for an agricultural transformation (Hazell, 2017: 3). Some countries in Africa effectively supported agrarian regimes to reduce poverty. Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi promote the use of both agro-based programmes such as farm input support and cash transfers to reduce poverty particularly for the rural poor (Green, 2021; Oliveira and Cravo, 2021; Howland et al., 2019; Chakrabarti et al., 2019; Lawlor et al., 2019). Gumede and Shonhe (2021)'s collection of case studies in Africa shows that after attaining independence and formation of nation states, some African countries were preoccupied with addressing the land and agrarian question because of its centrality to production and poverty alleviation. The authors argue for hastening land reforms and for promoting agrarian-led development in Africa. Notably, in the many countries analysed in this book, land reforms have not gone well and indeed the whole of Africa suffers from food insecurity. Shonhe and Scoones (2022) show that contract farming deepened by the Fast Track Land Reform Programme boosted maize production amongst medium-scale farmers in Zimbabwe. Against this background, this chapter builds on the welfare regime theory to make the case for strengthening agrarian welfare regimes in Africa. Other studies in Zimbabwe show the positive effects of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme on agricultural production, equity and social justice (Chavunduka et al., 2021; Ngarava, 2020; Shonhe et al., 2022; Shonhe and Scoones, 2022).

Across the globe, many countries now regard cash transfers as an innovative policy instrument to alleviate poverty and increase household food consumption. Poor countries in Africa also adopted cash transfers as a model of social provision that provides a safety net for the poor and marginalised. The increasing adoption is attributed to both cash transfers' developmental impacts and poverty reduction impacts in African countries (Barrientos, 2013; Hanlon et al., 2010). The growth of cash transfers

also ‘occurred because of the diffusion of ideas, knowledge, experience and policy learning between countries in the South’ (Patel, 2018). Patel further argues that, in Africa the expansion of social protection, in particular cash transfers, reflects the ‘influence of global and African social development agendas. The agendas favoured social protection. some of which was influenced by the growing evidence from different parts of the world about social protections’ benefits in reducing poverty’ (Patel, 2018: 86). However, evidence on the impacts of cash transfers in poverty reduction, including the mention of cash transfers as a key policy instrument in the Sustainable Development Goals 2030, does not underscore the role of agro-based approaches to poverty reduction especially in semi-industrialised economies.

Zimbabwe might have adopted the child-oriented cash transfer programmes or subsidies associated with one or other of the ‘models’ developed by its richer neighbours to the south (South Africa, Botswana, Namibia). It might also have adopted the models favoured, and promoted energetically, by the World Bank, UNICEF and other external agencies. But the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)—which was in power until 2009 and after 2013, and shared power between those dates—resisted cash transfer programmes, favouring instead agricultural interventions (including land reform and farm input subsidy programmes). ZANU-PF’s ambivalence towards cash transfer programmes represents political choices informed by the nature of Zimbabwean society and politics.

The persistence of an agrarian approach to poverty reduction in Zimbabwe, despite transnational actors’ proposals to change it, indicates the limits of global social policy actors. It also underscores the need for new approaches to addressing poverty from an African perspective. The Zimbabwean case discussed in this chapter provides a critical adoption of welfare development to promote a ‘truly global understanding’ of social protection (Midgley, 2013: 182). Zimbabwe’s welfare regime, as argued later, does not fit easily into either Esping-Andersen’s three welfare typologies: conservative, social democratic and liberal ideal regime types (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Neither does it conform to typologies of child welfare regimes in the North (Bradshaw, 2012). The analysis in this chapter suggests that Zimbabwe’s welfare regime fits better Seekings’ agrarian regime type promoting poverty reduction through family support and peasant agricultural production (Seekings, 2012). Pre and

post-independence, Zimbabwe has adopted an agro-based social protection system supporting peasantry oriented land redistributions, farm inputs provision and donor supported food aid during drought periods. However, some of these aspects transformed due to the agrarian change, especially the Fast Track Land Reform Programme implemented in the 2000s. The 2000s agrarian and political transitions led to the reconfiguration of Zimbabwe's agricultural production (Shonhe, 2019). Part of the agrarian change has been attempts to reduce poverty, hunger and vulnerability (due to age and disability) through land and input distribution. The state assumed a leading role particularly in distribution of land to farmers. However, international development partners such as the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) have collaborated with the government to support agricultural production by providing farm inputs to poor peasants in rural areas.

This chapter does not consider debates on the dimensions of welfare regimes analysis. Neither is it interested in the classification of welfare regimes although I inadvertently discuss this to provide background. Instead, it makes a case for strengthening an agrarian welfare regime such as in Zimbabwe in poverty reduction. The ambition is to make an empirical contribution and to re-theorise our understanding of welfare regimes in the global South, particularly in Africa. The Zimbabwean case study, representing many similar countries in Africa, illustrates the significance of agrarian welfare regimes for poverty alleviation in semi-industrialised and largely agro-based contexts.

The next section describes the study methodology. The ensuing sections present findings from documentary data beginning with the analysis of the globalisation of cash transfers and their expansion in the global South. The key observation is that giving the poor cash has become the preferred poverty reduction policy in comparison to agro-based support particularly amongst transnational actors. Following this discussion, an overview of welfare regimes in the global South is provided. The Zimbabwean welfare regime is located in this welfare development discussion in the following section, arguing that the promotion of an agrarian welfare regime in agrarian societies like Zimbabwe present the best possible approach to addressing poverty. The chapter concludes by arguing for strengthening agro-based social protection that is complemented, not replaced, by government-funded targeted cash transfers in addressing poverty.

14.2 METHODOLOGY

In this qualitative research, document analysis is applied to understand welfare regimes. Government reports, previous studies, newspapers, and research reports were reviewed to identify and explain the welfare regime in Zimbabwe. Relevant documents were selected, appraised and the data synthesised following Bowen (2009)'s document analysis procedure. Existing documents on social protection and the broader field of social policy in Zimbabwe and other African countries were reviewed to explore dominant poverty reduction approaches in each case. The adoption of document analysis helped understand the variation in welfare regimes globally and in the global South noting that the ideal types of welfare in the West cannot be applied to the South without modifications. The method was more applicable to this qualitative study as it facilitated the production of rich descriptions and analysis of a single phenomenon of welfare provision. Based on empirical evidence build from document analysis, I conclude that typologies of welfare provision proposed in the South do not aptly classify Zimbabwe's welfare regime as agrarian despite the dominance of agro-based social provision. Content analysis was applied to the data from the documents.

14.3 POVERTY ALLEVIATION AND THE 'GLOBALISATION' OF CASH TRANSFERS

Since the 2000s, international donors and United Nations agencies have sought to 'globalise' cash transfer programming. Development partners and African governments collaborated to give money directly to the poor and vulnerable as an essential component of social protection programmes (Hanlon et al., 2010; Ferguson, 2015). Hanlon et al. further argue that just giving money to the poor without any conditions is a promising strategy because it is developmental, avoids hardships and reduces poverty.

These development partners view giving the poor cash as the panacea for poverty reduction in the Global South, with less emphasis on agro-based social protection approaches (Gliszczynski and Leisering, 2016). Awortwi and Aiyede (2017) argue that cash transfer to the poor, people with disability, older persons, orphans and vulnerable children and the destitute is gradually becoming a popular social protection programme in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In Southern Africa, Mozambique, Zambia,

Malawi and later Zimbabwe implemented varied examples of cash transfer programmes (Chinyoka, 2017; Devereux and Kapingidza, 2020).

The result has been a heterogeneous adoption and expansion, particularly in Africa. The variation in proliferation and expansion in cash transfers in the global South reflects some governments' reception to ideas to expand coverage and resistance to do so by others (Hickey et al., 2018). 'Growing' economies in Africa has not provided increasing and inclusive job opportunities and income growth, so poverty and inequality are both rising. According to Awortwi and Aiyede (2017: 2), 'giving cash to the poor and vulnerable is, therefore, a key strategy to integrate the poor and make them feel the benefit of changing economic fortune'.

International actors have built evidence on the impact of cash-based programmes in advocating for their adoption in the Global South. Reducing rural poverty in Ghana's Upper West Region is associated with the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) cash transfer programme (Fuseini, 2018; Fuseini et al., 2019). In a recent 8-country comparative study of 'the story of cash transfers' for children, Davis and colleagues document 'the accumulated evidence of the broad reaching impacts of cash transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa' (Davis et al., 2016: 1). Handa's latest contribution to social protection for children examines the impact of cash transfers on child nutrition (Groot et al., 2017).

Handa and others investigate *Social Protection for Africa's Children* (Handa et al., 2011). The collection reviews the impact of social cash transfers on children in East and Southern Africa (South Africa, Malawi and Ethiopia). The authors conclude that social protection is an important tool for child wellbeing. Their work in both Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (Handa and Davis, 2006) makes a compelling case for expanding social protection for children. Some studies evaluate the impact of cash transfers in East and Southern Africa showing how different programmes impact child wellbeing including their education and nutrition (Kilburn et al., 2017; Davis et al., 2016; Handa et al., 2009, 2011, 2015, 2016a). The focus in these studies is on making better policies to address poverty.

In Zambia, international donors pushed the government to address poverty by expanding cash transfers (Pruce and Hickey, 2019). Although the government agreed to pilot cash programmes, expansion was constrained by political elites within government, particularly Magande, then Minister of Finance to illustrate the importance of individuals in

adoption of poverty reduction approaches (Kabandula and Seekings, 2016). As a result, the Zambian government has not expanded other cash programmes and the donor-driven Child Grant Programme beyond the three pilot districts despite evidence that the programme impacts on food security and nutrition (Seidenfeld et al., 2014; Handa et al., 2016; Devereux and McGregor, 2014; Chakrabarti et al., 2019). The Zambian case illustrates that the adoption of social cash transfers in the Global South is a negotiated process between international actors and domestic politics (Hickey and Seekings, 2017; Schmitt, 2020).

In Zimbabwe, international donors sought to push for the expansion of the major cash programme, the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer (HSCT) programme by funding and piloting cash distribution in few districts (Chinyoka, 2017). Donors, especially UNICEF, generated evidence from the pilot programme to advocate for government ownership and ultimate funding. In addition, donor-funded impact evaluations showed the HSCT had statistically significant impacts on food security and diet diversity and reduction of youth exposure to violence (Bhalla et al., 2018; Chakrabarti et al., 2020; Pace et al., 2022).

The push for adoption and expansion of cash transfers in the above cases illustrate that there was no attempt to introduce cash programmes linked to the agrarian nature of societies in much of Africa, especially Southern Africa. Transnational actors like the World Bank and International Labour Organisation were determined to have government-funded cash transfers as the major social protection instrument without paying attention to agrarian change from which poverty stemmed. Because much of Africa is rural, poverty exacerbates more from deagrarianisation than urbanisation and lack of industrialisation. Moreover, many countries in Africa are semi-industrialised and poor and funding donor favoured poverty reduction policies like cash transfers remains a challenge. African countries have been conservative in implementing proposals for cash transfers (Seekings, 2019; Chinyoka and Ulriksen, 2020; Chinyoka, 2019) because the proposals contradict national priorities and do not promote the tradition of social protection in each country. The promotion of agriculture-based poverty reduction policy provides a more suitable policy approach in the African context.

14.4 WELFARE REGIMES AND POVERTY REDUCTION

There is no consensus on the most effective welfare regime in reducing poverty. However, the effectiveness of different welfare regimes seems to be context specific and there is usually not one regime within a country. Plagerson and Patel (2019: 1) assert that, ‘Traditional welfare regime classifications struggle to contain and explain the burgeoning, contradictory and diverse models of social provision that are appearing, developing and maturing, particularly in many developing countries’. Esping-Andersen’s formative work on welfare regimes shows that state provision to address poverty differs in terms of ‘regime types’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1999). Welfare state provision constitutes different arrangements of institutions—state, market and the family - and distributive outcomes shaped by different historical actors. Esping-Andersen argues that welfare regimes cannot be categorised based on the single dimension of expenditure because regimes vary along multiple dimensions only weakly related to expenditure. For example, countries with very different regimes may end up spending much the same as each other (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26–28).

Esping-Andersen clusters welfare states into three categories - social democratic (Nordic countries such as Sweden), conservative or corporatist (continental Europe such as Germany and France) and liberal states (Anglo-American like the United States and Canada) (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 26–29). Citizenship-based generous and universal income support for children is meant to reduce poverty and attain equality in social democratic states. This welfare state provides a relatively high degree of autonomy, limiting the reliance on family and market. Autonomy in these states is achieved through high level of decommodification, that is, the extent to which the state provides income to citizens as a right independently of the market value of their labour as a commodity. By contrast, conservative states provide encompassing and income-related child benefits, emphasising family support and negligible state provision. Liberal states provide mainly means tested transfers to poor families. The state plays a minimal role, and the market is the primary provider for the employed breadwinners. Liberal regimes are less likely to be effective in poverty reduction in Africa as more poor people are more likely to be excluded because fewer people are in formal employment.

Esping-Andersen’s regimes types have been adapted in different settings to show variation in social protection and poverty reduction

approaches. Seekings (2005) adapts Esping-Andersen's analytical framework in the 'South' but argues that it is inadequate as it neglects 'ways in which states influence distribution through shaping the development or economic growth path'. Seekings (2017: 16) offers an alternative typology of income support that distinguishes between agrarian, inegalitarian corporatist and redistributive regimes. In these Southern regimes, decommodification is entailed through social assistance such as cash transfers and agricultural subsidies rather than social insurance. The poor are more likely to be included where benefits are not tied to formal employment. In Africa, agrarian regimes seem to have been more effective in poverty reduction.

In 2012 Niño-Zarazúa et al. (2012: 12) sketched typologies of cash transfers in sub-Saharan Africa that distinguished between the 'Southern Africa' and the 'Middle Africa' models. In this analysis social protection programmes in sub-Saharan Africa differ in structure and scope across countries. Garcia and Moore (2012) came up with almost similar distinctions that grouped cash transfer programmes into 'middle-income' (corresponding to the Southern Model) and the 'low-income or fragile' (similar to middle Africa model) regime. The fragile model entails provision of short-term benefits focused on food security or emergence responses. The benefits are usually donor-funded and lack programme sustainability. Many of these classifications resemble Esping-Andersen's categories in one way or another.

These regimes have transformed over time. For example, in Botswana deagrarianisation led to new forms of social assistance mainly social cash transfers (Seekings, 2020). These regimes focus on general welfare but show how social provision in Southern Africa differs with less focus on how governments, especially in Southern Africa, have relied on agro-based schemes in addressing poverty and hunger. As we see in the next section, agrarian welfare regimes like in Zimbabwe provide innovative means to poverty reduction and need to be strengthened.

14.4.1 Poverty Reduction and Innovation in Zimbabwe's Agrarian Welfare Regime

The World Development Indicators show that in 2022 poverty rates (measured using the \$1.90/day/person) in Southern Africa were highest in Malawi with 74% followed by Zambia and Zimbabwe with 59 and 40% respectively. Namibia had the lowest rate with 14%, South Africa 19%

and Botswana at 15% (World Bank, 2022).¹ More poor children live in Zimbabwe compared with other countries in the region. In 2012, 78% of all children were poor compared with 63% in South Africa (ZIMSTAT, 2016; Delany et al., 2016: 34). Such high poverty levels in Zimbabwe require that the government adopt innovative poverty reduction interventions and fully implement its comprehensive social protection policy adopted in 2016.

Elsewhere, we present three policy options for Zimbabwe as it redesigns and implements its social protection policy (Chinyoka and Patel, 2020). First, we suggest that Zimbabwe might continue along the historical pathway of the agrarian society and its accompanying welfare regime. The second policy option is to follow other countries in Southern Africa's focus on expanding targeted cash transfers to reduce child and family poverty. Finally, Zimbabwe might adopt a hybrid model of social protection that combines the agrarian welfare regime with cash transfers. We conclude that the hybrid model is more suited to the local economic context because Zimbabwe remains an agrarian economy with strong familial (kinship) and communal systems of social provision despite the pressure on these latter systems to meet the needs of children and families. Consequently, we recommended complementary poverty-targeted cash transfers. As we see below, this chapter picks up this argument to suggest that strengthening agrarian welfare regimes promises to be a strong poverty reduction approach in Zimbabwe and other urbanising but semi-industrialised countries in Africa.

The government of Zimbabwe has sought to address poverty using a package of social protection mechanisms. Scholars do not explicitly describe the welfare regime in Zimbabwe as agrarian but their analyses of the characteristics of the country's public policy in general suggest an agrarian regime (Moyo, 2013; Scoones, 2014). The welfare regime in Zimbabwe does not fit either Esping-Andersen's 'three worlds of welfare capitalism' (Esping-Andersen, 1990) nor typologies of child welfare regimes in the North (Bradshaw, 2012; Daly and Clavero, 2002). It fits better Seekings' typology of social provision in the global South. Seekings distinguishes between *agrarian* regimes that promote kinship support and strengthen 'peasant agriculture. Such regimes promote access

¹ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.DDAY>.

to land, products markets and production systems' with a primary objective to reduce poverty. This contrasts with *pauperist* regimes that target 'deserving categories of very poor people through highly targeted non-contributory social assistance' (Seekings, 2012). Seekings' (2005: 16) analysis of 'Southern states' that 'promote income security through access to land' and where 'land reform programmes, and ensuing government support for small farmers, can provide poor families with the opportunity to produce for either their own consumption or for the market' aptly describes and distinguishes Zimbabwe's welfare regime.

The social protection system in Zimbabwe is agrarian because ZANU-PF governments (pre- and post-Government of National Unity) emphasised drought relief, land reform and farm input distribution (Munemo, 2012; Moyo, 2013) primarily targeted at poor peasant farmers. This approach is pro-agriculture, enduring since independence in 1980 but interrupted by a partial shift from an agrarian regime to experiment with poverty-targeted cash transfers during the Government of National Unity (Chinyoka and Seekings, 2016). During the Government of National Unity, however, ZANU-PF continued to run its agro-based social assistance, providing farm inputs to small farmers.

Since attaining democracy, governments in Zimbabwe have favoured land redistribution to fight poverty. At independence, a white minority continued to exploit 'varsity' land—individual farms averaging 2000 ha—for large-scale commercial farming at the expense of the peasantry. Between 1980 and 1999, 'Zimbabwe pursued a market-based land reform programme' that did not result in the large-scale transfer of previously white-owned land to peasants (Moyo, 2013: 201). Since 2000, ZANU-PF has redistributed white-owned land previously to small-farm families largely of rural origin and black commercial farmers' (Bratton, 2014: 76; Moyo, 2013: 42). Whilst it is the post-agrarian societies that provide most or all of the models for cash transfer programmes, Zimbabwe (together with Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique) is different in that the agrarian society has survived: these are (outside of drought years) non-arid environments, with strong peasant sectors, in stark contrast to South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia. In Zimbabwe, agriculture provides livelihoods to 80% of the population, accounts for 23% of formal employment, and contributes about 18% to GDP and approximately 33% of foreign earnings.

Despite falling aggregate agricultural production after the fast-track land reform of the 2000s, for some small farmers, production and living

standards have improved, particularly in the countryside, where some formerly very poor people are now more food secure. Although land reform is said to have largely benefited former President Mugabe's cronies (Bond, 2005; Moyo, 2013; Robertson, 2011; Scoones, 2014), the government largely supports agriculture as the primary poverty reduction strategy. In the following two subsections, the focus turns to approaches adopted by governments in Zimbabwe to promote poverty reduction through a sustained agrarian welfare regime.

14.5 LAND REDISTRIBUTION

Zimbabwe's comparative advantage in promoting an agrarian welfare regime lies in that it is already supporting smallholder and peasant farmer production as part of rolling out its agricultural transformation. Hazell (2017: 2) argues that poverty reduction in Africa be anchored on 'inclusive transformation based on promoting the growth of small farms and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Africa's food systems'. The best approach to reduce poverty in Zimbabwe particularly after the 2000 Fast Track Land reform Programme that resulted in the formation of what Mao Ze Dong identified as the 'middle peasants'—peasant farmers who own agricultural land—in the becoming of peasantry in China during the 1960s (Negri and Hardt, 2004) could entail government agricultural input support.

Land redistribution presents livelihoods opportunities for the poor in many respects in the Zimbabwean context. It provides opportunities for accumulation in intensive agricultural production and agriculture-linked business enterprises for young people (Scoones et al., 2019). Nyawo (2014) shows that land redistribution presents an effective approach to poverty reduction as experiences of resettled farmers indicate increased food sovereignty and production. Land redistribution enlarged the peasantry and increased peasants' access to better-quality land and natural resources (Moyo, 2011). Recent studies show that the allocation of small plots for growing crops and grazing land to landless and poor farmers in Zimbabwe raised agricultural productivity (Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019). Mkodzongi and Lawrence further argue that in some cases peasants have produced surpluses and compete with large-scale commercial farmers to reshape forms of accumulation and social differentiation.

Agricultural production allowed small-scale farmers to make profit and reinvest their proceeds with women producing and having control over surplus grains (Addison, 2019; Shonhe, 2019).

14.6 AGRICULTURAL INPUT SUPPORT AND FOOD AID

In the early 1980s, the ZANU-PF government had encouraged peasant production through land redistribution, improved marketing and credit lines. Basking in the glory of its election victories, ZANU-PF had abandoned these schemes in the 1990s. In the period leading to the 2009 election, President Mugabe established the presidential Agricultural Input Pack Support Programme in support of the agrarian welfare regime. The programme revitalised agriculture following the collapse of financial schemes for farmers since the land reform programme in the 2000s. The programme had wide coverage, second only to food aid. It promoted self-reliance and discouraged donor and government dependency. Mugabe said that the programme ‘empower[s] our farmers for greater crop production’. Moses Moyo, ZANU-PF Umguza District Coordinator, said that the programme teaches people ‘not to depend on donors but to be self-reliant so that we work on the land so that we feed our families’.²

The Input Scheme now receives a higher budget allocation than any other social programme and largely covers households that benefited from the land reform programme from 2000. The Scheme, which is supposedly a government programme, has remained discretionary, with no clear selection criteria. It is usually implemented by the president’s office in collaboration with ZANU-PF councillors and traditional leaders including chiefs, and at times with the Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry of Public Service and Social Welfare (MPSLSW), which is responsible for family and child welfare, is not involved in the implementation of the programme. The distribution modalities suggest partisan and patronage politics centrally in state support for poverty reduction programmes.

A key pro-agrarian welfare regime reform implemented by the ruling party after winning the 2013 elections is the empowerment of farmers through Command Agriculture. Despite downscaling the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer on ‘affordability’ grounds in the face of

² Chronicle newspaper, 17 January 2012. Available at: <http://www.chronicle.co.zw/presidential-input-scheme-rollsinto-ntabazinduna/> (accessed 9 March 2017).

increasing food insecurity (ZIMSTAT, 2016), the ZANU-PF administration rolled out a US\$500 million small-scale farmer input support scheme, Command Agriculture, in 2015. The programme sought to achieve household and national food security through enhanced maize production. This is achieved through supporting Command Agriculture farmers to produce approximately 91% of Zimbabwe's maize requirement (equivalent to 2 million tonnes).

The Command Agriculture programme ostensibly promotes family reliance rather than government or donor dependency. Together with the agricultural input package, Command Agriculture aligns to the ruling party's agrarian approach to social protection for the poor and poor families with children. Emmerson Mnangagwa, then Vice-President, underscored that Command Agriculture would 'stimulate the agro-industry and create employment' and potentially 'generate income and improve livelihoods of all people'.³

With regard to food aid, since 1982, Zimbabwe experienced successive droughts that threatened agricultural productivity. Munemo (2012) writes that in the 1980s and 1990s President Mugabe was quick to respond to drought through 'expansive relief programmes' including employment creation programmes. These programmes earned Mugabe international recognition. Political insecurity subsequently weakened Mugabe's commitment to such programmes, however, and by the mid-1990s, he had 'progressively moved [away] from offering the broad programmes of relief' (Munemo 2012: 88). The political crisis in the late 1990s led him to revive food aid programmes as he 'politicized' relief to consolidate his power. As Munemo (2012: 88) explains: 'Mugabe's adoption of drought relief programmes reflected his own political strength or weakness, shifting as his standing changed'. When Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party 'faced insecure political environment [...] they responded to droughts by adopting food aid programmes for adults'; when they were more secure, 'drought-relief programmes for adults shifted away from free food aid to cost-effective programmes that avoided dependency and limited waste, such as food for work' Munemo (2012: 88). ZANU-PF, thus, continued to rely on emergency food aid in drought years when its political insecurity intensified in the 2000s.

³ The Herald, 25 August 2016: <http://www.herald.co.zw/vp-mnangagwa-calls-for-unity-on-command-agric/>.

Thus, ZANU-PF preferred food aid, farm input schemes and land reform to direct cash, favouring programmes that largely benefit the rural population constituting the large proportion of peasants and smallholder farmers. Food aid and farm inputs, however, intensified ZANU-PF's patronage. During the 2000–2008 economic crisis, for example, 'Agricultural inputs and maize intended for food relief were sold by [ZANU-PF] party functionaries or were awarded to card-carrying acolytes of ZANU-PF, while these supplies were withheld from persons suspected of opposition sympathies' (Bratton 2014: 86).

In summary, land redistribution, coupled with farm input support, particularly to the majority of rural poor, therefore, provides a fresh impetus to promoting innovative poverty reduction strategies in agrarian societies like Zimbabwe. Earlier research on poverty and food security emphasised the centrality of agriculture in improving food production, security, consumption and poverty reduction in Africa (Conceição et al., 2016). Findings in this chapter are consistent with these studies but further argue that cash transfers and agricultural farm mechanisation expanded as poverty reduction instruments in Africa, innovative harnessing of new but Africa sensitive social policies and technology is essential in agro-based economies like in Zimbabwe to reduce poverty substantially without conceding to international influence. For example, the analysis of Africa's policy and technology options in the first chapter by Shonhe and Chinyoka in this book shows that effective adoption of appropriate sizes of tractors should be considered to link agricultural production and social protection targets. Therefore, effective poverty reduction in agrarian economies like Zimbabwe should encompass adaptation of social policies and technologies.

14.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter connects to the ongoing debate about welfare regimes and poverty reduction. The global rise of cash transfers has incredible support in rich countries but proving less effective in reducing poverty in semi-industrialised economies. South Africa, for example, spend a lot on social grants but child poverty has not significantly reduced. Rather, more citizens are becoming poor with the unprecedented rise in unemployment despite the increasing number of cash transfer beneficiaries. The adoption of social protection instruments like cash transfers in the developing world, particularly in poor countries such as Zimbabwe should respond

and be sensitive to the needs and context of such societies. Ending poverty in Zimbabwe should strengthen its agrarian path compatible with the Zimbabwean society. Social protection programmes like agricultural inputs, in addition to distribution of arable land to smallholder farmers and peasants, have greater potential to raise crop production and address hunger and food security in most poor households. Zimbabwe can also draw some lessons from Botswana implementing poverty reduction programmes not primarily influenced by international actors but because ideas from external actors were adapted into local social protection systems, norms and values (Chinyoka and Ulriksen, 2020).

This chapter does not advance the view that giving the poor cash ‘deplete still relatively scarce public funds that could otherwise be employed for ‘productive’ investment’ (Bonilla and Gruat, 2003: 1). Rather, the long term developmental and poverty reducing impacts of cash transfers are recognised. The suggestion is that cash transfers are an imperative social policy instrument in certain contexts, but the promotion of agrarian welfare regimes provides a promising alternative poverty reduction approach in agro-based countries like Zimbabwe. In semi-industrialised countries, cash transfers can effectively complement agro-based social protection rather than replace it. Suppose the disjuncture between global social policy, in the form of cash transfers, at the global and African levels means that Africa should continue on a poverty reduction trajectory that responds to its needs but not favoured by transnational actors. In that case, it is imperative for Africa to hold firm. Many African countries need government poverty alleviation programmes that produce sustainable poverty reduction and address the major cause of poverty in the continent, especially in Southern Africa, that is, deagrarianisation.

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Rural Women's Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality in Mungwi District, Zambia

Tobias Mubanga Mutale and Oliver Mtapuri

15.1 INTRODUCTION

Poverty and inequality among rural women are a worldwide phenomenon affecting women of all ages and races. This problem, however, is deeper on the African continent and particularly in Zambia. The bill of rights in the constitution of Zambia declares that every person has the right to access health care, housing, food, clean water for domestic use and to social security (Constitution of the Republic of Zambia, Article 62(1), 2016). Despite this declaration, rural women in Zambia continue to languish in dire poverty and inequality. This study sought to present and theorise poverty and inequality from the perspective of rural women of Zambia in Mungwi District, in the Northern Province.

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Despite the fact that Zambia attained its independence in October 1964, the gap between the poor and the rich has been widening leading to an increase in poverty and inequality levels in both urban and rural areas (Mwenge 2016). While there has been steady macroeconomic growth, GDP growth average of 5.5% annually and 7.3% in 2012, the growth has not translated into a reduction of poverty and inequality (United Nations 2013, p. 1). Zambia's Gini coefficient which currently stands at about 0.69 up from 0.60 in 2010 proves the point and makes Zambia to be one of the most unequal nations in the World (CSO 2015; Mwenge 2016; United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2018). According to Central Statistical Office (2016); these indicators confirm that inequality is very high in Zambia. Inequality leads to inferior opportunities for the disadvantaged and those who are extremely poor, especially women in rural areas. Inequality also undermines stability, solidarity in society and sustains the growth of poverty from generation to generation. Poverty and inequality hinder human development and therefore it is vital to comprehend the nature of poverty and inequality in a nation in order to enact and implement appropriate policies and interventions to mitigate and reverse poverty and inequality (United Nations 2013, p. 2).

This state of affairs threatens the lives of the most vulnerable members of society, especially rural women. Compassion International (2020) contends that, "Poverty is hunger. Poverty is a lack of shelter. Poverty is being sick and not being able to see a doctor. Poverty is not having access to school and not knowing how to read. Poverty is not having a job, is fear for the future, living one day at a time. Poverty is losing a child to illness brought about by unclean water. Poverty is powerlessness, lack of representation and freedom". The CSO (2016) observes that poverty has numerous definitions because of its multifaceted and intricate nature. There is no commonly agreed meaning of poverty. The Living Conditions Monitoring Surveys (LCMS) consider an individual to be poor if he/she undergoes some level of economic and social deprivation (CSO 2016). Furthermore, the Central Statistical of Zambia perceives the poor as individual members of the society who are not able to sustain basic human needs, consisting food, clothing and shelter from their income (CSO 2016). Therefore, the motivation is to find ways to encourage lawmakers to improve poor people's lives especially the rural dwellers.

In Zambia, poverty is largely a rural phenomenon (World Bank Group 2017, p. 4). Even though there is a claim that poverty in rural areas has

reduced, the statistics still show that rural poverty is still very high. The CSO (2016) compares poverty levels among female-headed households and male-headed households and the rates were 78.9 and 76% respectively. This relentless rising of poverty and inequality in Zambia, calls for more research on the matter especially from a grounded theory perspective so that the problems can deeply be understood. Sen (1999, p. 1) writes that any meaningful development requires the reduction of poverty, and social deprivation.

15.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

15.2.1 *Women's Poverty and Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)*

Although poverty, as well as inequality, has reduced elsewhere in the world, women's poverty and inequality remain extremely high in Sub-Saharan Africa and this region remains the world's most unequal region (McFerson 2010; UNDP 2016, 2019). The World Bank (n.d.) reports that about 389 million people in the region continue to live on not more than \$1.90 (United States) per day. Like in the other parts of the world discussed above, Sub-Saharan African experiences high levels of income inequality (Okojie and Shimeles 2006). Women are said to have less access to land, capital, paid labour, education, credit facilities as well as technology (World Bank, n.d.) The quality of life of the women in SSA is certainly worse than that of men (Kaka 2013). The poverty situation of women in SSA is fuelled by the inequality that exists between women and men. Non-income disparities between the two sexes have also been said to be particularly high in the region. Okojie and Shimeles (2006) also contend that asset-based and capacity-based inequalities are higher in rural areas than in urban areas of SSA. There are clearly many inequalities driving poverty in SSA, particularly inequalities related to accessing land, education, health, public services, labour markets and involvement in politics. McFerson (2010) lists four causes of poverty which include lack of opportunities, low income, lack of assets and social marginalisation. Poverty and inequality are costly to SSA economies. Keeping women in poverty and inequality consequently negatively affects the economic growth of SSA. Extreme inequality is detrimental to growth and development (Odusola 2018). For Odusola (2018), regressive taxes, unresponsive wage structures, inadequate investment in education and

social protection for those that are marginalised, and discriminatory social norms, especially for women, are all drivers of inequality leading to poverty and conflict.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) sprang from Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), whose objectives were to decrease economic vulnerability of Southern Africa, creating regional cooperation and organising resources to promote policies in the region as a determined action to achieve economic liberalisation. SADC was formed in August 1992 and some of its aims are to ensure the development, economic expansion, reduce poverty and enhance the quality of life of the people of Southern Africa through regional cooperation (SADC 1993, 2003).

From inception, SADC envisioned dealing with the well-being of the people in the region by focussing on growing the economies of the member states, poverty alleviation, and helping the disadvantaged through regional integration. At this stage in the cooperation there was no special attention given to women issues especially regarding poverty and inequality. Moreover, SADC later implemented a protocol relating to gender and development. This instrument looked at assimilating and classifying gender differences and labelling women's problems and experiences essential to the design, enactment, monitoring and assessment of programmes and policies across all areas to equally benefit men and women (SADC 2008). The SADC region through its declaration and the treaty 6(2) vowed not, "to discriminate against any person on the grounds of *inter alia*, sex or gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture, or disability" (SADC 1993). SADC member states have consented that sustainable development may only be achieved through the removal of inequalities and marginalisation of women. Removal of gender inequalities and discrimination of women is achievable not only through economic growth and redistribution, but also through suitable projects, activities, legislation, policies and aimed at promoting gender equality and empowering women in all SADC member countries (SADC 2012). Despite these efforts by this region, SADC remains a community where poverty and inequality are still very high and where human rights violations are still being perpetrated against women in countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo due to war and other African countries. The following section of this chapter deals with women, poverty and inequality in Zambia.

15.2.2 *Poverty and Inequality in Zambia*

Article 51(1, 2, 3) of the constitution of Zambia (2016) states that, “Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the rights to equal opportunities in cultural, political, economic and social activities. Women and men are entitled to be accorded the same dignity and respect of the person. Women and men have an equal right to inherit, have access to, own, use administer and control land and other property”. Similarly article 62(1)(a, b, c, e, f) of the same constitution declares that,

A person has the right to the highest attainable standard of health, which includes the highest right to health, which includes the right to health care services and reproductive health care; accessible and adequate housing; be free from hunger and to have access to adequate food of acceptable quality; clean and safe water in adequate quantities and to reasonable standards of sanitation; social security and protection, and education.

Notwithstanding, the above constitutional declarations and Zambia’s stable economic growth from 1990 to 2015, poverty remains a major challenge to national development (MNDP 2017). At the end of 2015, it was predicted that extreme poverty would be eliminated, however, Zambia is ranked as one of the poorest nations in the world with approximately 54.4% of poverty levels. Poverty remains stubbornly high despite a good period of economic growth (MNDP 2017; World Bank Group 2017).

The Ministry of National Development Planning confirms that half of the population of Zambia presently survives below the poverty line, which is US\$1.09, while 40.8% are not able to meet their everyday essential needs like food. This condition is much worse in the countryside where approximately 76.6 of the population is poor (MNDP 2017). The overall number of disadvantaged families across the country is steadily increasing and is made up of individuals with limited access to critical public services that are essential for survival, such as quality health care, quality education, clean drinking water and sanitation. It has also been observed that these households have poor nutrition, which indicates a situation of food insecurity within these families. This further deprives people of human capital potential and further buttresses intergenerational poverty, keeping these families in a vicious cycle of poverty. Female-headed households, children-headed households, persons with disabilities, orphaned children

and chronically ill and the elderly are likely to be more susceptible to poverty in society (MNDP 2017).

The Report by the Ministry of Gender and Child Development of Zambia indicates that most people in Zambia live in poverty; this situation being exacerbated by the inequality that exists between the sexes in relation to available opportunities. The most affected are the people in rural areas rather than urban dwellers. In 2010, the population and housing census showed that 65% of the Zambian population lived in rural areas. Urban poverty in 2010 was approximated to stand at 28% compared to 78% in rural areas. Dire poverty where households are unable to meet dietary needs was approximated to stand at 58% in the countryside and 13% in urban areas (MGCD 2014). The Ministry of Gender and Child Development (MGCD 2014) also argues that in accordance with the Living Conditions Monitoring Survey of 2010, poverty is higher among women, which stood at 80% when compared to men, with 78%. Similarly, severe poverty levels affected more female-headed households than male-headed households. Women's poverty has continued to be an encumbrance to their involvement in general decision-making since women find themselves overwhelmed by their gender roles, which contributes to them being less educated and unskilled and as such find themselves dependent on men. Women are also unequally affected by the HIV and AIDS epidemic, consequently, they continue to be victims of gender-based violence and remain the poorest with limited formal and informal power. The United Nations (2013, p. 4) reports, that poverty in Zambia is mainly a rural phenomenon.

15.2.3 Inequalities Exacerbating Women's Poverty in Zambia

Inequalities that exacerbate poverty and inequality among women may be embedded within the structures of society and the state policies and programmes, in legalised systems and in social and cultural norms. These inequalities which exacerbate women's poverty in Zambia include gender, income, education, health, and employment inequalities; inequalities in factors of production, political participation and representation, legalised inequalities, in cultural norms and manifesting in violence against women. Improving rural areas for the benefit of rural women needs careful interventions that focus on rural development (MNDP 2017).

15.3 METHODOLOGY

The study was carried out to shed insights on poverty and inequality as experienced by rural women of Mungwi district in Zambia. It adopted a qualitative research approach because it is more appropriate for this kind of study which looks at women's lived experiences of poverty and inequality. The sample consisted of 64 women aged between 20 and 65 years. The researchers purposefully chose to work with women aged 20 and above because culturally they are mature, they have families, they have children and have sufficient life experiences especially the phenomenon of poverty and inequality. This study, therefore utilised purposive sampling as information-rich participants.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to collect information from the women. Mungwi District is located in the Northern Province of Zambia. The province is rural. According to CSO (2018) incidence of poverty in Zambia shows that about 76.6% poor people reside in rural areas. Similarly, incidences of poverty by province in Zambia by 2015 showed that Northern province stood at 79.7% which is one of the highest in the country after Western province and Luapula province which both stood at 82.2 and 81.1%, respectively. According to CSO the population of Mungwi District is estimated to be 151,058 as per 2010 national census, of which 74,730 are men while women account for 76,328. Mungwi district was chosen because of the high poverty levels in this District. The researchers undertook 26 one-on-one interviews with only female participants and others participated in Focus Group Discussions. The interviewees were available because a prior appointment was made through the gatekeepers. Accessibility to the interviewees was also possible because the interviews were conducted when there was less work in the people's fields. As a result of this, most people invited to take part in the interview were at home instead of being in the field planting or harvesting. Two interviews per ward in eleven wards were conducted. Four interviews were conducted in Mungwi ward. Most participants interviewed had an extremely low level of education. Out of the 26 women interviewed only one woman was divorced. Divorces in Mungwi are not so high. Out of the twenty-six women interviewed, nine of the women indicated that they were married, 13 women were single or not married representing the highest number of women of the total women interviewed. They were two widows. To maintain the confidentiality of the identity of the participants, the researchers used letters INT and a number

to code participants. For instance, participant number one, two and three would be INT1, INT2, INT3 and so forth.

15.4 FINDINGS

15.4.1 *Demographic Profile of the Participants*

Table 15.1 shows demographic information of the total number of participants in one-on-one interviews.

Table 15.1 Demographic information of participants

<i>Number of persons</i>	<i>Identity of participants</i>	<i>Age</i>	<i>Marital status</i>	<i>Level of education</i>
1	INT1	33	Divorced	College
2	INT2	24	Single	Grade 12
3	INT3	65	Married	Form 2
4	INT4	30	Single	Grade 12
5	INT5	61	Married	Form 3
6	INT6	66	Widow	Standard 4
7	INT7	55	Married	Form 3
8	INT8	31	Single	Grade 8
9	INT9	28	Married	Grade 9
10	INT10	27	Single	Grade 2
11	INT11	20	Single	Grade 6
12	INT12	21	Single	Grade 7
13	INT13	24	Single	Grade 9
14	INT14	20	Single	Grade 7
15	INT15	20	Single	Grade 12
16	INT16	21	Single	Grade 9
17	INT17	20	Single	Grade 8
18	INT18	26	Window	Grade 8
19	INT19	24	Not married	Grade 9
20	INT20	30	Married	Grade 7
21	INT21	45	Married	Grade 6
22	INT22	47	Married	Grade 5
23	INT23	40	Married	Grade 9
24	INT24	51	Married	Standard 3
25	INT25	23	Married	Grade 12
26	INT26	20	Single	Grade 12

Source Fieldwork

15.4.2 *Women's Perceptions of Poverty*

When asked about their perceptions and their understanding of poverty. The participants perceived poverty in terms of financial incapacitation. Almost all women were unanimous on the fact that poverty is lack of income and wealth. The women also described poverty in terms of failure to afford basic commodities, lack of resources needed to live a decent life, failure to sustain survival and that poverty was a major disability which leads to powerlessness in the event of natural and artificial disasters. The excerpt below articulates a woman's perception of poverty in Mungwi District who said:

Poverty is financial helplessness, not being able to feed the family, not being able to have shelter, food, and clothes, it is lack of resources needed to live a good life. It is the failure to afford basic commodities. It is a situation of being vulnerable to calamities that occur. But the biggest cause of all these evils is lack of money. Because it is from lack of money that all vulnerabilities proceed, and it is exceedingly difficult to escape this trap. (INT1, aged, divorced, College Education)

To understand the above quotation, Chambers (2006) describes poverty in terms of income poverty as the first meaning, followed by poverty as lack of material things and thirdly as capability deprivation a term which was coined in by Amartya Sen. Chambers argues that poverty is not just income poverty, lack of material things but it is also capability deprivation. Poverty is not just about what people wish to own and how they feel, it is also what they can do and what they can be. In their description of poverty, women felt that they are poor because they have been deprived of many opportunities—one of which is having a proper education. One participant painfully explained:

Poverty is being denied an opportunity to do what you can do and what you wanted to become. Most of us women here in the village are not given an opportunity to go to school because schools have never been near to our villages; Also, because as women we were destined for marriage. As you grew up, you are socialised to behave and think like a mother. While boys were sent to go and study no matter where the schools were located, as girls, we were not allowed to leave home. We were denied the opportunity to become what we would have wanted to become. Now the greatest poverty we have is the poverty of the mind. The little education we have can barely take us anywhere. (INT10, aged 27, Single, Grade 2 Education)

People in society who own material things are regarded with respect. Poor women in Mungwi District suffer being despised because they are poor and do not own a lot of material things. To support this view, participant INT8 described poverty in terms of wealth and respect as she said.

Poverty is not just lacking food and other essential things for life. In poverty we are helpless and value-less, we lack the power to influence anything in society as women. In poverty we do not own anything, we have no wealth. While others own animals, houses and bicycles; and even cars, we own nothing, not even good clothes because they are unaffordable. When you own material things people consider you as a wealthy person and they respect you and they listen to you when you speak. We have no voice because we do not own anything. (INT8, age 31, Single, Grade 8 Education)

Lack of material wealth renders rural women voiceless. Voicelessness can be likened to powerlessness which is one of the clusters of disadvantages that interact with other clusters of disadvantages to keep people in poverty and inequality (Chambers 1983, p. 112). A participant from FG4 added:

Poverty is not one thing; it is an interaction of many difficulties for us women. Poverty is a lack money. It a lack of proper housing. We cannot afford houses with sanitation. Poverty means a lack of proper education for us women and our children. Furthermore, poverty means a lack of access to a doctor and medicine, and a lack of voice or power. However, the overt poverty around us, is a lack of food and clothing. (FG4, Married, aged 33, Grade 4 Education)

Human needs theory emphasises that for people to be fully actualised, their physical needs, safe and security needs, and understanding needs, ought to be fully actualised for them to develop (Aruna and Hanachor 2017).

15.4.3 Description of a Poor Woman

When asked who a poor woman is? It emerged from empirical evidence that there were many different answers, but some similarities were also observed. A poor woman is one who has no income, she is abused by her husband, she is not respected in society and she is socially excluded. She is noticeable from her appearance, behaviour and lack of confidence. A

poor woman is vulnerable to many calamities. Above all, a poor woman lacks education and capacity to educate herself. She walks long distances to access clinics, markets, and other services. A 28-year-old participant with two children defined a poor woman as follows:

Apart from all the difficulties she must go through, a poor woman is one who has no time for herself. When women elsewhere find time to entertain themselves and to develop themselves, a poor woman dedicates all her time caring for others. She is overwhelmed by the care for husband, children, and house chores. She has time for everything but lacks time for herself. Similarly, a poor woman walks long distances on foot carrying her produce to the market for sell on her head. Her fatigue or tiredness is enormous. When she returns home, she does not stop to rest. She only rests when she is sleeping. (INT9, aged 28, Married, Grade 9 Education)

Regan describes a situation whereby women have the responsibility to do almost everything that needs to be done in a household. Regan writes that a woman does everything from cooking to fetching firewood and water, looking after children's well-being by bathing, feeding and nursing them. Additionally, women also must fend for their husbands. To understand why the participant says that women have no time for themselves, Regan, asserts that women are in most cases over-laden with household responsibilities, Abdourahman (2010) argued that,

In countries where time use studies have been conducted, it has been shown that women work significantly longer hours per day than men. In rural areas especially, most women's time is spent on household and subsistence activities. Little time is left for market related and remunerated activities. Compared to men, women have very heavy time loads due to the need to balance the demands of their multiple roles: productive, reproductive, social, and community. The patriarchal foundation of the distribution of roles by gender is the major cause of gender inequality, the heavy time-burden on women and girls, and ultimately the feminisation of poverty.

Abdourahman (2010) opines that to emancipate women, there is a need to focus on time poverty. Poverty for women is rarely given enough attention in literature and by development agents. Some of the descriptions of the poor woman by the responded coded in NVivo are presented in Fig. 15.1.




Fig. 15.1 Description of a poor woman

Chambers (2006) lists twelve disadvantages of poverty and some of them include social relations, material poverty, poverty of time, insecurities, lack of education, lack of information, physical ill-being, institutions and access, lack of political clout ascribed and legal inferiority. These disadvantages are the same as suffered by the rural women of Mungwi District. To understand poverty and inequality, the women of Mungwi District were asked to explain how poverty comes about or how people sink into poverty.

15.4.4 *Sinking into Poverty*

There are many reasons why the poor may find themselves in a cycle of poverty. According to empirical evidence collected from the women of Mungwi District, there is general acknowledgement that in Mungwi

District women may be poor because of government negligence. The women felt that they have been neglected for an exceedingly long time. The government has not assisted women as desired by bringing the development to the area to improve their lives. A 24-year-old participant and a school leaver expressed herself in the following words,

It seems to me that we are all poor here in the village. However, I also believe that some people are poorer than others. We find ourselves in poverty because we have been neglected. The government does not worry about us. We are good for nothing. So, the major reason why we are poor is that our area is poor. We are isolated and we are far from everything schools, hospitals, and all other things to uplift us from poverty. There is no government assistance which comes our way. But some are poor among us because they are sick or lazy. They do not want to plough and plant anything when it rains. In the end, they become vagrants. (INT13, Single, aged 24, Grade 8 Education)

In support of these sentiments above, another key participant submitted that:

People find themselves in poverty because they do not want to try to uplift themselves. Those who try to help themselves are not disappointed they always have something to eat and something to wear. The lazy ones suffer. (INT4, Single, aged 30, Grade 12 Education)

Rural people always depend on each other. Parents try with all their effort to assist their children. When children grow up, they must reciprocate the same generosity towards their parents especially when they move to towns and cities where they can make a bit of money. However, this is not always so some children forget their parents. The following statement by a 61-year-old key participant supports these assertions:

We who are not young any longer, we find ourselves in poverty because some of our children, forget about us when they migrate to towns. Instead of sending us some money, we are forgotten. At the age of 65 one needs assistance from children. Those who are helped through money sent to them by their children find life much easier. We give birth to children hoping that when we grow old, our children will help us. Elderly people in our country do not have a pension, the pension is our children. (INT5, Married, aged 61, Form 2 Education)

For INT5 culturally, Bemba people are obliged to help their parents when they are elderly. However, people who leave rural areas to go to cities or towns do not necessarily get good jobs to afford to look after their parents. The elderly needs constant income for them to survive and improve their lives. The human needs theory also supports the idea that human beings need physiological needs such as food, clothing and housing which are met through access to financial capital. Similarly, for human being to be fully satisfied they need to achieve safety and security needs (Aruna and Hanachor 2017). The circumstances of the elderly as mentioned above points to a lack of safety and security, particularly economic security. The policy on pension is not extensive to cover the elderly in the rural areas. To reduce hardships the rural elderly people go through, NGOs could find ways to assist the elderly through self-help projects and diversification of livelihood strategies. Other participants explained that women found themselves in poverty due to alcoholism and intergenerational poverty. Below is a direct statement from one of the key participants aged 65 years:

Alcoholism and failure to find work, and intergenerational poverty can drive people into poverty. In other words, for some family, poverty runs in family veins from one generation to another and cannot easily be broken. Only when something deliberate happens can the generational curse be exorcised. Poverty lives in our families, and we have it in our blood. (INT3, Married, aged 65, form 2 Education)

In support of the thoughts above from interviewee INT3, poverty being in blood means it is carried from one generation to the next. In other words, it is intergenerational and perpetual. It affects even future generations. Other studies agree that people who have inherited property from previous family generations have benefited economically and have been buttressed against economic shocks (Cooper and Bird 2012, pp. 527–528). A 55-year-old participant with five children and numerous grandchildren submitted that poverty is often caused by natural disasters in Mungwi District. She said,

Sometimes we find ourselves in poverty due to famine caused by drought or pestilences. One time we had completely no food in our village because of the drought. That year we did not have rain; all our crops dried up. Unfortunately, we did not receive much assistance from the government. We have also faced years when locusts destroyed crops and caused hunger

and desperation. But poverty can be due to many other factors such as lack of education and poor health. (INT7, Married, aged 55, Form 3 Education)

In direct contrast to the above submissions regarding why people descend into poverty, the following is what one participant had to say:

Poverty must not be blamed on the government or natural disasters or on lack of remittances from relatives who are well off. People must work hard. Waiting on the government to deliver is what leads people into derision of poverty. Similarly, waiting for remittances from relatives cause people to be lazy. I think poverty for most people is self-inflicted because people lack initiatives and do not want to work. A lot of people in Bemba land could be well off if they worked hard because they have access to land and for many years, we have received good rain. As much as we are poor, bad poverty cannot be blamed on the government. (INT25, Married, aged 23, Grade 12 Education)

INT25 observes that while people are generally poor, extreme poverty may be caused by lack effort from an individual. However, when natural calamities such as droughts, floods, pestilences strike, the rural poor have no control over them. Rural communities are prone to natural disaster and they cannot protect themselves and their livelihoods against the natural disasters due to lack of early warning systems (OCHA 2019; Venkateswaran 2014, p. 51). Above we have dealt with women's perception of poverty. The next section considers women's perceptions of inequality in Mungwi District.

15.4.5 *Women's Perceptions of Inequality*

The perceptions of inequality by Mungwi District women, was expressed in their description of inequality and how inequality comes about. They described their understanding of inequality under the following themes: Unequal treatment of people, Unequal opportunities, Unequal distribution of resources, regarding some people with higher esteem and others with low esteem, Inequality is oppression, favouritism, disparities in development.

15.4.5.1 *Unequal Treatment*

The rural women of Mungwi District understood inequality in terms of unequal treatment especially in relation to men. The women complained that their treatment by society was not the same as treatment of men, in other words, there is no equality in the manner the women are treated as compared to men. One of the participants described unequal treatment in the following words:

Inequality is treating people unequally. We women are usually treated as not equal to men. We are not supposed to be equal to a man. This is true in households but also in society. A man always comes first. He is the head of the house, and we are the feet. While both the head and the feet are important, the head is considered superior. The unfortunate thing is that sometimes the head fails to function properly, and the entire family is led astray. This kind of treatment unfortunately also leads to allocating of less resources to women. For instance, men have control over all decisions that must be made and oversee the little material things we have. (INT16, Single, aged 21, Grade 9 Education)

Unequal treatment is not only a social reality that plays itself between men and women. It also happens between boys and girls and even among women themselves. The implication of unequal treatment is that it leads to inequality and eventually to poverty for women because they have limited resources, to improve their situation. The other implications of this, is that women remain at the bottom of the social hierarchy (Mutume 2005). Liberal feminism advocates for equity, justice and equal opportunities (Enyew and Mihrete 2018).

15.4.5.2 *Unequal Access to Opportunity*

Women of Mungwi District also highlighted the fact that inequality involved unequal access to opportunities between men and women. They lamented that there was no equal access to opportunity in accessing things such as education and jobs but also that an opportunity in terms of starting point in life between boys and girls was not there. One participant expressed the idea of unequal access to opportunity in the following words:

For me, inequality is seen in terms of opportunities. Boys and men from the start have a better opportunity to start school and to learn and even to go away and find a job. They achieve this because there are opportunities

for them. For girls, such opportunities are few. Fewer opportunities mean that girls do not have a brighter future as compared to boys. And this is the reason why we women are where we are today. We have fewer opportunities and I think we deserve to start from the same footing as men and be given the same opportunities. (INT14, Single, aged 20, Grade 7)

The best way to assist women to go further in life and have a good life, is to be given equal access to opportunity as that given to men. Kant (2004) reiterates that if people's early life or social background affects their prospects for education and employment, barriers should be removed so that everyone has equal access to an opportunity. Equal starting points involves that adequate material conditions are supplied so that everyone can obtain the same ability and position as everyone else. It is important that women and men are given a fair start in order to progress in life. For instance, equal opportunity to accessing education and making sure that everybody's needs regarding education are met is granting people their right to education. Equal access to opportunity is a basic need (Kant 2004). One participant said,

Inequality is about denying one group of people access to opportunity for a good life while others are given everything they need to prosper in life. Inequality is when you are treated less than others. It is usually done to deny you the basic needs and rights you have and to keep you underdeveloped. This is how we feel here in Mungwi. (INT26, Single, aged 20, Grade 12 Education)

For INT26, being treated less than others may be imply that you are less important therefore the state does not need to worry about the circumstances or condition you find yourself in. The implication of this is that the rural people of Mungwi District are on the government's agenda when it comes to development. That is what I think this skewed treatment leads to.

15.4.5.3 *Inequality as Unequal Distribution of Resources*

Another way in which the women of Mungwi described inequality was in the way they felt that there was an unfair distribution of resources both in their households and society. The women felt that despite working so hard and contributing nearly 70% to the household income and household activities, resources were not equally distributed. Since household

income comes from the selling of farm produce, the man of the house normally keeps the money once the produce is sold. The woman who toils more than the man does not oversee the funds. To substantiate this claim, one participant said,

I understand inequality in terms of distributing resources that are needed for the well-being of a person and the running of the house. As women we spend most of the time at home maintaining the house, caring for children, and planting and cultivating the field. We go to work in the field to make sure the crop grows, and we do the harvesting. As if that is not enough, we are the ones who take the harvest to the market for selling. After selling, we must hand over the income to the man of the house. Little money may be spent on the household needs while the rest of the money, the man may use it as he wishes. That is the inequality of the highest degree. (INT17, Single, age 20, Grade 8 Education)

Another participant said that,

Inequality is not only when men control us in terms of holding money in our household, but it is also the control over all other productive resources such as land and other property which we have acquired together. It seems to me that everything in the house is owned by my husband and I would have no recourse to it if we were to divorce. All the resources of the homestead belong to my husband. Perhaps the only thing I own is pots because the kitchen is controlled by a woman. (INT12, Single, aged 21, Grade 7 Education)

The cry by participants INT17 and INT12 above are similar in the sense that they both feel unfairly treated because of the way men control financial resources and other productive resources. This could be a cultural dilemma which must be corrected. The control of resources where women feel all resources are controlled by men is underpinned by detrimental social norms, views, practices, and power relations (Cole et al. 2015, p. 166). Article 51 of the Zambian constitution promotes equality between women and men. Similarly, liberal feminism advocates for equality of both genders and condemns cultural gender stereotyping. While cultural norms are enshrined in communalism which promotes respect and sharing of resources, cultural norms among the Bemba people do not go far enough in addressing unfair distribution of resources, especially in households. The distribution of resources within a household is

left to the household which is controlled by head of the household who is usually the man. Women usually have no recourse to any disparities that may arise from unfair distribution of resources in a household. INT12 further says that the only thing she owns is her pots. This implies that it is only the kitchen that women control, and this is culturally sanctioned. However, it can be observed that the kitchen represents a place with heavy chores such as cleaning and cooking which is an addition to other chores done by women. Contrary to the above two participants, one participant saw inequality as the unequal distribution between rural areas and towns. She said,

For me, inequality is very much reflected in the unequal distribution of resources between rural areas and towns. Even though most towns depend on rural areas for food and firewood, rural areas lack a lot of material and human resources. In other words, we in rural areas lack essential things such as proper houses, clean water, electricity, roads, proper markets, hospitals, schools, courts. We are forgotten. It is like we are only visible when we are required to vote during elections. And when that period is over politicians disappear with their promises. This kind of inequality has always been there, the towns always get the bigger piece of the economic cake. (INT23, Married, aged 40, Grade 9 Education)

For INT23 that there is inequality between rural areas and towns in terms of development. Rural areas supply raw materials and food for towns contributing to the development of cities. Processed food and consumer goods depend on the raw materials from the rural areas. Processed food and consumer goods manufactured in cities are transported to back to rural areas where the rural dwellers pay high prices for the manufactured good. Unequal relationship exists between rural and urban areas. The implications are that poverty and inequality is perpetuated through this unbalanced relationship. For sustainable livelihood approach the context in which people are found is essential. Rural areas are isolated, and this contributes to the intensification of poverty and inequality. Rural and Town Planners may consider this unequal relationship as they develop rural and urban spaces. The government may also consider to banning the depletion of rural resources only to benefit urban areas.

15.4.5.4 *Inequality as Favouritism and Oppression*

In their description of inequality, the women also referred to inequality as favouritism and oppression. According to their understanding of

favouritism, it is taking sides especially in the allocation of resources between two people. Favouritism is practised by both men and women, and it occurs due to various circumstances. When favouritism reaches an advanced stage, it can easily deteriorate into oppression. Favouritism as a form of inequality is very much linked to oppression. Empirical evidence regarding inequality as favouritism and oppression is articulated by one of the interviewees who said:

I see inequality as a form of favouritism. Favouritism is usually done when a man favours one woman at the expense of the other. It is practised by men in a polygamous family. A man will always love one woman more than the other and the presents will follow that pattern that the loved one gets better things all the time. As women, we tend to practice favouritism when dealing with children that are not ours. For some, it comes out clearly especially when entrusted with looking after orphans. Favouritism is usually precipitated by lack of resources such as income, food and clothing. Favouritism at its worst can turn into mistreating and oppressing the orphan. We have had many cases such as these in the village. (INT9, Married, aged 28, Grade 9 Education)

For participant INT9, income, food and clothing may be sources of inequality. A lack of enough of income forces them to feel as if they are “lesser human beings” when dealing with others. In a household it is usually those who control resources that begin to favour some over others. Favouritism may be caused by scarcity or wilful oppression of the other. At another level such as the national level, a group of people or region may be favoured over another in the allocation of resources. Similarly, favouritism at this level may be precipitated by scarcity in resources or may be a deliberate action against a group of people or region. The next section deals with inequality as landlessness.

15.4.5.5 *Inequality as Landlessness*

The women in Mungwi District like most women in Zambia still do not own land as their own. When women were asked to describe what inequality was, some of them mentioned that being landless is inequality. To understand further what landlessness means regarding inequality, a 66-year-old participant submitted that:

Inequality is keeping women without property to render them worthless. We are looked upon as if we do not exist. We do not own land, when

our husbands die, many a time we are told to go back to our kinsmen. Landlessness for women is a form of inequality which has existed for a long time and continues today. Only men are entitled to land, women have not been considered as landowners because they get married. When they get married, some women go away; sometimes they get married to a person from another group of people who cannot own land here. For these reasons and others, we do not own land. We can till land as much as we want but we are not allowed to own it. (INT6, Widow, aged 66, Standard 4 Education)

The excerpt above participant confirms previous studies that declare that women are not allowed to own land under customary law. Spichiger and Kabala (2014) argue that under the customary law of Zambia, women could not own land because customary law undermines women. Under this law, married couples do not own land in partnership, nor do they inherit property from each other. Only men, who are the household heads are entitled to own land and for the use of the household. Land can only be inherited by male children of the household. Women are not allowed to acquire land or property on their own. Women must live with their parents, husbands or sons. In addition to this, a 66-year-old widow said:

Before my husband died, we lived on a large piece of land which I thought belonged to both of us. Little did I know that I was not supposed to continue living on the farm when my husband died. I was shocked when my in-laws asked for me be removed from the land after my husband's death. I was so shocked. I was told that I had no child with my late husband so I was free to get married to another man on whose land I would settle. After ten years of being single, I have not found someone to marry and what this means is that I have no place I can call as my own. The place I knew as my own was taken away. The only way I could survive was to come to my people, my father's kinsmen. So, I consider landlessness as a major injustice and inequality that women experience, and it must be corrected by the law of the country. (INT6, Widow, aged 66, Standard 4 Education)

Land is a natural capital upon which rural people's livelihoods are based (DFID 1999, p. 2.3.3). Land provides spaces for farming and forests for firewood, wild food and fruits. Chasing INT6 from that land where she lived with her husband for many is against the constitution of Zambia. The constitution of Zambia (2016) article 51(3) says, "Women and men

have equal right to inherit, have access to, own, use, administer and control land other property”.

15.4.5.6 *Unequal Share of Work*

Unequal sharing of work was another way in which the women described inequality. Nearly all women felt that work in the household was unevenly shared. Women felt that they were carrying the greater proportions of the workload in their families. They felt oppressed by domestic work. They had no time to rest. Unequal share of work needed to change as it is a form of oppression for women who cannot advance themselves because of the existence of too many household chores and duties. Too much work impacts negatively on women development and their health. One of the participants explained:

For me, inequality is seen in our households. We the women of Mungwi District are oppressed by doing household chores which are too many. The worst things are that we are not assisted by our husbands. It is different in homes where there are grown-up girls, they give some relief, otherwise there is too much work cut out for every woman in her household which is too much. As a result of this unforgiving demand from housework, most of us have no time to develop our selves. Above all, too much work impacts on our health negatively. When we complain of too much work as women, some men think that we are lazy. (INT18, Widow, aged 26, Grade 8 Education)

When we look at the challenges faced by the women in Mungwi District, the discussion more also focuses on disproportionate sharing of work between men and women. For women interviewed in Mungwi District, inequality is favouritism and oppression, unequal distribution of resources, unequal opportunities, unequal treatment of people and regarding some people higher esteem and others with low esteem.

15.4.6 *Perceptions on the Origins of Inequality*

To further understand women’s perception of inequality women were also asked to explain how inequality came about or rather how it begins in their lives and society. As with other questions of the research, the answers given by the women reflected their personal experiences and what happens in the society they live in. The women mentioned gender disparity, greed, negligence by the government, politics and conflict, state

corruption, theft by the rich and unequal treatment of men and women in the household as the main sources of inequality in the society of Mungwi district.

15.4.6.1 *Gender Disparity*

The women in Mungwi District lamented that the distribution of labour and other roles in a household between women and men is a major source of inequality. The allocation of resources and opportunities were biased against women whereas men benefitted better from what society offered. Disparities such as access to land, sharing of work and income and access to education still need to be resolved in Mungwi District. Gender is still a determining factor in accessing resources and opportunities in Mungwi District and unfortunately, it is biased against women. Asked about how inequality came about, INT12 lamented:

I believe that the existence of a woman and man determines a lot why there are differences between men and women. Inequality therefore for me begins because of gender disparities. As women, we get more work, but we are given fewer resources and income to work with and we have less access to education to advance ourselves. For me, inequality is grounded in gender because the roles of women are different from that of men. Women's roles are always more than those of men. For instance, child-rearing is most left for women who must do many other chores. (INT12, Single, aged 21, Grade 7 Education)

To further understand gender disparity, the UNDP (2013) reports that gender is a principal indicator of social-economic classification as a result, of exclusion. Notwithstanding one's socioeconomic class, there are general gender differences in material well-being. Gender inequality is, therefore, a feature of most societies with men better positioned in social, economic and political rankings. One participant believed that inequality starts with the unequal allocation of chores and said:

Inequality starts from childhood when boys and girls are given different roles. I give boys different work to do from girls mostly as determined by culture. Boys must follow their father to work in the field while girls must remain at home to assist the mother in the kitchen. When the boys return with their father from the field, they both must rest while the girl does not necessarily rest. She continues to assist the mother who continuously work

until everyone goes to bed in the night. (INT12, Single, aged 21, Grade 7 Education)

Implied by INT12's sentiments is that boys have more time at their disposal to do other things than girls. This is tantamount to time inequality. A lack of time to spare by the women is a hindrance to personal development of women. Women ought to have time to be used on things they feel will take them forward. They may also need time for entertainment so that they do not feel all the time they have is for working and helping other people to develop.

15.4.6.2 *Greed*

Haynes, defines greed as an appetite to acquire or possess material things more than one needs or deserves especially concerning material wealth. The problem with greed is that those who are greedy take away resources, wealth and power or food, which are meant to be shared by many. When people are deprived of their basic needs because of a few greedy people, poverty and hunger is likely to strike the majority. According to Abraham Maslow's theory of needs, human beings cannot survive if they are deprived of the basic physiological needs (Aruna and Hanachor 2017). When asked how greed begins, participant INT15 said:

Inequality begins with greed. When people have an intense selfish desire for wealth, power or food they do not consider people's well-being except their appetite. I see a lot of families here that have been ripped apart because of the greed of one person. There are cases whereby a husband does not share income from farm produce or any income that come to the family. Intense selfishness is also manifested in the misuse of exercise of power over others. Sometimes I feel that some men misuse this power in our homes because they are selfish. (INT15, Single, aged 20, Grade 12)

Another participant who said that inequality begins with greed said:

Inequality begins with greed. Sometimes you cannot see this greed overtly, but it can be detected when everything you want to do as a woman to advance yourself is constantly opposed by your husband. This is greed which later leads to inequality between husband and wife. Greed starts with controlling a woman too much such that she has no space to grow- this causes inequality. (INT26, Single, aged 20, Grade 12 Education)

For INT15 and INT26 that greed can lead to inequality. Greed is not only found in the household context where a woman denies food to an orphan or husband refusing to share income with the wife, it is also practised at government level where individual officers misuse public funds or resources. When asked how greed begins, participants from FGI focus group discussion said: “Greed is the source of all evils. People want to have everything for themselves even when they have enough. Greed, if not watched can lead to high proportions of inequality” (FGI, Married, aged 56, Standard 3 Education).

15.4.6.3 *Government Negligence*

The women of Mungwi District also strongly singled out the government negligence of women as a source of inequality. Women felt that Mungwi as a rural District lacked infrastructures such as hospitals, schools, transport, communication, electricity, proper roads and agricultural markets. Article 14 of CEDAW (UN 1981) calls upon all states that are signatory to the convention to make sure that all women have access to health care facilities, social security programmes, education, formal and informal, extension officers, self-help groups and cooperatives, agricultural credits and loans, market facilities and technology. However, the government of Zambia seems to be slow when it comes to putting in place the needed infrastructure for the rural people of Mungwi District, and as a result, women feel the impact of inequality escalating. The women walk long distances to go to hospitals and to go and sell their produce in the market. To be precise, most rural people in Zambia including rural people of Mungwi District take more than an hour walking to the market for fertiliser, seeds and other inputs. The average distance rural people walk is about 21 kilometres to access social amenities and other needed services (World Bank Group 2017). To explain the negligence of the people of Mungwi District one participant said:

Inequality begins with government’s negligence of the rural poor people. While people in town also suffer, our suffering is greater. The government does not worry about us. They have forgotten about us. There is no development coming to Mungwi District. Our children have no schools, we have no hospitals. Many women die when giving birth to children and many children do not make it beyond five years because hospitals are far. Many people who die, their lives could be saved if we had hospitals nearby. Our roads are bad, vehicles rarely come here because they are afraid their

vehicles will break down. And because of bad roads, we find it difficult to find a market for what we grow. Besides these difficulties, there are no jobs here in the village where one can earn an income. Life is difficult here in the villages of Mungwi District and it is especially more difficult for us women. (INT16, Single, age 21, Grade 9 Education)

A 20-year-old young woman who has lived all her life in Mungwi District but also had a chance to visit towns lamented that:

The government has brought about inequality. We people in rural areas have been unfairly treated. In town, people have houses made of bricks and blocks. Sadly, for us, we can only afford mud houses. When heavy rain comes, most of these mud houses collapse. Also, only people in town have electricity. We do not know when we shall ever have electricity brought to our villages so that our lives can improve. Above all, our houses do not have running water. Our water is rarely treated. We get it from the well or river. Our children constantly have running stomachs of bad drinking water from wells and rivers. Moreover, our sanitation is bad because we use pit latrines. Most people do not want to construct pit latrines, instead prefer to use the bush to help themselves. This is a problem because diseases are killing us due to people defecating in the nearby bushes. (INT11, Single, aged 20, Grade 6 Education)

Unless the situation in terms of the government's response to the development of rural infrastructure improves, the lives of women in Mungwi District will not change. The difficulties outlined by the two women above will compound the clusters of disadvantages such as isolation, powerlessness, vulnerability, poverty and physical weakness. The sustainable livelihood approach calls for the government and the private sector to put in place laws and policies and institutions which can help to improve the people's well-being, reduce vulnerability, improve food security and sustainability of the natural resources (DFID 1999, p. 21). Liberal feminism advocates for equal opportunity and equality before the law even though it limits the role of the state in the lives of people. Liberal feminism advocates those women and men should have the same rights to education, economic emancipation and other matters of equality (Lay and Daley 2007).

15.4.6.4 *Unequal Treatment of People*

Another reason given for the inequality by the women of Mungwi District was simply that inequality arose from the unequal treatment of people. They emphasised that people often were treated differently in homes, at the community level and even at the national level. Showing partiality in the treatment of people always is what eventually leads to inequality and mistreatment of people. One participant put it succinctly that:

Inequality begins with the way we treat people in our homes by showing partiality, favouring those we love and mistreating those we do not love. Inequality begins with treating your children well with respect and dignity and fending for them materially while mistreating others like orphans. Orphans are usually mistreated by being overworked, denied food, education, clothing and so forth. Unequal treatment of people also means treating people of the same community differently. Inequality also means treating people of the same nation differently due to their geographical location. (INT3, Single, aged 30, Grade 12)

Participant INT3 thinks inequality is treating people of the same nation differently due to their geographical area. Women in Mungwi District being a rural area are more disadvantaged than those in the urban areas. Women in Mungwi District struggle with no readily available resources in their homes, they have no readily available running water in their homes, they have to collect firewood if they have to cook, there is no means of transport in many areas of Mungwi District as a result, women waste a lot of time walking to the market to buy what they need. The geographical position is certainly a fact that affects women in Mungwi District negatively. The need is for the government to prioritise rural people's development so that their lives can improve (Swanepoel 2010). Prioritising the rural people's development is also supported by the sustainable livelihood approach which calls for improving poor people's livelihoods to promote human development (Morse and McNamara 2013).

In addition to the above sources of inequality, a 61-year-old married woman described the source of inequality in the following words:

The word for inequality in our language is strong. It is *umucishacinani*, which means to treat people unequally or treat people with favouritism. Treating people unequally is something acquired at a tender age during socialisation. That is where treating people unequally began. Treating

people is taught by a parent to a child very often unconsciously. Children observe how parents are treating others within the household and beyond the household and later when they are grown-up, they repeat the behaviour they learnt. Therefore, we have inequality or favouritism. (INT5, Married, aged 61, Form 3 Education)

Commenting on unequal treatment as a form of inequality a participant from a focus group discussion said:

I grew up with my stepmother. My mother died when I was about 10 years old. My stepmother always treated me differently. When my father was away for work in the field, then I would be given hard work. I was given to do all the chores in the house without sharing it with my other siblings and when I was too tired to continue working, stepmother would shout at me and call me all sorts of names. Inequality was visible in the way I was unequally treated. (FG3, Married, aged 26, Grade 5 Education)

Unequal treatment of women by men is one of the major causes of women's oppression that feminist theorists have pointed out. It leads to poverty and its perpetuation. There is need to initiate designing and employing interventions and actions that deter unequal treatment between men and women in order to deal with the underlying causes of inequality. Apart from understanding the unequal treatment of people as the source of inequality, women also cited State corruption and big men's theft as the basis for inequality. In the following section, we deal with State corruption and big men's theft.

15.4.7 State Corruption and Big Men's Theft

The women in Mungwi District were also crystal clear that a lot of the inequality they suffered was perpetuated by state corruption and big men's theft. Every government allocates funds for the development of both urban areas and rural areas. The women decried that Mungwi District never received its share because there were no government projects that were being undertaken by the government in the area. The lack of development and inequality suffered by the women of Mungwi District is largely attributed to the state corruption and big men's theft. State corruption is the major way in which national resources are

plundered and channelled into private pockets. One participant decried that:

We, the women of Mungwi District have been adversely affected by corruption. We are told when it is election campaign time that a lot of money for development will be allocated for development projects in our area. But to our dismay, we never see any development projects on which funds are spent in Mungwi District. This is because corrupt members of parliament and government officials squander the funds. As a result of this, nothing trickles to us, we suffer poverty. We have no shops, schools, no hospitals, no agricultural inputs, and no banks to give us loans. Our government is at the forefront perpetuating corruption, our members of parliament once elected to parliament, vanish into thin air and we never see them till the next time they come soliciting for the next term of office. They come with t-shirts and caps to woo us with so that we can vote them in again. They want to entice us with t-shirts and caps whereas they drive big vehicles with big tyres bought with corruption funds. It is unfair and shameful for them to do that to us. (INT19, Not Married, aged 24, Grade 9 Education)

To help us understand the degree of corruption, Mtimkulu and Napier (2004) contend that the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) which took over from United National Independence Party (UNIP) campaigned on the pledge to a corruption-free, transparent and accountable government that would be responsive to Zambian people's ambitions. However, this pledge could not be kept, and corruption became even worse than before. At this time, the international community put enormous pressure on the MMD government because of corruption and drug trafficking. However, President Fredrick Chiluba always denied the allegations that they were not proved despite former member attesting to corruption in the government (Mtimkulu and Napier 2004). One former member of MMD attested that: "As far as I am concerned, the real bad eggs are still in the government, and I do not think anybody can walk with his head high and say that the MMD is clean. Chiluba seems to have ignored corruption among ministers in his circle and drug traffickers are protected (Mtimkulu and Napier 2004)".

It seems that MMD did not do much to fight corruption and to end it. A long as it was the ministers and other senior government officials involved, the government was not going to do anything about it. Szeftel (in Mtimkulu and Napier 2004, p. 56) writes that:

Yet, despite the creation of independent anti-corruption and enforcement commissions, the promises to punish corruption of the Kaunda period were not kept and the early zeal to tackle the problem withered with time. Instead, members of the new elite again used political access to enrich themselves and reward followers.

Since the Kaunda and Chiluba regime, the trends in corruption have not changed. The politicians have not changed, they only move from one political party to the other. It is as the saying goes, “it is the same monkeys, only the trees have changed”. Despite Zambia changing governments many times since independence, the effort to eliminate corruption have been futile. Those who report corrupt activities are forced to prove it. Commitment to the elimination of corruption in this kind of environment is almost impossible. The sustainable livelihoods approach calls for development protagonists to be aware of vulnerabilities in which people find themselves which must then be addressed through projects and strategies of the transforming structures of the government. The poor women of Mungwi District find themselves in corruption vulnerability which emanates from within the structures that are supposed to assist them to alleviate the inequality and poverty they experience.

To express vulnerability and inequality the women in Mungwi District suffer at the hands of the big men, one of the participants expressed it in the following words:

Inequality is inflicted on us in every aspect of life. For instance, after we have harvested our crop, we can barely sell at a favourable price. We always must dance to the tune of the big men who come from towns to buy our harvest at an exceptionally low price. Since they have the money and they have no other competitor, we are obliged to sell our maize at a loss. We always feel robbed, but we are powerless to change anything. (INT20, Married, aged 30, Grade 7 Education)

Power differentials leading to lowering of prices is rife in rural areas of Mungwi District. This action by the powerful exacerbates inequality and consequently poverty. One participant said:

One of the problems we face is a lack of unity among us when it is time to sell our produce. We cannot sit down together to agree on the selling price of our produce and present that price to the buyer. Instead, everyone wants to sell at their own price which is low price. For us to get the best

out of the buyers, we need to unite and form a formidable force against the buyer. A divided house cannot stand. (FG2, Single, aged 20, Grade 12 Education)

In FG2 a sentiment was expressed that the only way to overcome inequality in the marketplace is to be united as producers of a certain produce. It can be surmised that rural farmers must be agile to the scheming of the bigger buyers in the market for them to overcome inequality.

15.4.8 Consequences of Poverty and Inequality

To further understand perceptions of rural women of Mungwi District regarding poverty and inequality, women were asked what they thought the consequences of poverty and inequality were to a poor person? INT1 had this to say, "People become thieves, some engage in prostitution, parents force their children into early marriage, some resort to witchcraft, Satanism, and some get psychologically confused". Participant INT25 added that "People begin to engage in activities such as prostitution, ritual killing, people become mentally disturbed, depressed and eventually end up being suicidal". Another participant said:

The consequences are disastrous. Poverty and inequality isolate us. We are cut off from development. We are vulnerable. We get sick and die easily. We are ignored because we are poor. We are forgotten. Most of us cannot read and write properly because of poverty. We cannot save ourselves. (INT11, Single, aged 20, Grade 6 Education)

When asked what she thought were the consequences of poverty and inequality to a poor person, INT9 with a lot of pain in her eyes had this to say,

When you are poor you are a victim of many things. You are a victim of diseases, you are isolated, you have no food, and you have no access to education. There are no roads where you live, you have no access to technology, you have no voice. (INT9, Married, aged 28, Grade 9 Education)

15.5 DISCUSSION

Politics is about who must gets what, when and how. Politics can also be said to be the authoritative allocation of scarce resources. If politics are explained in those terms, it can be concluded that politics are at the centre of conflicts because not everyone can benefit from the scarce or limited resources. Women in Mungwi blamed politics and conflict as one of the sources of inequality because they are excluded from participation in politics, which are male-dominated and confrontational. Inequality, therefore, thrives on exclusion from participation, especially in decision-making and leadership. Mungwi District women are also excluded from benefiting from common resources when they vote for opposition parties. Whether they voted or not, women still do not seem to benefit from the authoritative allocation of the resource through politics. Because of this kind of exclusion, women find themselves excluded from all activities relating to politics. They have been restricted to the private realm of the family and domestic responsibilities while men are usually associated with politics and the public domain (Kotze 2000). Complaining about how politics excludes women from politics one woman said:

Politics and conflict are part and parcel of the inequality we experience in Mungwi District. Women are rarely in the leadership position to fight for their interests. Those who have tried failed to go further because of insults hailed at them. As women cannot speak for themselves, their opportunities are grabbed by someone else and it is usually a man. This means that inequality between men and women will continue to grow wider in Mungwi District. (INT2, Single, aged 24, Grade 12 Education)

In circumstances of intolerance and the subjugation and suppression of women, their dignity and contributions are both under-valued and devalued.

One word which was often repeated by the rural women of Mungwi District is “*Ubumi*” which translates as health or wholeness. It recurred throughout the interactions with them and deserves special mention because the word has a significant meaning. It refers to both life and health. For instance, *Ubumi ubusuma* refers to both a good life and good health. Similarly, *Ubumi ububi* would refer to bad life and bad health. This word, translated as wholeness, is therefore important in a situation of poverty and inequality because they can somewhat be addressed if wholeness is achieved. In theorising about poverty and inequality with the

women of Mungwi District, the women spoke about diminished wholeness due to poverty and inequality. In other words, where there is poverty and inequality, there is likely to be reduced wholeness. Poverty indeed affects both material things and the health of a person. When women are lacking physical needs, in terms of food, income, good sanitation, and education, their chances of experiencing a decent life are diminished. Lack of good health also impacts negatively on one's life. Wholeness is further impacted on negatively, when women have no access to facilities which enhance *Ubumi* or wholeness. For example, lack of hospitals and clinics deprive rural women of the healthcare which is meant to improve life and health. The principle of wholeness encourages all stakeholders to find ways to support rural women to achieve it through improving their lives and health prospects. Fighting poverty and inequality, therefore, involves fighting against both bad life and bad health and these two evils can be reduced by supporting wholeness of the rural women. Therefore, assisting the women of Mungwi District to attain wholeness is enabling them to realise their full capacitation.

Evidence from this Chapter shows that poverty and inequality are complex, and need to be understood, in context. All women were unanimous on the fact that poverty is a lack of income and wealth. The analysis of the data also shows that poverty is a failure to afford basic commodities, a lack of resources needed to live a decent life, and failure to sustain survival. Based on the evidence, rural women considered poverty as a disability leading to powerlessness in the face of disaster. In this context, Chamber's (1983) observes that poverty is an interaction of disadvantages combined with isolation, to keep people poor. The description of poor women, by the women of Mungwi District, as one who lacks an income is abused, not respected, socially excluded and noticeable from appearance, behaviour and confidence, was ground-breaking. A poor woman is also vulnerable to many adverse circumstances, lacks education, and walks long distances to access services. The findings also show that there are many reasons why women sink into poverty. Women felt neglected by the government and that this is the main reason why rural women sink into poverty. The women did not feel that the government was making enough effort to lift them out of poverty. Other reasons why people sank into poverty include sickness, laziness, lack of remittances and natural disasters.

For women of Mungwi District, the biggest inequality was the feeling of being left out in many activities of society as well as their status of

being landless. The genesis of inequality was rooted in households and protruded into a whole household and then spreads into the community and the entire nation. Evidence also shows that inequality begins with gender disparities, politics, conflict and corruption. It can be surmised that the consequences of poverty and inequality cannot be over emphasised, they have a telling effect on poor people. In cases where the poor are neglected by the government or any other developmental stakeholders, it becomes impossible for them to overcome both poverty and inequality.

15.6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This Chapter presented rural women's perceptions of poverty and inequality in Mungwi District. It also presented how people sink into poverty. Further the Chapter examined women's understanding of inequality and how it morphs. The Chapter looked at the effects of poor governance, corruption and greed on women's experiences of poverty and inequality. Evidently, there are different experiences of poverty and inequality among groups of women in Mungwi District. The Chapter concludes that there is a need for income support from the government in the form of social protection that must be targeted at all unemployed women and other vulnerable groups in the district. More suggestions in the form of recommendations were articulated by the participants. For instance, while a Social Cash Transfer has been a good step in the right direction, it is recommended that the government must ensure that it reaches more people, especially those over the age of 65 years. It is imperative to educate people about sources of inequality and poverty and how these affect people in reducing their dignity and capacity to innovate. The women also recommended that the government of Zambia must ensure that every child has access to education and that it must be enforced in rural areas because most children do not attend school. More schools must be built in Mungwi District so that children do not have to walk long distances to school. Early marriages or child marriages must be entirely abolished. Pregnant girls must be allowed to continue with their education. Similarly, a deliberate decision must be made by the government to build more hospitals and clinics to curb women and pregnant mothers having to travel long distances for treatment. Hospitals must be well-stocked with drugs/medicines, ambulances and other hospital equipment. Moreover, most rural women are small scale farmers

in Mungwi District. Therefore, the study suggests that rural women be given land tenure security and marriages concluded in rural areas ought to be registered with the government and spouses should own property jointly or separately if they wish to do so. Women need to be assisted with inputs for planting such as seed for a variety of crops and membership to cooperatives must not be gender-biased in favour of men. It is also essential that women have access to microfinance. The government needs to assist rural women by introducing farming with machines and technology in Mungwi District. Diversification in agriculture is needed e.g. coupling crop cultivation with livestock rearing, poultry farming and aquaculture. In the cultural sphere, culture consists of virtuous norms, such as respect for the elderly and generosity to everyone; however, there are also detrimental norms. Therefore, detrimental norms that encourage domination and discourage upward mobility and development of women should be re-evaluated and through traditional authorities. The political participation of women remains low and therefore a quota system must be adopted to increase the participation of women in public offices such as parliament, cabinet and government positions. Gender mainstreaming must apply to all sectors of society, government, and non-government organisations. Since Mungwi District is still lagging in infrastructure development such as roads, transportation, telecommunications technologies—infrastructure is vital for rural development—the government should focus on revamping infrastructure in Mungwi District to expedite development.

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An Investigation into the Nexus Between Innovation and Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa

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16.1 INTRODUCTION

Most Asian countries and some other emerging economies have been largely successful in navigating the complexity of the contemporary global economy and becoming competitive. This has not been the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). According to the World Bank (Calderon et al.

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2019), the digital revolution in the twenty-first century could stimulate inclusive economic growth (+2% a year) while reducing poverty (1% less a year) in SSA. Following this reasoning, countries in the SSA region should be able to take advantage of technological innovations to reduce poverty. This logic raises the question whether innovation would lead to the reduction of inequalities. In this chapter, the Gini Index from the World Bank and the Innovation Index of the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO) are used to assess this relationship in 14 purposively selected SSA countries.

By combining the two variables, we highlight that the link between innovation and inequality is not clearly established and that the direction of the correlation is not the same in the countries assessed. Our empirical approach indeed indicates a negative correlation between innovation and inequalities in some SSA countries. However, advancement in technological innovations may paradoxically be accompanied by an increase in inequalities.

16.2 POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN SSA

The average economic growth rate in SSA in the last five years is below 3% (Calderon et al. 2019) compared to an average of 5.66% in the 2004–2013 period (Odusola 2017). The region's growth in the past five years is 0.6% below the global average¹ (see Table 16.1) (International Monetary Fund 2019). However, the GDP of SSA is projected to be higher in 2020 (3.6%) compared to 2.4% for the global economy. Despite experiencing an upward trend in economic growth (although below the global average in the last five years), this growth has not been translated into a reduced unemployment head count. This has led some observers to describe economic growth in Africa as jobless growth (Page and Shimeles 2015; African Development Bank 2018; Irwin et al. 2018) which led to very minimal poverty reduction (Mattes et al. 2016). Against this backdrop, Page and Shimeles (2015, p. 20) argue that SSA has the 'lowest income elasticity of poverty to growth of any of the world's six developing regions'. Worth noting, however, is the fact that levels of poverty

¹ Nevertheless, this rate is very different in each country in SSA. For example, in 2018, it was greater than 4% in countries such as the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda but it was 1.9% in Nigeria and only 0.8% in South Africa (Calderon et al. 2019).

Table 16.1 Annual percentage real GDP growth

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Average growth
SSA	3.1	1.4	3.0	3.2	3.2	2.78
World	3.5	3.4	3.8	3.6	3.0	3.46

Source International Monetary Fund (2019)

differ across different sub-regions with Central and West Africa being characterised by the most experiences of lived poverty.

Across the sub-region, inequality has remained stubbornly high although with cross-country differences (African Union 2015). The region has the second-highest inequality level in the world despite a 4.3% decrease between 1990 and 2009 (Oduola 2017). The Gini Index is greater than 0.6 in some southern African countries (South Africa, Botswana and Namibia) and is above 0.45 in most central African countries (Oduola et al. 2017). In a number of African countries in the southern region such as Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and Mozambique, large income disparities continue to be recorded with 50% of the national wealth earning limited to only the top 20% (Oduola 2017, p. 1). Phenomenon such as this has led the African Union (2015, p. 111) to conclude that ‘the robust economic growth that Africa enjoyed over the past decades has increasingly concentrated wealth in the hands of a few with limited amounts trickling to the majority of the population’. The African Union (2015, p. 111) further notes that a high level of inequality, coupled with a growing unemployed youth in urban areas, pose potential security risks to the continent. Cognisant of this reality and in the interest of sustainable development, ending poverty and inequality was adopted as the number one priority of the continent’s Agenda 2063 (African Union 2015). Proactively working towards ending poverty and inequality is more pertinent in the SSA context where experiences of extreme poverty are being exacerbated by the impacts of climate change (Zhou et al. 2017; Masson-Delmotte et al. 2018).

In the next section of this chapter, we examine the link between innovation and inequality.

16.3 INNOVATION, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY REDUCTION

Academic research indicates that innovation is critical in reducing poverty and inequality. Cognisant of this link, there are various initiatives around Africa geared towards stimulating innovation. At the continental level, the Science Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa of the African Union's New Partnership for Africa Development is geared towards enhancing innovation. Similarly, the African Union (2014, p. 11) sees 'Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) as multi-functional tools and enablers for achieving continental development goals'. With a particular focus on industrialisation and STI as a key investment target of the Science Technology and Innovation Strategy for Africa, various initiatives and support programmes across Africa have been initiated to support innovation at various scales (national, regional and continental). The ultimate goal of these initiatives is the realisation of improved socio-economic conditions of Africans (The New Partnership for Africa's Development 2019). Achieving the expected level of innovation requires significant financial commitments from member states. However, most African countries spend less than 1% of their GDP on Research and Development thus constraining innovation (The New Partnership for Africa's Development 2019).

Over the years, several studies have reported a positive association between innovation and economic growth (Petrariu et al. 2013; Daley 2014; Bara et al. 2016; Broughel and Thierer 2019) which contribute to reduce inequality (Breau et al. 2014; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2015; Mushtaq and Bruneau 2019; Risso and Carrera 2019). For instance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2015) argues that 'innovation drives growth and helps address social challenges'. Similarly, a study by Benos and Tsiachtsiras (2019, p. 2) found a negative correlation between innovation and personal income inequality thus leading to a conclusion 'that innovation activities reduce personal income inequality in a world panel of countries'. In another study using research and development as a measure of innovation and the Gini Index and based on a panel dataset of 74 countries from 1996 to 2014, Risso and Carrera (2019) found that high levels of research and development contribute to inequality reduction. The study further notes 'that innovation has to be high enough (above a threshold value of 0.10% of GDP) to obtain positive effects on income

distribution, otherwise the distribution gets worse' (Risso and Carrera 2019, pp. 78–79).

However, the link between innovation and inequality has been mixed in other research. Some studies have found a positive association between innovation and inequality while others found a mixed association. For instance, a study by Permana et al. (2018) based on the number of applications to the European Patent Office as a measure of innovation, found that innovation increases income inequality. In another study, Benos and Tsiachtsiras (2019, p. 9) observed that 'innovation has an ambiguous effect on income inequality, which depends on the level of aggregation of the analysis'. The study further notes that analysis of data at the regional level shows a positive correlation between innovation and equality while a negative correlation is observed using national data. In essence, the nature of the relationship between innovation and inequality is dependent on the level of analysis.

16.4 INNOVATION, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY REDUCTION IN SSA

Africa has been traditionally considered as a net consumer of innovation. However, SSA countries are increasingly progressing from being passive consumers of innovations and becoming active agents in the generation of high impact innovations (Kshetri 2016; The New Partnership for Africa's Development 2019). The region is home to several innovations designed specifically to address various socio-economic challenges experienced by the region and by so doing, defies being tagged as mere innovation adaptors (Kshetri 2016, p. 1274).

Although there have been several innovations in the region in recent years, those that target the financial sector have received a lot of attention. Mobile money technology such as M-Pesa has been instrumental in increasing access to finance for a previously unbanked population and by 2016, about 55% of the half a billion people globally with access to mobile money were in Sub-Saharan Africa (GSMA 2016 cited in Lashitew et al. 2019, p. 1202). In Kenya alone, the platform has more than 130,000 agents (Lashitew et al. 2019, p. 1208) and has lifted about 2% of Kenya's population from extreme poverty (Suri and Jack 2016).

Mobile money platforms provide an opportunity for a vast majority of the previously unbanked population to 'leapfrog' to an innovative platform that provides more efficient economic opportunities (Bara et al.

2016; Aron 2017; Lashitew et al. 2019). This reduces the opportunity costs (e.g. cost of travel to and from banks, safety as well as convenience) associated with traditional banking platforms (Suri and Jack 2016; Lashitew et al. 2019). By increasing access to financial transactions, mobile money platforms could be instrumental in the modernisation of the informal sector (Lashitew et al. 2019, p. 1201) and by implication, contributing to the reduction of inequality.

16.5 MATERIALS AND METHODS: THE DATA

This section seeks to examine whether an increase in innovation would lead to the reduction of inequalities. There is a need to examine the nature of inequalities and the complexity of the nature of the methodological approach to be used to analyse this linear relationship. In this analysis, our variables of interest are inequality indices (Gini Index) and innovation indices. Each year the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO 2019) ranks the most innovative by assigning scores between 0 and 100. Overall, this innovation index contains detailed indicators on the innovation performance of 129 countries. These indicators (80 in total) take a broad view of innovation, covering the policy environment, education, and infrastructure and business development.

South Africa was crowned Africa's most successful African country with a score of 34.04 out of 100 and ranks 63rd out of 129 listed countries. Switzerland, Sweden and the United States occupy the top places with scores of 67.24, 63.25 and 61.73, respectively. Our innovation indices are therefore the innovation scores of SSA countries observed in the dates we have selected according to the countries' innovation efforts, but also according to the appropriateness of their data. As for the income inequality indices (Gini Indices), they come from World Bank data (World Bank 2019) observed in member countries between 1960 and 2018. It is important to mention the excessive amount of missing data for SSA countries. To overcome the concern about missing data, a first idea was to select the top SSA countries according to the WIPO ranking in 2007. For the inequality variable, a second idea was for the selected countries to restrict the sample to the most suitable years for missing data. To allow for missing data, we prefer the multiple imputations method as proposed by Rubin (Rubin 1996). Multiple imputations allow us to have a sample of the data for exploratory analysis, given the structure and volume of the data. The countries that are the subject of our analysis are Ivory Coast,

Cameroon, Ethiopia, Namibia, Zambia, South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Senegal, Madagascar, Nigeria, Tanzania, Kenya and Ghana.

Multiple imputations allowed us to have estimates of the estimated values of missing indices. The advantage of this method is that it allows us to choose the number to maximise the probability of having the estimated value close to the actual value. If the choice of the multiple imputations method allows us to correct the problem of missing values, a question remains as to the relationship between the value of the estimated missing index and the value of the actual index. To justify the relationship between the estimated value of the inequality index and the real value, we adopt Milton Friedman's theory of permanent income (Friedman 1957). In *A Theory of the Consumption Function*, Friedman (1957) proposed the establishment of microeconomic consumption behaviours based on intertemporal choices. The approach shows that consumption depends essentially not on current income, but on permanent income. For Friedman, there are two types of income: current income (transitional or accidental income) and permanent income. The sum of permanent and current income gives the actual income. Since transitional income is accidental, only permanent income provides the actual consumption. Current income varies over time, while permanent income varies slightly over time. By using multiple imputations to fill missing data, it is expected that the estimated values will differ only very slightly from the original imputations values since the measurement of inequalities applies to permanent income and not to accidental income. Therefore, the estimated (imputed) values are close to the actual values. With multiple imputations, we obtain a sample of data on inequality indices, which, combined with innovation indices from WIPO reports, provides the data for the analysis of the linear relationship between inequality and innovation.

16.6 METHODS AND THE RESULTS

In the analysis of the link between two complex macroeconomic variables in the methodological approach, we consider that there may be exogenous factors, but also that this link may change over time. Our analysis strategy is exploratory in nature (Principal Component Analysis: PCA) and can be summarised in two main steps (see Figs. 16.1 and 16.2).²

² X represents the inequality variable (Gini Index) and Y the innovation variable (Innovation Index). CPI(X) refers to the first major component of the inequality index

The first step explored the variability of the innovation index tables and inequalities, which we note by X and Y, respectively. We perform a PCA on tables X and Y. From this first step, we find that the first main component summarises 80% (respectively 82%) of the variability of the data. This led us to summarise the Xp table (respectively Yp) by its first main component.

In the second step of our analysis, we study the linear relationship between the two tables (inequalities and innovations). We do this through the selected main components. In short, we do an analysis by the main component (PCA) leading to a map that allows us to visualise the typology of the different countries. The analysis of the linear relationship allows us to have the following typology below.

The visualisation of the typology of countries leads us to the following representation (Fig. 16.3).




Fig. 16.1 Principal component analysis (Stage 1)

(extracted from the inequality component analysis), and CPI(Y) refers to the first major component of the innovation index (extracted from the inequality component analysis). PCA refers to the main component analysis.




Fig. 16.2 Principal component analysis (Stage 2)

The typology of our first analysis gave us profiles of four countries according to the nature of the correlation between inequality and innovation.

- A category of countries characterised by strong innovation (category 1), but a high level of inequality. These are very innovative countries but characterised by high inequality, as in the case of South Africa and Namibia.
- A category of countries characterised by a high level of innovation and a low level of inequality (category 2). They are found to be innovative countries at a lower level than South Africa, and with lower levels of inequality. This is the case in Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Rwanda.
- A category of countries characterised by a low level of innovation and a low level of inequality (category 3). These are countries in which there is minimal innovation but with a very low level of inequality. This is the case in Ethiopia, Tanzania, Cameroon, Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Uganda.
- Finally, we note a category of countries characterised by a very low level of innovation, but very high inequality (category 4). This is the case of Zambia, which remains an innovative but highly unequal country.




Fig. 16.3 Observations-variables (correlation profiles)³

The negative linear relationship hypothesis is only satisfied for Kenya, Senegal, Ghana and Rwanda. From this analysis a series of questions arises, i.e. why do some countries have profiles with low innovation and low inequality and other countries have profiles with high innovation and high inequality? The negative correlation between innovation and inequality is explained by the fact that innovation improves people's daily lives by increasing their incomes and improving their daily lives. But the existence of profiles of countries with low levels of innovation and low inequality leads us to the idea that innovation may not be the only factor able to reduce income inequality.

In the period studied for the link between innovation and inequality, we wanted to see the link between innovation indices and the unemployment rate. Following the method explained above in the case of the

³ In this graph, innovation and inequality represent the active variables and countries represent the active observations. The different colours represent the nature of the correlation profile: yellow refers to the profile of category 1; green refers to the profile of category 2; blue refers to the profile of category 3; and orange refers to the profile of category 4.

link with inequalities, we conducted a principal component analysis on innovations and unemployment rates to extract the main components of each indicator to see the linear relationship. From the main components extracted, we analysed the main components allowing us to visualise the typology of the different countries (Fig. 16.4).

From this analysis, we also obtained the profiles of four categories of countries:




Fig. 16.4 Observations-variables (correlation profiles)⁴

⁴ In this graph, innovation and unemployment represent the active variables and countries represent the active observations. The different colours represent the nature of the correlation profile: green refers to the profile of category 1; orange refers to the profile of category 2; yellow refers to the profile of category 3; and blue refers to the profile of category 4.

1. A category of countries with a high level of innovation and a very low unemployment rate—these are very innovative countries with a low unemployment rate. This category comprises Kenya, Ghana and Rwanda.
2. A category of countries with high innovation and high unemployment—this category involves South Africa, Namibia, and Senegal. In this second category, even if we obtain a positive correlation between innovation and unemployment, we note that South Africa stands out clearly from other countries with a very high unemployment rate and a very high rate of innovation. In the time taken to do the analysis on this country, the intensity of the positive correlation seems to express an increase in the innovation rate accompanied by an increase in the unemployment rate.
3. This category was characterised by a low level of innovation and a lower rate of unemployment. The category comprises Uganda, Tanzania, Madagascar and Cameroon.
4. A fourth category of countries was characterised by a low level of innovation and a high level of unemployment—this is the case in the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Zambia. In this category, even if we obtain a negative correlation between innovation and unemployment, we note that Zambia stands out clearly from other countries with a very high unemployment rate and a suitable rate of innovation. In the time allowed for analysis of this country, the intensity of the negative correlation does not seem to express a decrease in unemployment due to innovation.

16.7 CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we used the Gini Index from the World Bank and the Innovation Index of the WIPO to assess the relationship between the two variables in 14 purposively selected SSA countries. Our analysis indicates a mixed relationship between innovation and inequality. We conclude this chapter with the following remarks that could be the starting point for further academic research on the link between innovations and inequalities: For this study, our analysis was limited to 14 out of the 48 countries in SSA and covered a period of four years. Because the countries in our analysis were conveniently sampled (only SSA countries that have a Gini Index and innovation data for the period of observation), we cannot say that our findings are representative of the sub-region. Further research

with a larger/representative sample of countries from the region should provide generalised results that could (in)validate our findings. In addition, further research could also analyse the link between innovation and inequality by including other exogenous variables that contribute to inequality. Other measures of inequality, besides income inequality, could also be considered in future studies. We also note that the method used in this study has a bearing on the outcomes. Our approach is underpinned by the assumption that there is a linear relationship between innovation and inequality.

Furthermore, the nexus between innovation and inequality gives rise to several interpretations that could be contradictory. The sense of the relation between the two variables is not always easy to determine and it is difficult to know exactly if there is a causal link or if it is only a correlation. For instance, does a low level of innovation with a low level of inequalities mean that the concerned countries do not have to innovate in order to maintain weak inequalities? In the same way, would growth in innovations paradoxically result in increasing inequalities in these countries? Furthermore, should the case of a negative correlation between innovations and inequalities in some SSA countries be interpreted as a sign of the need to innovate for reducing inequalities or as a signal for implementing policies of inequality reduction to develop capacities of innovations? These problems raise a number of issues; among others, the relevance of using the WIPO innovation index to measure innovation in SSA countries, especially since these countries only recently entered the WIPO index ranking. In future research, we will take the time dimension to analyse and see how the link between innovation and inequality evolves over time.

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